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**LA «TERREUR DE L'HISTOIRE»
OU LA TERREUR DU POLITIQUE?**

LORENA PĂVĂLAN

Dans l'acception donnée par Mircea Eliade dans *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*, la terreur de l'histoire signifie les événements historiques vidés de leur signification trans-historique, autrement dit le conditionnement de l'homme par des actions et faits au-delà desquels on ne peut pas entrevoir la volonté divine.

Au contraire, dans une «histoire considérée comme théophanie», les événements historiques qui semblaient absurdes gagnaient une signification religieuse, c'est-à-dire ils apparaissaient comme la manifestation du pouvoir divin.

Mircea Eliade est arrivé à cette conception en faisant une comparaison entre deux types d'humanité, à savoir l'homme des civilisations traditionnelles (l'homme archaïque, qui «avait à l'égard de l'histoire une attitude négative») et l'homme de la civilisation moderne (l'homme historique, «qui se sait et se veut créateur d'histoire»)¹.

Pour un homme appartenant aux cultures traditionnelles (remarque Mircea Eliade en étudiant les mythologies), «vivre» signifie la conformité aux archétypes, c'est-à-dire respecter la «loi» qui est la traduction d'une révélation «des normes de l'existence faite par une divinité ou un être mythique»². Il n'y a pas de «terreur de l'histoire» dans un tel cadre, dans lequel «la souffrance en tant qu'événement, en tant que fait historique»³ a du sens.

Les catastrophes cosmiques (sécheresse, inondation, tempête, etc.), les invasions (incendies, esclavage, humiliation), les combats et les guerres se retrouvaient dans un prototype, ou dans un ordre dont la valeur indéniable faisait qu'elle ne soient ni gratuites, ni absurdes.

Dans la conception archétypale, par l'acceptation d'une logique extra-humaine, l'homme était libre de recréer l'univers à l'occasion de chaque rituel qui répétait une histoire sacrée.

Dans la perspective historiciste, posthégélienne, la liberté implique l'existence «historique» et alors «la liberté de faire l'histoire en se faisant lui-même»⁴ est propre à l'homme moderne. Mais, d'autre part, «la pression de plus en plus puissante de l'histoire contemporaine»⁵, «dénudée de signification»⁶ est ressentie comme «terreur de l'histoire».

Car la liberté «tend à devenir inaccessible à mesure que cette époque devient plus historique, nous voulons dire plus étrangère à tout modèle trans-historique.

D'une manière naturelle, le marxisme et le fascisme, par exemple, doivent aboutir à la constitution de deux types d'existence historique: celle du chef (le seul vraiment libre) et celle des adhérents qui découvrent dans l'existence historique du chef non pas un archétype de leur propre existence, mais le législateur des gestes qui leur sont provisoirement permis»⁷.

La solution que propose Mircea Eliade à l'homme moderne pour se défendre contre la terreur de l'histoire est l'acceptation d'«une liberté qui prend sa source et trouve sa garantie et son appui en Dieu»⁸. En polémisant contre l'existentialisme de facture marxiste, Mircea Eliade trouve que «toute autre liberté moderne, quelques satisfactions qu'elle puisse procurer à celui qui la possède, est impuissante à justifier l'histoire; ce qui, pour tout homme sincère à l'égard de lui-même, équivaut à la terreur de l'histoire»⁹. On pourrait se demander, avec Mircea Eliade: «Quelle consolation trouverions-nous à savoir que les souffrances de millions d'hommes ont permis la révélation d'une situation limite de la condition humaine, si par delà cette situation limite, il n'y avait que le néant?»¹⁰. Mais un tel désespoir n'est pas provoqué par «l'existentialité humaine». Il s'agit plutôt d'une conséquence répétable (pas dans l'horizon des archétypes, répétition qui, on le voit, ne peut être dépassée) de la présence humaine «dans un univers historique où la quasi-totalité des êtres humains vit en proie à une terreur continue (même si elle n'est pas toujours consciente)»¹¹.

Le sentiment de terreur propre à l'homme actuel est produit non seulement par l'absence du sens des événements historiques, sans aucune justification dans le plan divin, mais par l'inconnu, l'imprévu et l'inexplicable qui se trouvent à leur origine, dans le cas du terrorisme, par exemple.

Qui sont, à vrai dire, les terroristes, qui sont leur maîtres, quels sont leurs motifs réels d'agir, même s'il y a des attentats revendiqués par des organisations comme Hamas ou Al-Qaeda?

Soit qu'il s'agit du terrorisme arabe (afghan ou irakien), du terrorisme irlandais, espagnol, ou italien, au fondement du terrorisme il y a un problème politique.

En même temps, le terrorisme participe à ma définition de la condition humaine échouée dans une histoire cruelle et absurde.

Pour Jean Baudrillard, par exemple, «le terrorisme, comme les virus, est partout. Il y a une perfusion mondiale du terrorisme, qui est comme l'ombre portée de tout système de domination, prêt partout à se réveiller comme un agent double»¹². Il est possible parce que la balance du Bien et du Mal propre à l'univers traditionnel est rompue «à partir du moment où il y a extrapolation totale du Bien», «et c'est comme si le Mal reprenait alors une autonomie invisible, se développant désormais d'une façon exponentielle»¹³.

Un acte terroriste est (dans la vision de Jean Baudrillard) un «événement symbolique d'envergure mondiale, c'est-à-dire non seulement de diffusion mondiale, mais qui mette en échec la mondialisation elle-même»¹⁴.

Qui seront les victimes du terrorisme dans l'avenir plus ou moins proche? Voilà une question qui impose l'analyse d'«une structure formelle qui articule la

négaration de la réalité commune, la cohérence logique et la réduction de la politique à la violence»¹⁵.

Mais aussi un thème de recherche digne d'un «laboratoire de la peur». Car le terrorisme est abordé dans bien des perspectives (politiques, juridiques, journalistiques et policières), «mais ses mécanismes, son mode d'action sur le public, ou ses ressorts psycho-sociologiques, si l'on préfère, restent encore insuffisamment explorés»¹⁶. Pierre Manoni a appréhendé le terrorisme comme technique de persuasion. En analysant les états émotionnels impliqués dans le terrorisme, autrement dit le passage de la peur à la terreur, Pierre Manoni conçoit le terrorisme comme «névrose expérimentale» et aussi comme «psychose collective»: «Dans les grandes cités modernes où intervient le terrorisme, toutes les conditions favorables au développement d'une psychose collective sont réunies. On y retrouve les principaux éléments qui, d'après Georges Heuyer permettent aux psychoses collectives de naître: 1- l'idée fautive, 2 - la peur, 3 - les conditions du groupe et du milieu»¹⁷. C'est pourquoi la victime témoigne d'une attitude caractérisée par «l'inquiétude chronique, l'amoindrissement des facultés d'adaptation et la tendance à s'en remettre à d'autres pour prendre des décisions et organiser les résistances»¹⁸.

Il y a aussi un «effet pervers» du terrorisme, spéculé par les gouvernants, même s'ils sont aussi des victimes du terrorisme: «Les actions terroristes seraient notamment l'occasion, pour les dirigeants politiques, de faire oublier provisoirement les crises, ou du moins d'en amortir l'effet en profitant habilement du bruyant théâtre terroriste qui captive les attentions pour masquer certaines difficultés économiques ou sociales du moment. L'attention de la population étant polarisée par les attentats, elle se trouve, de ce fait, moins sensible aux autres problèmes. Les pouvoirs administratifs peuvent même utiliser les attentats pour donner le change et éviter l'aggravation d'une crise sociale, en déplaçant l'attention du public sur les actes de terrorisme»¹⁹.

Et dans ce cas, plus ou moins conscients, les dirigeants politiques font le jeu des terroristes, comme l'a remarqué Michel Wieviorka: «Le terrorisme est un spectacle (...) et les terroristes l'on bien compris, ils savent que leurs actes seront amplifiés par les médias, qu'il constituent une offre parfaitement adaptée à la demande, et ont acquis un savoir-faire qui autorise à parler de stratégies médiatiques»²⁰.

Le terrorisme joue sur le registre de l'émotion, plus que sur celui de la raison et s'il y a un sens pour les victimes ainsi que pour les spectateurs dans les actes terroristes, il s'agit seulement d'un sens textuel (dans une acception sémiotique très générale selon laquelle le monde entier avec chaque élément composant est un texte).

Les journalistes sont en quête de ce sens (même s'il n'y a aucun sens des événements) et par leurs dénominations différentes des terroristes ou des attentats ils font un mélange entre la fiction et la réalité. Parmi les dénominations du terroriste et de l'attentat il y a des dénominations justificatrices («les humiliés et les offensés», les «résistants», les «combattants») et aussi des dénominations

amORALES qui brouillent la distinction commune entre bien et mal, consignées par Roselyne Koren. «Les grands seigneurs de l'attentat», «le club des *nec plus ultra* de la terreur en société», «les chefs historiques», les «membres éminents» (des Brigades Rouges), «les intraitables», «les incurables romantiques», «le légendaire Carlos» — semblent, d'après Roselyne Koren, «combler les aspirations épiques d'un auditoire en mal de légendes»²¹.

Par les «machines textuelles» les journalistes, tout comme les politiciens jouent «le jeu que l'idéologie terroriste veut lui faire jouer», même si «aucun combat pour la liberté ne justifie qu'on tue aveuglement, *a fortiori*, dans les nations qui jouissent de démocraties parlementaires», même si «le terrorisme n'est pas un langage, ni l'ultime ni le seul recours des causes désespérées, mais le contraire du langage: la barbarie»²².

Quant aux terroristes, Jean Baudrillard a souligné la paradoxale absence du sens dans leurs actions: «Ces terroristes échangent leur mort contre une place au paradis. Leur acte n'est pas gratuit, donc il n'est pas authentique», car au-delà de leur croyance, «tout cela — la cause, la preuve, la vérité, la récompense, la fin et les moyens — est une forme de calcul typiquement occidental. Même la mort, nous l'évaluons en termes d'intérêt, en termes de rapport qualité-prix. Calcul économique qui est un calcul des pauvres, et qui n'ont même plus le courage d'y mettre le prix»²³.

Calcul économique, calcul psychologique — «le terrorisme l'a parfaitement compris»: il n'arrive à «l'action sur les corps que pour manipuler les esprits»²⁴ — ou sémiotique, le terrorisme demande, comme solution, une réplique dialogique: «Car faire face au terrorisme, ce n'est pas seulement applaudir aux succès de l'antiterrorisme. C'est aussi être sensible aux problèmes que la barbarie de la terreur et du meurtre vient signifier, et être soucieux de leur apporter un traitement politique fermant la voie à la violence, en ouvrant ou en élargissant celle du dialogue démultiplié et de la négociation, aussi conflictuels soient-ils»²⁵.

Mircea Eliade avertissait déjà dans les années '60-'70 (par son œuvre en général, mais spécialement dans l'étude *Un nouvel humanisme*) que la compréhension de l'autre serait la seule solution pour garder l'équilibre du monde et pour conquérir la paix: «D'une part, les peuples de l'Asie ont récemment fait leur rentrée sur la scène de l'histoire et, d'autre part, les peuples dits primitifs se préparent à faire leur apparition à l'horizon de la grande histoire. En ce sens ils cherchent à devenir les sujets actifs de l'histoire au lieu de ses objets passifs, rôle qu'ils ont tenu jusque-là. Mais, si les peuples d'Occident ne sont plus les seuls à faire l'histoire, leurs valeurs spirituelles et culturelles ne vont plus jouir de la place privilégiée (...) Ces valeurs sont maintenant analysées, comparées et jugées par des non-Occidentaux. De leur côté, les Occidentaux sont de plus en plus conduits à étudier, à analyser et à comprendre les spiritualités de l'Asie et du monde archaïque. Ces découvertes et ces contacts doivent se prolonger dans le dialogue. Mais pour être authentique et fertile, ce dialogue ne doit pas se limiter au langage empirique et utilitaire; le vrai dialogue doit porter sur les valeurs centrales de la culture de chaque participant»²⁶.

Autrement, nous resterons des spectateurs ou des victimes d'un continuuel mouvement de réponse (même dans ses apparences spontanées et arbitraires) d'une terreur organisée avec des moyens capricieux, à une terreur organisée selon toutes les règles de la pensée et de l'ordre technique, celle du politique.

NOTES

1. Mircea Eliade, *Le mythe de l'éternel retour. Archétypes et répétition*, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p.158.
2. *Ibidem*, p. 112.
3. *Ibidem*.
4. *Ibidem*, p. 174.
5. *Ibidem*, p. 159.
6. *Ibidem*, p. 112.
7. *Ibidem*, pp. 175–176.
8. *Ibidem*, p. 180.
9. *Ibidem*.
10. *Ibidem*, p. 179.
11. *Ibidem*, p. 181.
12. Jean Baudrillard, *L'esprit du terrorisme*, Paris, Editions Galilée, 2002, p. 17.
13. *Ibidem*, p. 22.
14. *Ibidem*, p. 9.
15. Philippe Raynaud, *Les origines intellectuelles du terrorisme*, cf. François Furet, Antoine Liniers, Philippe Raynaud, *Terrorisme et démocratie*, Paris, Fayard, 1985, p. 40.
16. Pierre Manoni, *Un laboratoire de la peur, terrorisme et media*, Paris, Editions Hommes & Perspectives, 1992, p. 11.
17. *Ibidem*, p. 201.
18. *Ibidem*, p. 213.
19. *Ibidem*, p. 228.
20. Michel Wieviorka, *Face au terrorisme*, Editions Liana Levi, 1995, p. 86
21. Roselyne Koren, *Les enjeux éthiques de l'écriture de presse et la mise en mots du terrorisme*, Paris, L'Hartman, 1996, p. 244.
22. *Ibidem*, p. 258.
23. Jean Baudrillard, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
24. Pierre Manoni, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
25. Michel Wieviorka, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
26. Mircea Eliade, *La nostalgie des origines. Méthodologie et histoire des religions*, Paris, Gallimard, 1971.

HISTORIANS AND THEORISTS. SAME SUBJECT WITH DIFFERENT APPROACHES

LUCIAN JORA

It should be known that history is a discipline that has a great number of approaches.
Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406)

Our paper is a try to raise questions and give some opinions on the problems involving the statute of History as a discipline and methodology of investigation in political analysis.

We are confronted daily with the temperamental antipathy between historians and theorists, particularly in the media. I remember a recent analysis of an ante-bellum political discourse. With irony, leaders of the time are accused of nationalism, xenophobia, or anti-Europeanism. Ridiculously, in a kind of an-historic logic, leaders of countries recently out of WWI are blamed for not perceiving Europe in the terms Romano Prodi perceives it eighty years later with the experience of two world wars and half a century of European integration. Emblematic figures of Romania's XIXth century politics are blamed because in discourses or media, they name themselves "nationalists". They ignore that the term "nationalist" at the moment had a signification far away from the today's pejorative meaning. I still remember a talk with a well-quoted Romanian political scientist who approached political analysis coming from philosophy. He sustained that the attitude of Ceausescu's regime regarding the Prague Spring in 1968 was integrally dictated by Moscow. A timid recently graduated in History bothered to ask what was the empirical base for those assertions, and if there were official stenograms or recent revealed documents? The answer was sharp and simple. We don't need documents when we have the logic kind of approach unavailable to a less developed intellect. We have to admit it is an ingenious answer but unconvincing and after all, un-academic.

Differences within the method and argumentation structure

We have to deal with two positions often radicalized during the argumentation.

Historians are interested in change accusing theorists of sticking to a certain limited event. The event is artificially pulled out of the context just to demonstrate de validity of a theoretic model. Historical antecedents not supporting the model are ignored. Theorists, in order to extend an analogy codify, the events

in main principles. For historians, “generalisation” is a major “sin” for this kind of analysis. Although many critics agree that often professional historians cannot resist the temptation to generalise, and the minutious empiric investigations were unable to explain in a trustable way the major events of the XXth century.¹

Also they invoke a number of epistemological and ontological problems with history: “it is culturally situated, it is narrated, it is dependent upon evidence selected by the historian, it is unavoidably ideological, it is inferential, it is not positivist, its meaning is never finished, truth is always deferred.”²

We have bestsellers which, when integrating historical investigation within the analysis, treat history as an anecdote, a background whose mission is to offer color or to demonstrate a wanted assertion regarding the present. The result is a generalized vision which professional historians used to treat punctually a particular type of personality consider speculative. They argue that through this method the theorist’s opinions are not the result of a professional investigation. First opinions (or the model) are enounced, then the “selective past” is called argument. “What is your model ?” is the first question we have often heard in the last years in relation to social sciences research plans. Prescribed theoretic models require uniformity. Trying to achieve it the investigation becomes often a guillotine, selecting and deforming the information to correspond to the shape of the prescribed theoretic model. The result may be attractive as a jewel of logic but without a correspondent in a reality too complex to be integrated into matrices.

Frankly, these are investigation techniques to seductive not to be used by many historians as well. Success books (several written by historians) begin with the author’s conclusions followed by an effort to demonstrate them. This kind of approach is not without logical consistency but against the logic requested by a professional historical investigation which calls it “Procrustes’ Bed” phenomenon.

The goal for historians then is to approach the past without a preconceived analytical framework, to allow the sources to suggest a compelling framework of understanding; in other words, the study of history should not be driven by theories. Certainly, a noble dream for most of us seeking answers about the past and an ideal easily distorted in the search for understanding. Perhaps this is why over-arching theories of causality have dominated historiography. Convincing arguments are found on both sides of this discussion, yet neither the theoretical model is wholly satisfactory on its own.

For the more recent times when we have many sources available, it is even more risky to work with examples. Anyone may ask legitimate questions about how these examples were selected. This procedure may demonstrate almost everything. Even here we may notice a nuance. The procedure is not condemnable if the results are not pretended to be absolute.

It was a time of optimism when Ranke’s positivist school truly believed in the possibility to reveal the “truth as it once was”, a “truth” as infallible as other sciences pretend to reveal. Southgate (quoted by O’Brien) trawled deeper and further back and came up with a selection of passages going back to Josephus and Lucian writing in the first and second centuries A.D. and who shared the

optimism of Thucydides with the concerns and capacity of historians to tell the truth, or in Lucian's phrase "laying out the matter as it is." Southgate surveys a long line of historians who recommended and believed they could construct definitive depictions and interpretations of the past.³ Significantly he considers that venerable historiographical tradition appears to come to an end with the Great Victorians, including Ranke, Gardiner, Acton and Bury.⁴

Since the positivist school, scientific procedures in History as a discipline have rested upon several assumptions that historians share; for example, there are no *a priori* truths, no unassailable facts, no privileged sources and, above all, no final interpretations. For most of this century, few historians ever claimed to be doing much more than following (with the help of material at their disposal) such scientific procedures and assumptions. Few ever represented themselves as natural scientists in search of certainties, truths and historical laws. This is because the sources need to be conceptualized; that the languages and vocabularies of documents require careful translation and critical decoding; that correspondence between historical sources and a real or lived past is tenuous and established with difficulty. "Historians will wonder when and if their social scientists speculative counterparts read postmodern depictions of their craft practices, whether their critics have looked at any of the handbooks or attended any of these mandatory courses on 'sources and methods' advertised for graduate students in history. Are they acquainted with the traditions of philology and textual criticism, with training offered in paleography and diplomatic, with the care devoted to teaching research students how to cope with dead, foreign and with the evolution of living languages? Have they listened to the conversations of historians about changes in meanings of words through time and to their long (alas sometimes tedious) disquisitions in seminars about the difficulties of decoding sources? Modern, professional historians have been engaged in deconstructing texts, contesting each others readings and interpretations of sources for as long as most can remember. Reminders about the fragility of the base upon which reliable but provisional histories are written are salutary and not a proof of weakness but rather an intellectual attitude. What is more intellectual than questioning continuously the epistemological foundation of your own discipline and your own capacity to reveal the truth, your own professional position and role within the community?"⁵

Scientific rigor and social impact — a difficult combination

Historians' declared intention to analyze the past without a pre-established analytical structure, would ideally allow the sources as such to suggest an un-subjective model which remained "a bridge too far". It is an ideal easily under threat by the human desire to understand something, to integrate the facts into a coherent and clear explicative structure. The result is a tendency to sacrifice the nuance for the success of a grossier discourse that ensures forms of "truth" communicable and accessible to the public.⁶

There are difficulties arising from a certain rigor to reveal correctly the sources to which many scholars dedicated their entire life. A life and an effort too often

anonymous. The relativism I was talking about previously cannot offer an attractive discourse to a public who wants clear and clean assertions.

Within the public it is much easier to impose ideas lunched by publicists or politicians. Historians have the duty to intervene and to correct even when the results are unspectacular or not what the public wants to hear.

Professional historians often become “victims” of public taste. The solution closest to the “truth” is usually complex, casual and unspectacular with nuances difficult to distinguish which seems to affect the rational clarity. But within these rebellious nuances we may find the specific key to understand a phenomenon, a historical period or event.

Doubts about the empirical-analytical as the privileged path to historical knowledge have emerged. This has not happened in history alone, of course. In all the arts, humanities, social sciences, and even the physical and life sciences the question is increasingly being put, how can we be sure that empiricism and inference really gets us close to the true meaning of the past? In history how can we trust our sources — not because they are forgeries or missing, but because of the claims empiricism is forced to make about our ability not only to find the data, but also just as importantly represent their meaning accurately?

“It is not an abstract or scholastic philosophical question to ask, where does meaning come from in history? Is it the past itself? Is its meaning simply ushered in by the historian. Is the historian merely the midwife to the truth of the past? Does the past contain one true meaning or several? Is there one story to be discovered or several that can be legitimately generated? How do we distinguish the historical referent of a discourse and its constructed, its ideological, meaning? Can history ever exist beyond discourse? And the very big question, is history what happened, or what historians tell us happened?”⁷ All these have to be addressed when we do history, to ignore them is to do only half the job. Meaning in history is always created, never found in only the empirical locus. History, because it is an act of will, embodies dissent as well as conformity (and all the spaces between). History is and should be disruptive. History should confront all norms of thinking and believing — not just the what of history but the how and why as well. “History, if it is not always a philosophical undertaking that questions how we think and rethink the relationships between subject and object, form and content, fact and fiction, truth and perspective, observer and observed, then I have my doubts as to whether it is worth all the years the professional historian has to spend in the archive.”⁸

Returning again to the social and formative function of History some analysts remark that yet in a world ever more burdened by an unprecedented amount of information, instantly available, the need to provide a humane and historical perspective on people and events becomes more urgent, not less.⁹ Alan Munslow explains further this idea: “By this they mean the kind of thinking about history that recognizes its form as a written narrative and suggests that form also provides a model for the study of the past itself. This is because we are narrative creatures. I agree with those sustaining that historians do not just read the data

of the past, instead — and on this many use to go along with Vico and Kant — we negotiate it through our concepts. History's *a priori* is the human power to conceptualize through narrative. History is not just about lived experience as retold by historians as a narrative, but the experience of existing within particular narratives whether they are gendered, subaltern, race, class or whatever. The past did exist, but does not have meaning until the historian writes it as history."¹⁰

In the same sense Richard J. Evans reminds us that: "...Two and a half thousand years ago, the Greek historian Thucydides complained in the preface to his history of the Peloponnesian War that poets and others were purveying false and imaginary accounts of what had happened, and announced his intention of setting the record straight. In the past, only a tiny minority of the literate and the educated were exposed to professional history and historians. Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with over a third of the entire population passing through higher education when they reach the end of their teens in advanced industrial societies, and a growing proportion of mature and part-time students entering an ever-expanding process of lifelong learning, the number of those who have access to and are influenced by university-based history and historians is probably greater in absolute terms than it has ever been before."¹¹

The elitist attitude and tendencies are not only intrinsically regrettable: they also carry with them worrying public consequences. For as historians are compelled to grind out their specified quota of specialized articles and inaccessible monographs, which are at best read only by a handful of professional colleagues, and are at worst almost completely ignored, this makes them less and less able to fulfill that essential public function which remains their real and abiding justification: satisfying the interest and furthering the comprehension of that broader, non-professional audience memorably described by Hugh Trevor-Roper as "the laity". The old school adepts "recognize (indeed embrace a greater concern with) the 'poetics of history' but believe that any triumphs of form over substance are brief and few and far between. Historical narratives do compete for hegemony. Acclaim for metaphor, rhetoric and fashionable styles of history is transitory because disciplines exist to sort out the wheat from chaff."¹²

More or less in the same direction from the same position pleads Arthur Marwick. He reminds us that: "All human activities, including history, are culturally (or socially, the meanings in this instance are the same) influenced, but history is not culturally constructed or culturally determined. Too many naïve statements have been made along the lines of each age rewrite its history. History is not a formation dance in which everybody in one period marches in one direction, and then, in the next, marches off in a different direction. What has happened in the history of historical writing is that the scope, and the sophistication, of history have steadily extended. In the twentieth century there was some development away from political history, but political history is still very important. In fact, no one type of history is intrinsically better than another: provided the fundamental, but ever-expanding methodologies are adhered to, it all depends upon which topics and questions are being addressed. In the recent

study of history greater emphasis has been given to comparative history and to cultural history: but one of the greatest strengths of history today is that nothing is ruled out. Conclusion: At its very core history must be a scholarly discipline, based on thorough analysis of the evidence, and in the writing up of which language is deployed with the utmost precision.¹³

Personally as a general attitude we plead for a human, public oriented, as intelligible as possible kind of history or at least a way to communicate continuously to the public in an accessible way the findings expressed in studies and publications dedicated to the narrow specialist circles. Saying this, we by no means encourage any compromise with the scholar epistemology of history. Historians like Alun Munslow are well aware: “In spite of this rich variety of methodological developments or shifts and turns of interest, the foundational way historians know things about the past has been unchallenged. Despite the use of statistics, the new themes (society, women, gender, culture) and the application of fresh concepts and theories, there remain two steady points in the historian’s cosmos: empiricism and rational analysis. As the product of the European eighteenth-century Enlightenment the empirical-analytical model has become the epistemology for undertaking the study of the past. In other words is it the historian who provides the truth of the past as she represents it rather than as she finds it? This is the essence of the postmodern challenge, the turn to the narrative-linguistic and its implications.”¹⁴

In other words, within the historical profession, assuming the factual background and the critical school methodology may be a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the professionalism within the branch — even if not the brilliance, spectacular and public success — the *vice versa* is not an available option. For historians no one can formulate a theory without erudition, without the critical school’s instruments, without a consecrate method or appeal to concrete facts.

The convergence

Today historians are much more receptive to the theories of social science. The methodological implications of new discourses have also been considerable, with historians now looking well beyond the official government-type documents that fuelled most of the nineteenth-century. There has been a growing convergence between history and the various disciplines of the social sciences. As the practice of historical research has become influenced by sociology, anthropology and social theory, so the social sciences have become increasingly historical in character too. Legitimate opinions of the old school confirm those assertions: “Intellectual trade across the borders of our disciplines continues as it has done for generations. Although this commerce may well be expanding at a faster rate than ever before, few historians seem prepared to accept assertions that the advance of a logically irresistible wave of postmodern thought has enjoyed such an obvious success in colonizing the social sciences and other humanistic disciplines on the borders of history that historians can no longer

preserve an autonomous position outside an epistemology that has become hegemonic.”¹⁵

Historians and social scientists — despite their many differences — generally subscribe to one and the same theory of action: “the notion that human beings are rational and that their actions can be explained by reference to the interests of the person or group who perform them. As both groups of scholars agree, people act in order to gain utility or in order to minimize loss; they do what they do because it is in their interest to do it. Many of these explanations may sound plausible, the only problem is that there often is not enough evidence to support them. As a close reading of the primary sources show, several actions cannot straight-forwardly be described as aiming toward utility gain, and although the country and its leaders certainly had religious, military and economic interests of various kinds, a defense of these interests was not what brought the country to war. Does this then mean that the intervention was irrational after all? Since modern scholars only have been able to conceive of the action in rationalistic terms, and since the rationalistic model plainly does not fit the historical material, the reason why someone went to war has simply been out of bounds of the scholars’ imagination.”¹⁶

Most professional historians for many reasons will refuse to cover the costs requested by philosophical engagement. The skeptical detachment from the intellectual controversies triggered by postmodernism may be motivated by commodity for some or the overwhelming amount of work supposed by traditional historical erudition for the others.¹⁷

The interdisciplinary openness does not exclude the technicality requested by historical investigation as far as it is practiced not by a solitary person but by well-established multidisciplinary teams. There are few individuals truly capable to professionally assume several paradigms at the same time. A solid academic infrastructure with well established multidisciplinary teams is requested. For this reason the “total history” was practiced so far within or in connection with the big historiographies.

Again, it is an assumed risk first to gain and then to apply the professional system strictly. The human society is much too complex and the associated process of revealing and then collecting data for scientific projects to long and costly than is socially acceptable. At least here the last decade evolutions, the information technology and the interactive inter-communicable databases allow us to be optimists.

Sorin Antohi considers that we may well assist to a passage from “an idolatry of facts to an idolatry of the theory”. An optimum solution is a continuous negotiation between the two temptations and levels of investigation. Al Zub speaks about a “tolerance” as the first rule within the historiographic discourse and debates.¹⁸ We will agree upon that as far as this tolerance is reciprocal. A “tolerance” expressed in a dialog between the border disciplines — a dialog presented in an intelligible form for both historians and other social scientists. A certain open, ecumenical attitude may help us became more professional with all the rigor and conceptual precautions.¹⁹

Contemporary status

The Annual Bibliographies of British History published by the Royal Historical Society reveal a similar upward trend: in 1989, 3222 authors published 1116 books and 2561 articles; in 1997 the figures were, respectively, 6064, 2016 and 4748.²⁰ In a country like Romania the number of graduates in the same amount of time grew about four times while the number of publications and articles around then times, the situation in other CEE countries being more or less on the same path. There are more university-based historians teaching and researching and writing here today than ever before; they are producing more scholarly work here today than ever before; and so it is hardly surprising that the general standard of history departments today is rising. For instance we are surprised to read the opinion of David Cannadine who considers that: "...we live in a society which is increasingly amnesiac and a-historical where historians of my generation wield far less cultural authority than those of an earlier era; where the media coverage of events is increasingly devoid of any temporal dimension."²¹ We have also an unprecedented number of graduated in history involved in media or politics, at least in Europe. To this we should add the unprecedented number of specialized magazines, TV channels, Internet sites, museums, cultural tourists, heritage protection projects etc., something which reflects an unprecedented interest in history at the public level.

"Under these circumstances, it is difficult not to smile at those who claimed in the early 1990s, that history was in a terminal crisis: in part because post-modern critics doubted history's claims and historians capacities to tell the truth about anything; in part because it became over-specialized to the point of complete incoherence; and in part because the triumph of liberal-democratic, free-market capitalism meant that history itself had now come to an end. The obsession with output and performance requires visible and measurable products unless we have also in mind that a culture of productivity is different from a culture of creativity."²²

NOTES

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**L'IMMIGRAZIONE ITALIANA NEGLI STATI UNITI:
GLI ANNI 1880–1930 E L'EVOLUZIONE DI UN GRUPPO ETNICO¹**

IRINA STOICA

“Seguendo il sole, lasciando il Vecchio Mondo” è il motto di un giornale italiano fondato a New York intorno al 1920. Gli Stati Uniti rappresentarono un'ancora di salvezza per le sacche di povertà del continente europeo, le quali s'accalcavano disperatamente sui ponti d'imbarco delle navi in partenza per il Nuovo Mondo. Gli Stati Uniti e la Statua della Libertà: la speranza e il simbolo; l'idea e l'immagine; tutto ciò stava guidando le povere masse nel lungo viaggio sull'Atlantico verso la promessa, verso l'illusione che alcuni non videro mai materializzandosi durante le loro vite, semmai durante le vite dei loro discendenti. “Affidatemi le vostre stanche, povere masse che qui si affollano anelando alla libertà... io levo la mia mano davanti alla porta dorata” erano le parole di benvenuto incise sul basamento della Statua della Libertà con cui sono stati accolti (da uno dei più celebri simboli della libertà) gli immigrati europei arrivati nel porto di New York dopo il 1876.

Ma non sempre la porta era stata dorata, né la vita oltre quella soglia gratificante. L'America offriva una promessa incerta ed enigmatica, come il sole, che nel suo cammino verso ovest talora abbaglia col suo splendore talaltro scompare nella foschia o dietro coltri di nubi. La speranza si trasformò in delusione, il simbolo della speranza in simbolo dell'indifferenza. L'immagine — spesso più veridica — che quella statua copriva, era una folle immense e sfinita che aspettava a sentire la parola d'acchetto dell'ufficiale, parola che alcuni non la sentivano mai perché mallati e rifiutati l'entrata. E per gli italiani, soprattutto per quelli arrivati con la seconda ondata migratoria degli anni 1880–1914 e 1919–1927, la porta dorata avesse nascosto grandi difficoltà e pregiudizi affinché qualcuno di loro scrissero per quelli rimasti in patria: “...di loro che questo paese non è quello della tanto declamata libertà, perché se nella baia di New York si erge maestosa una statua, quella non è il simbolo della libertà ma è quello dell'ipocrisia.”

Se prima del 1880, l'immigrazione dall'Italia negli Stati Uniti fu formata in gran parte da piccoli imprenditori e borghesi dalla Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia e Toscana, tra fine Ottocento e il primo quindicennio del Novecento la composizione sociale degli immigranti italiani cambio². Verso il suolo nord americano si avviò così una massa enorme proveniente dalle regioni meridionali di contadini poveri, braccianti, ex operai stagionali delle piccole manifatture

entrate in crisi, manodopera agricola di tipo avventizio, artigiani in via di proletarizzazione³. Indirizzandosi per lo più negli stati della costa atlantica, ma anche nella parte ovest (dove la grande industria era localizzata), gli immigrati italiani costituivano l'ossatura centrale di una manodopera dequalificata, disponibile per i lavori gravosi rifiutati da gruppi etnici di più antico insediamento. La manodopera immigrata *unskilled* proveniente dall'Europa del sud e centro-orientale rappresentava "una fonte d'oro zecchino" per gli imprenditori statunitensi ed era tanto cercata in quegli anni di rapido sviluppo e ristrutturazione dell'economia con l'introduzione della catena di montaggio e l'eliminazione dei tempi morti. Queste innovazioni richiedevano soprattutto forza lavoro unskilled massimizzando il profitto attraverso la creazione di economie di scala quale reso possibile dal metodo produttivo fordista e dalla meccanizzazione dell'industria. Era vitale per l'imprenditore assicurarsi una forza lavoro a basso costo, difficile da mobilitare perché parcelizzata e frammentata e soprattutto disponibile. Questi ragioni sono gli stessi che indurrano all'uso massiccio degli immigrati in funzione crumiraggio⁴. Alcuni imprenditori avevano persino organizzato le proprie reti di reclutamento dall'estero della forza lavoro.

Gli italiani, che registrano, nei soli anni 1900–1914 un flusso verso gli USA di 3.420.146 persone, "il maggiore esodo mai registrato da una singola nazione in tempi storici" con le parole di Sowell, rappresentano la maggior componente della manodopera unskilled impiegata in settori come l'edilizia civile e abitativa, la costruzione di ferrovie, strade, metropolitane, industria tessile. Il lavoro in fabbrica o nei cantieri, il piccolo commercio al minuto o le miniere: sono questi i settori che reclutano manodopera negli Stati Uniti dell'inizio Novecento, un paese sostanzialmente cambiato rispetto al periodo della Guerra d'Indipendenza che avesse visto i primi pionieri europei colonizzatori di sterminate praterie e conquistatori dei giacimenti d'oro e il formarsi dei miti di libertà ed abbondanza, del mito dell'America come Il Nuovo Eldorado. "Ciò che differenziava la nuova immigrazione dall'antica" — scrive Jeanine Brun — non era veramente la maniera di comportarsi né le esperienze degli immigrati, era l'America stessa, la sua struttura sociale. Ai nuovi immigrati, essa non poteva offrire che un posto in una struttura economica e sociale secondaria, in una seconda America che si creava allora e che, a ben guardare, era straniera agli stessi americani. Era allora che si segnava una nuova tappa dello sviluppo americano, uno sviluppo dell'industria che richiedeva forza lavoro a basso costo per produrre ricchezza e offrire ricavi ai primi colonizzatori, quelli che nel '700 tribolavano per sbarcare il lunario, ma che adesso rifiutavano i lavori pesanti in quanto americani di terza generazione.

Lo sviluppo industriale degli Stati Uniti della fine dell'Ottocento e la concentrazione della produzione e della ricchezza nelle mani di pochi grandi capitalisti "trasformano la struttura sociale del paese e provocano l'apparizione di classi sociali fortemente differenziate. Con la fine della 'frontiera' e la monopolizzazione crescente dell'industria e dell'agricoltura, 'l'elasticità economica' della giovane America tende a sparire e si assiste ad un irrigidimento progressivo dello stato sociale dei membri di ciascuna classe".

E in questo contesto che vengono ad aggiungersi gli emigrati meridionali, pronti ad accettare qualsiasi condizione di vita (nei squallidi tenements delle grandi città o nelle baracche affollate delle miniere) e di lavoro (salari estremamente bassi e spesso instabili) per raggiungere l'obiettivo con cui erano partiti: un guadagno e un accumulo di capitale che permettesse loro la realizzazione in patria del desiderio di riscatto⁵ e del bisogno di autonomia decisionale nell'organizzazione del proprio lavoro in Italia. Bisogna ricordare a questo proposito che, per molti di loro, la decisione a partire era finalizzata ad una speranza di ritorno a scadenza più o meno ravvicinata nei paesi di origine.

Nel spiegare le ragioni della scelta di emigrare degli abitanti meridionali, la tesi di Briggs, in opposizione a quella del radicamento e della rottura di Handlin, punta sul ruolo assunto dal vecchio assetto sociale ed economico ed a un suo prolungamento attraverso un miglioramento della propria condizione sociale già acquisita. Di fronte all'evolversi della loro situazione e, assistendo alla loro perdita di statuto sociale ed economico, prendono finalmente la decisione di partire.

All'arrivo negli Stati Uniti non sarà la "porta dorata" ad aprirsi ai nuovi immigrati (semmai nei loro sogni o alle loro future generazioni sul territorio americano), ma i tenements di Chicago e di New York, i *blocks* dai luridi cortili adibiti a stalle e il *boarding boss system*. Quest'ultimo mezzo di socializzazione ed inserimento nel lavoro venne a far parte integrante della vita dei nuovi immigrati. Ciò che spiega la diffusione del padrone *system* è il bisogno di sentirsi in qualche modo protetti e garantiti in un paese in cui le tensioni fra le etnie si inseriscono nella conflittualità esistente all'interno del mondo del lavoro fra *skilled* e *unskilled*, fra operai di mestiere e operai non qualificati.

Il boss costituiva un supporto necessario per l'inserimento dell'immigrato nella società americana e nel mondo del lavoro. Il boss diventava un momento centrale di mediazione fra le esigenze dei proprietari delle piccole e grandi aziende industriali statunitensi e il bisogno immediato di lavoro dei contadini emigrati. Essi assumono un ruolo centrale: reclutano manodopera, la smistano là dove è richiesta, determinano spesso i salari. Lo strapotere dei bosses è reso possibile, oltre che dalla fiducia in loro riposta dagli immigrati, dai particolari bisogni dell'industria americana del periodo. Nonostante le accuse che venivano rivolte ai lavoratori provenienti dall'Italia meridionale, quel tipo di lavoratore dipendente era funzionale alla fase di sviluppo che l'industria attraversava. La difficoltà di inserimento stabile in un determinato processo produttivo e la disponibilità ad accettare lavori che comportavano un continuo nomadismo, venivano ricondotti a comportamenti negativi tipici dei meridionali rispondenti a bisogni esclusivi e immediati di guadagno e non a una più razionale organizzazione di una proficua permanenza negli Stati Uniti e ad un inserimento nel tessuto sociale americano. La società e i giornali americani condannavano a parole durissime il *boarding boss system* che ritenevano vicino alla schiavitù e contribuiva a forgiare l'immagine negativa degli italiani come iniziatori di clan e mafie⁶. Ma non fu mai presa una posizione critica riguardo le condizioni economiche che incoraggiavano l'uso della forza lavoro come rapido fonte di guadagni.

Ma proprio di questi comportamenti “negativi” aveva bisogno l’industria. Proprio questa disponibilità era fonte di odio (da parte degli operai qualificati mobilitati all’interno dell’AFL⁷) e allo stesso tempo di sfruttamento da parte degli imprenditori. E ancora, la disponibilità manifestata dai meridionali a lavorare a salari più bassi, se destava contro di essi le ire dei progressisti e degli operai organizzati, rendeva possibile agli imprenditori l’assunzione di quella manodopera a basso costo di cui abbisognavano in un periodo di grande ristrutturazione e meccanizzazione del settore. Gli stessi bosses, d’altronde, facilitavano e permettevano, grazie al continuo smistamento e spostamento di gruppi di lavoratori, quella rotazione etnica all’interno delle aziende su cui i proprietari contavano per garantirsi una situazione non conflittuale e un regime di pace sociale in fabbrica.

Il ricorrere al boss per penetrare nel mondo del lavoro (affidamento che presupponeva una scarsa comunicazione con il mondo esterno), l’isolamento dei nuovi arrivati rinchiusi nei quartieri e nei cerchi costituiti da parentela — amici della stessa regione contribuiranno alla loro incapacità d’integrazione nella *larger society*, di “americanizzarsi”⁸. Il rifiuto dell’assimilazione, l’atteggiamento radicale ed estremista attirerà la xenofobia dell’opinione pubblica americana (essenzialmente moderata) nei loro confronti e non meno la persecuzione delle autorità. La reazione degli immigrati italiani, almeno della prima generazione, sarà l’omogeneizzazione etnica all’interno dello stesso gruppo sociale emigrato e dentro piccoli raggruppamenti territoriali, le *little Italies* che esistono ancora oggi e che seguono la logica del “campanilismo” (come la definisce Dino Cinel in un suo saggio: “Il susseguirsi della vita quotidiana, organizzativa e lavorativa in funzione della piccola campagna o regione di provenienza”). L’autore richiama, camminando nei distretti periferici di Chicago, le stesse immagini che aveva incontrato nelle città del Sud Italia: la stessa atmosfera trasportata in un quartiere del Novo Mondo.

La modalità e la capacità organizzativa e di associazione degli immigrati italiani è analizzata in molti studi che hanno in comune l’evidenziare di una estesa rete di mutuo soccorso e associazioni su base locale. Le società di mutuo soccorso rispondevano alla necessità di proteggersi contro gli infortuni al lavoro e i casi di malattia frequenti fra gli immigrati; fornivano assistenza medica gratuita, indennità di disoccupazione e sepoltura. La vita sociale degli immigrati ruotava intorno alle società e organizzazioni locali che si proponevano a raccogliere i provenienti dalla stessa regione con lo scopo di socializzarli e offrirli un mezzo di accesso alla *larger American society*. Solo con l’avvento del fascismo e il crescente nazionalismo degli immigrati nacque una nuova solidarietà basata su un concetto più ampio di etnia e non più sulla logica limitata del campanilismo.

Il moltiplicarsi delle tante little Italy, che più che piccole Italie sono tante piccola Palermo, Napoli o Cosenza, ripeteruanti alcuni luoghi tipici dei paesi di provenienza, dalle feste religiose alle fiere risponde a molteplici esigenze. La necessità di non perdere e di preservare una propria identità come requisito di sopravvivenza, l’affermazione di un proprio sistema di vita come contrapposto a quello delle altre etnie immigrate, il bisogno di vivere collettivamente come

momento anche di autodifesa. Più che essere ispirate da motivi patriottici o nazionalistici, le little Italy rispondono ad esigenze di identificazione e di non perdita di senso. “La creazione di little Italy — scrive Robert Rougé — è un tentativo per conservare delle tradizioni che permettono di proteggersi dall’anonimato e dal tumulto della città. Tale creazione si compie non in riferimento alla nazione italiana, troppo recente, ma nel ricordo, di particolarismi locali, della regione o della città d’origine delle quali gli emigranti che si raggruppano, quartiere per quartiere, desiderano mantenere i costumi, le feste, grazie ai quali essi riescono, nella stessa città, a preservare la loro identità.” Oltre la difesa e la preservazione delle tradizioni, queste autoesclusioni in comunità rinchiusa dalla stessa etnia non facevano altro che riaffermare la mentalità campanile a scapito dell’integrazione nella società del paese d’adozione.

Ma, questa modalità di autodifesa, non è che il ripetere di un circolo vizioso di esclusione e sospetto della società ospite che porterà a mezzo secolo di scontri e pregiudizi nei loro confronti: dal linciaggio di New Orleans dei siciliani sospettati di legami con la mafia, alla persecuzione degli anarchici (di cui facevano parte tanti italiani) seguita alla bomba di Haymarket e fino al condanno alla pena di morte di Sacco e Vanzetti nel 1927 a causa della loro fede anarchica⁹.

La caratteristica principale della presenza italiana nel movimento di contestazione era il suo pregnante radicalismo e ciò li fece particolarmente suscettibili all’odio e al sospetto della larger American society perché — come scrive Rudolph J. Vecoli — “evidentemente, un’identità radicale non era un’opzione possibile nella terra del capitalismo trionfante” o — come meglio si esprimeva Menotti Seratti in una lettera — “Dietro le ambiguità profonde del SPA¹⁰, il protezionismo dell’AFL¹¹, c’è la realtà di un paese creato da emigrati e ferocemente alienato e calpestato proprio in questa sua anima più profonda da un capitalismo trionfante”.

La presenza degli immigrati italiani nelle lotte sindacali, negli scioperi e negli scontri di strada che avvennero in quegli anni è indiscutibile. Se si pensa solo agli scioperi di Lawrence e Paterson, del settore tessile a Chicago¹², del industria dei sigari a Tampa, Florida dove gli italiani furono i protagonisti di episodi memorabili della lotta sindacale negli Stati Uniti¹³, il panorama è completo. Gli scioperi di Lawrence e Paterson costituiscono l’esempio più efficace del modo di gestire le lotte da parte degli Iww¹⁴ (il sindacato industriale), della presa di coscienza degli operai immigrati, soprattutto italiani, e della loro volontà e capacità di mobilitazione. Gli italiani ebbero un ruolo centrale nella gestione di questi scioperi. Intorno ad alcuni episodi che vedono come protagonisti italiani si svolge la dinamica della mobilitazione¹⁵.

La maggior parte dei leaders italiani fu implicata nell’organizzazione di scioperi, boicottaggi e picchettaggi in sede anarchica e radicale nelle file del sindacato industriale, gli Industrial Workers of the World, sotto il nome di Wobblies¹⁶. La loro presenza conferma, come scrive Cartosio, “la centralità del contributo italiano al nuovo sindacalismo e la continuità nell’esperienza politico-sindacale dei socialisti e dei sindacalisti rivoluzionari italiani”. Il sindacato industriale, l’IWW fu il cuore della lotta sindacale negli Stati Uniti, nelle condizioni in cui il maggiore partito socialista, il SPA, adottò la tattica

dell'elettoralismo e poi di "entrismo" nei sindacati di mestiere dell'AFL, i cosiddetti "closed shops". Dai crumiri di fine secolo, usati dagli imprenditori in funzione anti-sciopero, come *strike-breakers*, gli italiani immigrati si trasformarono in sovversivi, anarchisti e *dangerous public enemies* per la forma americana di governo.

Formalmente, come iscritti nella FSI (Federazione Socialista Italiana del SPA) e nello SPA (Socialist Party of America), gli italiani erano ben pochi ed anche la loro presenza, rispetto alle altre federazioni di lingua, assai debole a causa della continua mobilità geografica in cerca di lavoro. Nonostante ciò, la storia del socialismo e del sindacalismo italiano negli Stati Uniti si concentra non tanto sul terreno paradigmatico dell'organizzazione, quanto sull'attività di piccoli gruppi sparsi sul territorio, che si formavano e disfacevano a causa delle contingenze, che "migravano" in caso di crisi economica e disoccupazione, per ricostruirsi poi, spesso con gli stessi membri, nel luogo dove si trovava lavoro. E la storia di un sindacalismo diffuso su un territorio ampio, quindi difficilmente incanalabile in un partito. Esiste un'enorme discrepanza tra l'entità numerica della Federazione italiana e quello che fu il movimento socialista italiano *at large*, comprese gli IWW, formato da uomini che non avevano la tessera dell'affiliazione ma che si sentivano molto vicini al socialismo.

Ciò che ai radicali italiani interessava, e nel dopoguerra divenne sempre più chiaro, non era il piano politico-istituzionale, ma la lotta in fabbrica. Non ha dunque senso misurare il radicalismo degli immigrati italiani attraverso il numero degli iscritti alle federazioni socialiste, sindacaliste rivoluzionarie o comuniste, o dei militanti raccolti nelle file anarchiche. Sono numeri che non danno in alcun modo la dimensione di un movimento che fu molto più vasto e diffuso su tutto il territorio.

I leaders italiani socialisti e radicali assumono un ruolo molto importante nella mobilitazione degli operai. Carlo Tresca, Giuseppe Bertelli, Molinari, Menotti Seratti, Arturo Caroti, Girolamo Valenti sono alcuni loro nomi. Essi ricoprono un doppio ruolo: di leaders politici quale espressione del "risentimento di classe" interno alla comunità immigrata e di radical ethnic brokers o "mediatori culturali" tra comunità etnica e società ospite. Era il compito dei leaders nella loro doppia veste a ricostruire il tessuto dei rapporti quotidiani tra comunità, militanza politico-sindacale e conflittualità industriale.

Il tratto degli immigrati italiani e dei loro leaders, che li rendeva distinguibili fra tutti gli altri, era il loro marcato radicalismo. In effetti, come scrive Elisabetta Vezzosi, "più che socialisti in senso stretto gli italiani erano radicali". Ciò li faceva poco permeabili nei confronti di un partito socialista dalle posizioni elettoraliste e assimilazioniste moderate. Infatti, come scrive Buhle, il famoso sociologo americano, "per il lavoratore radicale nato all'estero, divenire americano...significa adottare i modelli di consenso della società più vasta che lo circondava (come fece la maggior parte dei figli dei radicali) ed abbandonare proprio quei tratti che lo avevano reso distintamente radicale."

La forza di lavoro immigrata costituì la principale risorsa a disposizione degli imprenditori americani per combattere gli scioperi divenuti frequenti in quegli anni in cui si verificavano i metodi di produzione fordisti. Ma, dopo un primo

periodo di confronto con la realtà lavorativa americana, accadde una presa di coscienza degli immigrati ed una crescente ondata di proteste sindacali e di contestazione che le classi agiate cercarono di risolvere elaborando una nuova dottrina che giustificasse e sancisse non solo la spregiudicata accumulazione capitalistica, ma anche l'esistenza della diversità che rendesse accettabile le differenze di classe sempre più marcate. E in quest'ambiente che Andrew Carnegie scrisse il suo articolo, "Il Vangelo della ricchezza" e "The empire of business" in un tentativo di giustificare la continua ostentazione della ricchezza acquisita degli "eletti". Agli antipodi, c'erano gli immigrati italiani (soprattutto meridionali) recentemente arrivati dalla patria, per i quali la vita e la ricchezza di Carnegie o di altrui erano un sogno irraggiungibile poiché possibile solo per americani di seconda o terza generazione, figli dei primi colonizzatori.

Se questo breve cenno storico vale per la descrizione delle condizioni in cui la seconda ondata migratoria dall'Italia e quella più massiccia costituita dai meridionali si fosse inserita, le condizioni di vita e di lavoro delle generazioni d'italoamericani che seguiranno si caratterizzerà — come si può evincere dallo studio di Piero Gastaldo — da una spiccata mobilità occupazionale e di reddito in alto. Con lo scopo di ricostituire le tracce e le caratteristiche di un gruppo etnico e di un etnotipo cui si rivendica oltre 12 milioni di cittadini americani, Francis A.J. Ianni, Rudolph J. Vecoli e Andrew Greeley hanno cercato di fornire delle informazioni pertinenti cui non mancano le date statistiche. L'opinione pubblica americana e non solo si è abituata ad un'immagine stereotipa degli italoamericani¹⁷ come fonte di lotte di clan e disturbi mafiosi. Ma, come risulta dallo studio sui cattolici americani (1977) effettuato da Andrew Greeley, questa immagine è sostanzialmente errata. Dopo anni di affannosa teorizzazione sui perché dello scarso successo degli immigrati italiani (e cattolici in generale), le realtà statistiche dimostrano il contrario: un successo notevole quanto inatteso, ed ottenuto in mezzo a grandi difficoltà. Leggendo i dati si scopre che, rispetto alla media dei bianchi americani, gli italoamericani hanno il più alto reddito familiare medio.

Se anziché concentrarsi sulle prime generazioni o sugli slums¹⁸ a forte componente italoamericana della prima generazione, le ricerche fatte avessero cercato di ottenere un'immagine rappresentativa di questo gruppo, si sarebbero dovuti accorgere che già nel 1960 gli italoamericani stavano ottenendo risultati brillanti. L. Broom arrivò a costruire sui dati ufficiali del 1960 un indice complessivo del successo socioeconomico per alcuni gruppi etnici americani, con particolare riferimento alle seconde generazioni. Esso mostra che gli italoamericani di seconda generazione si trovano nettamente sopra la media nazionale.

Se la prima generazione d'italoamericani fu la protagonista degli scioperi negli anni dieci dell'inizio secolo, i loro figli, la seconda generazione, fu l'oggetto del cosiddetto "conflitto d'identità"¹⁹ che attraversò molti degli americani negli anni '70 del Novecento. La terza generazione, quella di oggi, è invece attraversata da quella che gli psicoanalisti chiamano "crisi d'identità"²⁰, subendo la legge del ritorno formulata da Marcus Lee Hansen²¹. Insieme, tutte tre queste generazioni hanno contribuito al formare della nazione americana apportando l'eredità italiana negli Stati Uniti.

Sotto la spinta della ricerca di una “vera” identità, si sono intrapresi molti studi che tendono ad analizzare la saga italo-americana e soprattutto l’esito della lotta contro i pregiudizi e gli stereotipi di cui l’opinione pubblica americana era prigioniera.

Nel contesto del problema dell’etnicità, il dato importante è l’opinione secondo cui il crimine organizzato è un prodotto d’importanza italiana, opinione per cui esso è associato specificamente agli italoamericani e alla loro coesione socioculturale, data per scontata. Bisogna aggiungere che dire “crimine organizzato” serve anche come metafora per indicare la resistenza dell’italoamericano all’acculturazione e all’assimilazione.

Un’altra stereotipia verificatasi nei confronti degli italiani (e che necessita un trattamento speciale a causa del suo forte impatto nel “folclore” scientifico) è quella del preponderante familismo quale evidenziato da Banfield²². La famiglia si pone come l’unica istituzione sociale, a disposizione dell’immigrato che meriti la sua lealtà. Numerosi commentatori hanno rilevato il ruolo di questa struttura istituzionale monolitica nell’impedire la formazione di qualsivoglia gruppo nonparentale in Italia. La forza dei vincoli familiari tra gli italoamericani, anziché unirli e fungere da base alla solidarietà di gruppo, impedisce una mobilitazione etnica, sicché, quando tale solidarietà cadde a seguito del processo di acculturazione, il suo graduale indebolimento contribuì all’assimilazione anziché alla costituzione di un corpo di norme etniche comuni e caratteristiche.

L’evoluzione nel tempo dell’identità italo — americana non è — come si è visto — priva di sorprese nel senso che ci riserva una storia incentrata non tanto sulla continuità che sui cambiamenti avvenuti in seguito alla mobilità culturale ed occupazionale. Se i primi contatti con la terra statunitense furono duri per i primi emigrati formati, nella loro grande massa, da meridionali, la loro ascesa ed importanza socioeconomica e politica non ritardò ad affermarsi nei decenni ulteriori alla seconda migrazione degli anni 1980–1927. I clan e le relazioni parentelari e clientelari si sono appassiti col tempo sul suolo americano, poco adatto ad ospitare questo tipo di pratiche. Gli italiani (meridionali o settentrionali) si sono guadagnati, non senza sacrifici, un posto inconfondibile nel forgiare la cultura e l’identità americana. A partire dagli anni ’60, gli americani di origine italiana cominciano a capeggiare le statistiche dei mestieri meglio pagati e a svolgere attività a pieno titolo nella politica. Oggi, i nipoti degli immigrati italiani che aspettavano il lasciapassare nella baia di New York alla fine del ’800 si confondono ai nipoti dei primi presbiteriani ed insieme sono impressionati a scoprire le loro radici sul vecchio continente.

NOTES

1. Il sociologo Francis A.J. Ianni introduce la differenza fra gruppo etnico ed etnotipo. Il gruppo etnico ha una connotazione diversa in quanto collettivo sociale “mobilitato” i cui membri hanno interessi comuni e un legame

parentale che li avvicina ad esso. Ci deve essere un’organizzazione sociale che nasce da questi interessi e i suoi membri devono trovare la loro principale identità sociale e personale all’interno del gruppo stesso. Non di meno la loro

- partecipazione deve essere volontaria. L'etnotipo poiché concetto che designa "immagini mentali", comportamenti concreti, fantasie e credenze del singolo individuo, è diverso dal gruppo etnico. L'etnotipo ritiene il modo in cui certi individui ricerchino un'identità etnica in assenza di socializzazione entro i gruppi stessi.
2. Bisogna ricordare che l'immigrazione italiana negli Stati Uniti era sempre stata un fenomeno ambivalente. Fra gli immigrati ci furono sempre rappresentanti di prima importanza della borghesia liberale, piccoli uomini d'affari in crescita, ma anche grandi proprietari ed intellettuali repubblicani che avevano lasciato la madre patria in seguito agli eventi del '48.
 3. La vita era dura per loro sul continente dilaniato da guerre e carestie. Lasciando famiglia, terre e case, s'indirizzavano verso il continente americano pronti a fare Li sacrifici ancora maggiori per non tornare in patria. Era un cammino senza ritorno. Parte a questa mentalità portata dagli immigrati europei, più tardi e in diverse situazioni, L'America cercherà d'isolarsi e badare se stessa per non trovarsi più "mischiata" nelle disastrose vicende del Vecchio Mondo.
 4. I crumiri o gli strike breakers erano I lavoratori che accettavano condizioni precari di lavoro, erano spesso sottopagati e le vittime di incidenti sul posto di lavoro. Odiati e marginalizzati dagli altri lavoratori perché disobbedienti alle regole (imposte con tanta difficoltà nel mercato del lavoro), I crumiri provenivano, nella maggior parte dei casi, da paesi diversi da quello dove lavoravano.
 5. Spesso, gli immigrati dovevano riscattare se stessi contro una somma di denaro offerta agli bosses che avevano organizzato il viaggio e che avevano assicurato loro condizioni di sopravvivenza alla destinazione. A causa di questo sistema, estremamente radicato nelle comunità italiane, l'opinione pubblica americana si formò l'impressione sbagliata che era una caratteristica soprattutto italiana che stava all'origine del loro comportamento antisociale ed anarchista.
 6. A questo proposito, si vedano le popolari serie Tv del clan di Corleone dove la vita di tre generazioni di italiani negli Stati Uniti è sotto vaglio in una maniera comica.
 7. Associazione Federale dei Lavoratori era il sindacato degli operai specializzati, fieri del loro mestiere di cui ne facevano un titolo di gloria. Questi lavoratori cercavano d'organizzare scioperi per promuovere migliori condizioni lavorative. I loro ripetuti sforzi d'imporre regole al mercato sono arrivati ad uno stallo non per mancanza di mezzi, ma a causa dei nuovi immigrati che accettavano qualsiasi offerta e condizioni all'assunzione. Questo accontentarsi di poco stava all'origine del loro isolamento nel mondo del lavoro e nella società e conferì loro lo statuto di crumiri.
 8. L'abitudine ad aggregarsi secondo fattori etnici molto circoscritti, confinati spesso alla regione di provenienza, e il perpetuarsi di quest'influenza sui nuovi immigrati hanno notevolmente inciso sul loro comportamento (che diventano restii ad assimilare i valori della società accogliente) e sulla maniera in cui furono percepiti (come sovversivi e pericolosi).
 9. In un paese che guardava agli italiani come a soggetti particolarmente inclini al delitto, divenne assai difficile ottenere un processo equo nel 1921 per Nicola Sacco e Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Essi erano stati arrestati sulla base di prove discutibili e furono condannati a morte per l'assassinio di un di un contabile a Braintree, Massachusetts. Mentre attesero in prigione, manifestazioni e richieste di appello in loro favore cercavano (senza successo) di ottenere la loro scarcerazione. Infine vennero giustiziati, nel 1927, e Vanzetti, nella sua ultima dichiarazione, riassunse con maggior eloquenza di tutti i suoi difensori le ragioni per cui moriva: "Sto soffrendo perché sono un estremista, ed estremista, ed indubbiamente io sono un estremista; e poi "Ho sofferto perché ero un italiano, ed indubbiamente io sono un italiano.
 10. Il Socialist Party of America si dissolse negli anni '30 a causa dell'insufficienza di membri e perché l'ideologia di sinistra era guardata con diffidenza dalle autorità e dalla popolazione. Era percepita come una minaccia per i valori americani e per lo stato di diritto. Esempificando, molte volte era rifiutato l'accesso agli immigrati in possesso di carta d'adesione al Partito Comunista o Socialista del loro paese. Fu il caso del socialista Carlo Tresca che faceva avanti e dietro tra Italia e gli Stati Uniti. Il Partito Socialista statunitense conobbe un trend di iniziale crescita e influenza che culminò con gli scioperi di Chicago e poi d'estinzione graduale nella struttura dei sindacati di mestiere AFL.
 11. Anche la vita dell'AFL in quanto sindacato dei più pregiati lavoratori americani non fu molto più "felice". Col tempo, il sindacato di mestiere organizzato nello stile corporatista medioevale diventa meno radicale, rinuncia a fare scioperi e parte integrante del patronage.
 12. Gli scioperi di Chicago sono stati tra i più memorabili della storia sindacalista americana. Segnarono un punto di svolta e costretteranno i politici a prendere sul serio i frequenti scioperi. Da allora in poi, le politiche al riguardo del Congresso furono centrate sull'indebolimento dei sindacati.
 13. A Tampa, quanto a Lawrence e Paterson, gli organizzatori furono i radicali americani ed italiani

- Bill Haywood, Joseph Ettor e Arturo Giovannitti. Furono loro ad avere un'impronta decisiva sulla svolta degli scioperi.
14. Industrial Workers of the World era il sindacato più radicale e più influente degli Stati Uniti all'inizio del secolo. Nelle sue file, erano presenti molti anarchisti e comunisti. La presenza italiana era fra le più alte. La sua forza fu inversamente proporzionale alla sua vita. Questo sindacato uscì dalla scena politica più rapidamente di come ne entrasse.
 15. L'esodo dei bambini; la resistenza passiva degli operai, delle donne e dei bambini che si sdraiavano a terra nel momento in cui la polizia riceveva l'ordine di caricare i cortei; la manifestazione delle donne, non soli scioperanti, con striscioni su cui campeggiava la scritta "We want bread and roses too" erano alcuni dei momenti che rendevano "unica", molto "italiana" la mobilitazione di Lawrence.
 16. I Wobblies erano i militanti dentro gli sindacati industriali IWW che hanno avuto il merito di raccogliere le varie forme di protesta degli operai non specializzati, di dare un significato politico e ampio ai loro bisogni e alla loro volontà di lotta, di esprimere in termini unificanti e comprensibili a tutti, il rifiuto di un sistema che proprio sulle divisioni e le differenze fra le varie etnie aveva trovato modo di costruirsi e crescere.
 17. Francis A.J. Ianni parla a questo proposito di un mutuo possesso e scambio di "componenti di valore" che ricorrono sia nella letteratura popolare che in quella scientifica e che non sono sufficienti a fornire una base per l'identificazione di gruppo o individuale in quanto italoamericani. Questi elementi di valore frequentemente associati all'identità italoamericana sono: il preponderante familismo, la propensione ad organizzare attività criminali e l'opposizione all'educazione scolastica.
 18. Gli slums erano i sovraffollati e malsani quartieri delle grandi città, rifugio degli elementi più poveri, degli unskilled, dei criminali più o meno manifesti. Le cattive condizioni sanitarie e la povertà degli abitanti concorrono a determinare gli alti indici di morbosità e mortalità. La dissenteria, la meningite, la tubercolosi, si diffondono con virulenza fra i meridionali d'Italia.
 19. Così viene definito da Erikson, psicoanalista americano d'origine scandinava, il disagio della seconda generazione di emigrati che vive nell'emarginazione, non facendo parte completamente di nessuno dei due mondi e avvertendo costantemente le pressioni contrastanti di modi di vita opposti: quell'ancestrale improntato dai loro genitori e quello americano cui cercavano di adattarsi.
 20. Lo stesso Erik H. Erikson sviluppò negli anni '50 il concetto cercando di spiegare "i problemi d'identità come facendo parte del bagaglio mentale di generazioni di nuovi Americani che si lasciavano alle spalle la madre patria per fondere le loro identità ancestrali in quello comune del self made man". Essendosi fondato sull'identità come prodotto di un'interazione tra personalità individuale e società che dura tutta la vita, questo concetto vede l'identità etnica come "primordiale" nel formarsi della personalità umana.
 21. Secondo Marcus Lee Hansen, storico dell'immigrazione, i nipoti degli immigrati, sicuri della loro americanità e liberi dal complesso d'inferiorità dei loro genitori, esprimono la loro curiosità circa le loro radici nel Vecchio Mondo.
 22. Il sociologo Edward Banfield ha formulato che l'arretratezza degli italiani del meridione possa essere spiegata dall'incapacità "di agire insieme per il loro bene comune e persino per qualsiasi obiettivo che trascendesse l'interesse materiale immediato della famiglia nucleare". Nel suo saggio del 1958, Banfield critica quest'eccessiva importanza della famiglia che esclude altre istituzioni sociali.

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**POLITICS ALL THE WAY DOWN, OR THREE CONTRADICTIONS
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CENTURY
— POSTMODERNISM, LIBERALISM, AND MEANINGLESS SOCIETIES —**

DAN DUNGACIU

“In fact Descartes, who initiated the determined pursuit of an objective truth untainted by cultural blinkers, a Reason untainted by ‘custom and example’ (his own term for culture), had forged the tools and weapons which were required for a colonialist-patriarchal domination of the earth. Descartes had claimed to use the cogito as a premise so as to escape cultural blinkers. Over three centuries it returns with a vengeance as a device for locating and affirming them, as the only reality.” (Ernest Gellner)

“There is something new in the world: not the end of history, or the clash of civilizations, or the inexorable terminal decline into criminal anarchy. Rather, we are at a point and in a time when well delineated, predictable, familiar practices, institutions and ways of life give way to ill-defined, diffuse, anxiety-producing and violent realities. The kind of time Augustine may have had in mind when he said, ‘it was not absolute nothingness. It was a kind of formlessness without any definition.’” (Ken Jowitt)

“We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning.” (J. Baudrillard)

“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” (L. Wittgenstein)

The today crisis of “politics” is the crisis of its status. Fundamentally, postmodernity has questioned the locus of “normative political theory” in contemporary society. In its “antifoundationalist”, “anti-metaphysics” or “anti-essentialist” versions, it has *disenchanted* the “secular reason”, which has produced and made possible the modern political theory (or, at least, the kind of principle — usually called neutral principle — favoured by liberal theorists). Today “political theory” uses practices developed in the Age of Reason, but without the confidence that they are moored to timeless principles. Now, we realize that the idea of a distinctive, autonomous, normative activity called “political theory” becomes dubious when the grounding principles of such an inquiry and the vocabulary, which has dominated it, are called into question. The contradictions and confusions are inevitable (see: Dungaciu 2004: 461–488).

The following text attempts to investigate three major contradictions, which characterize and mark our way of thinking and — as a consequence — our societies at the beginning of the century. These contradictions are generated by the attempt to reconcile two perspectives — two *Weltanschauungs* — which are, fundamentally, impossible to reconcile: rational liberalism (if not the product,

the fulfilment of the Age of Reason, or the Enlightenment) and postmodernism (in its most radical version – antifoundationalism). The three contradictions analyzed below — which result from the pretension of many of us to be, at the same time, liberal and postmodernist (antifoundationalist, essentialist, or constructivist) — concern the claim to promote and justify further on: a) the separation of church and state; b) the “building” of new supra-national institutions and identities — the case of the European Union; c) the rationalist and humanist view on the human being.

My chief aim in this paper is not to offer a solution to these contradictions, but to suggest some possible consequences of them and to issue a call for a serious theoretical re-examination of our situation, regarding not only the relationship between liberalism and postmodernism (especially in its antifoundationalist stance) in general, but the condition of our societies — meaningless societies — at the beginning of the century.

“Mission impossible”: *the reconciliation between liberalism and postmodernism*

As I have said before, the source of the contradictions I will analyze here is a double allegiance: to *liberalism* and to *postmodernism* (antifoundationalism, constructivism, and antiessentialism). This double allegiance is highly contradictory, because the two views and perspectives are very difficult — if not more! — to reconcile. In Stanley Fish’s words, it is a real “mission impossible” (Fish 2001: 162), which marks and haunts our sociological endeavours at the beginning of the century.

The task of the following three sections is to bring proof for that statement. But before I do that, we need satisfactory and coherent working definitions of “liberalism” and “postmodernism”.

What is liberalism? Liberalism as “political rationalism”

For almost three centuries liberalism constituted the principal current of modern politics in Europe and the West. Liberalism is a sponge term; it has been given multiple, often contradictory definitions (Bennett: 1996: 309–312).

Basically, there are three meanings attached to this word. The first one is more limited, indicating a particular political (economic, social, etc.) view among other within a democratic society. In this sense, liberalism is something different from — and opposed to — social democracy, labourism, conservatism, republicanism, etc. The second meaning suggests that liberalism and democracy are virtually polar opposites (see J. Stuart Mill, Carl Schmitt, etc.), and the third one conflates the two worlds: now liberalism is perceived as identical to democracy, or at least they overlap heavily.

For the scope of my analysis a large and general definition of liberalism will be enough, so the last perspective is preferred. Two comments, here.

First, the definition of liberalism used here is rather a *philosophical* and *intellectual* one. I follow the approach of Pierre Manent, who attempted to write

an “intellectual history of liberalism” and for whom liberalism was, essentially, a “theologico-political problem” (Manent 1986; Manent 1987). For the French author, the crucial thing in order to identify liberalism is the separation of church and state, and the discourse, which justified such a political and intellectual view. Because of that, the first liberal identified by Manent was Niccolò Machiavelli, the first who cogently suggested and encouraged such a “liberal” view.

Second, in this text I shall use liberalism as a synonym for “political rationalism”. The liberal institutions were originally justified on the basis of a revolutionary comprehensive philosophic doctrine, concerning human nature, the purpose of political society, and the proper domain of religious faith. The *apogee* of this process was the Age of Reason.

As I mentioned before, the distinction between “democracy” and “liberalism” becomes irrelevant in such a perspective; the two words being now almost synonymous. A liberal means in my presentation any man or woman who accepts democracy as the best political system (or, in a churchillian style, “the best we can imagine”) — rule of law, separation of church and state, constitutionalism, etc. Simply put, the liberals are those who live in modern democracy and accept the democratic game. This is the most general sense, shared by any political actor in a democratic society (using this general definition, republicans, social-democrats, democrats, national-liberals, conservators, labourists, etc. — are all *liberals*).

This broad definition is adequate and sufficient for my purposes. More has to be said about the significance of the term postmodernism.

What is postmodernism? Postmodernism as antifoundationalism

We cannot begin to define “post-modernism” until we have some reasonably clear working notion of what “modernism” means, though this term is itself used in too many senses and contexts.

The first significance of the word is, again, philosophical. If one looks at how philosophers and social scientists use that term — and this is the sense and the context I am interested in —, then one could find among different ranges of meanings and associations some arguably firm reference points. One could trace modernism back to the seventeenth century and to Descartes’ attempt to provide a new foundation for philosophy in his famous declaration *cogito ergo sum*, conceived as an absolute, indubitable ground of knowledge. What it meant was that the one thing one could be certain of is that the human mind (or the thinking substance) must exist in and through the act of the thought (Habermas 1987; Sedgwick 2001: 3–45; Skirbek and Gilje 2001: 190–273).

Then, again, moving one hundred and fifty years on, we might prefer to date the emergence of the “true” philosophical modernism with Kant and his huge ambitious attempt to provide a transcendently justified account of the various human faculties, that is to say, cognitive understanding, practical reason, aesthetic judgement, and reason in its “pure” or speculative modes. Indeed it has been argued that all the great philosophical debates since then — debates around

truth, knowledge, interpretation, the status of the human or social *vis a vis* the natural science — have their origin in Kant. From this standpoint, modernism is best described as an attempt to establish the scope and limits of the various distinct yet interrelated faculties of reason, knowledge and judgement. For many philosophers this would be a defining moment of modernity, the philosophic discourse of modernity, and a discourse that has continued right down to the present day (*Ibid*).

Postmodernism is the negation of these views; it is the opposite of them (David 1994). Basically, what postmodernism wants is to abandon the conception of a universal rationality such as Descartes or Kant endorse. The essence of postmodernism is the rejection of the universal reason which underline the “project of modernity” (Habermas 1987). In its most radical form, postmodernism goes by the name of antifoundationalism, antiessentialism, or constructivism (Rorty 1991). The “antifoundationalist” trend of thought means that we cannot assume the stable self, the rational society, the progress of history, and the safe separation of fact from fiction — these are all in question. This is not to deny the existence of physical or social reality, it is to problematize our access to understanding it; it is to appreciate that our knowledge is only available through the medium of language as well as thought (Rorty 1991; D’Amico 1999: 199–249; Frank 1989: x–xlvi).

Arguably this style of thinking began over a hundred years ago when Nietzsche attempted to undermine liberal rationalist grounding by a radical critique of reason as such. This critique asserts that no claim to knowledge is founded in the one truth. All claims to knowledge come from a particular human, all too human perspective, are socially constructed. As a commentator has put it: “there is nothing to which we can appeal in order to settle the most profound human disagreements, and thus there is no possibility that the awesome variety of conflicting opinions about the most important things to human beings, including the best political order, can be transcended through universal and objective knowledge. The original claims that liberalism is grounded in natural rights and reason and therefore that it is universally legitimate are naïve and even arrogant fictions” (Owen 2001: 2). Moreover, the antifoundationalism denies that the impartiality that reason claims to itself is humanly possible. Judd Owen explains: antifoundationalism, “being a variety of historicism”, teaches that all of our thinking is bound up in some “worldview”, a horizon that varies from society to society, and from age to age. “No worldview is rooted in timeless principles, nature or divine decree. All have their sources only in the vagaries of history, in ‘sheer contingency’. There is no rational or natural viewpoint that transcends all such partial viewpoints. No single perspective could hold all worldviews in its scope without distorting them. It seems that the political rationalist therefore cannot adjudicate impartially” (*Ibid.*).

Thus, liberalism and postmodernism are irreconcilable views. And still, many of us keep on declaring themselves — implicitly, if not explicitly — liberal *and* postmodern. The consequence is three deep contradictions, which we are rarely aware of.

*The first contradiction. The foundational crisis
of the separation of church and state*

According to Judd Owen (2001), the key issue here is this: if liberalism is a “faith” (the antifoundationalist view), what becomes of the separation of church and state (one of the dogmas of liberalism). This is — or must be — a very important question for us — “we, the liberals” (Richard Rorty) —, and let me contemplate this picture a little bit closer.

As I have already mentioned, the liberal doctrine concerning religion — the separation of church and state — was originally justified on the basis of a revolutionary comprehensive philosophic doctrine, covering human nature, the purpose of political society, and the proper domain of religious faith. It was the product of the Age of Reason, or the Enlightenment, the cornerstone of the Enlightenment’s political philosophy, as well as its political project.

At the core of the entire project was *Reason*. Reason was the instrument which allowed the European thinkers — called rationalists, liberals, etc. — to take a decisive step in order to free themselves from the intellectual and spiritual influence of the Catholic Church. We can say, with Pierre Manent, that the content of modern liberalism derives from such a fundamental orientation toward politics chosen by modern and pre-modern Europeans. *Reason* has been the instrument, which has helped them to solve the equation established by John Locke in his *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689): “I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other” (Locke 1993: 393). (Somebody could argue — and a few contemporary thinkers did argue — that more than three hundred years later we are still at it and no closer to achieving the exact distinctions or settling the just boundaries than Locke was when he identified the condition that made his project at once so urgent and so difficult. But this issue is not my concern at the moment.)

Reason desires to be above the fray; it wants to be the “Supreme Judge of all men”. Reason desires to be impartial and objective. This history goes back to Aristotle: as he makes it clear in the *Politics*, it is the task of the political scientist to adjudicate among the contending political parties, investigating what is the best regime in the given circumstances as well as the “best regime” simply. That is — as Judd Owen observes —, even Aristotle’s pre-liberal political rationalism may seem somehow *impartial* and *neutral*. In Book 7, Aristotle speaks of the life of the rationalist as “the life of the foreigner and separated from the political community. He articulates the objection of the political human being that life of rational analysis is inactive, or, we might say, disengaged from life. Aristotle, obviously a partisan of rationalism, responds to this objection: rational study is an activity and the most complete and humanly satisfying one” (Owen 2001: 10).

But the story of Reason has changed radically at the beginning of the century. Richard Rorty, among others — he is if not the most important, the most

famous today among the thinkers who promote such a point of view —, found out that “in our century, the rationalist justification of the Enlightenment compromise with religion has been discredited” (Rorty 1991). This “compromise” was found in the liberal toleration of religious belief; citizens were allowed to hold any religious beliefs whatsoever, so long as they were kept private. Liberals discovered that political society could get along well, indeed better than ever, if religion was kept separate from politics. This separation was made possible, it was believed, owing to the discovery of a moral universal, natural, and therefore more solid basis for political society than religion — plagued by intractable and impassioned disagreement — could ever reasonably hope to provide. According to this view, the separation of church and state was thought to be justified by the claim that, despite our various accidental differences of faith, all human beings share a “common rationality”. This rational human essence was thought to “ensure that free and open discussion will produce ‘one right answer’ to moral as well as scientific questions”.

Such was the Enlightenment’s rationalist justification for pushing religion to the private sphere. Religion may perhaps be tolerated as “relevant to, and possibly essential for, individual perfection”; but it must nevertheless be considered “irrelevant to social order” since it is not “common to all human beings *qua* human beings” (Rorty 1991).

But these images and justifications are dead for us, for we are not modern anymore. That much postmodernism taught us. The notion of Reason as a “Supreme Judge of all Men” is absurd; at least unbelievable.

Today, “contemporary intellectuals” — from philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Quine, to anthropologists and psychoanalysts — have collectively managed to “erase the picture common to Greek metaphysics, Christian theology, and Enlightenment rationalism: the picture of an ahistorical, natural center, the locus of human dignity, surrounded by an adventitious and inessential periphery”. Reason was thought capable of transcending this “adventitious and inessential periphery”, littered with the products of mere “cultural bias”, which include “religion, myth, and tradition” (Rorty 1991: 176; D’Amico 1999: 199–249; Frank 1989: x–xlvi; Skirbek and Gilje 2001: 453–470; see also Owen 2001).

Again, this is false and the whole picture has to be altered because it is impossible to live *neutrally* — this the postmodern credo. Rationalism cannot avoid dogmatism. Antifoundationalism concludes that “reason is always dogmatic. The belief in the very possibility of science and of life and society guided by rational norms must therefore be said to be rooted in a prejudice faith” (Owen 2001: 10–11). Liberalism is thus only a *parti pris*. It is based on faith — faith in Reason...

We carry on practices begun in the Age of Reason, but without the confidence that our practices are moored to timeless principles. The separation of church and state remains. But can any justification be offered for it, after the demise of liberal rationalism (Carter 1993)?

*The second contradiction.
European identity versus national identity?*

The following section refers to the most important and urgent debate of the European agenda at the beginning of the century: the future of Europe. “We, the liberals” — sceptical and postmodern liberals of the old continent are no more “national” — we are today “Europeans”...

The tone of the European integration debate seems to become today more critical and uncertain; especially when at stake is the *cultural* dimension of the European integration. We still have too many questions and just a few reasonable answers (see: Rosamond: 2000 and Herrmann... 2004). What sort of political entity is the EU creating? What does “European identity” really mean? What is the relationship between “national” and “European identity”? How can we today explain, justify and promote convincingly the latter?

In the following section, I shall argue that the “answers” to these questions are haunted by the incapacity of European intellectuals to overcome the dilemmas of postmodernism; namely, I shall suggest that we do not have any possibility to argue cogently and simultaneously on behalf of “European identity” and/or the “end of national identity”, because the logic of such a “demonstration” is profoundly contradictory: it is not reasonable to be *antifoundationalist* as far as the “national identity” is concerned, and perfect *essentialist* when at stake is... the “European identity”.

Again, we, the liberals”, can not be “European” and postmodernist at the same time...

*Demythologisation of the nation
and... the mythologisation of Europe*

Let me start this section with a few comments on what appears to be the process of demythologisation of the nation and the mythologisation of Europe.

The construction of the EU represents the most exciting and profound development in European politics and society at the turn of the century. Over the past fifty years the project of European unification has developed from a “European Coal and Steel Community” to a Common Market, from a Common Market to the “European Economic Community”, from the European Economic Community to the “European Communities”, and from the European Communities to the “European Union” — defined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as “a new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”. This evolution has been accompanied by “a shift in emphasis from integration, perceived as a rational by-product of economic prosperity and legal harmonization”, to more recent concerns with “integration as a cultural process”, and “culture” as a “political instrument for furthering that construction process”. Now, the main concern appears to be how to go beyond political or economical issues and foster a “European identity” that will extend integration into the more “cultural” and psychological domains of everyday life (Shore 2000: 1). Maastricht has introduced a new “Cultural article” into the Treaties, thereby providing a legal basis for the Community intervention into the “cultural field”.

But what exactly does “European identity” mean? Who could accurately define this concept today beyond the national referential in convergence with which the “European identity” has existed for almost two hundred years? Unfortunately, we have not too many satisfactory answers.

What we have in most cases is a negative definition of the concept, which follows usually after a deconstruction and demythization of the “concurrential” project, namely, the national one. The “national identity” is deconstructed and what is hoped to appear is the “European identity”. In this picture, “European identity” means something, which ineluctably transcends the “national identity”, once the “history” has already announced the end of the “national project”. (The observation that this prediction is older than... one hundred and fifty years, dating from the times of Marx and classical liberalism, is beyond our interest here and now; the same counterarguments could be opposed to the thesis of the “end of nations”.)

The main point here is not the truth of this argumentation — the future of the nation state, of nationalism, and so on — but the logic of it; moreover, the effects and the consequences of the very same logic can be applied, now, to the “European identity” — which is supposed to surpass the stake or dusty “national identity” (Dungaciu 2004: 461–488).

The problem is this. Nation — we are told by the so-called “inventionist” or “postmodernist school” (Smith 1998, 2001) — is a “myth”, a “construction”, an “invention”, an “imagined community”, a “discourse”, and a “narration”. Nation is a project, which was “invented” by the nationalist intellectuals and, later, promoted and imposed by the institutions of the national state. Only the dangerous nationalists could believe that nation is something “essential” or “perennial”, something fundamental in the history of mankind. We, the liberals, do not. We, the postmodern, antifoundationalists, European liberals at the beginning of the new century know this is wrong. We are lucid minds, clear, transparent and perspicuous spirits. We know too much to be “nationalist” anymore; we have finally understood what is behind the national rhetoric: nothing, or, at least nothing of what the nationalists pretended to be. The “national project” is, indeed, at the end.

But we are not at the end of the road. Because concomitantly with the failure of the national project, a new “solution” turns up at the horizon — it is called “European identity”. It is tacitly constituted through a negation — it is not what “national identity” meant to be! — and it incorporates all the virtues and qualities, which were missing in the previous identity project. Historically, the “European identity” is inevitable, and, morally — it is something good!

But is this really a solution? Because the metamorphosis of the negative project — namely, the deconstruction of the national project — into a positive project — the European identity — occurs through a methodological and epistemological leap which is, at least — and this is not a small thing! — guilty of inconsequence! You cannot unwarrantedly suggest the abolition and cancellation of a so-called myth — the myth of nation — and to propose, with nonchalance, a new... myth. Because what we have in reality is nothing but a (new) mythological construction,

namely, the myth of Europe and of the European identity. Europe is nothing more than a “myth”, a “construct”, an “invention”, a “discourse”, a “narration”. It is at least everything a nation is in the eyes of those who accept the postmodern approach to nation and nationalism.

Instead of confident and triumphant speeches, the “solution” of the process of demythization of nation seems to be nothing more than... mythologization of Europe.

“Nation Building” — No!; “European building” — Yes!

Let me now say some words about the “European building” process, which is, in my view, a perfect imitation of the “nation building” process. Briefly, I shall sketch some evolutions concerning the vision of the future of Europe, the invention of the European tradition, the representation of “European culture” in EU iconography, EU cultural, mass media, and information policy, etc.¹

EU leaders frequently invoke the vision of a future European state based on a federalist order. Jacques Delors, speaking on the French television in 1990, declared: “My objective is that before the end of the Millennium (Europe) should be a true federation”.

Architectural metaphors featured prominently in the discourse of EU elites and in the project they call “European construction”. Their image of themselves sometimes implicit, often explicit, was that of architects and masons engaged in the historical task of designing a new Europe. The idea is expressed clearly in the speeches and writings of Yves-Thibault de Silguy, the French Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs: “Since 1992 — he writes — community output seems to have expanded constantly, a phenomenon which is usually described — revealingly — as the ‘construction’ of Europe: architects and masons busying themselves around an edifice, while onlookers must wait until it is completed before they can appreciate its quality. All are laying the stones of a cathedral, the design and majesty of which will only be fully appreciated by our successors.”

The idea of creating a new kind of supranational political order in Europe is enshrined in the founding Treaties of the European Economic Community (EEC), and the preambles to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1951 Treaty state: the aim is “to lay foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. A federalist vision of Europe has been implicit in the ethos and organizational structures of European Community ever since its creation, even though subsequent treaties have removed or disguised the emotive word “federalist” from their final texts, as was the case in 1991 with the Maastricht Treaty. (The penultimate draft — 8 November 1991 — of the Maastricht Treaty contained the following wording for article A: “by this Treaty the High Contracting Parties established amongst themselves a Union; ... this Treaty marks a new stage in a process leading gradually to a Union with a federal goal”. Article W2 added to this: “A conference of representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 in the perspective of

strengthening the Federal character of the Union to examine those provisions of the Treaty which provide for such an amendment.”

The vision of the future of Europe seems to be a federalist one and the EU cultural policy, information policy, mass education, etc. are promoting to serve this goal. The term used to describe this process is “Europeanization”. The idea that Europeans can be “Europeanized” appears contradictory, but the concept is none the less useful for understanding what some authors call the “colonization of Europe by itself”.

What is not enough stressed by the commentators of the process, is that, despite the insistence of EU supporters on the *sui generis* nature of the EU, there are nevertheless some obvious parallels to be drawn between the process of “European construction” and the rise of the nation state. Just as bureaucratization of post-revolutionary French society under Napoleon helped to transform “peasants into Frenchmen” (E. Weber), EU elites hope to transform Greeks, Germans, Danes and French into ‘Europeans’ — a process which, in theory, starts among those elites themselves”.

Briefly, let me present some of these strategies. Before the Maastricht Treaty, however, the EU had embarked upon various initiatives in the fields of media and information policy to promote integration in the sphere of culture by enhancing what it saw as ‘the European identity’. Several areas perceived to possess popular appeal were identified as sites for promoting the ‘European idea’: a Europe-wide audio visual area, a European Academy of Science, a Euro lottery, etc.; among the “symbolic measures” could be counted: the creation of a new EC emblem and flag, a European anthem — the “Ode to Joy” —, European postage stamps, the harmonization of the European passport, the re-structure of the ritual calendar by creating new celebratory calendrical markers, such as festive “European Weeks”, “European Culture Months”, etc., and 9 May was officially designated “Europe Day” (Shore 2001).

EU historiography follows the same trend. Typically, it represents the last three thousand years of European history as a kind of moral success story: a gradual “coming together” in the shape of the European Community and its institutions. According to this conception, European history is an evolutionary process that starts with “prehistory”, before advancing to the age of classical antiquity and beyond. The result is that European identity is portrayed — as I have just said — as a kind of moral success story: the end product of a progressive ascent through history — albeit a highly selective history — from ancient Greece and Rome, to the spread of Christianity, the Renaissance and the scientific revolution, the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the triumph of liberal democracy. Titles like: “Europe: a common civilization, a destiny, a vocation”; sentences like “*le miracle européen*” or “an essential Europe” are common features of this rhetoric.

As Chris Shore has put it, Jean-Baptiste Durosele’s *European: A History of Its Peoples* (1990) is a perfect example. Here history is seen as a “genealogy of progress”. It is invariably a selective, sanitized and typically heroic re-reading of the past, one that systematically excludes or ignores the darker side of European

modernity such as the legacies of slavery, anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism, colonialism or imperial conquest. European history, it seems, is as much about ‘forgetting’ as it is about remembering and interpreting past events”.

A process, which is tantamount to the XIXth century “nationalization” of the education system, could be easily identified. Since the launch of its ‘Jean Monnet Project’ in 1990 the Commission has created over 1,722 new university teaching projects in ‘European integration studies’ — including 409 ‘Jean Monnet Chairs’”. As a commentator put it: “As the universities have come to depend increasingly on EU money for research grants and project funding, often dispensed through professionals whose careers have been closely tied to the EU, it would not be unreasonable to assume that ‘European Union studies’ are not as critical of the EU as might otherwise be the case” (Shore 2000: 29). This has prompted C. Delanty to comment that the majority of studies on the European Union “tend to be of an uncritical and even laudatory nature and often delivered in elegiac prose” (Delanty 1995).

What the “European liberals” don’t say

As I have said before, the problem with such an approach is that it perpetuates and promotes the entire “rage” of errors, which the “national culture” has been blamed for. What is bad for the nation is good for Europe!

First of all, such an approach reifies an outdated idea of culture as fixed, unitary and bounded wholes that is sociologically naïve and politically dangerous. The result, however, is that nationalist ideology is simply replaced by a new ideology of “Europeanism”... The true saviours of Europe from the horrors of Nazism, Fascism and military aggression during the Second World War are thus not the leaders of the Resistance or the wartime Allies, but Monnet, Spaaks, Schuman, De Gaspari and Adenauer: these ‘visionary statesmen’ have become the symbolic guardians and ancestors of the ‘European idea’” (Shore 2000).

Second, far from embodying the thinking of a new age in human history, this approach — prevalent among EU policy-makers and strategists — seems to indicate an altogether more conservative current of nineteenth-century social evolutionist thought. This invariably portrays the European Parliament and Commission as heroic agents of change, on the side of history — the new proletarian class! —, leading Europe forward in search of its “*vocation fédérale*”.

Finally, it becomes obvious that despite claims made by its supporters that the EU is forging a unique political entity that “transcends” the nation state, the new Europe — as we have seen before — is being constructed on much the same symbolic terrain as old nation states of the last centuries. Flags, anthems, passports, trophies, medals and maps are all icons for evoking the presence of the emergent state, only instead of “national sovereignty” it is the EU institutions and ideals that are emphasized and endorsed.

In conclusion, as C. Shore justly argues, the EU’s claim to be “going beyond” the model of the nation state is a highly debatable proposition. According to critics such as Tom Nairn, the European Union heralds not the end of the nation

state but its expansion into what Nairn has described as a “super-nation-state founded on European chauvinism”².

“We, the liberals...” — from “sapere aude” to “political correctness”

The third and last contradiction I wish to point out at the end of my presentation concerns the liberal rationalist perspective on the human being: liberal anthropology.

The Enlightenment was certainly not, as is sometimes maintained, a kind of uniform movement of which all members believed approximately the same things. Nevertheless, there are some principles upon which the “project of Enlightenment” rested. One of them is that “all the answers are knowable, that they can be discovered by means which can be learnt and taught to other persons; that there are techniques by which it is possible to learn and to teach ways of discovering what the world consists of, what part we occupy in it, what our relation to people is, what our relation to things is, what true values are, and the answer to every serious and answerable question”.

“Learnt” and “taught” are crucial words here; one can learn what true values are, either intellectual or moral. What is common to all those thinkers is the view that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge; that “if we know what we are, and we now what we need, and we know where to obtain it, and we obtain it by the best means in our possession, then we can live happy, virtuous, just, free and contented lives” (Berlin 1999: 22–25). This is an important idea: all virtues are compatible with one another. Equality, liberty, fraternity must be compatible with one another; so must mercy, justice, morality.

The legacy of the XVIIIth -XIXth centuries, then — a legacy which was also preserved tacitly in the XXth — is the view on the human being as a “rational animal”, capable of instruction and education, through which, at the end, he or she will achieve the fulfillment of their “human nature” — which is both a moral and an intellectual fulfillment. The more the human being is educated, the closer he or she will be to the true ideal type of humanity. Education means progress: human progress — intellectual and moral progress, but also progress of society. Liberalism is, fundamentally, optimist and reformist.

The contradiction which marks our liberal societies today does not result directly from the “encounter” between rational liberalism and postmodernism (antifoundationalism); it results indirectly, nevertheless.

We can reasonably assume that one of the consequences of the postmodernist (deconstructivist and antifoundationalist) view is the so-called “multiculturalism debate”. And an important effect of this quarrel — or rather a part of it — is the “political correctness” debate. (Incidentally, let me remark that these “debates” have been initiated by the scholars and intellectuals connected with universities and academic life.)

I am not going to enter into the complications, confusions, or contradictions of this terrible debate. In order to make my argument, I want to point out just one aspect of it.

As everybody knows, one of the most important issues in an American campus is the one regarding “sexual harassment”. Basically, the issue here is the attitude and behavior, which educated human beings living in a prestigious and highly honorable academic area, have or manifest towards each other. Usually, when you enter into an American campus, you receive, among other things, a booklet entitled “Cultural aspects of sexual harassment”. Let me quote from the one provided by the “International Student & Scholar Services” — State University of New York (SUNY). The first section is called: “What is sexual Harassment?”: “Sexual harassment consists of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other physical or verbal behavior of a sexual nature which has the effect or intent of interfering with an individual’s academic or work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment... The following examples of sexual harassment are provided by the Project on the Status and Education of Women: verbal harassment or abuse; subtle pressure for sexual activities; unnecessary touching, patting, or pinching; leering at a person’s body; constant brushing against a person’s body; demanding sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt threats concerning grades, employment, or evaluations; physical assault, including rape”. Further on, you can find out: “Why do I need to know about sexual harassment?”, “What are some of the sexual harassment dilemmas I may face?”, “What may happen to someone charged with committing sexual harassment?”, “What are my options if I think I have been sexually harassed?”, “What will happen if I complain about sexual harassment?”, “How can I avoid other forms of sexual discrimination?”, etc.

I am not going to argue that this not a very important issue; far from that. What I am trying to reveal here are some consequences of such a situation, abnormal, unbelievable and incomprehensible at least for the “founding fathers” of modern and rational liberalism.

As we have seen from my quotation, “sexual harassment” is such an elusive concept and the examples of “sexual harassment” are so numerous, that — as you may know —, many American professors prefer to keep the door open during an academic or professional meeting especially with a female student or faculty member. It is a precaution worth taking!

This is not a banal observation. Because behind this “practical” solution (so to speak) for the vigilance of the liberal and open-minded habitants of the academic world lies the contradiction I was talking about at the beginning of this section. A contradiction between the liberal and rational view on the human being — marked by “reason, progress and education” —, and the view on the human being which underlines the entire PC debate — the human being is a beast. This is actually the “hidden” hypothesis — more or less hidden — of such a watchful endeavor. This is the root; this is the vindication of such a dreadful suspicion. A man — but also a woman³ — is always a “prime suspect”; his or her nature is inevitably bad; the first impulse is not rational, but irrational, it is to do evil, it is offensive and morally depraved. And all this not in any way diminished by his or her high level of education...

Basically, the PC debate means the end of the liberal and rationalist project. Nobody can conciliate these two beliefs or existential attitudes anymore.

*Epilogue. Postmodernism and meaningless society.
“The end of certainties” and... the beginning of confusion?*

A final point. The discussion of the three contradictions I have dealt with in my article has not only a *philosophical* significance — a sort of Byzantine quarrel about the “sex of the angels” —, far from what we know to be a *practical* approach.

I do not think that this is the case. The contradictions I was talking about in this paper suggest more that incapacity to clarify our views; they suggest a “mood”, an “attitude”, and an “atmosphere”; a social atmosphere. Fundamentally, postmodernism is a *feeling*; we can call it “the end of certainties” (Ilya Prigogine) or otherwise. The core of this attitude is the incapacity of our modern frameworks to provide us a *meaning* — this is the root and, concomitantly, the consequence of postmodernity. The *crisis of meaning* is not only individual, it is social, political, and economic. The “postmodern sentiment” — the postmodern “frame of mind” — is, again, the root and the consequence of this situation.

What we do not have anymore — and what we need today — is a *meaning*, “un espace de sens” — as a French scholar put it (Laidi 1998: 9–43). And he explains: though all the upheavals we experience daily “can have several meanings”, nothing indicates “they have a meaning”, if by meaning we imply “the triple notion of foundation, unity and final goal: ‘foundation’ meaning the basic principle on which a collective project depends; ‘unity’ meaning that ‘world images’ are collected into a coherent plan of the whole; and ‘end’ or ‘final goal’, meaning projection towards an elsewhere that is deemed to be better”.

The consequence of this *meaningless society* — as I would call it — is that social, economic, and political disorders, thought interdependent, fit less and less readily into a common explanatory framework: There is no task more urgent for us, sociologists, than “the grounding of the simplest and most common words in a collection of stable, collective meanings. There is no task more urgent than the reconstruction of a symbolic separation between the sphere of daily experience and the tracing of a new horizon of expectation” (1998a: 178).

The idea that we *live* in a *meaningless society* — that means, simply said, contradictions between our *social practices* and our *principles* —, could become an important item on the sociological agenda at the beginning of the century. In Immanuel Wallerstein’s words, this could be a major “challenge” for “the culture of sociology” (Wallerstein 1999: 220–251).

More words would have to be said about the *consequences* of this situation for the future of our societies and, simultaneously, for the future of the sociological debates. I do not have the space to develop this thesis here, but I suggest that one of the most important results of this “state of mind” at the beginning of the century is *the resurrection of religion*. Religion will be perhaps the most important “answer” to the uncertain and meaningless world, because

religion is one of the most fundamental “suppliers” of “meanings” and existential “solutions”. This is the explanation for the apparent paradox that a (rather) atheist or (at least) non-religious trend — postmodern *mood* — goes along with a religious resurrection. Today — when our ideas and our choices matter more than ever — the religious and spiritual movements have to be part of our sociological concerns and interests. They can offer a framework and/or a meaning for this *meaningless world*. For better or for worse...

*

In conclusion. We are at the beginning of a new century. The need to project ourselves into the future has never been so strong, while we have never been so poorly armed on the conceptual front to conceive the future. A crisis that is more than a theoretical one seems to mark our societies. As I have tried to suggest in this article, a wide gap between our social practices and our principles confront and challenge us today. We seem to live in *meaningless societies* now; or, rather, in a “world crisis of meaning”. This is what the “end of certainties” is about.

What can we hope? Maybe not much; but at least that the “end of certainties” will not be the *beginning of confusion*.

NOTES

1. This section is based on Shore 2000. See also Rosamond 2000 and Herrmann 2004.
2. It is interesting to remark that the high rate of voter abstention and the declining turnout at successive European elections — instead of massive “electoral” campaigns — indicate that electors remain largely indifferent or hostile to the EU”. And more, the Eurobarometer polls offer systematically unfavorable results for a “euro-optimist” attitude. The reluctance of the French people to vote “yes” for the European Constitution is just an element in this picture.
3. We can read in the booklet: “Although most sexual harassment incidents involve a male staff member, male faculty member or male student harassing a female, there can be cases of women harassing women, and men harassing men.”

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RUMÄNIEN NACH 1989. EIN BLICK VON AUSSEN

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Übersicht über rumänische Parteien und Organisationen¹

<i>Abkürzung</i>	<i>Rumänisch</i>	<i>Deutsch</i>
ADJV	Asociația Tineretului German din România	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Jugendverbände
DA (Wahlbündnis der PNL und PD 2004)	Alianța Dreptatea și Adevărul	Allianz “DA” (Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit)

CDR	Convenția Democratică din România	Christdemokratische Konvention (Wahlen 1996)
F.D.G.R./DFDR	Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România	Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien
FDSN (seit 1993 PDSR)	Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale	Demokratische Front zur Nationalen Rettung
FSN (seit 1993 PD)	Frontul Salvării Naționale	Front zur Nationalen Rettung
IPP	Institutul pentru Politici Publice	Institut für öffentliche Politik
PD	Partidul Democrat	Demokratische Partei
PDSR (seit 2002 PSD)	Partidul Democrației Sociale din România	Partei der Sozialen Demokratie (von Rumänien(s))
PNL	Partidul Național Liberal	Nationalliberale Partei
PNȚCD	Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat	Christdemokratische Nationale Bauernpartei
PR	Partida Rromilor	Partei der Roma
PRM	Partidul România Mare	Großrumänien-Partei
PSD	Partidul Social Democrat	Sozialdemokratische Partei
PUNR	Partidul Unității Naționale Române	Partei der Rumänischen Nationalen Einheit
PUR	Partidul Umanist din România	Humanistische Partei Rumäniens (sozial-liberal)
UDMR	Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România	Demokratische Ungarische Union Rumäniens

A. Einleitung: Hinführung zum Thema und Eingrenzung der Fragestellung

Nach dem Ende der kommunistischen Alleinherrschaft in den Staaten Mittel — und Südosteuropas kam es nicht nur zu einem “Wiedererwachen der Geschichte”², sondern auch zu einem problematischen Wiederaufleben überwinden geglaubter ethnischer Konflikte und nationalistischer Bestrebungen³, vor allem in Südosteuropa. Diese Vorgänge sind mitunter mit der Konservierung entsprechender, zugrunde liegender Konflikte in den vorherrschenden kommunistischen Regimen zu begründen.⁴ Historisch betrachtet sind diese Konflikte auch auf eine sehr vielschichtige und komplizierte Siedlungs — und Migrationsgeschichte, besonders in Südosteuropa zurückzuführen.⁵ Im Zuge dieses neuen “Geschichtsbewusstseins” wird die Frage politikwissenschaftlich relevant, inwiefern Geschichte gezielt als Legitimationsbasis für Herrschaftsansprüche und — ausübung eingesetzt wird und wurde.

Da das postkommunistische Rumänien einen besonders eindrucksvollen und überdies historisch kontinuierlichen Fall der Heranziehung von Geschichte als Legitimation für Herrschaft darstellt, und um die theoretischen Ausführungen dieser Arbeit auch praktisch verifizieren zu können, wird das postkommunistische Rumänien zwischen 1989 und 2004 in dieser Arbeit exemplarisch für zahlreiche andere Fälle Mittel — und Osteuropas (z.B. das Serbien Slobodan Milosevics (1989–2000), Kroatien unter Franjo Tudjman (1991–1999), die Republik Mazedonien unter Ljubcho Georgievski (1998–2001)⁶ oder die Slowakei unter Vladimir Meciar (1992 – Februar 1994 und Dezember 1994–1998)) analysiert.⁷

Auch in Rumänien konnte und kann ein “Wiederaufleben der Geschichte” beobachtet werden. Die Besonderheit in Rumänien allerdings ist, dass die “Verwendung von Geschichte” im Postkommunismus eine mehr oder weniger konsequente Fortsetzung nationalistischer und historisch begründeter Mythenbildungsmaßnahmen der Ceaușescu — Diktatur darstellt. Speziell die Endphase des Ceaușescu — Regimes war durch einen extremen Nationalismus, durch gewalttätige Diskriminierung nationaler Minderheiten und die permanente Verletzung von Menschenrechten geprägt. Geschichte wurde als “Knüppel” gegen alle “anderen”, wie Minderheiten, den Westen und politische Gegner eingesetzt. Ceaușescu berief sich zur Legitimation seiner Herrschaft immer wieder auf die Nation und er bediente sich gezielt des Nationalismus. Die Intensität mit der er auf die Nation und den Nationalismus als Legitimationsbasis zurückgriff war beispiellos im Ostblock, denn im Gesamtwerk von Karl Marx finden sich zwar zahlreiche Äußerungen zu nationalen Problemen, eine systematische Analyse der Nation fehlt aber in dem sonst so umfangreichen Werk.⁸

Doch warum war die rumänische Regierung in der kommunistischen Ära die einzige Regierung in Zentral — und Osteuropa, die derart betont aktiv die Nation und den Nationalismus als Herrschaftsmittel benutzt hat?⁹

Der Kommunismus unterband den Nationalismus in der Region nicht, ganz im Gegenteil. Für die anderen Regierungen der Region, die sich außerstande sahen, den Nationalismus zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil zu monopolisieren, stellte sich der Nationalismus als ernstes Problem. So sah sich die Regierung in Ungarn

mit einer nationalen Revolution konfrontiert. In der Tschechoslowakei forderte der Nationalismus an der Basis des Volkes von der Regierung Reformen. Titos unitaristisches Projekt in Jugoslawien blieb nur erhalten dank der von ihm durchgeführten Transformation der nationalen Frage vom Vorkriegskonflikt gegensätzlicher nationaler Ideologien zu einer Auseinandersetzung über die Struktur und Zusammensetzung der Jugoslawischen Föderation. Dies erreichte er durch formelle Regelungen in den 1960ern und 1970ern: Parteivorsitz und Staatspräsidentschaft rotierten, ein Proporzsystem in Partei — und Staatsorganen bezüglich der Republiken, Provinzen und der ethnischen Herkunft wurde eingeführt und eine Höchstamtszeit wurde festgelegt.¹⁰ Nur in Rumänien konnte die Regierung selbst¹¹ die Führung der nationalen Bewegung einnehmen, wobei ethnische Minderheiten innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen brutal unterdrückt wurden und Rumänien auf die sowjetische Vorherrschaft in nationalistischem Stil antwortete.

Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint es wenig überraschend, dass *im postkommunistischen Rumänien ein nahtloses Anknüpfen an die Ceaușescu — Herrschaft* möglich war. Um zu analysieren, wie dies genau erfolgte, werden im Folgenden die Prozesse der Demokratisierung in Rumänien analysiert und die Rolle von Geschichte in diesem Kontext skizziert und überprüft, inwiefern George Schöpflin recht hat, wenn er schreibt, dass das Jahr 1989 einen Sieg der nationalen Identität über den Marxismus darstellt.¹²

Drei der Hauptquellen für diese Arbeit sind Attila Aghs “Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans”, Linz und Stepan’s “The Effects of Totalitarianism” (in: *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*) und Archivmaterial aus dem Archiv des “Demokratischen Forums der Deutschen in Rumänien” (DFDR/F.D.G.R.) in Sibiu/Hermannstadt, Rumänien. Diese Arbeit soll sich auf die beiden Werke Attila Aghs und Linz und Stepan’s beziehen, die während des Wechsels von nicht demokratischen Herrschaftsformen zu neuen, demokratisch geführten und legitimierten Systemen wichtig sind. Es wird versucht, einige dieser theoretischen Aspekte der Demokratisierung dadurch aufzuzeigen, dass sie auf das Beispiel Rumänien übertragen werden und mit dem zweiten Aspekt der Themenstellung, dem Faktor “Geschichte im Postkommunismus”, verbunden werden. Die Arbeit sollte jedoch ihren Schwerpunkt in den thematisch wichtigsten Faktoren haben. Die konsultierten Theorien sind allerdings nur *ein möglicher* theoretischer Ansatz, das Thema dieser Arbeit auf eine politikwissenschaftlich und historisch fundierte Weise zu bearbeiten.

Im Schluss dieser Arbeit werden die Probleme und der gegenwärtige Status Rumäniens mit einer prognostischen Betrachtung von Rumäniens Zukunft und dem rumänischen Streben in Richtung EU und nach Westen verbunden.

B. Hauptteil

Der Faktor “Geschichte” während der Demokratisierung in Rumänien

1. Rumäniens Geschichte: Das Erbe und die Last der Vergangenheit

Rumänien ist mit seinen 238.391 Quadratkilometern und seinen 21,7 Millionen Einwohnern¹³ nach Polen der größte der so genannten “postkommunistischen”

Staaten Mittel — und Südosteuropas. Die Rumänen selbst sehen ihren Staat als *ihren* Nationalstaat, aber de facto ist Rumänien ein Land mit vielen Nationalitäten. Es gibt ungefähr 1,4 Millionen Ungarn, wohl zwischen 60 und 70.000 Deutsche¹⁴, die auch “Sachsen” (in Siebenbürgen) und “Schwaben” (im Banat) genannt werden, circa zwischen einer und zwei Millionen Sinti und Roma und kleinere Minderheiten von Ukrainern, Polen, Russen und Lipowenern (slawischstämmige Bewohner des Donaudeltas), Serben, Bulgaren, Kroaten, Slowaken, Tschechen, Mazedoniern, Ruthenen, Türken, Tartaren, Griechen, Albanern, Armeniern, Juden und Italienern. Insgesamt werden 20 Minderheiten vom rumänischen Staat offiziell erkannt.¹⁵ Es wird sogar geschätzt, dass die Minderheit der Sinti und Roma zwischen “2 und 3,5 Millionen Menschen, also bis zu 10 Prozent der Bevölkerung stellt”.¹⁶

Der moderne rumänische Staat in seinen jetzigen Grenzen ist ein Produkt des Ersten Weltkriegs. Vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg bestand Rumänien nur aus den zwei “historischen rumänischen Fürstentümern, der Walachei und der Moldau”¹⁷ (dem so genannten “vechiul Regat”¹⁸, das alte Königreich, oder Königreich von Rumänien), das den Ersten Weltkrieg seit 1916 auf der Seite der Alliierten kämpfte. Nach der Niederlage Österreich — Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg wurde Ungarn (in der Donaumonarchie firmierend als “Transleithanien”) im, durch Ungarn als “Diktat” empfundenen Frieden¹⁹ von Trianon²⁰ gezwungen, das Banat, Siebenbürgen, Sathmar (Satu Mare), die Marmarosch (Maramureş) und das Kreischgebiet (Crişana) an das Königreich Rumänien abzutreten, dem alten “Regat”.²¹ Der Reichsteil Österreich (“Cisleithanien”) verlor das Buchenland (Bukowina) an Rumänien. Auf diese Weise wurde Rumänien ein ethnisch höchst heterogenes Land, da diese neu gewonnenen Territorien zwar in ihrer Gesamtheit über 50 Prozent rumänisch besiedelt waren, jedoch regional auch zum Teil überwiegend von Ungarn, Deutschen, Ukrainern und Juden bevölkerte Orte und Landstriche beinhalteten. Zwar war Rumänien auch schon vorher durch seine jüdische Minderheit ethnisch heterogen gewesen, aber man sträubte sich sehr, dies zuzugeben.

Von 1965 bis 1989 wurde Rumänien “im Geist des Neo-Stalinismus und des nationalen Kommunismus”²² von Nicolae Ceauşescu²³ beherrscht. Ceauşescu setzte die nationalen Minderheiten wie Ungarn und Deutsche unter starken Druck und beherrschte das Land mit seinen Freunden und Verwandten wie ein Sultan, und im Ganzen “passte Ceauşescu den Marxismus- Leninismus mehr an den Nationalismus an, als umgekehrt”.²⁴ Auf Grundlage dieses historischen Hintergrundes Rumäniens und seines Erbes der totalitären Vergangenheit wird es offensichtlich, dass Rumänien vor 1989 mit einer ganz besonderen Form der Herrschaftsform — unterschiedlich von den Ländern des östlichen Mitteleuropa, zu “kämpfen” hatte: Sultanismus. Jede Art persönlicher Initiative in diesem “dynastischen Sozialismus”²⁵ wurde sofort bestraft, und sogar Schreibmaschinen mussten bei der Polizei angemeldet werden.²⁶

Wenn man die Änderungen der politischen Strukturen nach dem Fall Ceauşescus im Jahr 1989 verstehen will und wenn man nachvollziehen möchte, warum sich diese nur langsam entwickelt haben, muss man sich in der

Retrospektive klar machen, wie drückend und totalitär die Diktatur Ceaușescus wirklich war. Ceaușescu war die allerhöchste Autorität auf jedem öffentlich relevanten politischen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Feld.²⁷ Dieser Fakt degradierte die Bevölkerung auf den Rang einer lediglich applaudierenden Masse. Je länger dieser Zustand vorherrschte, desto klarer zeigte sich allerdings auch, dass sogar Ceaușescu selbst das Opfer seines eigenen Personenkults wurde und dass sich schließlich auch sein persönlicher Größenwahn aufgrund dessen entwickelte. Er selbst begann, an seinen eigenen Kult wirklich zu glauben.²⁸

Ana Blandiana²⁹, eine charismatische rumänische Schriftstellerin, die in ihrer Geschichte "Kopie eines Alptraums" eine der beeindruckendsten Beschreibungen über das Lebensgefühl in Ceaușescus Rumänien wiedergibt, wurde zu einer Art moralischen Autorität vor 1989. Sie schreibt über einen gewissen "psychologischen Bestandteil", welcher im ganzen öffentlichen Leben von Rumänien beobachtet werden muss, und welcher dem Benehmen des Volks etwas Irrationales verlieh; ein Benehmen, das passend in George Orwells "1984" beschrieben wird, und das darauf zielt, das kleinste "Fehlverhalten" gegen das System zu verbergen. In Verbindung dazu erklärte Ana Blandiana im Bezug auf den Zusammenstoß zwischen ethnischen Ungarn und Rumänen in Târgu Mureș (Neumarkt) in einem Fernsehinterview des deutschen Fernsehens: "... diese Schlammschlachten, die man in Rumänien dann und wann vorfindet, sind das Ergebnis der allgemeinen Demütigung während Ceaușescus Diktatur. Ein westeuropäischer Beobachter kann sich keine Vorstellung von ihren Wirkungen auf die Psyche und Mentalität der Leute machen. Nichts davon ist natürlich, alles ist künstlich. Alles wurde initiiert, um die verschiedensten Ziele zu erreichen."³⁰

Dieser Mangel einer Tradition persönlicher Initiative ist eine besondere Ursache des langsamen politischen Fortschritts und für die zunehmende ethnische Unruhe, wie von Ana Blandiana aufgezeigt wurde. Der hohe Grad der Personalisierung der Macht bis 1989 führte zur Situation, dass es keine institutionelle Autonomie oder keinen institutionellen Pluralismus in Rumänien gab, und die Anzahl an unabhängigen Initiativen auf ein Minimum reduziert wurde. Dies war das entscheidende Defizit in der rumänischen Gesellschaft bezüglich einer Reform-orientierten und durch Initiativen angetriebenen Bewegung auf eine moderne und demokratische Gesellschaft zu, die durch zuverlässige Institutionen stabilisiert wird. In einem solchen modernen institutionellen System gilt: "Need is accepted as a normal part of social life and institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life."³¹ Diese Institutionen fördern auch Prinzipien, wie von T. H. Marshall in seiner ziemlich aufschlussreichen Klassifizierung von Bürgerrechten angegeben wird, die er in drei Hauptkategorien einteilte: "civil, political and social."³²

Wie mehrere akademische Studien über die politische Transition in Mittel — und Osteuropa gezeigt haben, ergaben sich die meisten Probleme während des politischen und ökonomischen Wechsels besonders aufgrund der fehlenden Entwicklung einer Zivilgesellschaft³³, d.h., von unabhängigen Interessengruppen, einer freien Presse und öffentlichen Initiativen, die helfen hätten können, Korruption durch Protest zu bekämpfen oder zu verhindern.³⁴ Wie William

Beveridge feststellte, "hängt der Erfolg einer guten Gesellschaft nicht vom Staat, sondern von den Bürgern ab".³⁵ Deshalb kann die Rolle der Staatsbürgerschaft als eine der treibenden Kräfte innerhalb der Entwicklung des modernen Staats betrachtet werden. Eine Vorverurteilung der rumänischen Bürger als "schlechte Bürger" im Sinne von Beveridge wäre aber äußerst voreilig und nicht im Sinne einer wissenschaftlichen Analyse, sondern eher im Stile von "Gelegenheitsanalytikern Osteuropa wie Klaus von Beyme".³⁶ Vielmehr muss die Geschichte als prägendes Element gesehen werden, das die Bürger zu dem machte, was sie sind.

Die sich ändernde Bedeutung der Staatsbürgerschaft ("Citizenship") bereitet aber den Weg, auf dem der demokratische Staat und die sich liberalisierende Wirtschaft folgen können. Solange die Zivilgesellschaft in Rumänien ziemlich schwach sein wird, solange wird auch die Entwicklung in Richtung eines modernen, demokratischen und wirtschaftlich liberalisierten und funktionierenden Staates im Sinne einer *Transformation* sehr schleppend sein. Im Falle Rumäniens verlief die Entwicklung einer Zivilgesellschaft und einer modernen Staatsbürgerschaft nicht sehr viel versprechend bis jetzt. Wie von Ernest Gellner beschrieben, würde eine wirklich aktive Zivilgesellschaft es erfordern, dass weder die nicht-politischen Institutionen, noch Personen von politischen Institutionen oder den Staat unterdrückt werden.³⁷ In der wohl interessantesten und prägnantesten Formulierung der Zivilgesellschaft, die Victor Pérez-Díaz in eine enge Definition, begrenzt auf eine gesellschaftliche Vereinigung von Institutionen ohne Staat, fasst, besteht diese aus gesellschaftlich-politischen Institutionen, gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und der Öffentlichkeit.³⁸ In diesem System ist es die Aufgabe des Staates, Recht und Ordnung sicherzustellen und die Kooperation und Konkurrenz zwischen den verschiedenen Institutionen zu beaufsichtigen.

Die Fakten im heutigen Rumänien sehen allerdings anders aus, und die oben genannten Bedingungen sind bis jetzt nicht erfüllt durch die politische Realität. Die Tatsache, dass die erfahrensten Politiker der heutigen politischen Elite direkt aus Ceaușescus System der Vergangenheit kommen, verbindet das Problem der schwachen rumänischen Zivilgesellschaft mit dem noch viel schlimmeren der politischen Eliten.³⁹ Auf diese Art sind Institutionen nicht in der Lage gewesen, sich stark zu konstituieren und Rumäniens Institutionalismus kann ziemlich gut als "schwacher, oder verzerrter Institutionalismus"⁴⁰ beschrieben werden, der sich als ein Erbe des Sultanismus und der "revoluția furată"⁴¹, der "gestohlenen Revolution" von 1989, entwickelt hat.

Nicht nur der Kommunismus per se, sondern auch *die Politik an sich* im Sinne eines Forums für öffentliche Angelegenheiten, mit dessen Hilfe konkrete Anliegen der Bevölkerung behandelt werden können, hatte seine Glaubwürdigkeit durch Ceaușescus Diktatur nahezu völlig verloren. Wie verbreitet diese apolitische Einstellung im heutigen Rumänien noch ist, wird sehr anschaulich durch das Beispiel der Machtübernahme der neuen Führung im Jahr 1989 gezeigt: Ion Iliescu, einer der früheren Chefideologen im Zentralkomitee der Rumänischen Kommunistischen Partei schaffte es schon *während* des Sturzes

Ceaușescu, sich als der “Retter der Nation” zu stilisieren, und die große Mehrheit des Volkes erklärte als Grund für ihre Unterstützung Iliescu: “...Iliescu hat uns Brot gegeben, er hat uns Elektrizität gegeben ...”⁴²

2. Die drei Stufen des Systemwechsels

In der Fachliteratur können drei Stufen der Demokratisierung unterschieden werden.⁴³ Das folgende Kapitel ist darauf angelegt, diese verschiedenen Stufen am Fallbeispiel Rumäniens praktisch anzuwenden. In diesem Zusammenhang soll besonders die so genannte rumänische “Eigenheit” und die spezifische Rolle von “Geschichte” während der Transition Rumäniens analysiert werden.

2.1. 1989 — eine Revolution?

Die demokratische Entwicklung in Mittel — und Südosteuropa nach 1989 kam nicht wie Phönix aus der Asche. Dem Aufstieg der Demokratie liegt ein langer sozialer Entwicklungsprozess zugrunde, “interwoven with the collapse of communism whose origins were long before 1989”.⁴⁴ Diese “zweite Realität” wurde deshalb für den Erfolg der späteren Entwicklung entscheidend. “Democracy remains the *possible* outcome of a civilising process that is constantly threatened by de-civilising turns.”⁴⁵

Aber genau an dieser Stelle unterscheidet sich der Fall Rumäniens und seines Wechselprozesses von dem anderer Länder, wie Ungarn, Polen oder der ehemaligen Tschechoslowakei. Diese mitteleuropäischen Länder betrachteten sich nicht als Europäer “zweiter Klasse”, da durch ihre *eigenen* Beiträge der politische Wechselprozess des ganzen ehemaligen Ostblocks ins Rollen geraten war. Dieses sehr weit verbreitete Gefühl der Polen, Tschechen, Slowaken und Ungarn spiegelt sich in einer der Reden des früheren ungarischen Premierminister József Antall. “We are not the back-yard of Europe ... I hope ... that they will at least pay more attention to our region ... and to the fact that the nations of this area, from the Poles to the Hungarians and others, have viewed the Western World with unrequited love for centuries. This unrequited love must end because we stuck to our posts, we fought our own fights without firing one shot and we won the Third World War for them.”⁴⁶

Der rumänische Fall hingegen war anders. Ironischerweise kollabierte der rumänische Staatssozialismus erst nach “dem Zusammenbruch des Staatssozialismus in der ganzen Region”.⁴⁷ Genau dieser Punkt ist für die anschließende Entwicklung des rumänischen Falles entscheidend. Ein gutes Beispiel, um eine Vorstellung zu bekommen, *wie anders* die rumänische Entwicklung war, ist die Tatsache, dass es im Juni 1989 nur zwei unabhängige Bewegungen in Rumänien gab, während es in Ungarn schon 21 waren.⁴⁸ Überdies erhielt Nicolae Ceaușescu im November 1989 auf dem 14. Parteitag der kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens noch 67 Standing Ovationen für seine Reden, während in den anderen Ländern die Systemtransformation bereits im Gange war, oder gerade eingeleitet wurde.⁴⁹

Deshalb unterschied sich der anschließende Wechsel des politischen Systems auch ganz entscheidend von dem der anderen sozialistischen Staaten. Rumänien

“profitierte nicht von einem frühen Anfang des Transitions-Prozesses”⁵⁰ und es konnte sich nicht auf einen, schon unter dem Mantel des formal noch herrschenden Staatssozialismus begonnenen gesellschaftlichen *Transformationsprozess* stützen. Aufgrund dieser historisch belasteten Ausgangsposition war der Demokratisierungsprozess in Rumänien weitaus schwieriger als in den so genannten “Visegradstaaten” und die nationale Geschichte konnte so zu einem bestimmenden Faktor der Herrschaftslegitimation im Postkommunismus werden.⁵¹

Ist es daher überhaupt möglich, im Falle Rumäniens von Re-Demokratisierung zu sprechen? Zuallererst muss festgestellt werden, dass Rumänien die demokratische Erfahrung fehlte. Daher war eine “pacted transition”⁵² zwischen Hardlinern und Softlinern des Regimes und Gemäßigten und Radikalen in der Opposition aufgrund der seltsamen Kombination von nationalistischem Sultanismus und Totalitarismus⁵³ unter Ceaușescu in Rumänien nicht möglich. Diese Vorbedingungen machten es unmöglich, dass Rumänien überhaupt einen “Pfad in Richtung einer echten Demokratisierung”⁵⁴, wie theoretisch von Alfred Stepan beschrieben, erleben konnte. In Rumänien spielten vielmehr Gewalttätigkeit und internationaler Einfluss⁵⁵ eine große Rolle beim Systemwechsel weg vom Sultanismus. In diesem innenpolitischen Umfeld ohne funktionierende Zivilgesellschaft, de facto ohne unabhängige Organisationen, erfüllt von Gewalt und materiellen Nöten, war es ein Leichtes für die etablierten Machteliten, an nationale Gefühle als “Ventil” der angestauten “Wut” zu appellieren und dadurch ausgesprochen antikommunistische Kräfte unter Verweis auf deren angeblich “antinationale Einstellung” von den Schaltstellen der Macht *fern* und sich selbst *in* diesen zu halten.⁵⁶ Eben diese ausgesprochen antikommunistischen Kräfte wären allerdings an den Stellen der Macht notwendig gewesen, damit die Chance erhalten blieb, eine *echte* Demokratisierung durchzuführen.⁵⁷

Dennoch fand eine bestimmte Art der Transition auch in Rumänien statt. Dies soll jetzt analysiert werden. Für die Analyse der Demokratisierung muss man allerdings festhalten, dass Rumänien und die “rumänische Demokratie anders ist als die aller anderen Staaten Mittel — und Südosteuropas”⁵⁸, weshalb es auch immer noch an seinen historischen Lasten in sehr hohem Maße leidet.

Die Krise des rumänischen Staatssozialismus begann auch aufgrund der in Kapitel 3.1. beschriebene Eigenheiten Rumäniens. Der Startschuss fiel, als die Securitate den ungarischen Priester Lászlo Tökés in Timișoara, der Hauptstadt des am ethnisch gemischtesten Teils Rumäniens, dem Banat, festnehmen wollte. Man könnte deshalb dieses Detail auch als Indiz dafür werten, wie der heterogene ethnische Charakter des Landes die demokratische Initiative unterstützte und somit die ethnischen Minderheiten als “vaterlandslose Gesellen” in das Visier der “Herrschafts-Erhaltungs-Waffe” Geschichte manövrierte.⁵⁹ Es ist sogar ziemlich wahrscheinlich, dass die Entwicklung nach 1989 *eher* das Produkt solcher struktureller Besonderheiten war, als das der demokratischen Erfahrungen der rumänischen Bevölkerung. Attila Agh, der Ungar ist, nimmt sogar den Standpunkt ein, dass es überhaupt keine rumänische Revolution im Jahr 1989 gab.⁶⁰ Die Parteigranden entfernten Ceaușescu mehr

oder weniger von der Macht. Dieses Schicksal teilte er mit Todor Schiwkow in Bulgarien und mit Erich Honecker in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, obwohl Ceaușescu Los bei weitem das blutigste war. Die “drei Stufen” Theorie unterstützend, wurde die erste Stufe (die “Zerstörung”, die “Krise” oder einfach der “Zerfall”) von drei entscheidenden Faktoren initiiert. Erstens, dem Massenaufstand, zweitens der Armeerebellion und drittens dem “Palace Coup”.⁶¹ Der tatsächliche Kern einer demokratischen Revolution jedoch, die eine nachhaltige Demokratisierung Schritt für Schritt erzwingt, fehlte im rumänischen Umsturz von 1989 eindeutig. Im absoluten Gegensatz zu einer “wirklichen” Revolution wurde diese Änderung durch etablierte Parteigrößen “unterstützt” und initiiert, um ihre eigenen Positionen behalten und sichern zu können.⁶² Um dies zu kaschieren, brauchte man einen “dramatischen” Abgang Ceaușescu à la Exekution, um sich selbst dann anschließend als “Retter des Vaterlandes” stilisieren zu können.

Ein gutes Beispiel in diesem Zusammenhang ist Ceaușescus Nachfolger, Ion Iliescu⁶³, der zur alten rumänischen sozialistischen Nomenklatur gehörte, die Rumänien bis 1989 unter Ceaușescus Führung ruinierte. Iliescus “Front der Nationalen Rettung” (NSF, FSN auf Rumänisch) ergriff die Macht und behielt sie bis 1996.

Iliescus so genannter “Palace Coup”⁶⁴, der der “vorgetäuschten Revolution”⁶⁵ oder der “gestohlenen Revolution”⁶⁶ folgte, war wegen der desorganisierten Masse, die politisch unerfahren und untätig in der Konfrontation mit Rumäniens “politischen Mandarinen” war, erfolgreich. Der eigentliche Coup selbst war die Tatsache, dass die NSF in der Lage war, sich erfolgreich als de facto monopolistische Vereinigung aller Anti-Ceaușescu-Kräfte darzustellen. Durch sein geschicktes Anknüpfen an die nationalistischen Parolen Ceaușescus gelang es ihm überdies, sich als “nationaler Retter” zu profilieren. Iliescu nutzte so geschickt das Fehlen einer funktionierenden Zivilgesellschaft und er torpedierte ihr — für ihn herrschaftsbedrohliches — Entstehen überdies durch das gezielte Schüren von Nationalismen und Geschichtsmysmen.⁶⁷ Dieses Kunststück gelang während der entscheidenden Wochen gegen Ende des Jahres 1989.⁶⁸ Dank dieses erfolgreichen “Tricks” konnte die alte Elite die Macht behalten. Eben dies war in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik oder in Bulgarien *nicht* erfolgreich. Das Rückgrat von Iliescus System waren die Bergarbeiter, die er im Jahr 1990–91 bei fünf Anlässen in die Hauptstadt rief, um rebellische Studenten und widerspenstige Intellektuelle zusammenschlagen zu lassen.

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass Rumäniens Entwicklung während der ersten Stufe der Demokratisierung nicht zu einem “wirklich” demokratischen System, sondern zu einer “Fassadendemokratie” führte, die im Folgenden beschrieben wird.

2.2. Die Transition zur “Fassaden-Demokratie” — Erster Versuch (1992–1996)

Das Jahr 1990 war für die Zukunft Rumäniens entscheidend, weil einige Vorbedingungen zugunsten oder gegen eine nachhaltige weitere demokratische

Entwicklung gelegt wurden. Die NSF „gewann“ geradezu leicht aufgrund der organisatorischen Defizite der anderen, frisch gegründeten Parteien die Wahlen im Mai 1990.⁶⁹ Sie vereinigte mehr als 60% der gültigen Stimmen auf sich. Die zweite erfolgreiche Partei war die Partei der ungarischen Minderheit, DAHR–RMDSZs, oder UDMR auf Rumänisch, die ungefähr denselben Prozentsatz wie den Anteil der ungarischen Bevölkerung an der Gesamtbevölkerung Rumäniens (7,5%) gewann. Auch dies unterstreicht die tiefe ethnische Spaltung Rumäniens. Zusätzlich dazu gewann Iliescu auch die Präsidentschaftswahlen.⁷⁰ Deshalb wurde die zweite Stufe der demokratischen Entwicklung, die Einführung von demokratischen Institutionen, nur oberflächlich verwirklicht. Die NSF war in der Lage, das Land nahezu ungefährdet und unkontrolliert zu beherrschen. Aufgrund der ausgeprägten regionalen Disparitäten Rumäniens unterstützte die öffentliche Meinung in Rumänien Iliescu und sein NSF — Regime in unterschiedlichem Maße. In den westlichen Landesteilen, wie in Siebenbürgen und im Banat, wo viele Angehörige ethnischer Minderheiten leben, war die Unterstützung für Iliescus Regime schwächer als in den rumänischen „Kernregionen“ der Walachei und der Moldau.

Bis 1991 wurde diese Fassadendemokratie von zwei Männern, Ion Iliescu und seinem Kollegen aus früheren — und jetzt verdrängten — Zeiten, Petre Roman, symbolisiert. Iliescu war der Präsident, während Roman Premierminister war. Jedoch hatten beide verschiedene „Visionen“, wie Rumänien sich entwickeln sollte. Roman war ein überzeugter Europäer und Modernisierer, während Iliescu nationalistisch und traditionsgebunden war und ist. Im September 1991 kam es schließlich zum ultimativen Konflikt zwischen beiden, der sich am Privatisierungsgesetz Romans und seiner Reformpolitik an sich entzündete. Die „Bergarbeiter aus dem Schiltal, dieselbe Gruppe, deren Brutalität Roman und Iliescu im Jahr zuvor gerettet hatte, kehrten nach Bukarest zurück und Iliescu nutzte diese Gelegenheit, und die Schlagkraft „seiner“ Bergarbeiter, um Roman loszuwerden.⁷¹ In der Dezemberverfassung von 1991 wurde eine Präsidentschaft in Anlehnung an die von Frankreich eingeführt, die den Präsidenten dazu ermächtigt, den Premierminister zu ernennen und den Vorsitz über Kabinettsbesprechungen zu haben. Der Staat blieb weiter zentralisiert. Jetzt wurden sogar Gemeinden und ihre direkt gewählten Bürgermeister von der Zentralregierung abhängig, da diese einen Präfekten an der Spitze jedes Bezirkes („Județ“, d.h. „Gerichtsbezirk“)⁷² ernannte, dem sie untergeordnet wurden. Hierzu bemerkte der East European Constitutional Review: „...Overall 133 mayors have been dismissed by government — appointed prefects... Of the 62 mayors who appealed to the Court of Justice only four received redress. Despite the reaction of the parliamentary opposition, international organisations and the electorate, the executive seems determined to carry on its program of purging mayors.“⁷³

Deshalb war Korruption die logische Folge in Rumänien.⁷⁴ In den Septemberwahlen von 1992 gewann die frühere NSF, die sich jetzt DNSF (Demokratische Nationale Rettungsfront) nannte, zwar die relative Mehrheit, aber jetzt musste sie mit der neuen Oppositionspartei Petre Romans, der „neuen“

NSF, konkurrieren, die etwa 10% der Stimmen gewann.⁷⁵ Da diese Wahlen dem Premierminister Nicolae Văcăroiu keine absolute Mehrheit im Parlament bescherten, musste die DNSF Kooperationen suchen, die am leichtesten mit nationalistischen und neo-kommunistischen Gruppen möglich waren. Um durch diese Herrschaftsbasis besonders im Ausland keinen schlechten Eindruck zu erwecken, änderte die DNSF im Juli 1993 ihren Namen wiederum, dieses Mal von DNSF zu PSDR (Partei der Sozialen Demokratie in Rumänien; PSDR auf Rumänisch).⁷⁶ Aber diese kosmetische Veränderung hatte weder die Art der Herrschaft, noch die herrschende Klasse an sich verändert.

Diese Fassadendemokratie reichte bis zu den nächsten Wahlen 1996, die von Emil Constantinescu gewonnen wurden, der neuer Präsident wurde. Im Jahr 1996 wurde die dritte Stufe der Demokratisierung, die Konsolidierungsphase schließlich begonnen. Die Fassadendemokratie wurde — zumindest an der Oberfläche — von einer echten Demokratie abgelöst. Unter der Oberfläche änderte sich allerdings so gut wie nichts.

2.3. Demokratisierung — Zweiter (1996–2000) und Dritter Versuch (2000–2004)

Linz und Stepan zufolge kombiniert die dritte Phase der Demokratisierung alte und neue Teile einer politischen Ordnung in einem neuen, homogenisierten System. Die Wahlen von 1996 markierten einen Meilenstein in der rumänischen Geschichte, obwohl einige Probleme, besonders im ökonomischen Bereich, blieben.⁷⁷ Die Taten der neuen Regierung waren “von historischem Wert für die demokratische Entwicklung Rumäniens”. Minderheitenrechte wurden anerkannt, Verträge mit Ungarn und der Ukraine wurden geschlossen und es begannen Gespräche mit der EU und der NATO. Sogar die Minderheit der Ungarn in Rumänien, vertreten durch die UDMR, trat in die Regierung ein und schickte zwei Minister nach Bukarest.

Jedoch hatte Rumänien immer noch eine sehr schwache Zivilgesellschaft, die für eine wirklich stabile Demokratie notwendig gewesen wäre.⁷⁸ Ein zweiter Aspekt, der ziemlich aufschlussreich über die politischen Realitäten in Rumänien ist, war die Tatsache, dass ein frustrierter Constantinescu nach nur einer Amtszeit auf eine erneute Kandidatur verzichtete. Er musste sich den undemokratischen Realitäten und der Last der sultanistischen Vergangenheit stellen, die ihn scheitern ließen. Deshalb waren besonders die Präsidentschaftswahlen des Jahres 2000 ein Schritt rückwärts in der demokratischen Entwicklung Rumäniens, weil Iliescu nach Constantinescus Verzicht wieder zum rumänischen Präsidenten gewählt wurde. Ein zweiter interessanter Faktor in den Wahlen des Jahres 2000 ist die Tatsache, dass Vadim Tudor, der Führer der Großrumänien Partei (PRM), einer klar antisemitischen und nationalistischen Partei, auf den zweiten Platz, direkt hinter Iliescu, kam. Dieses Ergebnis verrät die unangenehmste Wahrheit über die rumänische Demokratie: Sie ist weder stabil noch resistent gegenüber extremistischen politischen Kräften, sowohl von links als auch von rechts. In der Terminologie Attila Aghs kann zusammengefasst werden, dass Rumänien weit von wahrer *demokratischer Konsolidierung* entfernt

ist. Zwar hat sich die Demokratie entwickelt und Erfolge sind erreicht worden, aber es ist noch ein langer Weg zu einer stabilen Demokratie und Integration Rumäniens in Europa. Die Wiederwahl Iliescus verbesserte die demokratische Struktur nicht. Ganz im Gegenteil dazu marginalisierte die regierende PSD die anderen Parteien geradezu und ein Ende ihrer Dominanz war bis Anfang des Jahres 2004 kaum abzusehen.⁷⁹ Auch Parteineugründungen wie die im Mai 2003 durch den ehemaligen Präsidenten Emil Constantinescu begründete christdemokratische Sammelbewegung „Acțiunea Populară” (Volksaktion) konnten wenig an dieser Situation ändern.⁸⁰ Erst die Lokalwahlen vom 6. Juni 2004, die ein erdrutschartiges Erstarken der Oppositionsallianz DA aus PNL und PD mit sich brachten, änderten die Lage grundlegend.⁸¹ Die PSD war auch in der Wahrnehmung der Bürger verwundbar geworden.⁸²

2.4. Der Regierungswechsel im Dezember 2004: Neue Hoffnung für Rumänien, oder Rückkehr der Geschichte?

Wie nicht anders zu erwarten war, trugen Präsident Iliescu und Premier Năstase als Angehörige der alten Nomenklatur während ihrer gemeinsamen Regierungszeit zwischen 2000 und 2004 nicht dazu bei, eine echte demokratische Konsolidierung zu verwirklichen. Ganz im Gegenteil dazu waren sie beide damit beschäftigt, die Macht der PSD dauerhaft zu verankern und keine ernst zu nehmende politisch-demokratische Konkurrenz hochkommen zu lassen. Am deutlichsten wurden diese Versuche durch die gezielten Unter — Drucksetzungen von Oppositionspolitikern, zur PSD zu wechseln. Die regierende PSD verwendete alle ihr zu Gebote stehenden Patronagemöglichkeiten — und in einem derart zentralistischen Staat wie Rumänien bieten sich der Regierung jede Menge davon —, um ihren Einfluss über die zentral von der Regierung eingesetzten Präfekten dazu geltend zu machen, „Kommunalpolitiker zu ihren Gunsten umzudrehen”. Dieses Phänomen, bewusst häufig als „politischer Tourismus” bezeichnet in Rumänien, stärkte die Position der regierenden Partei noch mehr. Eine Studie des Instituts für Öffentliche Politik (IPP), die die Parteiangehörigkeit von Bürgermeister in Rumänien im Jahr 2000 mit der im Jahr 2003 verglich, zeigte eine massive Wanderung von Bürgermeistern von anderen Parteien zur PSD. Nach den Kommunalwahlen des Jahres 2000 waren 1.050 von insgesamt 2.957 Bürgermeistern (35,5%) Mitglieder der damaligen PDSR. Nur drei Jahre später stellte die PSD 1.947 Bürgermeister (65,4%, was einem Plus von 29,9% entspricht), 897 mehr als im Jahr 2000. Außer der PSD gewannen nur die UDMR (+1,5 %) und die sozial-liberale PUR (+1,0 %), eine Art Vasallenpartei der PSD⁸³, geringfügig.⁸⁴

Diese Vorgänge zeigen überdeutlich, dass Linz und Stepan's dritte Phase, die *Konsolidierungsphase*, in der die Relikte des alten politischen Systems mit den frisch eingeführten Teilen des neuen politischen Systems kombiniert und in einem homogenen System miteinander verbunden werden sollen, noch bei weitem nicht erreicht ist. Die vorher beschriebenen Ereignisse zeigen zwar, dass die alte Nomenklatur im neuen System angekommen ist, dies aber beständig nach ihren Bedürfnissen auszuhöhlen versucht.

Diese Erkenntnis wurde durch die Wahlen vom 28. November 2004 und die Präsidentschaftswahlen noch eindrucksvoller bestätigt. Während schließlich der Kandidat der Opposition, der Bukarester Bürgermeister Traian Băsescu (PD), in der Stichwahl der Präsidentschaftswahlen mit 51,23% gegen Premierminister Adrian Năstase (PSD) (48,77%) siegte, blieben die Mehrheitsverhältnisse in beiden Kammern des Parlamentes recht unübersichtlich. Beide in den Wahlkampf gezogenen Bündnisse, die Allianz DA (PNL und PD) und die Union aus PSD und PUR lagen nahezu gleich auf mit insgesamt 161 zu 189 Sitzen. Noch am 7. Dezember 2004, nur fünf Tage vor der entscheidenden Stichwahl um das Präsidentenamt, hatte sich das Zünglein an der Wage, die UDMR mit ihren insgesamt 32 Sitzen auf eine Unterstützung Năstases und eine Regierungsbildung mit der PSD und der PUR festgelegt. Am 21. Dezember 2004 sah die Sache schon ganz anders aus und die UDMR entschied sich nach der Niederlage Năstases nun für eine Zusammenarbeit mit der DA.⁸⁵ Sogar die PUR schwenkte nun um und schloss mit der DA ein Koalitionsabkommen, wie auch die Fraktion der 18 kleinen Nationalen Minderheiten, seit jeher politische Manövriermasse der jeweiligen Regierungen.⁸⁶ Der Weg war frei für Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (PNL), Băsescus Wunschkandidat als Premierminister, und er wurde schließlich am 28.12.2004 mit 265 zu 200 Stimmen durch das Parlament gewählt, 20 Stimmen mehr als die Koalition im Parlament Sitze hat.⁸⁷

Was war geschehen? Das starke Präsidentenamt, das unerwartet in die Hände der Opposition gefallen war und das die alte Nomenklatur in der Verfassung verankert hatte im Dezember 1991, um zur Not autoritär handeln zu können, falls der Transformationsprozess nicht nach Wunsch verlaufen sollte, wurde nun zum Verhängnis der PSD, da der neue Präsident Băsescu sich weigerte, die PSD trotz ihres Status als stärkste politische Kraft mit der Regierungsbildung zu betrauen. Sagte Băsescu noch scherzhaft in einer Wahlkampf — Talkshow zu seinem Konkurrenten Năstase, “was für ein Fluch muss auf dem rumänischen Volk liegen, dass es zwischen zwei ehemaligen Kommunisten zu wählen hat”⁸⁸, so zeigt der traurige Ablauf der Regierungsbildung doch eindeutig, wie gut die ehemalige Nomenklatur im neuen Rumänien angekommen ist. Was “der amerikanische Soziologe David Stark bereits 1992 als den Weg vom *Plan zum Clan* beschrieben hatte und was Katherine Verdery 1996 auf den griffigen Terminus “entrepratchik” brachte — eine Zusammenziehung aus Entrepreneur, Unternehmer und Apparatschik — scheint auch in Bukarest denkwürdige Realität geworden zu sein.”⁸⁹ Die weitestgehende politische und auch moralische Austauschbarkeit der Parteien zeigt sich insbesondere bei der Mehrheitsbeschaffung für die neue Regierung, die sogar soweit führte, dass sich ein so genannter “Gewerkschafterblock” von der ultranationalistischen PRM abspaltete, um die DA zu unterstützen.⁹⁰

Die Art und Weise der Kungelei um die Macht, fern jeder inhaltlichen Auseinandersetzung zeigt nicht nur den Mangel und die Instabilität der Parteienlandschaft in Rumänien, sie weist überdies auch beträchtliche Parallelen zum Rumänien der Zwischenkriegszeit auf, in der neben exklusivem Nationalismus auch Nepotismus, Korruption und politische Instabilität ganz

oben auf der Tagesordnung standen.⁹¹ Die Tatsache, dass der scheidende Präsident Iliescu kurz vor seinem Ausscheiden aus dem Amt beinahe schon täglich noch Begnadigungen und Ordensverleihungen vornahm und nicht einmal davor zurückschreckte, die höchste rumänische Auszeichnung, den “Stern von Rumänien”, an den Antisemiten Vadim Tudor zu verleihen und zugleich den berüchtigten ehemaligen Anführer der ehemals in Iliescus Namen marodierenden Bergarbeiter, Miron Cozma, zu begnadigen, zeigt, dass Iliescu bis zur buchstäblich letzten Minute, die er im Amt war, versuchte, die Macht der PSD auch über den Machtverlust hinaus zu sichern und der neuen Regierung möglichst viele Stolpersteine in den Weg zu legen, bzw. potenzielle Verbündete, wie Tudor, durch Schmeicheleien an sich zu binden, oder davon abzuhalten, sich nach seinem Ausscheiden aus dem Amt gegen ihn zu wenden.⁹² Genau so hatte er es auch nach seinem ersten Ausscheiden aus dem Präsidentenamt 1996 gehandhabt, was ganz entscheidend zum Scheitern der nachfolgenden bürgerlichen Regierung beigetragen hatte. Der angerichtete Schaden, wie zum Beispiel, dass der Nobelpreisträger Elie Wiesel seinen “Stern von Rumänien” nach der Verleihung an Tudor unter Protest zurückgeschickt hat, gehen Iliescu nicht nahe⁹³, da es ihm — ganz in kommunistischer Tradition — nicht um den Staat und Werte, sondern nur um seine Partei und seine eigene Macht geht. Es bedarf größten Optimismus, vor diesem Hintergrund eine bessere Zukunft und eine wirkliche Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Rumänien zu erkennen. Man fragt sich, ob die neue Regierung aufgrund der Hypothek ihrer eigenen Schwäche und Inkorporation der PSD — treuen PUR wirkliche Reformen wird anpacken können. Es ist möglich, dass sie sich wie ihre Vorgängerin 1996–2000 im Gestrüpp der von der PSD hinterlassenen Seilschaften verheddert und zu Fall kommen wird. Eine echte demokratische Konsolidierung ist vor diesem Hintergrund unmöglich. Es wäre mehr als traurig, wenn Rumänien sich aus diesen Gründen “zurück in die Geschichte” entwickeln wird, wenn es nicht gelingt, die Demokratie dauerhaft mit *gleichen* und *verbindlichen* Spielregeln für *alle* politischen Kräfte zu konsolidieren. Diese Sorge wird auch von der EU — Kommission geteilt, die eine ungewöhnliche Sonderklausel für Rumänien zur Anwendung gebracht hat, nach der, analog zum Beitrittsverfahren der Türkei, die “Notbremse” gezogen werden kann, falls der Reformprozess nicht weiter vorankommt.⁹⁴ Die Wettbewerbskommissarin der EU, Neelie Kroes, fasst die fehlenden Reformen in Rumänien so zusammen: “Rumänien bereitet mir Kopfschmerzen”.⁹⁵

C. Schluss/Fazit: Rumänien heute und morgen — Ein Ausblick

In der Theorie könnte Rumänien eigentlich eine “viel versprechende Zukunft”⁹⁶ haben. Nichts desto trotz bleiben immer noch viele Hindernisse, die auf dem Weg nach Europa überwunden werden müssen. Außerdem ist diese Route für Rumänien kein Weg “zurück nach Europa”, weil es eigentlich nie zu den mitteleuropäisch beeinflussten Ländern wie zum Beispiel die schon traditionell westlich orientierten Länder Ungarn und Polen gehörte. Nur die

früher österreichisch — ungarischen Teile Rumäniens, Siebenbürgen, die Bukowina und das Banat wurden vom Westen beeinflusst, dessen Einfluss auch heute in diesen Landesteilen noch deutlich spürbar ist. So wurde vor auch einigen Jahren Iliescus “antiwestliche Politik” eben in diesen westlichen und nordwestlichen, ethnisch heterogenen Teilen Rumäniens vehement abgelehnt, während seine Politik im ehemaligen “Altreich” sogar Unterstützung fand. Im rumänischen Fall sind die Karpaten “immer noch eine geistige Grenze innerhalb Rumäniens, die das Land in einen europäischeren Teil und einem weniger europäischen Teil teilt”.⁹⁷ Deshalb kann Rumänien nicht als ein “monolithischer Block” betrachtet werden, sondern es muss als eine Art heterogenes Mosaik behandelt werden.

Auch bei den jüngsten Wahlen im November 2004 zeigte sich diese klare Zweiteilung des Landes wieder. Während die reformfeindlich eingestellten Wendekommunisten der PSD und die Ultrationalisten der PRM besonders in den historisch — rumänischen und ethnisch nahezu homogen — rumänischen Regionen des Regat punkten konnten, gewannen die oppositionellen und fortschrittlicheren Kräfte der PNL und PD besonders in den ehemals österreichisch-ungarischen und ethnisch sehr heterogenen Landesteilen des Banat und Siebenbürgens.⁹⁸ Auch die Tatsache, dass die PSD überdies besonders in ländlichen Regionen ihre Stimmen holte und die Opposition in den Städten und Ballungszentren, zeigt, dass europäisches Bewusstsein, Modernität und Integrationsfähigkeit aufgrund von historischen und ethnischen Faktoren maßgeblich gefördert, bzw. gehemmt werden können.⁹⁹ Ist es zum Beispiel in Belarus die unterentwickelte nationale Bewegung und die extreme Schwäche des Nationalismus¹⁰⁰, die die postkommunistische Systemtransformation verhindert, so ist es in Rumänien der vom Staat de facto monopolisierte *exklusive* Nationalismus¹⁰¹, der in Fortsetzung des national-chauvinistischen Kommunismus unter Ceaușescu durch die gezielte Herrschafts-Legitimation durch nationale Mythen und die nationale Geschichte den Autoritarismus weiter am Leben erhält.

Dementsprechend war die demokratische Entwicklung in Rumänien auch eine der schleppendsten des ganzen früheren “Ostblocks”. Der Grund hierfür könnte zusätzlich noch auf die Tatsache zurückgeführt werden, dass “Rumänien die schwächste Opposition der Warschauer Pakt Länder hatte”.¹⁰² Dies ergab sich aus der totalitären, sultanistischen und exklusiv-nationalistischen Herrschaft Ceaușescus, “who was less Communist, less Socialist, less Stalinist, less doctrinist, than he was a “relative” of Idi Amin, Hitler, Reza Pahlavi and Bokassa”.¹⁰³

Das rumänische System wurde von “rumänischem Chauvinismus, wie Antisemitismus und Ressentiments gegen ethnische Minderheiten”¹⁰⁴, geprägt, die “beide in Rumänien eine größere Rolle gespielt haben, als in anderen mittel — und südosteuropäischen Ländern mit der möglichen Ausnahme von Serbien”.¹⁰⁵ Verbunden mit den über die Jahre hinweg ausgeübten sultanistischen Herrschaftsmethoden stellt dies das so genannte “Dilemma” dar, an dem das heutige Rumänien immer noch leidet: Der geistig-moralische Verfall unter der

Herrschaft Ceaușescus kombiniert mit dem ökonomischen Ruin, bilden eine ungeheure Hypothek, für Rumänien, die es auf seinem Weg in Richtung West — und Mitteleuropa zu überwinden gilt. In seinem “Wettbewerb”, in die Europäische Union einzutreten, muss Rumänien sich mit Ländern wie Ungarn, Polen und Slowenien messen lassen, die nicht von “historischen Lasten” solchen Ausmaßes belastet werden.

In dem Moment, in dem Rumänien mit dieser Last zurechtkommt, kann es sicher sein, der Erfüllung seiner Wünsche näher zu kommen. Eine Vorbedingung dafür, dass Rumänien als ein “vollwertiges” Mitglied der europäischen “Familie” akzeptiert wird, ist nicht nur eine gute Wirtschaftskonjunktur, sondern auch ein gut funktionierendes und auf solidem demokratischen Fundament stehendes Staatshaus, das sich durch Stabilität auszeichnet. Die erste Pflichtstufe hierfür muss die Stabilisierung echter Demokratie in Rumänien sein.¹⁰⁶ Sobald dies erreicht werden kann, werden sich auch positive Effekte wie nachhaltige ausländische Investitionen in Rumänien und ein Konjunkturaufschwung ergeben. Der Weg dorthin ist beschwerlich, vor allem durch die Tatsache, dass die Demokratie und die Prinzipien der Marktwirtschaft während des letzten Jahrzehnts in entscheidender Weise diskreditiert wurden, zusätzlich zu “decades of confusion and mistaken expectations concerning democracy”.¹⁰⁷

Daher wäre im Grunde genommen eine Art “moralisch-politische Revolution” in Rumänien notwendig, um sich Europa anzunähern.

Sicher hat Präsident Constantinescu (1996–2000), die ersten Schritte in die richtige Richtung gemacht: Durch die Öffnung seines Landes für europäische Partner aus dem Westen und durch die Unterzeichnung von Verträgen mit Rumäniens Nachbarn Ungarn und der Ukraine, um die gespannten Beziehungen zu diesen Ländern zu verbessern. Aber er scheiterte schließlich in seinem Kampf gegen die Korruption, Verbrechen und politisch extreme Kräfte, um den Erfolg seiner Bemühungen dauerhaft sicherzustellen. Seine äußerst geringen Errungenschaften wurden vor allem von der noch sehr mächtigen alten Nomenklatur aus Iliescus Partei PDSR verursacht (jetzt: PSD), welche immer noch massiven Einfluss in der niedrigeren und mittleren Verwaltung Rumäniens hat¹⁰⁸ und die ihn durch seine moderne und mutige Außenpolitik als “Vaterlandsverräter” verunglimpfte. Auch sein persönlicher Mangel an politischer Erfahrung trug zu seinem Misserfolg bei. In einem Staat, der derart zentralistisch organisiert ist, wie Rumänien, ist dies der letzte K.O. — Schlag für jede Zentralregierung, die sich gänzlich auf eine gute funktionierende Verwaltung verlassen muss.¹⁰⁹

Wenn die EU wirklich die endgültige Entscheidung fällen sollte, Rumänien als Vollmitglied zu akzeptieren — und gegenwärtig deutet vieles darauf hin —, ist es eindeutig schwierig, offensichtlich *rumänische* Gründe für eine derartige Entscheidung zu finden.¹¹⁰ Rumäniens Bilanz seiner politischen und wirtschaftlichen Reformen ist dürftig, und jeden objektiven Beobachter könnte im Falle Rumäniens der Verdacht beschleichen, dass subjektive politische und strategische Interessen jedwede objektive politische und wirtschaftliche Analyse überwogen haben dürften. Dies käme de facto einer Ohrfeige für die hart und

teilweise mit sozial sehr schmerzhaften Resultaten für die Erfüllung der Beitrittskriterien arbeitenden Länder der ersten Erweiterungsrunde, insbesondere Polen, Slowenien, die Tschechische Republik und Ungarn, und auch für den EU — Kandidaten Bulgarien, gleich.

Darüber hinaus fuhr bis zum Regierungswechsel die damalige PSD — Regierung damit fort, Nationalismus zu tolerieren und zum Teil sogar in einer Art “heimlichen Arbeitsteilung mit der PRM”¹¹¹ wohlwollend zu betrachten, wenn er im Sinne der Regierung war.¹¹² Der Minderheitenschutz wurde seit 2000 abgewertet und das Ministerium für Minderheitenschutz, das direkt an die Kanzlei des Premierministers angegliedert war, wurde zu einem “Departamentul pentru relațiile interetnice” (Departement für inere ethnische Beziehungen) innerhalb des “Informationsministeriums”¹¹³ heruntergestuft.¹¹⁴ Reformen werden weiterhin gezielt torpediert¹¹⁵ und als Rechtfertigung wird oft genug die national-geschichtliche Karte gespielt. In diesem Sinne wies der ehemalige Premierminister Adrian Năstase auch darauf hin, dass Rumänien seinen eigenen Weg der Reformen gehen werde: “We do not want to imitate the plans of others. We head towards a gradual reform in a national Romanian way...”¹¹⁶ Mit anderen Worten: Man reformiert nur das, was man auf Druck der EU ändern muss¹¹⁷ und bemüht wieder einmal die Geschichte und den Nationalismus, um seine Herrschaft zu sichern und zu rechtfertigen.¹¹⁸ Mittlerweile geschieht dies aber immer subtiler und man präsentiert sich “europatauglich”¹¹⁹ durch das Beflaggen der Europafahne¹²⁰ an allen Grenzübergängen und an allen öffentlichen Plätzen und Gebäuden Rumäniens. Dem steht allerdings die gezielte Provokation, vor allem der Ungarn, zum Beispiel in der von einer großen Zahl von Ungarn bewohnten Stadt Cluj-Napoca/Koloszvar/Klausenburg gegenüber, wo der nationalistische Bürgermeister Georghe Funar (PRM) bis zu seiner Abwahl im Juni 2004 alle Parkbänke, Zäune und sogar öffentliche Mülleimer vor ungarischen Kultureinrichtungen als gezielte Provokation in der rumänischen Trikolore anstreichen ließ und die rumänische Trikolore an allen Ecken wehen ließ.

Überdies erinnert die Art und Weise, in der Präsident Iliescu demokratische Verfahren zu Legitimierungszwecken missbrauchte und das verfassungsmäßige Gebot der politischen Neutralität des Präsidenten besonders im Wahlkampf ignorierte, sehr an den in Russland praktizierten “Jelzinismus”.¹²¹ Da ein derartiges System “den politischen Pluralismus einschränkt und den Verfassungs — und Rechtsstaat nicht ernst nimmt, ist es dem autoritären Herrschaftstypus zuzuordnen”.¹²² Dauerhafte “Lösungen für die unzähligen Probleme können nur in der Sphäre demokratischer Politik gefunden werden”¹²³ und nicht durch geschichtlich motivierten Nationalismus und autoritäre Herrschaftstechniken. Der postkommunistische rumänische Staat “weist autoritäre Züge auf, der Autoritarismus generiert aber Anarchie, die wieder autoritäre Lösungen hervorruft”.¹²⁴ Dies erinnert sehr an Russland und wie dort zeigt auch die Entwicklung in Rumänien, dass die “in westlichen Eliten oft genährte Hoffnung, Demokratie könne mit autoritären Mitteln am Verfassungs — und Rechtsstaat vorbei aufgebaut werden, naiv ist”.¹²⁵

Vor dem Hintergrund der bisher analysierten Missstände, bleibt es jedoch vorerst offen, ob der politische Machtwechsel vom Dezember 2004 wirklich nachhaltig — positive Veränderungen mit sich bringen wird. Die Gefahr ist groß, dass die neue, reformorientierte Regierung Rumäniens wie ihre bürgerliche Vorgängerin zwischen 1996 und 2000 an den allgegenwärtigen autoritären und von den Wendekommunisten noch verstärkten Strukturen scheitert. Es wäre Rumänien zu wünschen, dass die neue Regierung die Fehler ihrer bürgerlichen Amtsvorgängerin vermeiden wird und so Rumänien endlich auf einen konsequenten Pfad in Richtung konsolidierte Demokratie bringen kann. Dann würden sich auch die Geschichte als Legitimation der Herrschaft samt den *exklusiv* nationalistischen Tendenzen und somit auch die allgegenwärtigen autoritären Strukturen von selbst erledigen und ein integrationsfähiges und wirklich demokratisches Rumänien, könnte so ein wirklich akzeptiertes Mitglied der EU werden. Bis dahin liegt allerdings noch ein weiter Weg vor der neuen rumänischen Regierung.

Zusammenfassend kann man daher sagen, dass Rumänien nur dann *wirklich* erfolgreich sein kann und wird, wenn es die notwendigen Reformen voll und ganz in die Praxis umsetzt.¹²⁶ Mythen und nationale Geschichte sind definitiv keine längerfristig erfolgreichen Mittel, um sich den Herausforderungen der europäischen Integration und der modernen Welt stellen zu können.¹²⁷ Rumänien hat definitiv das Potenzial, um echte demokratische Spielregeln zu verwirklichen, aber es muss hart daran arbeiten, um sein Hauptziel zu erreichen, welches nur lauten kann, ein “wirklich akzeptiertes” Mitglied der europäischen Staatenfamilie zu werden und nicht nur ein Mitglied “aufgrund irgendwelcher strategischer Gründe”, oder vielleicht sogar schlimmer, als politischer Pariah zu enden.

NOTES

1. Weiter führende Informationen in: Lewis, *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*.
2. Glenny, *The Rebirth of History*.
3. Sterbling, *Überlegungen zum Wiederwachen der Geschichte*.
4. Joffe, *The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts*.
5. Völkl, *Rumänien vom 19. Jhd. bis in die Gegenwart*.
6. Vgl. Gallagher, *The Balkans since 1989: The Winding Retreat from National Communism*.
7. Vgl. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War*.
8. Mommsen, *Arbeiterbewegung und nationale Frage—Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, S. 63.
9. [Zwar waren Albanien, Jugoslawien und Bulgarien auch gelegentlich der Klassifikation “National Communism” zugewiesen, doch ist Rumänien der Fall, in dem der Nationalismus die bei weitem größte Bedeutung im Herrschaftssystem erlangte und bei dem der Personenkult die extremsten Züge annahm.]. Vgl. Gallagher, *The Balkans since 1989: The Winding Retreat from National Communism*.
10. Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans 1804–1945*, S. 67–79.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Schöpflin, *Nationalism and National Minorities in East and Central Europe*.
13. Archivmaterialien des DFDR/F.D.G.R. (21. September 2002) (A3).
14. [Die Volkszählung von 2002 geht von 59.764 Deutschen aus. Das Gesamtergebnis der Volkszählung von 2002 wird allerdings von zahlreichen Kennern der demographischen Entwicklung Rumäniens mit Skepsis gesehen. Gemäß den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung hat sich auch die Gesamtbevölkerung Rumäniens seit 1992 um rund eine Million, d.h. rund 4,2% der Gesamtbevölkerung, verringert. Speziell die offiziell errechnete Zahl von 535.140 Roma (2,5% der Bevölkerung) geht an der Realität

- wohl ziemlich vorbei und unterstreicht die Fragwürdigkeit der Ergebnisse der Volkszählung von 2002].
15. *Ibid.*
 16. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 257.
 17. Kolarz, *Mituri și realități în Europa de Est*, S. 145 ff.
 18. Völkl, *Rumänien vom 19. Jhd. bis in die Gegenwart*, S. 90.
 19. [“Ungarn verlor dadurch 1919 zwei Drittel seines Territoriums” (Kinder, S. 903), sogar junge ungarische Männer wurden “Trianon” getauft, um an dieses ungarische Trauma zu erinnern. (Gespräch mit Herrn Bunzmann, Regensburg, 6.1.2002)].
 20. Kinder, *Atlas zur Weltgeschichte*, S. 415.
 21. Leuștean, *România, Ungaria și Tratatul de la Trianon 1918–1920*.
 22. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 258.
 23. [“Nicolae Ceaușescu, geboren 1918, hingerichtet 1989. Ceaușescu beherrschte Rumänien von 1965–1989 auf diktatorische Art und Weise und wurde im Dezember 1989 gewaltsam gestürzt. Dies wurde von der rumänischen Armee gezielt unterstützt. Er wurde in einem Geheimprozess von einem Militärtribunal zum Tode verurteilt. Das Todesurteil wurde sofort vollstreckt.” (Anger, S. 133)].
 24. Schöpflin, *Rumanian Nationalism*, S. 104.
 25. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 350.
 26. Gespräch mit Herrn Rösler, Regensburg (6. Januar 2002).
 27. Gespräch mit Herrn Borger, Sibiu (24. März 2003).
 28. Gespräch mit Herrn Fritsch, Regensburg (12. Juli 2002).
 29. [Ana Blandiana wurde am 25. Mai 1942 in Temeschburg/Temesvar/Timișoara, Banat, Rumänien, geboren. Sie studierte Philologie in Cluj/Kolozsvár/Klausenburg, Rumänien. Ihr Band mit Gedichten wurde 1964 (*Persoana întâi la plural*, d.h. Erste Person Plural) herausgegeben. Sie hat Gedichte, Prosa und Essays geschrieben, und sie ist die Vorsitzende des rumänischen Pen-Clubs und Mitglied der europäischen Akademie für Lyrik].
 30. Südwest 3: *Schauplatz der Geschichte: Siebenbürgen*, Sonntag, 6. August 1995, 16.55 Uhr.
 31. North, *Institutions*, S. 3.
 32. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*.
 33. Wydra, *Democracy in Eastern Europe as a Civilising Process*.
 34. Wallace und Haerpfer, *Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption*.
 35. Beveridge, *Voluntary Action*, S. 320.
 36. Professor Jerzy Maćków, Universität Regensburg, Vorlesung *Nation und Gesellschaft in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, Wintersemester 2002/2003.
 37. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.
 38. Pérez-Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society. The Emergence of Democratic Spain*, S. 54 ff.
 39. Henkel, *Ostalgie und Heldentod: Was von den Revolutionen übrigbleibt*, in: “HZ”, Nr. 1827, (16. Mai 2003), S. 3.
 40. Wallace und Haerpfer, *Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption*, S. 14.
 41. Gabanyi, *Rumänien zwischen Revolution und Restauration*.
 42. Gespräch mit Herrn Borger, Sibiu (1. April 2003).
 43. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*.
 44. Wydra, *Democracy in Eastern Europe as a Civilising Process*, S. 288.
 45. *Ibid.*, S. 303.
 46. *Ibid.*, S. 298. Passim: *East European Reporter*, V (11), March–April 1992, S. 67.
 47. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 262.
 48. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 352.
 49. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, S. 399.
 50. Băleanu, *Romania – Resources for the Region*, S. 210.
 51. Völkl, *Rumänien vom 19. Jhd. bis in die Gegenwart*, S. 214.
 52. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 356.
 53. Schöpflin, *Rumanian Nationalism*, S. 95.
 54. Stepan, *Paths toward Redemocratization*, S. 64.
 55. Vgl. Brandstätter, *Schachmatt – Strategie einer Revolution*, ARTE Fernsehen (Mittwoch, 25. Februar 2004, 20.45 Uhr). [In dieser Dokumentation wird ein ganz neues Licht auf die Ereignisse in Rumänien im Herbst 1989 geworfen. Der Tenor der Sendung ist, dass Ceaușescu in Kooperation von KGB und CIA gestürzt wurde, da er und sein Regime nicht mehr in die Wendezeit passten, aber nicht von alleine zusammenbrechen wollten. Ceaușescu war zum einzigen noch verbliebenen Hindernis des Zusammenwachsens Europas geworden und musste daher gestürzt werden, so die Dokumentation. Darüber hinaus gibt die Rolle verschiedener anderer ausländischer Gruppen während der “Revolution” auch heute noch immer Rätsel auf].
 56. Gespräch mit Herrn Hicks, Oxford (24. Juni 2002).
 57. Maćków, *Der Wandel des kommunistischen Totalitarismus und die postkommunistische Systemtransformation*.
 58. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 365.
 59. Gespräch mit Herrn Kahr, Sibiu (18 Juli 2002).
 60. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 262.
 61. Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu anii numărătorii inverse*, S. 294 ff.
 62. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War*, S. 134 ff.

63. [“Ion Iliescu war rumänischer Präsident von 1990 bis 1996, als er die Präsidentschaftswahlen an seinen Nachfolger und Vorgänger Emil Constantinescu verlor. Da Constantinescu 2000 auf ein neuerliche Kandidatur verzichtete, wurde Iliescu wieder Präsident ...” (In: von Baratta (2002), S. 904). In seinem veröffentlichten Lebenslauf wird er ganz im Gegenteil dazu wie folgt charakterisiert: “Er wurde schon [vor 1989] für einen Politiker gehalten, dem man vertraute, den Kampf gegen Totalitarismus, für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Demokratie führen zu können.”].
64. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 263.
65. Mačková, *Parlamentarische Demokratie und Autoritarismus*, S. 54 ff.
66. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 358.
67. Sislín, *Revolution Betrayed? Romania and the National Salvation Front*.
68. Câmpeanu, *Ceașescu anii numărătorii inverse*, S. 293 ff.
69. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 265.
70. Völkl, *Rumänien vom 19. Jhd. bis in die Gegenwart*, S. 217–8.
71. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, S. 450.
72. Băleanu, *Romania — Resources for the Region*, S. 210.
73. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 364. Passim: *Constitution Watch: Romania*, in: “East European Constitutional Review 4”, Nr. 2 (1995), S. 22.
74. ADZ, *Umfrage zum Stand der Korruption*, in: Nr. 2655 (28. Juni 2003), S. 1.
75. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 269.
76. Crampton, *Eastern Europe In The Twentieth Century*, S. 451.
77. Gespräch mit Herrn Bunzmann, *Regensburg* (20. Dezember 2001).
78. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, S. 364.
79. Lucaciu, *Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă subordonată PSD?*, in: “România Liberă”, Nr. 670 (15–21 Mai 2003), S. 3.
80. *Fostul președinte al României și-a lansat noul partid*, in: “Curierul de Vest”, Nr. 22 (28. Mai 2003), S. 2.
81. *PSD erzielte die meisten Mandate, PNL und PD die meisten Stimmen*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 2906 (23. Juni 2004), S. 1.
82. [Es sollte an dieser Stelle nicht unerwähnt bleiben, dass sogar das Deutsche Forum als politisch recht schwache Vertretung der kleinen deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien, einen überwältigenden Sieg gegen die seit 2000 völlig dominierende PSD davontragen konnte. So besiegte der Bürgermeisterkandidat des DFDR für Sibiu, Klaus Johanns, den Kandidaten der PSD schon im ersten Wahlgang mit knapp 90% zu mageren 6% für die PSD und auch im Stadtrat der 160.000 — Einwohner Stadt standen 16 gewählten Stadträten des Forums von insgesamt 23 Stadträten lediglich 3 der PSD gegenüber. Im 33-köpfigen Rat des Județ von Sibiu war es nur wenig besser für die PSD, da dort 11 gewählten Vertretern des Forums lediglich 8 der PSD gegenüberstehen und auch in den anderen Siedlungsgebieten der Deutschen in Rumänien konnte das DFDR des Öfteren im direkten Vergleich mit der PSD punkten. Dieses Ergebnis macht sich umso eindrucksvoller aus, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Deutschen im Județ Sibiu nur rund 4% der Bevölkerung und auf Landesebene nur knapp 0,4% ausmachen. Das Resultat aber zeigt auch, dass die rumänischen Wähler nach einer glaubhaften lokalen politischen Alternative zur für ihre korrupten Machenschaften bekannten PSD suchten und sie im DFDR gefunden zu haben glaubten.] *Totales Vertrauensvotum*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 2896 (9. Juni 2004), S. 8.
83. [Die PUR ist eine Art “Privatpartei” des Medienmoguls Dan Voiculescu. Sie konnte nur ins Parlament gelangen, da sie auf den Listen der PSD mitkandidiert hatte. Die PSD war das Bündnis mit der PUR deswegen eingegangen, um für sich eine loyale Berichterstattung in dem großen TV-Privatsender *Antena 1* und in der Zeitung *Jurnalul Național* zu sichern.]. *Opposition rebelliert*, in: “HZ”, Nr. 1906 (3. Dezember 2004), S. 1–2.
84. *Wie demokratisch ist die Sozialdemokratische Partei?*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 2832 (10. März 2004), S. 3.
85. *Eine Regierung um die Liberalen und Demokraten zeichnet sich ab*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 3034 (21. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
86. *Minderheiten-Fraktion unterstützt die Bildung einer Regierung PNL–PD*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 3036 (23. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
87. *Vereidigung der neuen Regierung und Investitur durch das Parlament*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 3040 (30. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
88. Wagner, *Die neue Regierung*, in: “Banater Zeitung”, Nr. 581 (12. Januar 2005), S. 1.
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*
91. Roth, *Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919–1933*.
92. *Scheidender Präsident Iliescu hat berichtigten Bergarbeiterführer Miron Cozma begnadigt*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 3033 (18. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
93. *Iliescu kriegt weitere Orden zurückgeschickt*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 3034 (21. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
94. *Sonderklausel für Rumänien ist viel strenger als bei Bulgarien*, in: “ADZ”, Nr. 3028 (11. Dezember 2004), S. 1.

95. *Ibid.*
96. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 278.
97. Gespräch mit Herrn Hicks, Oxford (24. Juni 2002).
98. Teilergebnisse: Kleinere Differenz zwischen den beiden Bündnissen, in: "ADZ", Nr. 3021 (1. Dezember 2004), S. 1–2.
99. Vgl. hierzu: Maćków, *Am Rande Europas? Nation, Zivilgesellschaft und außenpolitische Integration in Belarus, Litauen, Polen Russland und der Ukraine*. Passim: Greenfeld, *Five Roads to Modernity*. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.
100. Maćków, *Am Rande Europas? Nation, Zivilgesellschaft und außenpolitische Integration in Belarus, Litauen, Polen Russland und der Ukraine*, S. 237. 101 *Ibid.*, s. 237.
101. *Ibid.*, S. 237.
102. Linz und Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, S. 346.
103. *Ibid.*, S. 353.
104. Kolarz, *Mituri și realități în Europa de Est*, S. 133 ff.
105. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, S. 261.
106. Gabanyi, *Die unvollendete Revolution: Rumänien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie*.
107. Szokolczai, *Experiences of Democratisation: Elements of a Comparative Historical Framework*, S. 28.
108. Henkel, Ostalgie und Heldenot: Was von den Revolutionen übrig bleibt, S. 3.
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A3: Forum Intern
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A7: Minderheitenpublikationen
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(Univ.), 1994–2004 Geschäftsführer des
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Rumänien (DFDR/FDGR), Sibiu/Hermannstadt,
Rumänien, (17. Juli 2002, 22., 24. und 29. März
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(Bukowina, Rumänien), jetzt Regensburg,
Redakteur im Ruhestand (Regensburg,
Deutschland, 20. Dezember 2001, 6. Januar
2002). [Egon Erwin Lajos Bunzmann, geboren
1921 in Dunavecse, Ungarn, lebt jetzt in Zeiler
bei Regensburg. Seit 1922 lebte er in Radautz
(Rumänisch: Rădăuți), Bukowina, bis 1941, als
die Buchenlanddeutschen in das Deutsche Reich
umgesiedelt wurden. Bis 1945 diente er in der
deutschen Luftwaffe in Italien, Frankreich und

- Polen. Nach dem Krieg war Herr Bunzmann mehrmals offizieller Dolmetscher einiger westdeutscher politischer Delegationen, die ihn mit dem damaligen Bundesminister Hermann Höcherl (CSU) zwischen 1966 und 1969 nach Rumänien führten. Der Autor begleitete Herrn Bunzmann im August/September 1998 nach Rumänien.]
- Fritsch, Wilhelm, Steierdorf (Banat, Rumänien), pensionierter stellvertretender Rektor des Von-Müller-Gymnasiums Regensburg, früherer stellvertretender Bürgermeister von Steierdorf-Anina (1962–1967), (Regensburg, Deutschland, 15. März 2002 und 12. Juli 2002.)
- [Wilhelm Fritsch, geboren im Jahr 1936 in Kronstadt (Rumänisch: Braşov), Siebenbürgen, Rumänien, stellvertretender Rektor im Ruhestand des Von-Müller-Gymnasiums, lebt jetzt in Regensburg, Deutschland. Herr Fritsch flüchtete aus Rumänien über Ungarn im Jahr 1971. Er war der Vertreter der deutschen Bevölkerung seiner Heimatstadt Steierdorf-Anina (Banat, Rumänien). In dieser Funktion agierte Herr Fritsch als der stellvertretende Bürgermeister von Anina. Der Autor begleitete Herrn Fritsch im Juli 2002 nach Rumänien.]
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- [Rudolf Rösler wurde im Jahr 1934 in Sächsisch-Sankt Georgen, Nordsiebenbürgen, Rumänien, geboren. Herr Rösler ist Magister Silvarius, Botaniker und Jagdgelehrter, er studierte Forstwirtschaftswissenschaften an der Universität Kronstadt (Rumänisch: Braşov), Siebenbürgen, Rumänien. Von 1958 bis 1976 arbeitete Herr Rösler in der Staatsforstverwaltung Rumäniens. Im Jahr 1976 wanderte er in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland aus und von 1976 bis zu seinem Ruhestand im Jahr 1999 war er als leitender Forstwirtschaftsdirektor im Forstamt Regensburg tätig. Im Jahr 1987 wurde Herr Rösler zum "Berater des Europäischen Rates bezüglich der Waldverwaltung des östlichen und südöstlichen Europa" berufen. Herr Rösler ist der Autor mehrerer Studien und Forschungsarbeiten auf dem Gebiet der Forstgeschichte Rumäniens.]
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
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**REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA VERSUS ROMANIA:
THE COLD WAR OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES**

MONICA HEINTZ

In their project of forging a Moldovan identity that would justify the existence of the economically distressed Republic of Moldova as an independent state, the officials search for the symbols commonly used for forging nationhood. As these symbols are the same or not significantly different from those of the neighbouring Romanian state due to their common history (same official language, though differently labelled, same tricolor, similar coat-of-arms), the Moldovan officials perceive Romania as a threat. My analysis based on anthropological fieldwork pays special attention to the political declarations of the Moldovan government and questions their capacity of strengthening citizenship in a country in which *ethnic minorities form more than 30% of the population and which experiences severe economic problems and massive emigration*. The analysis draws also attention to the evolution of NATO and EU borders, which have accelerated the identity problems of Moldova, which wishes to follow “neither Russian, nor Romanian ways”.



The issues at stake in the identity conflict

To understand the complex relationship between the two neighbouring states, Romania and the Republic of Moldova, one should necessarily go back to the history that unfolded on the physical territory on which these two states are constituted. Two thousand years ago the region was inhabited by Dacians, who were conquered by the Romans in 106 A.C. The population resulting from the mix of Dacians and Romans spoke a distinctive language, of clear Latin origin,

which was already recognized towards the 17th century as “Romanian” (first mentioned as “Romanian” by the Metropolitane Varlaam in 1643, quoted in *Literatura și Artă*, 13.11.2003). Later the wave of migratory people, especially the Slavs, influenced the language and mixed with the local population. From the 14th to the 19th centuries, the region was politically divided into three main kingdoms: Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania.



(from Treptow, 1996)

The three kingdoms were under the influence of three empires: the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Transylvania and from the 18th century the northern parts of Moldavia), the Ottoman Empire (Wallachia and Moldavia) and the Russian empire (the eastern part of the kingdom of Moldavia, baptized by Russians Bessarabia, from the 19th century). In the 19th century two of the kingdoms, Moldavia, without Bessarabia, and Wallachia benefited from favourable geopolitical circumstances to unite under the name of Romania.



(from Treptow, 1996)

After the First World War, due to the politics of nationhood promoted by Wilson and with the support of Western allies, Transylvania and Bessarabia voted for unification with Romania. The ensuing Greater Romania encompassed the current territories of Romania and the Republic of Moldova, and other territories now in the Ukraine (Northern Bukovina, Northern Maramureş and Southern Bessarabia) and Bulgaria (the Quadrilater).



(from Treptow, 1996)

The 1939 German-Russian Ribbentrop-Molotov nonaggression pact allowed the Soviet Union to claim Bessarabia without the intervention of German forces. On the 28th of June 1940, after an ultimatum, the Romanian army and administration retired from Bessarabia and the Soviet army took over. The “annexation” or “liberation” of Bessarabia, depending on whose point of view is expressed, was accompanied by massive movements of people: the Romanian elite (teachers, priests, administration) sought refuge in Romania; those who did not manage to flee were subject to massive deportations in Siberia (Bulat, 2000; Frunțașu, 2003). One year later, in 1941, Romania joined the German forces, now in conflict with the USSR, with the aim of recovering Bessarabia. From 1941 to 1944 the Bessarabian region had a joint German-Romanian administration. On the 17th of March 1944, the Soviet troupes crossed the Dniester and incorporated the Bessarabian region and Northern Bukovina into the USSR. Parts of the territory (Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia) were incorporated into the Ukraine and the remaining central part was consolidated as a new republic, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic

(MSSR). The frontier between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was reinforced and the history of the two countries was rewritten from a Soviet perspective: in order to justify the new borders, *Stalin created a new nation, the Moldovans, an action necessary for respecting the USSR policy of incorporating only nation states in the USSR* (Eyal and Smith, 1998). *The Moldovans were conceived as a separate ethnic group from the Romanians and held to speak a different language, the Moldovan, which started being written with Cyrillic to further differentiate it from Romanian, written with Latin characters.* The story of the birth of the “Moldovan” language was amply documented by Western social scientists, who found it of particular political interest (see Hegarty, 2001; Eyal and Smith, 1998; King, 2000). To render the picture more complex and prevent future territorial claims, Stalin also redesigned boundaries. He gave some of the Bessarabian territories to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and incorporated “in exchange” into the MSSR a long border territory just across the Dniester, Transnistria, which was existing since its creation by *Stalin in 1924 under the name of the “Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic”*. This strip of land, which had never belonged to the kingdom of Moldavia and had only 40% ethnic Romanians (in the 1989 census), became the main industrial and energy producer of the MSSR (Troebst, 2003). During the whole socialist period, the two socialist republics of Moldova and Romania had few contacts and the circulation of information concerning their common past was prohibited in both states. Maps in Romania would juxtapose the map legend on the MSSR’s territory, indicated only as “USSR”. The Romanian intellectuals in the MSSR had been massively deported, as all those who had had contacts with the Romanian administration before the war. Moldovans had their own schools, but those wishing further education had to gain proficiency in Russian. Russian specialists were brought into the Republic, mixed marriages were encouraged and the *Homo Sovieticus* was almost born. Meanwhile the Moldovan history and literature had been reduced to those parts of the history exclusively linked to the kingdom of Moldavia and to its Russian relations, while in Romania, Romanian history and literature excluded everything linked to the existence and products of the Moldovan territory. Despite this policy, at the end of the 80s, a newly formed generation of Moldovan intellectuals started claiming language and national rights. In a few years, facilitated by the Perestroika and the general 1989 movements in Eastern Europe, Moldovans obtained the recognition of their national language as unique official language in the country (31 august 1989), of their ethnic name, of the Romanian national anthem and political rights (Cojocaru, 2001). At the time, the Republic featured a mixed ethnic population, including 64.5% Moldovans (Romanians), 13.8% Ukrainians, 13% Russians, 3.5% Gagaouz and other groups (from 1989 census, the latest census available). Two years after, on the 27th of August 1991, after the putsch against Gorbachev, the republic declared its independence from the Soviet Union under the name of “Republic of Moldova”.



(from the CIA World Factbook 2003)



(from the CIA World Factbook 2003)

Romania was the first state to recognise Moldova's independence, an act often invoked today by Romanian politicians to defend themselves from the accusations of expansionism made by Moldovan officials. Fear of reunification with Romania was invoked by the eastern part of the republic, Transnistria, for justifying its secession, after a short war in 1992. Though technically separated from the Republic of Moldova (frontiers, other currency, own government, etc.), Transnistria still belongs officially to the Republic of Moldova, not being recognized as an independent state by the international community. For twelve years negotiators seek a solution to this conflict, which often distracts the attention of international press and population from other internal problems faced by the Republic of Moldova (the most important being emigration and Romanian/Moldovan identity problems). From 1991 onwards, the two states Romania and Moldova have coexisted peacefully and have been engaged in cultural and economic contacts. But the national rights gained in 1989 are gradually vanishing away due to the desire of Moldovan officials to base the legitimacy of their new state on the uniqueness of their nation. Thus the name of the official language was named "Moldovan" again, the anthem was changed to a text written by a Romanian born Bessarabian territory, Alexe Mateevici, history textbooks are periodically threatened to be changed (in 2004 in the majority of schools the History of Romanians was taught) and *the old Stalinist doctrine of the difference between the two ethnic groups is embraced, the officials refusing to consider the Republic of Moldova as a Romanian state within different state borders.*

Identities are always defined in two ways: through their intrinsic characteristics and in opposition. Similarities between the national characteristics and symbols

of Romania and Moldova render the first option difficult. *This is the main reason why the officials had to appeal to the second and develop an identity against the Romanian identity, by denigrating both Romanians and Romania as a state.*

The anti-Romanian campaign in the Republic of Moldova

The antipathy of Moldovan officials towards the Romanian state has grown after the 2001 elections in which the Moldovan Communist Party won a vast majority. The Communist officials promised to return to a territorial administration that would differentiate their countries' organization from Romania's organization (in *județe* as opposed to *raioane*), to change history curricula from Romanian History to Moldovan history and to introduce Russian as a second official language in the state. *While the first administrative measure was implemented in 2003¹, the attempt to change the history and to introduce Russian as the official language met with massive demonstrations especially from students. In 2002 a sitting was organized in Chișinău city center, by a pro-unionist party and supported by young people, to prevent the rewriting of history and to ask for the recognition of the Bessarabian Metropolitanate, a Romanian Orthodox structure that was not authorized to function since its revival in 1992.* The rewriting of history was temporally abandoned but a vast campaign is still made in its favour. In 2003 new "integrated" histories of Moldova started being taught in several schools in the Republic as an experiment and the state supported the publication and promotion of a *Moldovan-Romanian dictionary* (2003), of a *History of Moldova* (2003), written by Vasile Stati, who not only claims that there is a difference between the two ethnic groups, Romanian and Moldovan, but also state that Romania annexed Moldova in the 19th century, subjecting it to "roumanisation" and that the eastern part of the Moldavian kingdom, the present republic of Moldova, is the only part that survived, preserving its name and language. The books have a map of a "Greater Moldova" on the cover. The intention to include Romanians as a separate ethnic group in the census planned for 2004 was stated by Victor Stepaniuk, leader of the Communist Parliamentary fraction in October 2003 (*Timpul*, 19.12.2003). The idea was that, by getting the majority of people to assert their Moldovan identity, the reason for teaching Romanian literature and history in school will disappear. Also this introduces a division inside the Romanian-Moldovan population (estimated at 70% of the entire population in the Republic of Moldova minus Transnistria), between those who would declare themselves Romanians (mostly the elite) and those who would declare themselves Moldovans — mostly the rural population, who, in the opinion of Iulian Frunțașu (2003), have never acquired identities larger than their very local identities, which on the one hand helped them preserve their customs and language, but on the other hand hindered the process of integration into the Romanian nation, during the interwar period. This policy of division of the majority group has been actively employed by the officials: an alternative Writers' Union who would promote an anti-Romanian stance was created, as well as an alternative Journalists' union, etc.

Looking at the external Moldovan-Romanian relations, the year 2003 was marked by the accusation made by the Ambassador of Moldova in Paris to the Council of Europe that Romania did not revise its history of the Holocaust (the Council of Europe formally replied to assure Moldova that Romania was in the process of revising it with supervision from the Council of Europe), by president Voronin's declaration that "*Romania is the last empire in Europe*", by a letter to the Commissar for European Enlargement stating that Romania was interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova and spending huge amounts of money on its territory without coordinating it with the officials. *A practical consequence of this declaration is the fact that since the communists have been in power, the educational agreements promoting student exchange and the allocation of scholarships by the Romanian state to Moldovan citizens were suspended and have not been resumed yet. Despite this, the Romanian state offers scholarships to Moldovan citizens who apply for them, on an individual basis, at Romanian high schools and universities.* The Romanian officials defend themselves from the accusations of interference by reminding that the Romanian state was the first to recognize the independence of the Republic of Moldova and by supporting "the European destiny of the Republic of Moldova". *Meanwhile, Romanian officials persistently state the "special relation" between the two countries, two Romanian states, a formula strongly resisted by their Moldovan counterparts.* The mass media in Romania are generally indifferent to the actions and movements of the neighbouring country. This apparent indifference of Romanian official and press is easily explainable by the fear to compromise Romania's integration into the European Union, scheduled for the 1st of January 2007.

Here is an example of the confrontation of symbols and declarations between the two states and the press in the two countries. The 2nd of July 2004 was the anniversary of 500 years since the death of Saint Stephen the Great, important historical figure of the medieval kingdom of Moldavia, canonised saint at the beginning of the 90s. Both Romania and the Republic of Moldova had declared 2004 as the Year Stephen the Great. Saint Stephen the Great was celebrated with great pomp at a gathering of hundreds of thousands of people at the Putna Monastery, in Romania, where the king is buried. Moldovan Opposition newspapers announced that the president of Moldova conditioned his presence at Putna in Romania, where he had been invited by the Romanian president, on the recognition of the difference between the Romanian and Moldovan languages. The Romanian president denied that there had been such a discussion and stated that their relations with the Moldovan president were good. The Romanian press was indifferent to the matter. The Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin organized a counter celebration of Stephen the Great in Chişinău on the same date. *The presidential discourse insisted that history had rewarded Stephan with the preservation of his (Moldovan) state, language and people. His party newspaper, "The Communist" (2 July 2004), published on its front page a poem with clear territorial allusions, supported on the second page by an article entitled "For a Unique Moldova", thus advocating the incorporation of Romanian Moldavia into the Republic of Moldova.*

The 2nd of July is the Saint Day of Stephen in the Romanian Orthodox Calendar. In his eagerness, the president celebrated Saint Stefan on this day, while the Republic of Moldova uses the old orthodox calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church, thus Saint Stephen's day is 13 days later than in Romania, on the 15-th of July. While the Moldovan Opposition press considers this with hilarity and contempt, as it also looks down on most of the anti-Romanian manifestations of the communists in power, *I would like to argue in this paper for a much more serious consideration of the declarations, symbols and policy led by the communists. The material that I have collected in my 2003/2004 fieldwork in the Moldovan countryside shows that "moldovenism" has an impact on the Moldovan population. Its impact ranges from confusion as to one's own identity, to competition between Moldovans and Romanians and up to hate of Romanians.*

The competition of national identities at local levels

There are several societal factors that catalyse the positive reception of moldovenism at local levels. *The first is the ethnic composition of the country, which has 30% minorities, more than half of them born on the Moldovan territory, many of them better educated than Moldovans* (Skvortsova:169) and often in leading economic positions. The russophones minorities have constantly supported a policy closer to Russia and the CIS and feared policies bringing Romania nearer. For maintaining good relations with minorities who speak poor Romanian (there had been initially an obligation for the administrative staff to learn the official language of the country, but this was finally not reinforced), Moldovans continue using Russian in public spaces, as during the Soviet period. If they complain later in their personal environments about themselves being the only bilingual citizens (Romanian/Russian) in the republic, this is seldom echoed in other places than independent newspapers and among Moldovan/Romanian intellectuals (who are actually also the most proficient in Russian). Mixed marriages are frequent; constituting 21% of all marriages in rural areas and 36% in urban areas (the statistics from the socialist period includes Transnistria, where the rates are higher, Skvortsova, 2002:172). Children from mixed marriages are often sent to Russian schools — as many of them told me in a broken Romanian, the reason being that “the (Russian) mother wanted me to speak Russian and the (Moldovan) father was indifferent”. Language is the main distinctive feature between ethnic groups in Moldova, who otherwise have the same religion (Orthodox). Given that most of the labour migration from Moldova has Russia as a destination (Western Europe is more inaccessible due to visa regulations), children are encouraged to learn Russian as their perspective of future employment are linked to it. Russia is the country that offers employment to large parts of the Moldovan population, especially those living in the eastern parts of the Republic. Discrepancies in wealth, economic opportunities and Romanian or Russian sympathies can be seen between the western parts of Moldova, more Romania-oriented and the eastern part, more former Soviet Union-oriented.

The second factor is the perception of the 1989 national revival movement in the light of the present economic distress of the Republic of Moldova. Moldova is an agricultural country with no energetic resources, with 40% of its industry today in secessionist Transnistria. When the USSR collapsed, it was the end of the “good old times”, *bolshevita* — the communist voting in the 2001 election is an expression of communist nostalgia and trust in a communist regime. Or many communist voters in the countryside believe their national aspirations to be the cause of the failure of the USSR and thus the cause of their present economic distress. In their despair face to the economic situation in the country, they regret the national movements and blame their current economic problems on their elites and on Romanians in general (*the Moldovan/Romanian elites claim to be Romanian*).

A third related factor comes from the ideologisation that took place during the socialist period. Moldovans learnt in school that the Soviets had liberated them from fascist Romanians (during the war from 1941 to 1944 Romania was allied with Nazi Germany), from bourgeois Romanians (some educated people in the village in which I worked ignored even the fact that Romania was a socialist country). The Soviet past with the series of deportations from the 40s did not come under public criticism as in the Baltic States. *After 1989, when due to the mobilisation of urban elites in a series of demonstrations for national language and national symbols, Romanian was recognised as an official language in schools and history books became Romanian history books (on the recommendation of the Council of Europe), parts of the population saw this as a form of Romanian invasion.* The policy of the Communist Party in power, “neither with Russians, nor with Romanians”, makes Moldovans see in equal terms their national relation with Russians and their relation with Romanians. *This is mainly due to lack of information: isolated from the 1989 demonstrations and uninformed due to the lack of alternative non-governmental television and radio stations that would reach the countryside (the journals are quite elite oriented and difficult to read by people who had to switch from Cyrillic to Latin characters at an adult age). Thus many rural people do not know that their Romanian national revival took place independently from the country with the same name, Romania, which at the time was under the personal dictatorship of Ceauşescu. Also later movements of self-declared “Romanians” in the republic were not led by Romania as a country or by Romanians born in Romania.*

To mix things up further, a new type of Romanians appeared in the Republic of Moldova. These are Moldovans (and not only of Romanian ethnic origin) who obtained Romanian citizenship in the past ten years. Given Romania’s perspective of EU integration, the possibility to obtain Romanian citizenship is more and more appealing to Moldovans, who have tremendous difficulties to travel abroad and who are for their great majority seeking work abroad (official statistics count that 650,000 people, *i.e.*, 17% of the total population, work abroad). The minister of External Affairs of the Republic of Moldova drew the attention of EU authorities to the danger that “more and more citizens of the Republic of Moldova will be tempted to acquire Romanian citizenship for

travelling in the Schengen space and thus the Republic of Moldova risks of becoming a state with more and more Romanian citizens” (Jurnal, 23.01.2004). Romania, which is otherwise extremely shy in fraternity declarations towards the neighbouring Moldova (and this holds for the parties in power and in the opposition, except for the ultranationalists of the “Greater Romania Party”, 8% of the electoral options in the June 2004 elections), has a very special citizenship policy that allows ex-Romanian citizens and their descendents to re-obtain Romanian citizenship without having to comply with residence requirements. *Interestingly, this citizenship offer is what bothers less the moldovenists I have met, who in their great majority were seeking means to obtain Romanian citizenship while simultaneously blaming Romanians for stealing them their songs, authors, historical figures etc.* (The story told by Ilie Ilașcu, a former prisoner in Transnistria, now senator in Romania, in the Opposition press is that the promoter of moldovanism and of Greater Moldova, Vasile Stăne, has also applied to become “Romanian with the due legal papers”).

At local levels, the confusion regarding national and ethnic identity fosters negative feelings towards Romanians, who are known to live in a more prosperous country and thus thought to afford taking over everything: Moldovan national poets, the tomb of Saint Stephen the Great and all the churches he built, the literary figures of Eminescu, Creangă, Alecsandri (it so happens that an impressive number of Romanian literature classics come from the Romanian part of Moldavia, so they have been recognised also as Moldovan authors, even during the Soviet period, but being born in Romanian Moldavia, are indisputably Romanian). The strongest promoters of these negative feelings are people more aware than the average of their ethnic identity and proud of their Moldovan identity, as opposed to Russian and Ukrainian identities. Imagine their disappointment face to an ethnic Romanian from Romania (such as myself) who would use the same Romanian sayings, know the same popular songs and recite the same poems, probably even better than the Moldovans, because of her/him being socialised uniquely in the Romanian culture (and knowledge of the folklore is promoted as a major marker of the ethnic identity, see Cash 2002). My host in Moldova, a Romanian/Moldovan pro-communist, told me one day when the TV cable was installed to catch the Romanian State Television in the village, that one Romanian program was even too much! Until then, one could watch around five Ukrainian TV programs, and only with difficulty the Moldova State program (which runs for a few hours daily, in Romanian) — while there were no Ukrainian speakers in the village and there are quite a few arguments about how similar Russian (that villagers understand) and Ukrainian languages are... Clearly the unique Romanian program was seen as a danger, because it would risk of becoming the unique source of information for the Moldovans in the village (the Romanian Radio is already the most listened to radio and my pro-communist host won't actually listen to anything else. One day he caught a different program, he claimed to be a Chișinău program, because of the slight Moldovan accent and the music transmitted, to discover later that it was Radio Iași, Iași being the capital of Romanian Moldavia. He was not happy at my witnessing his confusion).

Conclusion

In this paper I have intended to show some of the difficulties of legitimising a country on exclusively national bases. The Republic of Moldova is a multiethnic country, born out of the USSR's collapse in 1991, which tries to found its independence and legitimacy on the national identity of its majority, the Moldovans (Romanians). As this majority shares the same ethnic belonging, language and history as the majority of the neighbouring country, Romania, due to its springing from the same core, the only available policy for the Moldovan identity creators appeared to be an aggressive denial of the common features, which was accompanied by accusatory political declarations towards the neighbouring state. While this policy appears as absurd to the Romanian elites of the Republic of Moldova and to the Romanian leaders and press, it does not go without consequences at local levels. The doctrine of "moldovenism" is embraced by uninformed, confuse sympathisers of the Communist Party, who become hostile to Romania and Romanians due to it. The cold war of declarations could thus generate more far-reaching animosities than would be expected.

NOTE

1. The organisation in *județe* was dating from 1999.

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“DON’T FALSIFY OUR HISTORY”. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND HISTORY EDUCATION IN MOLDOVA^{1*}

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Historian Jonathan Zimmerman argues that public schools in the United States have historically been the site of “culture wars”, where opposing political, cultural, and ideological interests dispute the nature and content of schooling.² The history classroom is one site of these wars. History has long been a contested subject as ethnic groups, ranging from German immigrants to African Americans, have fought and won to be included in history courses and textbooks. Zimmerman argues that, although more voices have been included into the grand American narrative, no group has undermined the unifying tenets of liberty, freedom, and economic opportunity.³

Although Zimmerman’s research is about the particular character of American democracy and society, his argument is useful in framing the current debate over history education between the Communist government and Romanian⁴ teachers and students in the Republic of Moldova. Yet the Moldovan case is distinctive because, unlike the American historical narrative, there are no central tenets to unify Moldova’s multiethnic population. Also, a historical narrative is not the only issue at stake as the opposing sides also represent competing identities. The current state sponsored national identity, which is one of a separate, multicultural and multilingual society, conflicts with the Romanian identity held by the majority, which is one of a nation culturally and linguistically part of greater Romania. This paper is an exploration of how the discord over Moldovan national identity takes form in history education.

The study of history education, textbooks, and curricula is an important lens through which to examine the broader question of identity for two reasons. First, in Moldova, history education is directly linked to identity, and Moldovans feel that history education is of great significance. Second, in the United States, Zimmerman argues that public schools are battlegrounds for competing ideologies because schools are the “chief public institution for distilling and delivering moral values to its young”.⁵ I found that Moldovan schools are also battlegrounds and, in studying the conflicting ideologies of identity, these schools are an ideal laboratory.

I will begin with an introduction to Moldovan history with regard to national identity and outline the current government’s initiatives. Then drawing from recently collected interviews, I will discuss how teachers and students have reacted

to the incongruence between their own identities and that proposed by the government, as well as how this conflict takes shape in their everyday lives. While many teachers and students have openly resisted the state policies through protests and petitions, others categorically reject the debate over identity because they feel it lacks significance in contemporary Moldova. I conclude with implications of these findings, particularly how the rejection of the identity debate by these educators may challenge the ways in which Western academics conceive of and approach identity in the region.

Methodology

This paper is the outcome of an exploratory research trip that I took to Moldova in the fall of 2003. I worked as a teacher in Moldova from 1997–1999 and I used my knowledge of the language and culture to return to the country and investigate issues surrounding history education. During my last visit, the debate over history curricula had reached a peak; I attended a national history teacher’s meeting, witnessed large street protests, and listened to the government’s rebuttal on national television. I conducted a wide range of interviews and collected data from a total of 26 individuals, including teachers, professors, students, government officials, and political analysts from both the Russian and Romanian ethnic groups. The majority of my interviews were pre-arranged and open-ended. However, I took every opportunity to talk to Moldovans about history education and, as result, I had several spontaneous interviews with student protestors on the street. My interviews took place in Chişinău, the capital city, and in two towns in central Moldova. Although there have been ongoing public debates about history education since early 2002, my paper focuses on the most recent point of contention, the government’s proposed *Integrated History* textbook and curriculum.

Moldovan History and Identity

Legend has it that a Romanian prince founded the region of Moldova in the mid fourteenth century.⁶ The two countries share a border, cultural traditions, and a common language. Moldova has not traditionally been independent; it has been part of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the kingdom of Romania, and the Soviet Union. These powers brought different languages, immigrants, and cultures to the region. Moldovan history, to a large extent, is the story of these empires, which controlled and fought over the region and the issue of Moldovan identity is rooted in this complex narrative. Romanian Studies professor Charles King writes “Moldova [remains], even a decade after independence, the only country in Eastern Europe in which major disputes existed among political and cultural elites over the fundamentals of national identity”.⁷

The creation of a national Moldovan identity was part of a much larger Soviet nation-building project. A distinct Moldovan identity was born in 1924 when the

Soviet Union created the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) along the Western borders of Ukraine. The language and customs of this region were similar to those inhabitants of the Bessarabia, the neighboring Romanian province. Yet, the Soviets attempted to create and maintain an identity that was culturally and linguistically independent of its western and non-communist neighbor, Romania. In 1940, Bessarabia was joined with the MASSR, the borders were redrawn, and the region became Soviet Moldavia.

In the early 1920s, the Soviet government sought to foster national identities amongst the non-Russian states through the implementation of an affirmative action policy called *korenizatsiia*. Historian Terry Martin writes that *korenizatsiia* was “a prophylactic policy designed to defuse and prevent the development of nationalism”.⁸ The Soviets systematically favored the minority non-Russian nationalities and penalized Russians through appointing minorities to high-level government appointments, increasing their access to higher education, and by supporting local languages and local intelligentsia. However, this policy came to an end in 1938 with the adoption of a new national constitution and when Stalin, in a departure from Lenin, decreed that the Russian should be the dominant culture in the Union. This new constitution called for the continuation of “affirmative action and nation building” of the periphery states but “not in such a way as to insult or demean Russians;” “all non-Russians... were required to learn Russian [and] familiarize themselves with the Russian culture... [and] Pushkin should be their national poet”.⁹

This Russification or “Sovietization” under the new constitution was clearly evident in Moldova. In *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union*, Gerhard Simon argues that “the integration of Moldavian territories surpassed that of the other regions”.¹⁰ Soviet authorities displaced local language by replacing the Latin alphabet with the Cyrillic alphabet, built citizenship through a rapid expansion of mass schooling, and removed traditional power structures by nationalizing all institutions, industries, and land.¹¹

Charles King argues that it was the inconsistent policies of nation building that has created today’s ambiguous Moldovan national identity. He explains that on the one hand the Soviets strove to create an independent Moldovan state with a distinct Moldovan culture and identity but this project ultimately failed because “after the Second World War, no one really tried”.¹² Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the idea of a distinct Moldovan identity was created by the Soviets and reinforced through the *korenizatsii* policies but the lack of sustained effort by the Soviet authorities allowed the nation-building project to wither. Nevertheless, even today there are remnants of this distinct Moldovan identity, which complicate the formation of unified identity among the varying ethnic groups.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Moldavia gained independence in 1991, and was born again as The Republic of Moldova. At the formation of the Republic, Moldovans affiliated themselves with Romania, the citizens modeled their new flag after the image of the Romanian flag, declared Romanian to be the national language, and emphasized Romanian heroes in state history books.

However, Moldova was and still is a multi-ethnic country where 35% of the population does not self-identify themselves as Moldovan or Romanian.¹³ According to a government official, whom I interviewed, there are actually 70 minority groups in the country and five languages are recognized (Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian). A public opinion survey from April of 2002 indicates that “[the] Moldavian/Romanian language is spoken within the family by 75% of respondents, being known by 91% of the population; [the] Russian language is spoken within the family by 26% and is known by 93%”.¹⁴

If Moldova is a multiethnic society, it is unclear as to why Moldovan leaders identified with Romania in 1989 instead of reinventing Moldova as a separate multi-ethnic state. Political scientist Vladimir Tismăneanu suggests a possible answer by explaining that post communist nationalism is a political and ideological phenomenon with a dual nature: as an expression of an historical cleavage, it rejects the spurious internationalism of communist propaganda and emphasizes long repressed national values; on the other hand, it is a nationalism rooted in and marked by the Leninist-authoritarian mentalities and habits directed against any principle of difference and primarily against those groups and forces that champions pro-Western, pluralistic orientations.¹⁵

In Moldova there were no “long repressed national values” because there was never a Moldovan nation. Thus, Romanian values filled this void. In applying Tismăneanu’s framework, Moldovans embraced nationalism, albeit Romanian, and, at the same time, rejected pluralistic society.

The movement throughout the 1990s to affiliate Moldova with Romania, despite its multiethnic character, has hindered the development of a strong, cohesive national identity.¹⁶ Many scholars of nationalism, like Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Anthony Smith, describe how an ethnic group goes about getting their own state. Anderson explains that a nation is an “imagined community” of “deep horizontal comradeship,” which has been brought together by a shared language (*i.e.* “print capitalism”) for the purpose of constructing a national identity that matches a state’s existing borders.¹⁷ Gellner contends that the imposition of a high literate culture upon a population is essential to create a modern nation. He describes this literate culture as “the necessary shared medium, the life-blood, or perhaps rather at the minimal shared atmosphere, with in which alone the members of society can breathe and survive, and produce”.¹⁸ Nationalism emerges as the linkage between the state and the culture; the striving to make the “political” and the “national” congruent.¹⁹ Smith argues that “not only must nations be founded upon ethnic cores, if they are to endure; they must also have, or find, a living past into which successive social circles of the educated may re-enter and whose legends and landscapes can locate the nation and direct its future”.²⁰ These theorists contend that nations have a common ethnic group that use means, such as language and education, to form a congruent state and populace.

However, these frameworks are inadequate in understanding the Republic of Moldova because the ethnic groups in the region did not form a state in their own image but rather inherited a state from the Soviet Union. By all accounts, the

Soviet project of Moldovan nation-building through language and education should have succeeded. Yet as King argues, their efforts failed because of inconsistent policies and declining support for the project.²¹ He also contends that the Soviet attempts actually solidified a Romanian identity rather than creating a distinctive Moldovan one. Thus, creating incongruence between the ethnic populations and the state in modern day Moldova.

From my previous experience of living in Moldova from 1997–1999, I found that this disconnection between the state and ethnic populations was clear. They categorized themselves not according to the nation in which they lived, but rather by their ethnicity, which they refer to as their nationality. Rogers Brubaker contends that this sort of identification reveals a Soviet legacy of maintaining dual notions of nationality — a territorial nationality and a personal nationality. Brubaker explains that these two nationalities were not always congruent in the Soviet Union.²² For example, an individual may have lived in The Soviet Republic of Moldavia but may have been classified as “Ukrainian” or “Russian” in his or her passport. Citizens continue to maintain this personal nationality in post Soviet Moldova, which is a country that has not one, but a plethora of “imagined communities”. For example, an acquaintance of mine was born in Moldova but his parents were born in Ukraine. He grew up speaking Ukrainian and called himself “Ukrainian”. My neighbors, Oxana and Lilia²³, a mother and daughter, were born in Moldova but had Russian ancestry, went to Russian schools, and considered themselves “Russian”. In contrast, the family with whom I lived for three months had Romanian ancestry, spoke Romanian, and considered themselves “Romanian” or “Moldovan” — terms that they used interchangeably. During my recent interviews, I asked 26 individuals how they defined themselves and I found that the responses were similar to the examples above. Again, people categorized themselves as either “Russian” (roughly one-third of my sample) or “Romanian” (one-third of my sample). However, a little under a third of my sample described themselves as “Romanians living in Moldova” or “Moldovan by citizenship only”. Only one informant responded that she was “Moldovan”.

Identities are often complex as described by many of my subjects. For example, one informant explained that several identities are often found in one family. Another told me that she was Gagauz but chose to become a Moldovan/Romanian and speaks Romanian “for her career”. A political analyst and a political party leader explained to me that many people do not wish to identify themselves as “Moldovan” because the “statehood of Moldova is not positive value for people who are living here — they look at this statehood as a failed project, as a prison”. The complexity and ambiguity of Moldovan national identity makes it difficult to apply frameworks like Anderson’s because Moldovans do not have a shared “imagined community”.

The Communist Government and the Renewed Debate on Identity

In February of 2001, just ten years after independence from the Soviet Union, Moldova democratically elected the Communist party to head the government.²⁴

Since 2001, the government and its supporters have turned away from Western-influenced democracy and reforms. They have renewed ties with Russia, attempted to re-establish Russian as a national language, reversed economic reforms by nationalizing companies, and has often bypassed Western diplomatic channels in resolving the Transnistria conflict.²⁵ The government has also hindered freedom of the press by censoring several independent newspapers, restricting television broadcasts from Romania, and censoring radio programs.²⁶ Yet, the Communist government has not been able to alleviate the country's dire poverty. *Transitions Online* reported gloomily at the end of 2001 that "the poor voters who cast their ballots for cheaper bread and salami remained as poor as before the elections... and Moldova's image with foreign investors and international funding organizations has taken a decisive dip".²⁷

It was the government's education proposals that brought protestors to the streets of Chişinău. In late 2001, the government announced plans to replace the *History of Romanians*, a compulsory secondary school subject, with the *History of Moldova*. Then, in February of 2002, the parliament proposed that the Russian language be a mandatory subject in schools. Tens of thousands of protestors, mostly university teachers and students, took to the streets of Chişinău to protest what they perceived to be an attempt at russification on the part of the Communist government.²⁸ The protests gained momentum and, in March, a group of university students established a tent camp, named "Liberty City", outside the parliament building. They built a small model of the Statue of Liberty and held placards that demanded the overthrow of the Communists. At this point, the protests became larger in scope. In an interview with me, a student activist who mobilized fellow university students explained, "the protests were first [and foremost] anti-Communist but we gave the official reasons of language and history". By April, President Voronin agreed to meet with the protestors and suspended plans to implement the new history curriculum and mandatory Russian classes.

The government has changed its position on history courses since 2002 and my paper focuses on the government's most recent plan, which introduces the *Integrated History* course. However, it is important to discuss the 2002 debate it because it provides context for the current debate. Moldovan scholar Vladimir Solonari's comparison of the textbooks, *History of the Romanians* and *History of Moldova*, clarifies the dispute. He found that the proposed *History of Moldova* textbook echoes the Soviet textbooks. In the Soviet book, pre-Soviet Moldova is presented as "people-as-nation", in which Moldovans had a shared ethnicity, and this made them a nation. The narrative changes course with the formation of the USSR, at which point Moldovan history and identity are subjugated to the larger history of Russia and the USSR. Additionally, what unites Moldovans changes from "people-as-nation" to "people-as-toiling-and-exploited masses". The latter classification attempted to unite Moldovans with citizens of other former Soviet states. These groups were no longer bound by shared ethnicity but rather by their shared struggle against bourgeois capitalism. Solonari argues that these two

conflicting concepts confused students and created distrust and skepticism about Soviet or “official historical discourses”. This is one possible reason for the rejection of Russian history and the emphasis on Romanian history in the early 1990s.²⁹

The proposed Communist textbook, *History of Moldova*, is similar to the Soviet one because it again subordinates Moldovan history to Russian history, and does not present the distinct Moldovan identity of “people-as-nation”. For these reasons, the Moldovan/Romanian educators rejected this new textbook through protests to the government. However, Solonari also notes that the current history text, *History of the Romanians*, is not necessarily better. In this textbook, Moldovan history is subjugated to Romanian history and pupils are often led to believe that there is something “fundamentally temporary and unhealthy about present day Moldova” because it is not part of greater Romania.³⁰ Neither textbook tells the story of a Moldova as a place separate and independent of its neighbors.

Since the 2002 protests, the government has changed its view on history and language education. Presently, all Moldovan high school students take two history courses in tandem, *History of the Romanians* and *World History*, which is comparable to world history or world civilization courses in the United States. The government wishes to consolidate the courses into a single course called *Integrated History*. This course would present Moldovan and Romanian history in the context of a world narrative and it would be given the same weight as other national histories, such as Russian or Western European history. In an interview, a representative from the Ministry of Education confirmed this plan and elaborated: “[the manuals of Romanian history, reflect the history of Romanians only. We must begin a new historical cycle to unite and not divide. All of the world is studying one history”. According to the official, 45 pilot schools are testing the *Integrated History* course.³¹ However, I was not able to obtain actual physical examples of curriculum and textbooks.³²

With regard to language education, the government official stressed that Moldova had “democratic” schools, and that “the state does not dictate language. Parents choose language. [Moldova] is a multinational state and nobody should regulate language”. This is a reversal of the 2002 proposal that would have made Russian a *mandatory* language class in schools. Today in Moldova, there are schools that provide instruction in the Romanian language, the Russian language, the Gagauz language, and other minority languages.

The official’s remarks are reflective of a new approach to national identity that the government introduced this past year. The motivation for this policy change is unclear but several of my informants believe the government’s “fear of reunification” with Romania account for the change. In July, the government newspaper published “The Concept of State Nationalities Policy of the Republic of Moldova” a statement which outlined the government’s goals for the “reintegration and consolidation of a single multicultural and multilingual people of the Republic of Moldova by harmonizing cross-national interests with the

interests of all ethnic and linguistic communities of the country”. Some of the “Principles of the State Nationalities Policy” include:

- equality of human rights and freedoms, regardless of ethnic origin, language, or religion;
- respect, recognition, and guaranteeing of the right of all citizens of the Republic of Moldova to preserve, develop, and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious originality;
- inadmissibility of discrimination based on ethnic origin, language, or region, and the inadmissibility of restricting of the right of citizens to use their native language or to choose a language of the upbringing and education for their children;
- inadmissibility of any actions aimed at assimilation or denationalization;
- strengthening of interethnic peace, nation building based on the historically created Moldovan-Russian and Russian-Moldovan bilingualism, as well as preserving the linguistic diversity.³³

Throughout the document, the government refers to the state language as “Moldovan” instead “Romanian”. By the use of the term “Moldovan”, the government is implying that their state language is the not same as their western neighbor, Romania. The government’s statement is a significant change from the pro-Romanian movement of the early 1990s because the government is de-emphasizing nationalism and introducing pluralism.

Another initiative that many of my informants talked about was a “patriot class” that Prime Minister Tarlev had recently proposed. Apparently, after a visit to the United States, Tarlev was so impressed by American students who said the Pledge of Allegiance at the start of each school day that he wanted to implement similar practices in Moldovan schools. I have yet to discover official details about Tarlev’s proposed “patriot class” and it may be more rumor than fact. Yet, many informants were concerned about the prospect of these classes and their concern is significant. It is in this context that the recent history debates have come about.

Teacher and Student Reactions

I now turn to the reactions of high school teachers, university professors, and university students to the government’s proposal for *Integrated History*. From my collected data, I found that teachers’ reactions roughly fell into three categories: 1) strongly opinionated and firm disagreement with the government’s proposed *Integrated History*; 2) agreement with the government for a more inclusive history but not necessarily for *Integrated History*; 3) disinterest in and/or rejection of the entire debate on the grounds that it is not relevant in everyday life. In many of the cases, the third category overlapped with the first and second. The students’ reactions to the history issue did not fall into such clearly defined categories. I found the students to be more interested in talking about the Communist

government's concept of national identity outside of the context of the history debates. None of the teachers or students whom I interviewed completely agreed with the government's plans.

Teacher Reactions

All of the Moldovan/Romanian teachers whom I interviewed are opposed to *Integrated History*. The strongest and most passionate resistance has most notably come from the Association of History Teachers of Moldova, which is an organization open to all teachers, professors, and researchers. In late October, they held an emergency meeting to discuss the proposed *Integrated History*. The meeting was advertised in the newspapers and over 150 educators attended. In her opening speech, the President of the Association stated:

Recently, an extraordinary and alarming situation has been created in Moldovan history education, with obvious tendencies of transforming into a crisis not only of the field of instruction and education, but also of the entire society. The Communist government has unleashed an unprecedented campaign against national and democratic values, and thus against scientific truth, against national history, and in particular against the course of Romanian history in the curricula... The goal is eliminating the course of Romanian history... The attacks against the history are part of a war declared against everything that is nationally Romanian. This is a political challenge, well orchestrated at the level of the state institutions. Behind these [challenges] is not only the actual Communist government, it is well known that such attempts took place before them as well, the real director of this is Moscow... historians have tried to prove to the government that on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, a population of Romanians has lived and continues to live, part of the Romanian people, and Romanian history is our history... Imagine that the Communist government would forbid a surgeon to use scalpels for their surgeries and would instead suggest using scissors for shearing sheep. I am sure that the doctors would react accordingly, promptly, categorically and with solidarity, and would try to show the government that it's not right. Or, as what is being imposed upon us, a false history, oriented against its own people, is the same instrument from which we will be mutilating the souls of our children.³⁴

In Soviet Moldavia, society was controlled by Moscow and the above reference to Moscow reveals a suspicion that the government is not only creating a new history course but also is reverting to Soviet-style control. The speaker claimed that there is an attack on "everything that is Romanian". This refers to the Soviet policy of russifying the population. Also, she declared the new history to be an attack on "national and democratic values". This comment is interesting because it implies that *Integrated History* is undemocratic. She, and possibly many of her colleagues, equated Western-oriented history (*i.e.*, *History of the Romanians*) with democracy. This may be a legacy of the country's Soviet past; any history that denies Moldova's connection to Europe echoes Soviet propaganda and thus, is inherently undemocratic. This sort of history is not an option for Moldova and

there is no room for compromise, just as surgeons can only use scalpels for their surgeries, teacher may use only Romanian history books to teach their children.

At the conference, other educators followed suit with emotionally charged speeches. Several teachers came forward and presented petitions from their particular village or town, exemplifying that the debate has moved beyond the capital city. The President urged her colleagues to resolve the issue “civically” using “pickets, meetings, demonstrations, warning strikes, and general ones”. Other speakers invoked references to the Soviet Union. A professor from Chişinău claimed: “[we know who we are and what we want, but we are being blamed for being nationalists, while they are using methods borrowed from the Bolshevik regime of the Soviet Union, because in the Soviet Union they combined methods with the most defamatory lies, as lies, they are being repeated and believed in”. These comments implied that the threat may not be the new history book or whether or not the history is more inclusive but rather that Moldovan society is returning to an early time — a time when Soviets suppressed Romanian heritage, identity, or nationalism.

What surprised me was that many teachers unquestionably supported the Romanian history course. When asked why there could not be a Moldovan history, Iulia, a history teacher and trained archeologist, replied in an interview with me: “because we are one nation, we have the same culture, same language, and same ancient roots... it is obvious that we are one nation, we are one people... it is amoral to have a history only about [Moldova]”. Artur, a teacher from a town in central Moldova, gave me a similar answer: “[there] is no history of Moldova without the history of Romania, they cannot separate us”.

I asked these teachers what they thought about the multi-ethnic character of the Moldovan population and how they thought history books should address minority groups. Iulia responded: “I am convinced that they should know our history because they chose to live here. They may learn our history in Russian but they should know [Romanian] history”. Artur said, “every country has minorities — they decided to live with us [Moldovan/Romanians]. Why should we put their history into first place?” Vasily, a teacher from Artur’s town, remarked: “Russians have their own country and they come here and they want to make us like them”. These were surprising remarks because many of these minorities have lived in the country at least since the Russian Empire’s annexation of Moldova in the early nineteenth century and since Russian Jews were forced to live in Moldova as part of the Empire’s anti-Semitic policies. Yet, these remarks support Vladimir Tismăneanu’s argument that post-communist nationalism is a combination of “long repressed national values” and the belief in a non-pluralistic and authoritarian society. By being Romanian, Iulia, Vasily and Artur have rejected decades of Soviet indoctrination but by denying minority groups a voice in society, they have embraced the “collectivist communist and pre-communist traditions by denying the individual right to dissent”.³⁵ Tismăneanu’s framework helps explain the confusion I felt when an informant celebrated democracy by exalting post-Soviet liberty, yet was completely intolerant of minorities.

Minority educators were noticeably absent from the history teachers' meeting. I asked Ion, a professor from a pedagogical college in Chişinău and member of the Young Historians Association, if there had been any public reaction from these groups. He told me that they had had a meeting with teachers from the Gagauz region³⁶ and a meeting with Russian teachers in Chişinău. According to him, these groups supported the consensus among Moldovan/Romanian teachers that *History of the Romanians* should remain in the curriculum. He gave me a list of Russian teachers who attended the meeting but I was unable to meet with any of them. However, from the conversations with my Russian informants, I am not convinced that minority teachers would have readily agreed.

All of the Russian teachers that I interviewed agreed that *History of the Romanians* should be changed or eliminated, but none of them supported *Integrated History*. Svetlana, a teacher from Chişinău who was born in Russia, told me: "We are living in Moldova; the history subject should be called *History of Moldova* because if the language we speak is Romanian and if the history we teach is Romanian, [then] what belongs to this state that is called Republic of Moldova? It is humiliating for the nation and for the people to speak someone else's language and study someone else's history. As a Russian native, I think that the history we teach and study should be the History of Moldova... the textbook, *History of the Romanians*, Moldova is an insignificant part of this book (RU)". In contrast to the Moldovan/Romanian teachers, Svetlana felt that Romanian history does indeed belong to someone else. She also questioned both the Soviet and the Romanian interpretations of Moldovan history. She explained: "When we were in school, the [Soviet History] manual was very connected to politics and it is the same now with this [*History of the Romanians*] manual. I can't say that the old manuals were good enough or objective enough but history is connected to politics. In previous manuals, the history of Moldova was regarded as a piece of land that wanted to unify with Russia and they brought many facts, many historical dates, and proof to support that theory and now it is vice versa with facts, dates, and proof to show that Moldova is piece of land that always wanted to unify with Romania. As a teacher of history I am very confused because I don't know what is true or not because both sides gives facts... now it depends on the person who teaches the subject. For me speaking Russian, having relatives who live in Russia, it is normal that I don't want Moldova to separate from Russia (RU)".

Svetlana was the only teacher in my study who suggested that an individual teacher determines how or which history is taught. Although the topic of how history is actually taught in the classroom is not the subject of this paper, it is still a relevant point.

The Russian teachers, with whom I spoke, agreed there that should be two history courses, one course for the history of the nation or country and one course for world history. However, some were uncertain as to what a history of the nation should look like and share Svetlana's confusion. Masha, a middle-aged teacher from central Moldova, explained that she "studied at a Russian school and was not educated in the Romanian spirit [that] we are one land". She learned and

believed that “Moldova and Romanian are different states”. But now she realizes that “Moldovan and Romanian are the same language and it may be possible that we could be one land”. Thus, she felt that “scientists should decide what the history should be called because it is not in [her] competence to decide”. Olga, a teacher from the same town but from a different high school, said that she “doesn’t know who is right”. She elaborated that “our people must know their history as part of Romania because we *were* one land” but thought that the course “should be called ‘History of our Native Land,’ as not to hurt anybody”.

Many of the teachers, both Russian and Romanian, expressed disinterest in the government’s re-opening of the identity and history question. I found that there were two general reasons. First, they thought the question irrelevant given the current economic conditions in Moldova. Second, they were suspicious of the government’s motives and thought that identity issues were a form of political manipulation.

Iulia, the teacher who unquestioningly insisted that *History of Romanians* be taught in school, ended our interview with the statement, “Moldovans do not think about identity because half the country is very, very poor, think about how to fill their stomachs... you can ask these questions when people are not hungry”. Masha, the Russian teacher from central Moldova, told me: “Tarlev talks of patriotic education but we are not able to educate for patriotism because our conditions are so poor that many people leave, it is opposite of making patriots... only in good conditions can we talk about patriotism”. Felicia, a professor from Chişinău who is ethnically Romanian, made a similar comment. When asked about the importance of national identity, she responded: “[national feelings] are to love the country and not want to leave... young people are leaving because they have thin foundations. It is easy, nice, and comfortable to be a patriot in a big successful country such as US, or Russia, or France or Germany with a glorious history, comfortable present, and bright future. It is so difficult to be a patriot in a small and poor country as Moldova is, and so deep in problems — political, economic and now even cultural problems”.

I had asked both Masha and Felicia about national identity and about being Moldovan instead of Romanian or Russian and both of them equated my question with patriotism. For them, it appears that national identity, which takes the form of patriotism, is only possible when a country’s economic and political conditions provide a comfortable place to live. Felicia remarked that “to love one’s country” required material wealth. This concept questions the bonds that form a nation and create Anderson’s sense of “deep horizontal comradeship”. If the shared history of Romanian, Ottoman, and Soviet domination is not enough to forge a nation, then, apart from the state, what holds Moldova together? This question recalls Eric Hobsbawm’s suggestion that “nation and nationalism are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone to analyse, the political entities described as such, or even the sentiments once described by these words”.³⁷ Perhaps, a new vocabulary and framework is needed to describe such places as Moldova, places with ambiguous nation identity and “thin foundations”, as described above by Felicia.

Several of the teachers mentioned that they thought the debate over history curricula was government manipulation. Olga, from central Moldova said: “politicians do not have any other work to do”. Vasily, from central Moldova, said “the government makes up these problems to manipulate us”. Artur, another teacher from central Moldova, added: “the government did this because they want everything under control, to put their mentality into us”. Artur’s comment reveals distrust of history curricula sponsored by the government and reinforces Solonari’s argument that Moldovans became distrustful of state-sponsored historical narratives. The belief of political manipulation may reflect a legacy of distrust for the government and official historical narratives.

Student Reactions

Almost all of the Moldovan/Romanian university students whom I interviewed believed that the renewed emphasis on national identity by the government was a form of political manipulation. Viorica, a political science student who participated in the 2002 protests, explained, “[identity] is not such a problem as the government makes it out to be, the public becomes victims, most young people do not care. [It is] a simple political tool, which distracts from other issues”. Vlad, a journalism student and the founder of a youth website said: “history and language are used just to upset you and sway your vote”. Victor, a student protestor who protested daily in front of the Russian Embassy, believed that “[the government] manipulates identity to keep us from Bucharest”.

The students who did not think that identity was a form of political manipulation expressed a sense of disinterest or fatigue over the question. Liviu, a student activist who lives outside of Chişinău, said: “I am tired of this [question about identity], for 12 years we have been discussing this”. A student at the State University in Chişinău told me that “people are indifferent [about it]... economics are more important and people care more about how to pay their bills and don’t have time to think about it”.

Many of the students also felt that the government did not represent them. My first Sunday in Chişinău, I went to a protest where roughly 2,000 people were demonstrating in the city center. I approached a group of students who were carrying placards that read “Don’t Falsify our History!” and “Down with Communism”. I asked them why they were protesting. One of the first replies was from a woman who said: “the government does not represent us”. In my later student interviews, I asked whether or not the government represented young people. The students consistently responded that the government did not represent them but rather represented “businessmen” or “old pensioners” or “Russian villages in the countryside”.

Conclusions

Teachers and students have reacted in different ways to the Communist-proposed history course and concept of national identity. From these reactions,

it is clear that issues related to history education create tension and disagreement in Moldova. As a comment by Svetlana, the Russian teacher from Chişinău, exemplifies: “history impacts on a person’s personality and mentality, and values”. Historian Jonathan Zimmerman argues that this is characteristic of schools in democratic societies. If there are multiple language, ethnic, cultural, and political groups in a society, there will be a debate as to how the interests of all these groups will be represented in public schools. The conflict is especially important to opposing groups because schools are viewed as the instrument that molds and shapes future citizens.³⁸ This is the case in Moldova where the government wants to create citizens in a multi-ethnic country that is culturally independent of its neighbors, and the opposing majority wants to create citizens who are culturally and linguistically tied to Romania. The Moldovan example is especially interesting because it reflects not only the conflicts of schooling in a pluralistic, democratic society but also the growing pains of democracy in the post-communist world.

The formation of a national identity is one of Moldova’s growing pains. The current state-created identity, one of a multi-ethnic society, does not reflect how most ethnic Russian or Romanian teachers and students see themselves. Yet as my data reveal, the issue of Moldovan identity is complex and difficult to characterize and frame. Apart from the dramatic presentations at the teachers’ meeting, most teachers and students have contradictory feelings about the identity debate. For example, Iulia, the teacher and archeologist, adamantly argued that Moldovans were Romanians and that the Republic of Moldova was indeed part of greater Romania but then she appeared to devalue her feelings by stating that identity was not so important in light of other pressing issues, such as the nation’s poverty. Identity is important to Moldovans, but perhaps basic needs, such as food, regular salaries, and health care, trump the place of national identity in everyday life. If Moldovans do indeed devalue debates over national identity, there are implications for how we study identity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

In discussing the “cultural wars” in American schools, Zimmerman reveals that while the battle rages on in “the rarified atmosphere of universities and think tanks... Out in the schools themselves, however, this battle was settled long ago”.³⁹ This disconnect could be applied to the history and identity debate in Moldova. Perhaps, some teachers rejected the debate on identity because they have already decided who they are and how they define themselves. The government and teachers’ associations may dispute what concept of identity is presented in schools but individual teachers may have already made up their minds as to what history they will teach in their classrooms, how they identify themselves, and what value they place on identity in their lives. For Moldovan/Romanian students who think that identity has become a form of political manipulation and that the government does not represent them anyway, the question of identity may become increasingly less important. Alternatively, it is possible that a distinct and unified Moldovan identity will emerge when the country is no longer mired in economic

and political strife. To reiterate the words of Masha, a Russian teacher, “only in good conditions can we talk about patriotism”.

NOTES

- * Editors'note: We have respected the author's random using “Moldova” and “Moldavia”, though, to avoid misunderstanding, the Romanian literature uses “Moldavia” when referring to the historical province (like Wallachia, Transylvania, etc.) as well as to the region under Romanian rule, and “Moldova” when referring to the State created in 1991 bearing the name of “Republic of Moldova”.
1. Funding for this research was provided for by the Dean's Grant for Student Research from New York University's Steinhardt School of Education. The author would like to thank Professor Lisa Stulberg for her guidance and support of the project. A version of this paper was presented at the Ninth Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities Columbia University, April 15–17, 2004.
 2. Jonathan Zimmerman, *Whose America? Culture Wars in the Public Schools*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
 4. I use the terms *Romanian* or *Moldovan* to describe those Moldovan citizens who speak Romanian and identify themselves as ethnically Romanian. I use these terms interchangeably and it does not represent a bias on my part.
 5. Jonathan Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
 6. Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russian, and the Politics of Culture*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 2000, p. 12.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
 8. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union 1923–1939*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 126.
 9. *Ibid.*, p. 461.
 10. Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, p. 178.
 11. *Ibid.*, pp. 178–179.
 12. Charles King, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
 13. 14% are Ukrainians, 13% are Russians, 2% Bulgarians, 3.5% Gagauz (Orthodox Christian Turks), 1.5% Jewish, and 1.7% other. US Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *Background Note: Moldova*, October 2003. Available online from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5357.htm>. Accessed 29 November 2003.
 14. Institute of Public Policy, *Barometer of Public Opinion, Moldova–March 2002*, Chişinău, Institutul de Politici Publice, 2002.
 15. Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 7.
 16. By “national identity”, I refer to a state or civic identity not an ethnic identity.
 17. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso, 1991, p. 7.
 18. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 37.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
 20. Anthony Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p. 207.
 21. Charles King, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
 22. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 34.
 23. All proper names have been changed. Most all interviews were conducted in English or Romanian, which I translated. However, some participants spoke Russian only and I worked with a translator for these interviews and they are marked (RU).
 24. The Communist party won 71 out of 101 seats in parliament. Vladimir Voronin is the current president.
 25. In 1992, a group of Russian Nationalists declared the Transnistria Region (the small sliver of land between Moldova and Ukraine) to be an independent republic. Currently, Transnistria is not recognized by any official organization. Yet, this renegade region prints its own currency, broadcasts its own TV and radio, and maintains Soviet emblems and customs and is a major channel for illegal arms trading.
 26. Iulian Robu, *Moldova 2001: Back in Time Transitions Online*, 27 January 2002 [journal online]; available from <http://knowledgenet.tol.cz>, p. 3.
 27. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 28. Michael Wines, *History Course Ignites a Volatile Tug of War in Moldova*, in: “New York Times”, 25 February 2002. [Newspaper on-line] available from www.nytimes.com/2002/02/25/international/europe/25MOLD.html.
 29. Vladimir Solonari, *Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova*, in: “Eastern European Politics and Societies”, no. 2/2002, p. 426.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 439.
 31. As of October 2004 and according to a government official, over 100 schools have implemented *Integrated History*.

32. Since my field work in 2003, the government has published the curriculum publicly (see *Istoria. Curs integrat*, in: "Moldova Suverană", 25 February 2004. Textbooks have yet to be published.
33. The Concept of State Nationalities Policy of the Republic of Moldova, in: "Nezavissimaya Moldova", 25 July 2003. Electronic Edition, in Russian, available by request from Boris Marian, paper's editor: tis@nemo.moldova.SU. I cite a translated version made available by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Chişinău, which was distributed publicly November 2003.
34. 26 October 2003. Public meeting of History Teacher's Association of the Republic of Moldova. Opening Remarks by Liuba Savinschi, President. Recorded by dictafone and translated by Irina Norrell, 1 November 2003.
35. V. Tismăneanu, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
36. In 1993 a small group of Orthodox Christian Turks, the Gagauz, negotiated with the Moldovan parliament to create a culturally and administrative autonomous region. The Gagauz speak and maintain schools in their own language, also called Gagauz.
37. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 182.
38. See Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1990; Martin Carnoy and Henry M. Levin, *Schooling and Work in the Democratic State*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1985; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983.
39. J. Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

THE DFDR AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROMANIAN STATE AFTER 1989: POLITICAL FORCE OR PUPPET?

JOSEF C. KARL

1. Introduction

For obvious reasons, the exodus of the 1980s and early 1990s seriously diminished German cultural presence throughout Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania. Nevertheless, even this small German presence has had an effect on cultural and political affairs in the region. Moreover, even ethnic minorities and communities smaller than the remaining 60–85,000 Germans¹ in Romania have attracted scholarly attention². Since the Germans form the third largest minority group in a country of 22 million inhabitants and 19 recognised ethnic minorities³ they cannot be seen as a phantom minority due to their drastically reduced numbers. To do so would be to neglect an important component of Romanian minority studies. These issues are worth noting because this study is the first ever systematic long term research covering the political post-1989 activities of the Romanian Germans⁴.

The existing academic work on the Germans in Romania is largely confined to the past, the time before WWII; some authors extend their coverage to the exodus of the Germans from the region before 1989. If there is an analysis of the German presence after 1989, it is in most cases either limited to the very last part of a study⁵ or to a short contribution in a journal⁶. Therefore, what is still lacking from the history of the German communities of post-communist Romania is the equivalent of the academic studies done on Transylvania's Saxons of the pre-war period by Göllner, Roth and Teutsch⁷. Having this in mind, it becomes relevant to focus explicitly on the effects of German cultural and political activities in post-communist Romania between 1989 and 2004. In particular, this study will concentrate on the *Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien (DFDR)/Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România (FDGR)*⁸, the sole organization representing the German minority communities in Romania.

This essay provides a synopsis of my research on this topic to date. I trace the role of the DFDR during the post-communist political transition and highlight how the different Romanian governments affected the DFDR and the DFDR's chances of pursuing its objectives under changing political circumstances. On the Romanian side the focus is on processes of democratisation and the particular political interest that Romania had in binding the German minority to

the Romanian state. On the German side, I discuss the situation within the DFDR, its hierarchy and how it reached its decisions.

2. The decline of the German population in Romania

It has been estimated that 343,913 Germans lived in Romania in 1948. By the census of 1956, the number had grown to 384,708. It suffered no significant losses until 1978 when Germany started to buy out those it recognized as German nationals⁹. As Ceaușescu cynically remarked, “the Germans and the Jews are my best capital”¹⁰; it was not just Germans the Romanian state was willing to sell but Jews as well. For the next few years, a quota of up to fifteen thousand Germans a year were allowed. As a result from 1978 to the revolution of 1989, over 160,000 Germans left Romania. The total loss of population through emigration since the 1956 census exceeded this figure, exactly by how much is not known but the published data from the period 1956 to 1987 of roughly 300,000 departing Jews and Germans indicates the magnitude¹¹.

After the fall of communism this tendency continued. In the last communist-era census, taken in 1977, 359,109 Germans were recorded in Romania¹². By 1989 the number had declined to about 200,000 of whom 111,150 were officially registered as recognised immigrants in Germany at the end of 1990¹³. Already during the first eight months after the change of December 1989 132,400 Germans had left Romania to Germany and Austria for good¹⁴. By 1992, the German population in Romania had dropped by two-thirds and by 2002 stood at 60–85,000, just 0.3–0.4 percent of the country’s 22 million inhabitants¹⁵. What had been a steady reduction of population before December 1989, quickly turned into precipitate decline thereafter.

Five reasons for the mass exodus of the Germans can be identified. First, because of their bitter experiences of the past, many Germans in Romania found it difficult to believe that the events of 1989 would bring a better future. Secondly, the political changes of 1989 also brought about a mass exodus of Germans from nearly all former communist states of Eastern Europe. Germany, unprepared for the scale, tried to “solve” the problem by implementing laws to “regulate” immigration from the east¹⁶. Fearing that the gate to Germany might be closed forever¹⁷, many Germans from Eastern Europe pushed even harder to emigrate. Thirdly, in the months immediately after the revolution, none of its hopes and expectations were fulfilled. Inflation was rampant and consumer prices climbed relentlessly. Although the shortage of goods available in shops had been waived for propagandistic reasons, inflation still prevented a higher purchasing power. Fourthly, these economic problems were exacerbated by an important psychological factor, the insecurity of being a minority. The most bloody incidents of the revolution took place between pro-Ceaușescu forces and the army in Timișoara¹⁸, Sibiu, and Brașov, towns with a relatively high proportion of German inhabitants¹⁹. This feeling of insecurity was further intensified by the Romano-Hungarian clash in Târgu Mureș in March 1990 and the vandalism the miners of the Jiu Valley brought to Bucharest in President

Iliescu's name in January and June 1990 and in September 1991. Finally, the rapidly increased number of burglaries, partly accompanied by murders, looting and arson, which were in particular directed against the supposedly wealthier Germans of Transylvania and the Banat, added to the push factor and the desire by the German minority to leave Romania²⁰.

3. The construction of the DFDR in 1989

In the context of this decline of the German population, the DFDR was founded on 28 December 1989 in Sibiu. Its founders wanted the DFDR to be an organisation representing the Germans in Romania and to be open to all ethnic Germans and also non-Germans who shared the DFDR's aims. The DFDR should act as an a-political cultural organisation and not as a party. Thus, it was still possible for members of the DFDR to join political parties, as long as they did not hold a leading post in both a political party and in the DFDR²¹.

The most important reason why the DFDR was founded at this time was the intention of the Germans to use the revolution as an opportunity to overcome the Romanian nationalism practised under communism. When he assumed power in 1965 Ceaușescu had intensified the nationalist policies already adopted by Gheorghiu-Dej and as conditions worsened nationalism was used to an ever greater extent to legitimise the regime. With conditions not improving after 1989 the minorities feared that this trend would be maintained and strengthened²².

These nationalist tendencies were an indispensable determinant influencing the development of minority organisations. Analysing the phenomenon of nationalism in Romania by the help of political theory shows that for Romania the subjugation of the peasantry before unification of the principalities prevented the emergence of the sort of popular nationalism that Serbia and Bulgaria experienced. The lack of a significant middle-class excluded a Czech-style bourgeois nationalism and the nobility's lack of interest in the government, and its fast demise after unification, was detrimental for the development of the Hungarian type of aristocratic nationalism²³. These factors provided that in Romania alone nationalism was bound up with the bureaucracy and thus monopolised by the state to serve the purpose of ruling circles²⁴. However, it is important to note that Romania was the only country in South Eastern Europe which did not expel its German citizens after 1945.

Moreover, the crisis of Romanian state socialism began in part due to the ethnic structure of Romania. The Romanian revolution started when the Securitate wanted to arrest a Hungarian priest, Laszlo Tökes in Timișoara, capital of the most ethnically mixed part of Romania, the Banat. One can therefore see that specific structural characteristics, such as the country's heterogeneous ethnic character, supported the democratic initiative. It is more likely that this development in late 1989 was more the product of such peculiarities than of any so-called democratic experiences of the Romanian people. These facts are indispensable for a study dedicated to a minority organisation.

4. *The initial years of the DFDR 1989–1996*

Initially, many of the DFDR's decisions were made at the top because its members were preoccupied, either with leaving the country or with accommodating themselves to what was supposed to be the democratic reality of post-communist Romania. In these circumstances, the leadership of the DFDR, under its founding President Dr Thomas Nägler, a historian from Sibiu, and its MP, Ingmar Brandsch from Mediaş, put its major focus on creating an organisational entity which could speak for the whole German community in Romania within the constraints of Romanian law²⁵. One of its first steps was to improve communication and cooperation amongst the different German groups in Romania and to create an effective, federally organised apparatus mirroring the heterogeneous structure of Germans²⁶. This policy was meant to address the expectations and security needs of the remaining Germans of securing a "cultural and political home" at an insecure time; it was also directed at satisfying the needs of the Romanian state which wanted to deal with one single partner in settling all issues regarding the German minority.

The relatively tense situation for minorities directly after the revolution of 1989, with clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians and the exodus of more than 50 per cent of Germans, made the first presidency of Ion Iliescu (1989–1992) a very problematic period for the DFDR. Its organizational structure was yet to be defined and only parts of the German community, the Saxons of Transylvania, recognised it as the legitimate representative of their interests. The Schwabs of the Banat were not inclined to recognize this "Saxon organisation"; those of Satu Mare were in the process of redefining themselves as Germans and the Bukovina Germans and the Germans of the Regat²⁷ were deeply lethargic. Therefore, the first three years of the DFDR's activities were confined to Transylvania and further restricted mostly to Sibiu. This fact emphasised the DFDR's lack of power base and its correspondingly weak relationship to the Romanian government. While other minority groups, such as the Hungarians²⁸, Roma²⁹, and Ukrainians, set up offices in Bucharest, the Germans did not; for various reasons, including the pattern of historical settlement, the DFDR centred their organisation in Sibiu. This decision made communication with leading circles in Bucharest even more difficult. Romania's extreme centralisation and inadequate transport system worsened the situation. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that the DFDR could not do much to promote its interests during the period from 1989–92; successful lobbying was next to impossible. Further exacerbating the situation was the lack of direct contact with Germany and Austria.

Moreover, the explicitly hostile Romanian policies towards minorities during the first three years of the post-communist era contributed to the alienation between the DFDR and the Romanian government. The Romanian policy during these initial years was highly influenced by the experiences with the Hungarian minority and also the shocking reality of ethnic wars in neighbouring Yugoslavia made the leadership in Bucharest very sensitive to any signs of autonomy, let

alone growing independence. Bucharest's main objective was, therefore, to contain such movements as rapidly as possible. In particular, "loyalty" to Romania was the most appreciated stance of an ethnic minority. Unlike the Hungarians who sought their natural interests as a large ethnic minority and wanted e.g. an amendment to the Romanian constitution to change the definition of Romania as a "homogeneous national state" or a referendum on territorial autonomy in the Szekelers regions of the Județe of Covasna and Harghita³⁰, the DFDR, beset by internal problems, did not pose any such threat³¹. Thus, their different aims alienated the Hungarians from the Germans and the German position towards the Romanians was seen by the Magyars as being "collaborationist" and "betraying the common case"³². These frictions with the Hungarians together with the Romanian policies towards the Hungarians which had their roots in the time before 1989 and which had not much changed after the revolution exacerbated the slow growth of the DFDR as a democratic organisation during this period as well³³.

Several academics take the point of view that there was no real Romanian Revolution in 1989 and that the party leaders more or less removed Ceaușescu from power and continued most of his policies³⁴. Subscribing to the "three stages" theory of Attila Agh, this "Palace Coup", the first stage of his theory, the "destruction", "crisis", or simply "disintegration", was initiated by three decisive factors. First, the mass uprising; secondly, the army rebellion; and thirdly, the palace coup³⁵. The actual core of a democratic revolution however, that democratisation is introduced step by step, was definitely not the case in the Romanian change of 1989. In absolute contrast to a "real" revolution, this change was "supported" by party leaders to keep their own positions³⁶. A good example in this regard is Ceaușescu's successor, Iliescu³⁷, who belonged to the old Romanian socialist ruling class which led Romania to ruin up to 1989. His "National Salvation Front" (FSN) seized power and kept it until 1996. Thus, the main protagonists of the Timișoara uprising, the ethnic minorities and in particular the Hungarians were even more regarded as "dangerous elements" by the circle around Iliescu who only wanted to remove Ceaușescu, but not change the overall system³⁸.

In the September 1992 elections this was even intensified, since the former FSN, now called the FDSN, failed to gain an absolute majority in either house of Parliament, and Prime Minister Nicolae Văcăroiu of the FDSN had to seek some sort of cooperation which was most easily found amongst nationalist and neo-communist groups³⁹.

Naturally, a partly nationalist government was not very beneficial for the DFDR. Moreover, Dr Paul Philippi, Professor of Protestant Theology at the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Sibiu, became the new President of the DFDR due to serious health problems of the first President, Dr Năgler⁴⁰. His main aims were the consolidation of Germans as an ethnic group, improvement of their relationship with the Romanians, a better understanding with the Hungarians and other minorities, and the DFDR's recognition by Germany and Austria. Positive achievements during this period were that the internal organisational

structure was solidified and the tensions between the Schwabs and the Saxons were reduced. Moreover, the DFDR's situation was also improved by the relatively cordial relationship between Germany and Romania. The German-Romanian treaty of 21 April 1992 included generous provisions for Germany to actively improve the situation of the German minority in Romania. Although the DFDR is not explicitly mentioned, articles 15 and 16 deal with the DFDR indirectly by guaranteeing the right of the German minority to organise itself without undue state interference. Article 16 even concedes to Germany the right to support the German minority by any material and monetary means deemed necessary to secure their future in Romania. Another important factor which improved the position of the DFDR was the fact that it won its seat in Parliament on its own by receiving the necessary number of votes in the 1992 elections⁴¹.

Interestingly, these successes were achieved because of the DFDR's consistent support of national unity. The DFDR's slogan that national unity and support for minority rights were two sides of the same coin proved successful. In the case of the constituency of Sibiu, the DFDR could also bargain using the distinctively different identity and self perception of the Transylvanian Romanians who seemed to have more sympathy for a German from "amongst themselves" than for a Romanian from the Regat, which is where the governing FDSN's candidate came from. In Sibiu, the DFDR's aim to represent a minority and the majority was seen as an opportunity for the town's Romanians to bargain from the supposedly special status the DFDR enjoyed in Parliament⁴². This willingness of the predominantly Romanian electorate of Transylvania to vote for a native German if the alternative candidate was a Romanian from outside Transylvania, *i.e.*, to prefer a Transylvanian to a Romanian, contributed significantly to the increasing political role of the DFDR.

The patrons of the DFDR could not have foreseen the full extent of the sluggish democratic progress up to 1996 in a time they supposed to be the transition to democracy and towards a future without nationalism. As a minority organisation with just one MP in the Romanian Parliament, the DFDR could only safeguard its interests by seeking alliances with major political parties. Therefore, the aim to act as a voice of the German population of Romania, and to look after their vital interests, gave the DFDR a political dimension and made it act more and more like a political party.

Hence, the main challenge of the DFDR throughout its existence has been the incompatibility between its explicit intention to act as an a-political organisation as explained in section 3, and its implicit will to be an active political force which made it act more and more like a political party. My contention is that the DFDR's permanent discourse of "creating an entity in internal unity and loyalty to the Romanian state" allowed it to combine both aims in spite of their apparent incompatibility. I argue that, in doing so, the historical Saxon tradition of constructing a *modus vivendi* with the ruling forces in Bucharest played a major role. The DFDR's strategy was to find a synthesis between on the one hand the pre-war traditions of Rudolf Brandsch and on the other hand the ideas of Hans Otto Roth⁴³.

5. *The growth of the DFDR 1996–2000*

The change of presidency and government in 1996 from the post-communist FDSN/PDSR to the conservative alliance CDR supported by the UDMR, changed many things for the DFDR. Given its better organisational setup it seems more than surprising, however, that the DFDR's election results were less than satisfying. All in all, the DFDR lost more than 10,000 votes compared to the 1992 elections. The constituency of Sibiu could not be won again. Instead the Banat Schwab Horst-Werner Brück had more votes in Timișoara than Wolfgang Wittstock received in Sibiu. Brück did not win the constituency of Timișoara, but made use of the 5 per cent provision for minorities offered by Romanian law⁴⁴. The DFDR centre under President Philippi successfully used this setback and transformed the defeat into a message for the Schwabs of the Banat, to show that the Saxons were willing to share their influence with the other German groups. Most of the membership accepted this explanation⁴⁵.

On the other hand, the elections were also a big success for the DFDR. The pro-minority CDR won the elections and Professor Emil Constantinescu, the chancellor of the University of Bucharest, was elected President. The CDR incorporated the UDMR in the newly formed government and a Ministry for National Minorities was established to be led by a member of the UDMR, György Tokay⁴⁶. Now the efforts to improve the relationship between the Hungarians and the Germans since 1992 were paying off. Due to the close contact between the two groups, the DFDR's Dr Klaus Fabritius⁴⁷ was made state secretary to Tokay.

The next four years brought major advances for the DFDR. The overall attitude towards minorities became much more open minded and friendly. Treaties with Hungary and the Ukraine were signed; the tensions between Hungarians and Romanians also lessened and the active involvement of the UDMR in governing the country had very positive effects. The year 1999 in particular brought some very positive results for the DFDR. New legislation regulated and simplified the process for restitution of socialised property. Now the DFDR could move into its newly renovated and restored party centre in Sibiu, located in a reclaimed house which had been owned by the Austro-Hungarian Officers Club of Sibiu before 1944⁴⁸.

Nevertheless, between 1996 to 2000 the Minority Protection Bill the DFDR and other minorities had tabled in Parliament in 1993 was not put on the statute book⁴⁹. This was partly the fault of minority-interest parties themselves, and particularly of the Hungarians whose demands for territorial and group-autonomy rights divided the minority parties and made it easy for the Romanians to block the bill.

Moreover, every diplomatic skill were needed to keep the DFDR in line with the expectations of senior-level officials in the Romanian government and with the Hungarians, who led the Ministry for National Minorities, in which the DFDR was a direct partner. Therefore, the DFDR's two fundamental principles of stressing internal unity and loyalty towards the Romanian state had to be

supplemented by a third, the attempt to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Hungarians without endangering the first two vital constants of the DFDR's survival strategy.

Although the DFDR had accomplished many of its aims, internally it was still dependent on the Romanian state and the Hungarians. The politically stormy year of 1998 which saw three Romanian and two German governments also became a year of fundamental changes within the DFDR. Professor Philippi resigned from his post as President after his 75th birthday in November 1998. Being the DFDR's MP in the Romanian Parliament, it was almost a matter of principle that Wittstock should succeed him. However, Wittstock, whose political position was closely aligned to the PDSR, alienated the ruling CDR and especially the UDMR who had rejected him as State Secretary in the Ministry for Minorities in 1996. These embarrassments were eased in two ways. First, Professor Philippi was appointed to the newly created post of an "Honorary President" and, secondly, Mr Benjamin Józsa, the President of the German Youth Organisations in Romania (ADJV) whose mother was German and whose father Hungarian, was appointed as Wittstock's new personal advisor. This course of action prevented damage to Wittstock and it helped to contain misgivings on the part of the CDR and UDMR because of Wittstock's position⁵⁰. These events clearly show that the DFDR was still far from being a sovereign political force.

6. *The transformation of the DFDR into a political party 2000–2004*

The result of the 2000 elections did not surprise those experienced in Romanian politics. A disillusioned population turned back towards the supposedly easier solutions and old formulae offered by the post-communist PDSR and its front man Iliescu, who also won the presidential elections. More shocking was that Vadim Tudor, the disturbed leader of the anti-Semitic and ultra nationalist PRM, came second in the presidential and parliamentary elections; Tudor even forced Iliescu into a second round of the presidential contest⁵¹. The most unexpected result of the 2000 elections from the perspective of the DFDR was the almost doubling of its votes; the DFDR came 19th of 69 political formations running in these elections. Wittstock won the constituency of Sibiu; moreover, Sibiu's mandate for the Senate went to a member of the DFDR, Dr Hermann Fabini, who was a candidate on the list of the PNL.

Moreover, the DFDR secured the election of five mayors, most importantly Mr Klaus Johannis, Lord Mayor of Sibiu, together with four in the Județ of Satu Mare, and ten members of local councils, six in Sibiu and four in the Sibiu Județ council. The interesting feature of these elections was that there was no positive discrimination in favour of the DFDR. The DFDR had to win its posts in direct competition with other parties. Thus, it is even more impressive and surprising that the DFDR managed to defeat the PDSR in Sibiu. In the city council of Sibiu, the DFDR did not put enough candidates on its list since it did not expect a victory. Thus, it could not claim two of the seats it actually won and had to cede them to others.

The 2000 elections gave the DFDR more political influence. So too did the prospect of EU enlargement. This led to the signing of a protocol of cooperation between the DFDR and the PSD⁵² in 2002. This protocol had somewhat contradictory consequences for the DFDR. On the one hand it guaranteed Johannis' support when visiting Berlin and gaining Germany's support for Romania's accession to the EU, whereas several benefits were granted to the DFDR. However, on the other hand it seems unlikely that either side will secure their objectives. The DFDR for its part had largely surrendered its fate to the governing PSD and the German government is unlikely to change its position towards Romania merely because Johannis is advocating Romania's accession. Given this, the DFDR's interests are only included in government policies if either Germany or Austria support the DFDR, or if Romania needs her minorities to present a positive image for her desire to join the EU. The Germans have a special role amongst the minorities since they are the third largest group and have an influential lobby in the west.

On the national Romanian level, the election results were impressive, in that the DFDR lost its state secretary and the whole Ministry for National Minorities was abolished. The PSD established a Ministry for Public Information instead and integrated a "Department for Interethnic Relations" with a State Secretary leading it⁵³. This post was given to a Romanian. The DFDR was granted an "Under Secretary", as was the UDMR. On the side of the DFDR this rather marginal post was given to Mr Ovidiu Gañ of Timișoara⁵⁴.

The 2000 elections also saw direct cooperation between the DFDR and the UDMR. Both organisations decided to have common lists of candidates in areas where the Hungarians lacked a strong presence⁵⁵. In the field of national politics the situation of the DFDR and of the UDMR again became more complicated since the new government of Prime Minister Adrian Năstase did not assign the same priority to ethnic minorities as did the preceding governments. Moreover, the lack of a Minority Protection Law became more than apparent. Minority groups, particularly the less powerful, were subject to the government's whims and dependent on its good will. The "Council for the National Minorities", established in 1993, had only an advisory role and in addition, the council could only formulate its proposals unanimously and could not improve the situation⁵⁶. This was the reason the UDMR left the council in 1995 calling it a "fig leaf of the Romanian government". The only role of this institution is the distribution of government money, a procedure which "reminds one more of Gregor von Rezzori's Maghrebinian Tales than of serious political discussions"⁵⁷.

For the DFDR the main consequences of the 2000 elections were: massive growth of responsibility on the local level and growing public support, but an increased necessity to stress loyalty to Bucharest and to the PSD⁵⁸. The ruling PSD used all its influence and central power via the centrally imposed prefects to "turn local politicians in its favour". This phenomenon, widely known as "political tourism" in Romania, strengthens the governing party's position even more. A study of the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) regarding the dynamics of the party affiliation of mayors in Romania in 2000 and in 2003 showed a

massive migration of mayors to other parties. After the local elections of 2000, 1,050 of a total of 2,957 mayors (35.5%) were members of the PDSR. Only three years later the PSD had 1,947 mayors (65.4%, +29.9%), 897 more than in 2000. Except for the PSD only the UDMR (+1.5%) and the social-liberal PUR (+1.0%) could marginally win⁵⁹. All other parties lost essentially to the PSD. This meant that in the Sibiu City council Johannis had to find a *modus vivendi* with the majority party since he was judged by the population by his deeds for which he needed the support of his council. He would only receive this support if he made deals with the PSD majority. The Romans had a proverb for such situations: *beneficium accipere est libertatem vendere*: to accept benefits means to sell one's liberty.

This political reality is symptomatic of Romania's structural problems. Well working democratic institutions would prevent such insecurity; they would guarantee the representation of minorities without the vital need to please the ruling élite⁶⁰. This prevention of insecurity and the guarantee of equal rights for all citizens and also for ethnic minorities would be a first step towards the creation of a positive economic framework⁶¹. Democratisation, minority protection and representation and economic reform are connected to each other and a successful economic reform process also needs a properly-working democracy and minority protection without *divide et impera* policies⁶².

In particular, EU requirements for accession include a fully implemented and working democracy⁶³. Romania "shares the general East European aspiration to join the EU"⁶⁴, but its transition towards political pluralism, minority protection and the market economy has been slow. The practised "stop-and-go policies and partial reforms will fail"⁶⁵, and a pure change of title and hollow minority protection are not enough. At the present the legislative framework is unstable, the political system highly questionable and the ground for corruption fertile⁶⁶. Moreover, the initial decentralisation process and its economic policies are full of deficiencies. The level of real and structural reforms of the economy and the methods of economic policy rather poor⁶⁷. The civil society is still very weak, political society without any robust alternative and rule of law intermittent⁶⁸. Finally, positively promotional politics are barely in existence and the level of minority protection is low compared to e.g. Hungary. Thus, Romania is "the farthest from a consolidated democracy"⁶⁹ compared to other post-communist countries.

Moreover, the Romanian *divide et impera* policy has also affected the political role of the DFDR. By discovering the German minority as a means to pursue its political ends, the PSD realised the DFDR's growing political role. By doing so the PSD weakened the unity of the different minority groups. This means for the DFDR that as long as it stresses its loyalty and subordination to the Romanian government it is supported in its wishes and problems⁷⁰.

7. Conclusion

To draw a conclusion, the DFDR faced a number of practical problems which were largely solved. It also had to solve organisational problems. Moreover, the

DFDR had to work out a practical stance that involved resolving the tension between opposing certain government policies, necessary to show it responded to its members' concerns, and the political reality of life as a small organisation, representing a small minority in a state which has come to be dominated by a single, all-powerful party machine (PSD).

Following precedents set in similar circumstances in the era of Dualism and in inter-war Romania, and influenced by the peculiar tradition of Romanian nationalism as discussed in section 3, it has decided to work from within, to the point of identifying itself nearly, though not completely, with the PSD. Nevertheless, by stressing its loyalty to the Romanian state and the ruling party and by unifying the Germans internally the DFDR has been able to improve its situation by the support of Germany. However, as the example of Sibiu shows, even these potentially good opportunities are heavily dependent on cooperation with the PSD simply because of the weak situation of the Germans as an ethnic group. The policy of cooperation has brought tangible benefits, e.g. the restitution of some land and of estates and the continuation in office of disproportionately large number of mayors. It also helped the DFDR to convert numerical weakness into political strength; the alternative of not cooperating, as pursued by the Hungarians until 1996, produces no discernible improvements.

Analysing the development of the relationship between the DFDR and the Romanian state it becomes obvious that the aim of the founders of developing the DFDR into an independent voice for the German minority in Romania towards the German and Romanian governments, as explained in section 4, was only marginally fulfilled with regards to Bucharest. Although the DFDR was Bucharest's exclusive partner with reference to its citizens of German nationality this arrangement did not really provide many advantages for the Germans.

These determinants should be taken into account when judging recent political results. In particular, the results of the 6 June 2004 local elections when mayor Johannis garnered close to 88.7 per cent of the votes and the DFDR won 16 of 23 seats (66.43 per cent) in the city council of Sibiu, leaving the PSD (3 seats) far behind, should be regarded from this view⁷¹. The DFDR was also very successful in its other local strongholds, especially with its new mayors in Cisnădie, Johann Krech, and Mediaş, Daniel Thellmann⁷². Nevertheless, this does little to change the overall weaknesses of the DFDR, in particular its internal regional disparities which are even intensified by the extraordinary success of the Saxons and Landler in Transylvania, the good score of the Schwabs of Satu Mare and the less than modest results of the Schwabs of the Banat and the Germans of the Banat mountain region of Caraş-Severin⁷³. What the results do show is that the DFDR has definitely become a widely accepted political party and is no longer an a-political cultural organisation of an ethnic group as it managed to secure 73,000 votes out of Sibiu's total 83,000. Only 2,000 of those were votes of ethnic Germans⁷⁴.

Although formally co-operating with the PSD, the DFDR managed to present itself as a credible local political alternative to the PSD⁷⁵. This is shown well by the overwhelming success in the local elections of 6 June 2004. However,

success brought its own problems and a first warning sign that the DFDR is heavily dependent on the PSD was the fact that the DFDR's good results in several villages were reduced by the centrally controlled local election committee (BEJ). The official reason given was that "minority organisations cannot be treated like political parties"⁷⁶. A more plausible reason seems to be that the DFDR with its 11 seats (29 per cent) in the council of the Judeţ of Sibiu (PSD 8, PD 6, PNL 5, PUR 3)⁷⁷ and its prospective President of the Judeţ council, has simply become too strong⁷⁸. The more powerful the DFDR becomes, the more it will have to stress its loyalty to the PSD and to the Romanian state. On the other hand, the PSD's political predominance, its unwillingness for political reforms, its abuse of political power and the use it makes of the DFDR, contribute to the DFDR's political success as local alternative to the PSD. Thus, developing alternative political partnerships would be highly recommendable for the DFDR since stressing loyalty is no longer likely to bridge the increasing gap between the two parties.

This leads to the final conclusion that the DFDR, while trying to secure a certain amount of independence, remained somewhat a puppet in the political play. However, contrary to the explicit intention of the DFDR to be an a-political organisation of the German minority it has implicitly developed over the years a strong political side. The remainder of this thesis will analyse in greater detail this paradoxical situation and the DFDR's strategy for solving it by its permanent discourse of following pre-war examples⁷⁹ of "creating an entity in internal unity and loyalty to the Romanian state".

NOTES

1. Because full details are given in the bibliography, footnote references omit the place and date of publication, authors' forenames, and full details of journals. Where the title of the referenced work is very long, it is abbreviated. Data from: MP Wittstock, Letter to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 1999, in: Archival File B6, July 1999.
2. See e.g., Guentcheva, *State, Nation and language: the Bulgarian community in the region Banat from the 1860s until the 1990s*, PhD. 24624 (University of Cambridge) 29 May 2001. The Bulgarian minority of the Banat numbered a mere 8,092 members in the 2002 poll. Data from: Romanian Government, *Populaţia după etnie la recensământul din anul 2002*, March 2003, pp. 5–6, in: Archival File A5, March 2003.
3. These are (in order of size): Hungarians, Roma, Germans, Ukrainians, Russians and Lipovenes, Turks, Tatars, Serbs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Croats, Greeks, Jewish, Czechs, Polish, Italians, Armenians, Albanians, Rusyns, Macedonians; Having a common organization, the Czechs and Slovaks are recognised as a single minority. From: Archival File A5, March 2003.
4. One of the major reasons, why this sort of studies have rarely been conducted, especially in Germany, is, that it is extremely difficult to defend such studies. The words of Dr Gerhard Seewann, director of the South East Europe Institute in Munich: "... The risk of being discredited as having right wing convictions was rather high, ... which is one of the reasons why the topic of German minorities in Eastern Europe was absolutely feared by post-war German academics..." are telling. It is, therefore, encouraging to note a recent impetus amongst German historiography to focus again on German minority groups in Eastern Europe after long years of absenteeism (e.g., Roth, Gündisch *et al.*). From: Seewann, *Kommunismus und Minderheiten*, in: "HZ", No. 1835 (11 July 2003), p. 5.
5. See e.g., Gündisch, *Wahrung der Eigenständigkeit trotz wechselnder Staats-Zugehörigkeit. Eine*

- 850-jährige Geschichte im Überblick; Hochstrasser, *Die siebenbürgisch-sächsische Gesellschaft in ihrem strukturellen Wandel*; Völkl, *Rumänien*.
6. See e.g., Gabanyi, *Bleiben, Gehen, Wiederkehren?*
 7. Göllner, (ed.), *Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848–1918*; Roth, *Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919–1933*; Teutsch, *Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*.
 8. The Romanian and German original abbreviations are used for political formations and parties. Please see appendix 1 for an English cross-index.
 9. Data from: Illyes, *Nationale Minderheiten in Rumänien– Siebenbürgen im Wandel*, pp. 39–60 and Totok, “Rumänisierung”, p. 128 ff.
 10. Hoffstadt and Zippel, *Reiseland Rumänien*, p. 76.
 11. Illyes, *Nationale Minderheiten in Rumänien– Siebenbürgen im Wandel*, pp. 39–60.
 12. Seewann, *Die Ethnostruktur der Länder Südosteuropas aufgrund der letzten Volkszählungen*, pp. 78–82.
 13. Schreiber, *Demographische Entwicklungen bei den Rumäniendeutschen*, p. 204.
 14. Gabanyi, *Bleiben, gehen, wiederkehren?*, p. 493.
 15. Paduraru, *German Novels*, 11 February 2004.
 16. Altogether, 1 291,112 Germans emigrated from the former USSR, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and the former Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1994. Data from: Bundesverwaltungsamt, *Statistik*.
 17. See Reichrath, *Wem gilt die Empfehlung 1201?*
 18. Geographical names are given in Romanian; the Hungarian and German equivalents may be found in Appendix 2.
 19. Even Dr Hans Klein, director of studies at the Theology Faculty of the University of Sibiu, was wounded.
 20. See Gabanyi, *Bleiben, gehen, wiederkehren?*.
 21. This is possible due to §§ 1, 5 and 11 of the constitution of the DFDR, dating from 1 February 1991. From: Archival File A3, February 1991.
 22. e.g., Gilberg, *Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceaușescu’s Personal Dictatorship*; Shafir, *Romania: Politics, Economics and Society; Political Stagnation and Simulated Change*.
 23. See Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*; Berend and Ránki, *Economic Development*; Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*.
 24. See e.g., Fisher-Galati, *Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: The Romanian Case*.
 25. Tontsch, *Der Minderheitenschutz in Rumänien*, p. 160. According to Romanian law the organisations of the National Minorities are not parties, but organisations in the sense of societies. This entails the possibility of stricter controls by the state. The same tactics was pursued by Chancellor Bismarck in Germany when he made all political organisations become registered societies in the 1880s. Nevertheless, the organisations of the National Minorities are treated like parties when it comes to national and local elections. From: Article 4, chapter 2, of the Law Nr. 68 from 15 July 1992 with regards to elections to the Houses of Parliament, in: *Ibid*, pp. 195–6.
 26. This issue shall be discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis as the scope of this essay did not allow to elaborate on it.
 27. The Regat consists of Oltenia, Muntenia, the Dobruđja and Moldavia.
 28. Founded on 25 December 1989. See: Kendi, *Minderheitenschutz in Rumänien*.
 29. See: Barany, *Minorities in Romania*, pp. 28–30; Erich, *Roma in den ehemaligen Staaten Ost- und Südosteuropas*, pp. 35 ff.
 30. *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 8 December 1991, 36286.
 31. See Gabanyi, *Ungarn und die rumänische Sicherheit — Perzeption und Politik*, pp. 514 ff.
 32. Interview with Mr Zoltán Kalmár, Sibiu, 28 September 2003.
 33. *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 23 April 1993, 37785 and Archival File A5, January 1993.
 34. e.g., Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, p. 262; Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, p. 400; Maęków, *Der Wandel des kommunistischen Totalitarismus und die postkommunistische Systemtransformation*, p. 1375; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, p. 358 (“Stolen Revolution”); Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu anii numărătorii inverse*, pp. 294 ff.
 35. Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, p. 262.
 36. See Sislin, *Revolution Betrayed? Romania and the National Salvation Front*.
 37. In his published CV he is characterised as “being widely regarded [before 1989] as a politician who could be trusted to lead the struggle against totalitarianism, for freedom, justice and democracy...”.
 38. On 6 December 1992 Iliescu Salvation Front tabled a declaration in the Romanian Parliament which even officially declared the UDMR to be an “extremely dangerous organisation”. From: *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 6 December 1992, 37399.
 39. To prevent bad publicity raised by this, especially abroad, the FDSN changed its name in July 1993 to PDSR.
 40. From 1969 to 1983 Professor of Protestant Theology at the University of Heidelberg, 1976 Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University,

- 1983–1996 Professor of Practical Theology at the University Cluj-Sibiu.
41. Archival File A8, September 1992.
 42. Archival File A8, October 1992.
 43. This means to cooperate more with the Romanian government (Roth) or to have a more independent stance by seeking cooperation with other minority groups (Brandsch). From: Wien, *Kirchenleitung über dem Abgrund*; Baier, *Rudolf Brandsch und Hans Otto Roth*, pp. 76–9; Völkl, *Rumänien*, p. 238.
 44. Archival File A8, November and December 1996.
 45. Mr. Brück resigned in January 1998 to become the new Attaché for economic affairs at the Romanian Embassy in Bonn. Thus, Wittstock was able to return to Parliament in February 1998.
 46. *Monitorul Oficial al României*, part I, No. 17/1997, 31 January 1997.
 47. Dr Fabritius, a biologist from Bucharest, has been President of the regional DFDR branch “Altreich” (Regat) since 1992.
 48. Archival File A6, June 1999.
 49. Draft from 7 December 1993. Nevertheless, Romania signed the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities on 1 January 1995. From: Archival File A5, March 1995.
 50. Mr Wittstock was member of the Communist Party of Romania between 1977 and 1989, though not holding any leading position. From: MP Wittstock, Letter to the German Embassy, 27 August 1999, in: Archival File B5, July 1999.
 51. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War*, p. 334.
 52. The PDSR renamed itself PSD in 2002.
 53. www.guv.ro, *Program de guvernare, Pe perioada 2001–2004, cap. X, Relațiile Interetnice*.
 54. DFDR, *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Rumänien 2003*, pp. 26–31.
 55. Archival File A8, May 2000.
 56. *Monitorul Oficial al României*, part I, No. 156, 9 July 1993.
 57. Interview with Mr Hansmartin Borger, Sibiu, 22 September 2003.
 58. Many of those even called Sibiu “Johannisburg” after the DFDR’s victory. From: Ohnweiler, *Die Stadt am Zibin auf dem Weg zu einem Johannisburg*, p. 39.
 59. *Wie demokratisch ist die Sozialdemokratische Partei?*, in: “ADZ”, No. 2832 (10 March 2004), p. 3.
 60. Przeworski, *Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy*.
 61. Rose, *Evaluating Long and Short-Term Transformation in Central Europe*.
 62. Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat, *The Gains from Privatization*.
 63. Smith and Wright (eds.), *Whose Europe?*
 64. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, p. 452.
 65. Stolojan, *Policy Making in Romania*, p. 16.
 66. Wallace and Haerpfer, *Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption*.
 67. National Bank of Greece, *Overview of the Romanian Economy*.
 68. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, p. 364.
 69. *Ibid*, p. 364.
 70. Special bonuses like the bilingual signs, which are often refused to the Hungarians, even in towns with a large number of Hungarians, are generously granted to the Germans even if they are a small minority in the re-named villages and towns. Following a government decision the local councils of villages and towns with a minority share of more than 20% of the total population are obliged to issue bilingual place signs, to publish decisions (“anunțuri de interes public”) in Romanian and the minority language and to use bilingual names for public institutions (“unități proprii”). From: Letter of the DFDR centre to its regional branches in the Banat, Transylvania and Satu Mare, 29 July 1997, in: Archival File A3, July 1997.
 71. Altogether, the DFDR won nine mayor ships (Sibiu, Cisnădie, Mediaș in the Județ Sibiu, Căpleni, Tiream, Ciumești, Petrești, Foieni in the Județ of Satu Mare and Gărâna in the Județ of Caraș Severin). The DFDR member Josef Retter became mayor of Pâncota (Județ Arad) running for the PSD, Edgar Klein won in Periam (Județ Timiș) for the PNL, Nikolaus Crăciun in Cenad (Județ Timiș) for the PD and Emeric Pleth, vice President of the DFDR in Belțiu (Județ Satu Mare), became mayor as an independent candidate. The DFDR won four seats each in the town councils of Cisnădie and Mediaș, three seats in Sighișoara, two seats each in Satu Mare and Carei and one seat in Codlea. Moreover, the DFDR could secure several seats in municipality councils in the Județ of Sibiu (3 each in Șeica Mică and Laslea, 1 each in Agnita and Șura Mică), the Județ of Satu Mare (52 seats altogether in the councils of Turulung, Tiream, Ciumești, Petrești, Foieni, Cămin, Căpleni, Ardud, Stanislău, Urziceni, Terebești, Berveni, Moftinul Mic, Tăsnad, Iojib and Craidorolt), the Județ of Timiș (1 in Biled, 1 in Buziaș), the Județ of Caraș-Severin (2 in Anina, 1 in Gărâna) and the Județ of Arad (1 in Peregul Mare, 1 in Pâncota). Moreover, in the Județ of Brașov the DFDR even garnered numerous votes in municipalities without any ethnic German inhabitants (e.g., Săcele). Altogether, the DFDR won 99 mandates in town and municipality

- councils. From: *Haushoher Sieg in Hermannstadt*, in: "HZ", No. 1881 (11 June 2004), p. 1; *Scriparu wurde Bürgermeister*, in: "KR", No. 2768 (26 June 2004), p. 1; *Erfolg für das Forum*, in: "HZ", No. 1883, 25 June 2004, pp. 1 and 3.
72. It is interesting to note that Krech's competitor in the second contest for the mayor ship in Cisnădie, Roberto Dietrich (PNL), was also of originally German descent.
73. Today the Saxons and Landler of Transylvania number approximately 31,500, the Schwabs of the Banat (Județe Timiș and Arad) about 25,000, the Germans of Caraș Severin 10,000 and the Schwabs of Satu Mare 10,000. From: MP Wittstock, Letter to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 1999, in: Archival File B6, July 1999.
74. *Totales Vertrauensvotum*, in: "ADZ", No. 2896, 9 June 2004, p. 8.
75. It is most interesting to see that the PSD did not manage to win any mayor ship in a single Județ capital in the ethnically mixed areas of the Banat, Transylvania, the Crișana, Maramureș and the Bukovina. All capital mayor ships there went to the PD (6), the PNL (4), the UDMR (3), the PNȚCD (1), the DA (1), the DFDR (1) and to an independent candidate (1). The PSD was only successful in the former Regat where it won 14 Județ capitals. However, even in these PSD core regions the PNL could secure 6, the PD 3, and the DA 1 (Bucharest) Județ capital. Altogether, the PSD won 794 mayor ships (43.51 per cent), the PNL 335 (18.36%), the PD 305 (16.41%), the PUR 109 (5.97%) and the PRM 74 (4.05%). The UDMR won 185 mayor ships and secured the best election result of its history. It is very remarkable that the UDMR also won in towns with only about 30–40 per cent Hungarian population (e.g. Satu Mare, Reghin), i.e. it was also supported by many ethnic Romanians. From: "PSD erzielte die meisten Mandate, PNL und PD die meisten Stimmen", in: "ADZ", No. 2906 (23 June 2004), p. 1.
76. *Tauziehen um Kreisrat geht weiter*, in: "ADZ", No. 2899, 12 June 2004, p. 1.
77. *Haushoher Sieg in Hermannstadt*, in: "HZ", No. 1881, 11 June 2004, p. 1.
78. The local election committee had refused to award the DFDR several seats in local councils in the Județ of Sibiu, arguing that "they have enough seats already". Only after appealing to the central election court in Bucharest the DFDR was granted the full number of seats. From: *35 Kommunalräte*, in: "HZ", No. 1882, 18 June 2004, p. 1.
79. Roth, *Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919–1933*.
80. I have been given full access to all *A-Files* and to all *B-Files*.
81. More information may be found in Lewis, *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*.
82. For a comprehensive cross-index of Transylvanian names, see Mittelstraß, *Ortsnamenbuch* and for those in the Banat and Satu Mare, see Ács *et al.*, *Erdély autótérképe*.

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A3: Forum Intern (General Internal Files)

A4: Korrespondenz mit BMI

(Correspondence with the German Ministry for Internal Affairs)

A5: Minderheitenfragen (Minority Issues)

A6: Enteignungsfragen (Restoration of Property)

A7: Minderheitenpublikationen

(Newspapers, Publications, Edition, Editing House)

A8: Wahlen (Elections)

A9: Regierung, Ministerien (Romanian Government)

A10: Dt.-Rum. Regierungskommission

(annual German-Romanian Intergovernmental Commission)

A11: Schulkommission (Schooling Issues/Commission)

A12: Allgemeine Kontakte (General Contacts)

"**B-Files**" (**Besonders/Particular**)⁸⁰

(Due to privacy reasons a further specification is omitted here.)

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Executive and Manager of the DFDR from May
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Romania, on 17 July 2002 (from 1600–1700 h), on

22 March 2003 (1400–1600 h), on 24 March 2003 (1600–1700 h), on 29 March 2003 (1400–1600 h), on 17 September 2003 (from 1600–1800 h), on 19 September 2003 (1600–1800 h) and on 26 September 2003 (1600–1800 h); Times given in Eastern European Time, i.e. Athens, Sofia, Bucharest, i.e. London time + 2.00 h).

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APPENDIX 1
*Index of Romanian organisations and parties*⁸¹

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Romanian</i>	<i>English</i>
ADJV	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Jugendverbände	Association of German Youth Organisations in Romania
DA(election alliance of the PNL and the PD)	Alianta Democratica	Democratic Alliance
CDR	Conventia Democratica din România	Democratic Convention of Romania
DFDR/F.D.G.R.	Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România	Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania
FDSN (since 1993 PDSR)	Frontul Democrat al Salvării Nationale	Democratic National Salvation Front
FSN (since 1993 PD)	Frontul Salvării Nationale	National Salvation Front
IPP	Institutul pentru Politici Publice	Institute for Public Policy
PD	Partidul Democrat	Democratic Party
PDSR (since 2002 PSD)	Partidul Democratiei Sociale din România	Party of Social Democracy in Romania
PNL	Partidul National Liberal	National Liberal Party
PNTCD	Partidul National Taranesc Crestin Democrat	Christian and Democratic National Peasants' Party
PR	Partida Romilor	Party of the Roma
PRM	Partidul România Mare	Greater Romania Party
PSD	Partidul Social Democrat	Social Democrat Party
PUNR	Partidul Unitatii Natiunii Romane	Romanian National Unity Party
PUR	Partidul Umanist din România	Romanian Humanist Party
UDMR	Uniunea Democrata Maghiara din România	Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania

APPENDIX 2
*Index of Romanian place and area names*⁸²

<i>German</i>	<i>Romanian</i>	<i>Hungarian</i>
<i>Siebenbürgen</i>	<i>Transilvania</i>	<i>Erdély</i>
Agnetheln	Agnita	Szentágota
Bistritz	Bistrița	Beszterce
Großlasseln	Laslea	Szászszentlászlo
Heltau	Cisnădie	Nagydisznód
Hermannstadt	Sibiu	Nagyszeben
Kleinschelken	Șeica Mică	Kisselyk
Kronstadt	Brașov	Brassó
Mediasch	Mediaș	Medgyes
Neumarkt	Târgu Mureș	Marosvásárhely
Regen/Sächsisch Reen	Reghin(-ul Săseșc)	Szászrégen
Schäßburg	Sighișoara	Segesvár
Schil	Jiu	Zsil
Vierdörfer/Zernendorf	Săcele/Cernatu	Négyfalu/Csernátfalu
Zeiden	Codlea	Feketehalom
<i>Sathmar</i>	<i>Satu Mare</i>	<i>Szatmárnémeti</i>
Bildegg	Beltiug	Krasnabéltek
Capleni	Căpleni	Kaplony
Darotz	Craidorolt	Királydaróc
Erdeed	Arduđ	Erdod
Fienen	Foieni	Mezofény
Großkarol	Carei	Nagykároly
Josefhausen	Iojib	Józsefháza
Kalmandi	Cămin	Kálmánd
Kleinmaitingen	Moftinul Mic	Kismajtény
Petrifeld	Petrești	Mezopetri
Schamagosch	Ciumești	Csomaköz
Schönthal	Urziceni	Csanáros
Stanislau	Sanislău	Szaniszló
Terebescht	Terebești	Krasznaterebes
Terem	Tiream	Mezoterem
Thurterebesch	Turulung	Túrterebes
Trestenburg	Tâsnad	Tasnád
<i>Banat</i>	<i>Banatul</i>	<i>Bánság</i>
Anina-Steierdorf	Anina	Stájerlakanina
Billed	Biled	Billéd
Busiasch	Buziaș	Buziás
Groß-Pereg	Peregul Mare	Németpereg
Pankota	Pâncota	Pankota
Perjamosch	Periam	Perjámos
Temeschwar/Temeschburg	Timișoara	Temesvár
Tschanad	Cenad	Nagycsanád
Wolfsberg	Gărâna	Szörénvordas
Berweni/Berweli	Berveni	Börvely

EUROPE — IN SEARCH OF A “DEFINITION”

GRIGORE GEORGIU

The critical time the European Union goes through, after France and the Netherlands voted against the Constitutional Treaty in national referenda, is also a time of reflection on the process of European construction, on its historical significance and, likewise, on its sore points. In a joint statement, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and the Acting President of the European Union showed their conviction that the Constitutional Treaty was good and that it would make “the EU more democratic, more efficient and stronger”. What was then the reason why the electors in these two founding states voted against? The analysts spoke of the gap between citizens and politicians, of the rejection of the liberal model the treaty would stand for, of the shock caused by the admission of new members into the EU and of the popular concerns over jobs.

Besides the social reasons or those related to the citizens’ decreasing confidence in politicians, the vote against the Constitution showed that people also feared a loss of national identity and sovereignty. The transfer to community institutions of powers that belonged before to the states also means that major decisions would no longer be under the direct control of citizens. As the polls and Eurobarometres warned, national strings are still more powerful than the European identity. Like many other political leaders, Mr. Graham Watson, MEP, President of the Liberal and Democratic Group in the EP, voiced a very interesting opinion on it, by saying that “the French slapped Europe’s left cheek, while the Dutch the right one. I hope that eventually it would get EU out of its numbness”.

Shattering off this “numbness” might involve a number of things: a redefinition of the political agenda and a delay of the enlargement (which would directly affect Romania), a reactivation of political leaders and their rapprochement to the citizens, a reshaping of the European project, as happened once the Maastricht Treaty was adopted. The stake of these debates refers to the future of Europe and nation-states, the question of cultural identity, at national and European levels and in the context of globalization.

European integration and the context of globalization

Lately, political and social thinking has had to deal with new challenges, brought to the forefront of intellectual debates by the accelerated, sometimes

baffling, seemingly chaotic changes, facing societies, states, cultures and individuals in the context of globalization. Political and media analysts are by now accustomed to refer to globalization as a mandatory landmark in the interpretation of events and changes which are at the top of the current agenda at the outset of this millennium.

The end of the Cold War set the entire world into a process of changes and developments, that did not fit into the pattern of predictability. Economic globalization has made it that, at the outset of this millennium, the economic capitalist system will work on other bases and at a different level. The accelerated trade exchanges, the interconnected markets, the power gained by multinational companies and the unprecedented mobility of the financial capital narrow down a country's capacity to control its own production of assets and their distribution. International relations are under a crossfire of tensions that are hard to decipher. The nation state that came into being as the outcome of the developments within the European societies and as a solution to the challenges of the modern age, sees today its own sovereignty restrained by the economic agents for which territorial borders have lost their significance. The process of European integration follows the same trend.

Therefore, under the pressure of these contexts, the historical, social and political sciences have a new agenda today. Globalisation and the reshaping of political structures, supranational integrations and regional tendencies to fragment national spaces, interstatal cooperations, the changing of spiritual identity under the impact of mediatic aggressions and consumption culture, multiculturalism and postmodern hybridization of the way of thinking, are just a few of the most disputed themes in the contemporary intellectual environment.¹

Moreover, the interest in the analyses on the developments and trends of the societies at local, regional or global levels, has generalized today and it doesn't belong only to the cultural and political elites as it used to in the past. What will happen in the European area? — here is a question with a major geopolitical scope. Will the integration logic defeat the differential logic? Will the European Union be configured as a federal superstate or as an association of national states? Will Europe keep in tomorrow's world the avant-garde position that it had in the modern epoch? What are the effects of the process of globalization, including the indirect and "perverse" ones? Do they standardize the world or do they deepen the disparity between the states, do they attenuate or do they stimulate the interest in the cultural identities? Many theoreticians are exercising their analytical force upon such themes, promoting various approaches, diagnoses and previsions.

However, the analysts must sometimes admit that their theoretical discourse is in sheer disagreement with the social and political developments it refers to, since the last decades have witnessed baffling and even zig-zagging developments, similar in a way to "the movements of the knight on the chessboard", as inspiredly said once Claude Levi-Strauss.² Many analysts do not see or cannot explain the discrepancy between "real history" and the interpretation role, which many

theoreticians are applying to this history. By its long-term geopolitical implications, the European integration is one of the most important historical processes nowadays. It has to be approached in its own complexity from combined interdisciplinary perspectives, which is a difficult matter because social and political thinking is facing a new problematic field and there is a risk to apply obsolete interpretation schemes on it.

The contemporary world is defined by two simultaneous processes: on the one hand, an increased interdependence between societies and cultures (expressed by the globalization of commercial markets and the expansion of new ways of communication), and, on the other, a rebirth of the interest in local, ethnic and national identities. Many theoreticians look into these contradictory tendencies and often speak of how important cultural identification is in the globalisation age, of “the clash of civilisations” in the contemporary world, including the “indigenisation” of development projects.³ Undoubtedly, in the case of the united Europe, the stake of all these debates is the place of national identities and specific cultures in the integration process. As I have stated on another occasion,⁴ most of these representations regarding the relations between cultural identities and the process of European integration operate by a “disjunctive paradigm”, through which both aspects are put in opposition. However, in the exciting debates on the “variable geometry” of Europe, in the novel political visions and the new quests of contemporary thinking, we can identify “a paradigm switch,” a conceptual displacement toward a “conjunctive paradigm” which helps us understand in a more adequate way the dynamic and complex “conjunctions” between unity and diversity in present-day world.

We have to overcome both those views according to which European integration would be incompatible with the national idea and with the promotion of national values, and also those narrow-minded nationalistic and anti-Western views that equate the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures to a loss of identities and of the cultural matrix. The two extreme positions feed on two utopias, likewise active in the theoretical register as in the community mindframe. The first has its support in the recent ultra-liberal ideologies of globalization (ideologies which took over from the Marxists the utopia that humankind moves toward unified, homogeneous and linear structures under the pressure of free market forces and of the new communication means), and the second is an inappropriate reaction and as utopian to these objective historical tendencies.

Projections on the European identity

In this context, social and political theories are called to define in a more precise way the European identity and to clear up its genetic and functional relationships with the diverse national cultural identities in the European geographical space. It means an extremely complex vertical relationship between two levels of the cultural reality — national and supranational. Building up a European “common cultural area”, likely to rally up in-depth citizens, races,

nations, societies and regions, proves to be much more difficult than putting together a common economic market.

The European Union is the outcome of a cumulative process which brings together European states and societies, a regional integration which successively marked indubitable steps forward on various levels (economic, commercial, juridical, institutional, political, monetary, financial, administrative, etc.) After the fall of the communist regimes and the end of the cold war, EU has redefined its historical mission, turning into an institutional and geopolitical framework for the reunification of Europe. The enlargement toward the East has become a major goal, while the gradual integration of the Central and East European states has given a new geopolitical dimension to the European project. An economically integrated and politically reunified Europe will certainly become a strong global geopolitical actor.

The European construction also raises another issue, a cultural and anthropological one: the societies making up Europe are nation-states, with different mother-tongues and cultures, with different historical traditions and memories, and their national identity is deeply rooted in special symbolic practices and experiences, which are hard to replace by a diffuse, superordinated European identity, which is currently working only with abstract legal and institutional expressions (treaties, regulations, institutions). The European cultural identity is indeed an issue, since it does not come out of a common historical, social and political background, it cannot emerge from a common past and common memories, likely to generate a profound feeling of belonging, similar to the feeling underlying national identities. The compliance to the widely-acclaimed system of political values (freedom, equality, human rights, solidarity, democracy, rule of law, etc.) does not suffice to cement a European identity, while for nationals "Europe" is still "an abstraction that competes from unequal positions with each tangible and deeply rooted nation".⁵

Political values are important and active in shaping up a European, meta-national consciousness; nonetheless they are perceived by citizens through their concrete embodiments in various institutions and practices, in public and social policies. The citizens from many Western states attribute their social difficulties to the bureaucratic institutions in Brussels and the EU enlargement, whereas united Europe is not felt as something vitally important and close to their daily life. Therefore, European identity needs also a more profound social support, a transpolitical or pre-political cultural foundation.

Roger Scruton shows in *The West and the Rest* that in the background of the idea of nation and modern nation-state we will find a "pre-political loyalty", historically shaped, previous to "the social contract" between governors and citizens. The modern nation-state, based on "territorial jurisdiction" and the notion of citizenship, on the representative democratic mechanism and legitimate governance, associated with the citizens' rights and duties, implies a "special type of pre-political loyalty," defined as a community of citizens who share a common tongue, customs, territory and interests in daily life.⁶ The

question is whether such a “pre-political loyalty” exists at a (pan)European level, likely to generate and support a trans-political and trans-national European identity. If the nation and nation-state, which underlay modern Europe, involves this kind of pre-political loyalty, then European cultural identity cannot be built up on the same model of national identities, because the European Union and the project to unify Europe cannot imply something of the kind.

The monetary unification, the coordination of economic programmes, the common external politics and the existence of political community institutions will not necessarily lead to the attenuation of national identities, but to their redefinition in the new polycentric environment. This is viewpoint gaining wider and wider support these days. Thus, analyst Barry Buzan⁷ has pointed out that an emerging state-like political construction needs a physical basis, institutions and an ideology to legitimise and organise it. However, we can see that the EU has a physical basis — the Schengen space —, has political institutions and a common currency, but “it lacks that symbolic patrimony through which nations knew how to propose to individuals a collective interest, a fraternity, a protection”.⁸ European identity misses this very symbolic, affective and cultural level.

From the perspective of cultural morphology, Edgar Morin asserts that “the paradoxical Gordian knot of European identity” consists in the fact that Europe represents a mosaic of cultures and traditions, a polycultural complex that cannot be summed up or reduced to “an original founding principle.” Although we mention common foundations of European cultures, placing their sources in the Greek-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultural fund, the syntheses resulting from the encounter of these traditions and the creative experience of modernity are “of a fabulous variety.”⁹

Therefore, cultural diversity is the first constitutive and defining element of European identity, and from this rich diversity springs the force and dynamism of this cultural area. Modern European culture must be seen as “a unity in diversity” as “a unitas multiplex”.¹⁰ It is “a tumultuous and disorderly site,” a real “whirlpool of intercalations and interferences”, that can be described and understood only through a “dialogical vision”, in which different and opposite elements are seen as parts of a contradictory unity, without suppressing these dualities and aspects. They are active in a “complementary game” of oppositions, such as religion and reason, faith and doubt, mythical and critical thinking, empiricism and rationalism, existence and idea, particular and universal, philosophy and science, tradition and innovation, immanent and transcendent, etc.¹¹

Therefore, the paradox of Europe is that its unity comes from division and conflict, while “the unity of the European culture relies on the vitality of its antagonisms.”¹² Once Europe acquired, after WWII, the consciousness of a common destiny, and the states embarked on the construction of a common groundwork for their unity, the European peoples found out that their past was marked by conflicts, wars and divisions, and who looked for a “founding principle” of Europe could trace up only a European evanescent and contradictory “spirit”, nourished by the tension of opposite impulses. Hence, the project of the European

unity cannot be based on the past, states Edgar Morin, since it is an expression of the political will of the present and a projection of the future.

It is therefore legitimate to ask whether a European cultural identity exists in reality, as long as intra-European divisions and conflicts have not gone away from the historical memory of the European peoples. However, we can speak of a latent cultural identity, that can be reactivated by cultural programmes and exchanges, likely to strengthen European conscience, or of a political project aiming to symbolically build up this identity. As a matter of fact, such a project is, to a great extent, carried on quite successfully in universities and academic circles, and it is about the interpretation of political events, social changes and trends of ideas in the history of Europe, in order to trace down antecedents and premises of current European unification.

This project undertaken by historians aims, in Edgar Morin's words, to turn the divided past into a "common" past in the eyes of our generations: "History must be rewritten, as each generation does, depending on the experiences lived in the present, experiences which, critically reprojected on the past, shed on new light on it." This retroactive operation onto the European past is needed "to find out what we have in common, not only in spite of, but mainly in our very divisions and antagonisms".¹³

The paradox of united Europe is therefore increased because "so far, it has never been created a consciousness or a feeling of a common destiny based on the future, that is on what has not yet happened".¹⁴ Undoubtedly, Europe sets into operation, again, its historical mechanism, which illustrates the case defined by Noica as "exception becomes the rule."

Europe — "exception becomes the rule"

As we know, Max Weber noted that it was only the Western World that gave birth to cultural phenomena of universal significance. For him, the reason behind it were, mainly, the processes of ratiocination in all the domains of life, from science, art, politics to the capitalist organisation of labour.¹⁵ Hence, European culture would have stand as an exception. From another perspective, the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica (1909–1987) found a new formula to characterise the European spirit, establishing a specific relationship between rule and exception, *i.e.*, "exception becomes the rule." Historical types of culture fall, preferably, under a certain relation between rule and exception. Noica determines five types of exceptions: "some that invalidate the rule, others that confirm it some that extend it, others that proclaim it and, finally, the ones that become the rule themselves."¹⁶ Europe, in its mediaeval and modern form, which appeared as a breakaway from the Ancient world, would exemplify the relation by which "exception becomes the rule."

What would that mean from a historical, social and cultural viewpoint? Unlike Ancient or non-European cultures stagnant and closed within their core of norms and ideas, intolerant to liberties represented by exceptions, and the

cultures that accept renewal when it broadens up the application field of rules or the cultures that legitimize exceptions (the difference, the multiplicity) alongside the unitary principle of the rule (the case of the Greek culture), the European world, by its creative dynamism, discover exceptions (ideas, languages, forms of expression and social organisation, etc.) which step by step become rules and norms that take precedence over the previous ones. Whereas the other cultures have set “a balance with nature” or “good encounter with nature,” modern European culture places itself from the onset “beyond nature,” establishing a rational knowledge beyond the natural empirical one.

By this creative mechanism, European art invented and established an amazing variety of languages and forms of expression, and the European science went beyond any appearances to formulate rational explanations and to operate with a world of mathematical fictions, while technology created a universe of objects and tools that transformed life environment into something “non-natural,” different from the natural environment in which the individual carried on his life for centuries. Based on this comparative outlook, Noica makes an eulogy of the European culture, saying that it became the only “complete” culture, able to be the “prototype” to other cultures, since it has a universal vocation, and its model was globalised, proved by the fact that “the entire world is today under the European model.”¹⁷

The five relationships between rule and exception find their correspondences in the five possible relationships between One and Multiple, a categorical couple from Plato’s philosophy, which expressed the types of cultures subject of the model of relation between unity and diversity. Noica notes that this relationship encompasses the very structure of culture and all its possible variations. Noica analyses five types of relationship between the two terms, each defining a possible type of culture: “1) One and its repetition; 2) One and its variation; 3) One *in* the Multiple; 4) One *and* the Multiple; 5) One multiple.”¹⁸ All cultures have, in one way or another, aspects and features of the five relationships. The accents and prevailing notes decide, however, the specific character of cultures.

The first three types of cultures give priority to unity as against multiplicity (bearing resemblance to totemic, monotheist and pantheist religions). The fourth model, specific to the Greek culture, animated by a polytheist spirit, establishes a balance between the two terms, while the unity of the principle expresses itself in the phenomenal multiplicity of the world. The last relationship, specific to the European culture, would express “a synthetic unity” in which “neither One nor the Multiple prevails, but the One is the Multiple from the very beginning, being distributed without division.”¹⁹

The European culture illustrates the model of a synthetic unity in expansion, that is breaking up into fields, autonomous unities, isotopes, a unity that diversifies and multiplies itself. It is not “a unity of synthesis,” which unifies *a posteriori* a given diversity. Speaking of a European culture, we do not deal with the unification of diversity (an operation specific to the process of

cognition), but with an inner diversification of the One, the breaking up of the background unity into other specific, individualized unities, into “a world of autonomous values.” Noica states that modern European culture was the only one to achieve this plenary model, and its beginnings are traceable to the establishment of the Christian dogma of the Trinity, starting with the Nicene Councils of 325 and 787.

The idea of a multiple unity in itself is an exception to the “hard-core” rules of classical logic, as defined by the Greek thinking, from Parmenides to Aristotle. Therefore, the European culture has become “the embodiment of the law into the case” and all its manifestations follow this principle of unity in diversity. Humanism, law, rationalism, sciences, arts, nation-states, democracy, the autonomy of values, all the creative facets of the European culture are illustrative of this mechanism of the exception which becomes the rule and of the unity in diversity, a formula which has become, not at all by chance, the constitutive principle of the European Union.

In this way, Noica endeavours to identify “the code” of the European culture, to determine the inner structure of the European spirit, to find afterwards illustrations and variable embodiments in factual history. How can a reality be unitary and diverse at the same time and under the same relationship? Human mind has been tackling this (insoluble!) issue once the individual became conscious, since, *humanity*, culture, are characterised by this paradoxical manifestation. Noica finds a similitude between the main morphological categories of the language and the features of a cultural era in the history of Europe. Therefore, “*a grammar of culture*” might derive from grammatical morphology.²⁰ Noun, adjective, adverb, pronoun, numeral, conjunction, preposition become forms of the logos which can “be accountable for an entire age or community raised to culture.”

In this way, the ages of the European culture can be put under the sign of a grammatical category. The Middle Ages fall under the sign of the noun, of substantive entities, Renaissance under the sign of the adjective, of the diverse and heterogeneous, while the Reformation and Counterreformation and the Baroque under the sign of the adverb, with its excesses and sophistication, with its tendency toward method and criticism. The reinstatement of subjectivity gives gradually way to the personal pronoun “I,” then to the plural “We” opening up the age of individualism and democracy. The 20th century will be dominated by the numeral and the conjunction, as “the age of the masses,” centered on the individual of statistics, isolated and counted out. It is the age of economic pragmatism, in which there is an outer relationship among people, which makes “people live next to each other as if they were one without another.”²¹ Philosophy and literature are now dominated by the feeling of the absurd and nihilism, but the European culture has within itself the capacity to overcome crises and try new mental and formal experiments.

As regards the specific way of the European culture to proceed by exceptions that become rules, it is also Europe where values became autonomous, unlike the

persistent syncretism of other cultures. The political got separated and grew autonomous from religion, the state separated from the church, secularisation became the norm of institutional organisation, education and social life. Finally, Europe invented nation and nation-state, which “became the norm of social and political organisation” for the modern world.²² And also Europe is about to go beyond this resistance structure of modern times, by inventing “the exception” called the European Union, as a *sui generis*, without historical antecedents in point of supra-national or meta-national organisation.

As a matter of fact, the very project of the European construction can be put under the sign of conjunction, in disagreement with intra-European disjunctions and conflicts of modern times. The European Union is neither an empire, nor a conjectural association of states, nor an intergovernmental organisation, nor an agreement of international cooperation, nor a confederation, nor a federation. It contains something of all these, but it is a synthesis of a different type. A supranational vector orients the European integration model, but it has a feature which distinguishes it from all suprastatal forms of organisation and cooperation known in world history. EU is a supranational and suprastatal organisation, which does not dismantle the constitutive national states; on the contrary it contains and preserves them, acknowledging their sovereignty and decision power within certain limits. This is the key to its historical originality. That is why, the EU could be more exactly called a postnational instead of a supranational organisation.


The process of globalisation actually started by a process of regionalisation. Europe built up its functional economic region after 1950, the first exception to become the rule in globalisation. The EU is the only integrated economic and political region, which has functional supranational institutions (parliamentary, executive and juridical), a unified economic market, a common currency, as well as converging policies, in various domains, aspects that single it out as compared to other economic regions worldwide with a low level of integration, mainly commercial, such as the NAFTA region, dominated by the USA, and the Asia-Pacific region, dominated by Japan and more recently by China. By way of conclusion, the EU is the first postnational organisation to play the role of a global actor in a world still dominated by nation-states.

NOTES

1. A critical analysis on these contradictory tendencies and on cultural identity and global process, in: John Tomlinson [1999], *Globalization and Culture*, Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers, Romanian edition: *Globalizare și cultură*, Timișoara, Editura Amarcord, 2002, pp. 104–151.
2. Claude Lévi-Strauss [1956/1973], *Race et histoire*, in vol. *Le racisme devant la science*, Paris, UNESCO, Romanian edition: *Rasă și istorie*, în vol. *Rasismul în fața științei*, București, Editura Politică, 1982, p. 19.
3. Samuel P. Huntington [1997], *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York, Simon & Schuster, Romanian edition: *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, București, Editura Antet, 1998, pp. 130–137.

4. Grigore Georgiu, *Identitate și integrare*, București, Editura Institutului de Teorie Socială al Academiei Române, 2001, pp. 22–27.
5. Anthony D. Smith, *Nation and nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p. 131.
6. Roger Scruton [2002] *The West and the Rest*, ISI Books, Romanian edition: *Vestul și restul. Globalizarea și amenințarea teroristă*, București, Humanitas, 2004, pp. 48–49.
7. Barry Buzan [1991], *People, States and Fear*, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London, Romanian edition: *Popoarele, statele și teama*, Chișinău, Editura Cartier, 2000, p. 274.
8. Anne-Marie Thiesse [2001], *La création des identités nationales. Europe XVIII^e–XX^e siècles*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, Romanian edition: *Crearea identităților naționale în Europa. Secolele XVIII–XX*, Iași, Polirom, 2003, p.12.
9. Edgar Morin [1990], *Penser L'Europe*, Paris, Gallimard, Romanian edition: *Gândind Europa*, București, Editura Trei, 2002, p.123.
10. *Ibidem*, p. 28.
11. *Ibidem*, p. 106.
12. *Ibidem*, p. 139.
13. *Ibidem*, pp.138–139.
14. *Ibidem*, p. 138.
15. Max Weber, [1934], *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, Verlag von J.C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, Romanian edition: *Etica protestantă și spiritul capitalismului*, București, Humanitas, 1993, pp. 5–22.
16. Constantin Noica, *Modelul cultural european*, București, Humanitas, 1993, p. 11.
17. *Ibidem*, p. 35.
18. *Ibidem*, p. 44.
19. *Ibidem*, p. 51.
20. *Ibidem*, p. 91.
21. *Ibidem*, p. 10.
22. Anthony D. Smith [1998], *Nationalism and Modernism*, London, Routledge, Romanian edition: *Naționalism și modernism*, Chișinău, Editura Epigraf, 2002, p. 202.

BOOK REVIEWS




Les Editions Tritonic nous proposent un livre traduit de l'anglais, coordonné par Jean Callaghan et Franz Kernic et qui réunit plusieurs articles de sociologie militaire. Ce livre est paru en Occident en 2003 et sa traduction en roumain représente un succès du point de vue de la nécessité de synchroniser les recherches réalisées en Roumanie en ce domaine. La tradition roumaine dans cette branche de la sociologie connaît des approches remarquables chez des auteurs comme Dimitrie Gusti, Anton Golopenția, Ion Conea, Gheorghe Brătianu. Dans la période communiste, les études dans le domaine militaire et de la sécurité ont subi l'influence inévitable du filtre idéologique. Après 1989, la sociologie militaire est présente dans certaines sections universitaires, il existe des institutions et des publications qui préparent et font paraître de telles recherches et études. Pourtant, celles-ci sont dominées par une approche historique ou géopolitique dont les limites deviennent évidentes au niveau conceptuel. George Cristian Maior, Secrétaire d'État et chef du Département pour l'Intégration Euroatlantique et pour la Politique de Défense du Ministère de la Défense Nationale, apprécie dans la *Préface* à l'édition roumaine que cette pénurie conceptuelle rend nécessaire la traduction d'un tel livre, pour dépasser les méthodes et les instruments de recherche propres au début du XX^e siècle: les notions, les concepts, les études regroupés dans ce livre peuvent assurer la connexion de la sociologie militaire roumaine aux performances de la sociologie militaire mondiale. Cette synchronisation rapide est obligatoire tant de point de vue théorique, au niveau de la recherche scientifique, que de point de vue pratique, c'est-à-dire au niveau de la décision politique sur le recours ou le non-recours aux forces militaires. Par conséquent, il faut établir une relation entre théorie et pratique, donc identifier la valeur

d'applicabilité des études, d'autant plus que la Roumanie est devenue en 2004 membre de la structure de sécurité qui est l'OTAN.

Les articles réunis sous le titre *La sécurité internationale et les forces armées* portent sur des sujets et des thèmes très vastes et divers, mais l'idée centrale du livre semble être de les concentrer en articles de petites dimensions, qui ensemble, construisent un manuel, d'ampleur presque encyclopédique et d'une approche interdisciplinaire.

La première partie du livre peut constituer une sorte de guide théorique, en synthétisant les démarches les plus actuelles dans l'étude des forces militaires et des relations établies entre l'armée et la société. La deuxième partie comprend des articles qui introduisent les facteurs global et régional dans les approches du rapport entre les domaines militaire et civil. La troisième partie, qui rassemble le plus grand numéro d'articles, traite des sujets et des thèmes principaux dans les sciences sociales: la professionnalisation de l'armée, la bureaucratisation des institutions et des organisations militaires, le contrôle démocratique de l'armée, l'intégration des minorités de tout type dans les structures militaires, les forces multinationales ou les concepts de doctrine et de sécurité. Toutes ces contributions sont importantes pour les conséquences qu'elles peuvent avoir dans la vie réelle et aussi pour leur valeur «scolastique». La dernière partie offre au lecteur une liste très utile de sources de documentation, sous la forme des bibliographies, des institutions, des données disponibles dans les bases électroniques.

Ruxandra Luca



This book fortunately reminds us all both the guiding characteristics of contemporary philosophy and their addressability, in relationship with the fields of political and social philosophy. Today we speak about a philosophy of the attention for details, for particularities and exceptions, that are making more

fluid the identity of any of the subjects of philosophical debate. Bringing diversity, pluralism and complexity, these characteristics are baffling and ambiguous outside an attempt of paradigmatic gathering, as the one sustained by the author. We find in the book an attempt that was carefully developed and deepened with time. It is a vision that was already shaped in 1995, when A. Botez published in *Revista de filosofie*, “*Spiritul filosofic al Oxfordului*” (“The Philosophical Spirit of Oxford”) where she showed: “...it is about the analytical and probabilistic spirit present in the British philosophy, religion, art and science from the old days, till today. (...) the multi-faces (...) of the Oxford spirit, characterized by the interests for the natural language and for the possible worlds that are created within the process of communication, for the distortions and the non-senses that might be born either at the emission or at the reception of a message. The analysis of the experiences and of the different languages, the semantics and the pragmatics, the probabilistic perspective of the game and the predilection for essences, knowledge and logics has specific orientations for British philosophy.”¹

The paradigm of the British culture belongs to the integrative concepts. They constitute a plenum that the author follows in its development as early as the 13th century. The most important of all these are knowledge, experience and language that A. Botez mainly advances in the foreword to the book as well in a relevant study, to prove the paradigmatic character of the British culture and investigate the role of philosophy. Yet, inside the book there are many other integrative concepts presented as they left their mark over the British culture, such as: intentionality, mental, physical, perception, causality, belief, conscience, representation, internalism, externalism, qualia, propositional attitudes, naturalism, psychologism, utilitarianism, games of language, semantic analysis, representationalism, grammar, memory, will, action, sense, signification, liberty, determinism, education, *mind-body* relationship, mental events, etc.

Interesting for the relationship with political and social contemporary philosophy are the pages dedicated to Steven Earnshaw. Well-known for his works *Postmodern Surrounding* (1994), *Postmodern Subject* (1995), or *Just Postmodernism* (1997), and others, he is a representative of the British integrative paradigm while also depicting the inevitable confrontation with postmodernism that characterizes under diverse labels the various contortions of contemporary thinking (in his case, mainly over the topic of society and the social). His contribution may be defined as an original participation in contemporary dialogue. He meditates over postmodernism, in general, and over humanism, in particular. In what concerns humanism, this author answers Hans Bertens who reduces postmodernism entirely to a sort of diffuse humanism. At the same time, he expresses his skepticism in relation to the fact that Bertens attempts to prove that the so-called linguistic turn marginalizes the elements of existentialism, thus not only weakening the possibilities of the self, but those of the actions as well. Although Earnshaw agrees with the idea that one of the present tendencies in philosophy consists in reaffirming existentialism, he does not agree that a school of existential postmodern humanism could ever subsist nowadays even within an

existentialist favorable context. Even so, changing the perspective of analysis and interpretation, he considers that along with postmodernism, a research on the question of “pain”, from a cultural, philosophical, medical or, more precisely, neuro-physiological point of view, is now very intriguing. This investigation could occupy an important place within the contemporary preoccupations of philosophy. Another aspect of postmodern humanism could be, after Earnshaw, the less probable (but desirable) correlation among the philosophy of science, mental philosophy and ethics.

Robert Trigg is an important philosophical presence within the landscape of social sciences. His most famous books *Understanding Social Science*, 1988 (followed by 5 editions), *Ideas of Human Nature*, 1988 (followed by 5 editions), *Rationality and Religion. Does Faith Need Reason?*, 1997, are illustrations of his effort to understand the nature of social reality in the presence of the tension between the scientific approach and the insinuation of values within such an attempt. The author acknowledges the foundation of his attempt: “social science has to do more to bring clarifications on the social factors and the fact that at the basis of social practice lie philosophical presuppositions. Especially now, after the sudden dismantlement of certain political systems, we have to research the role of the individual within society, because we face the real risk of confronting with an individualism resulted from the brutal pursuit of the selfish interest or with a relativism that closes up each society within its own traditions and in self-sufficiency.”² Like other contemporary British philosophers present in the book, he thinks that freedom itself must be reconsidered through the positive and negative duties we all share and which weld the fabric of society, through traditions and emotions that make society alive, and, eventually, but as important, through religion, to maintain the spirituality of any society.

Another star personality within the British philosophy, who has to be mentioned in any approach to contemporary philosophy, especially from a perspective that is intended to be meaningful for political and social philosophy as well, is Mary Hesse, a distinguished member of the Royal Academy. Maybe the most important aspect with political and social reverberations to be singled out from her work is the now famous design of a new epistemology presented in her study *How to Be Postmodern without Being a Feminist*, published also in Romanian, under the title *Cum să fii postmodern fără să fii feminist* in “Revista de filosofie” nos. 5–6/2000. There are several essential points to be made in depicting this new epistemology, one in the spirit of the linguistic turn. This new epistemology starts from rejecting the possibility of a univocal and ideal language as referential in representing the world. Even more, she underlines that the natural (vernacular) languages in themselves are neither univocal nor ideal, but contextual and holistic. Therefore, there are certain degrees present in defining the significations as a particular type of correspondence with the gradual approach to defining concepts. Yet, for the sake of precision it must be stated, as the author does, that the lack of ideality for the language does not eliminate the possibility to build logical arguments inside a certain language. Terms such as “rhetorics” and “persuasion” should be reevaluated in a positive way, because only

in relationship with the univocal ideal language, the argumentation for persuasion can be repudiated. The next step is to acknowledge that science too needs rhetorics. Bringing arguments and forming inferences are central to many sciences (anthropology, history, sociology, archeology), as the humanities are “already participative”. Through this sort of communicative participation, sciences (humanities especially) attempt to resolve the distortion subject-object through finding new orientations, such as feminism and postmodernism. Sciences focus today on communicating the comprehension and thus they are conveniently oriented towards the Habermasian interests of knowledge, for emancipation. Therefore any attempt to sustain and impose a unique point of view within the humanities is implausible. A trivial positivism is to be rejected. Of course, at the same time, it is necessary to impose restrictions of a scientific nature to any proposed interpretation. Yet, the metaphor and analogy are re-valorised in their scientific quality as old concepts. The author specifies: “(as) in daily talks, the correct, un-oppressive argument can function only through finding common presuppositions, then used in good comparisons, and then reasoning on their account for suggesting explications and actions. Gadamer, with his “merging of horizons”, Habermas, in the concept of “ideal speech situation” and Rorty, in his “conversation of humanity”, all attempted to catch this element of rationality, even if they did not always give enough attention to the interpersonal power relations existing in the cleanest and most correct shots at rational argumentation”.³ Here it is about acknowledging the importance of flexibility, possible in theory, as in methodology, which brings together again the empirical and hermeneutical sciences (if we give for example even only the use of the metaphor and language for creating scientific models, this epistemological bridge becomes apparent). On the one hand, sciences fight with reconsidering the points of view of the “actors”, and on the other, they have to face the “theoretical ideology filtration”. Science enjoys nowadays a moderate success due to pragmatism. Thus, the scientific categories are useful and not “real”, while the scientific propositions are relatively specific affirmations and not universally quantifiable “natural laws”. If it is true that a so-called “patriarchal ideology” is to be found again and again in many of the scientific accomplishments, still, Mary Hesse proposes pragmatism and moderation, a *common sense* specific to the British cultural paradigm in refusing to throw away the scientific accomplishments with “the filtrate” of the patriarchal ideology. At the same time, other social values (feminist, but not only), says the author, may have epistemological future over the technical scientific accomplishments in themselves, that cannot be “a source of all knowledge beyond doubt” anymore.

Mary Hesse is exemplary for the integrative postanalytic character of contemporary British cultural paradigm. From the theory of the metaphor and the symbolism of language to models and analogies useful for theoretical science (physics), to problems that appear at the frontier science-religion and the historical and archeological research, we find ourselves following Mary Hesse in the middle of the enchanted forest, we are like Alice, escaped from “the queen of hearts” following the cat’s advice, knowing now that postmodernism would

lead to somewhere with more and more sense, “if we only walk enough”. Or, in the words of the huge personality represented by Mary Hesse: “Postmodern philosophical orientation appears to me closer to my position, but not in the sense of *anything goes*, but in that of a modified realism, searching to replace standard theories with new perspectives. (...) I believe that epistemology has to be redefined because there is no universal knowledge, or unique methodology of science and one set of ends that natural and humanist sciences pursue throughout their history. Epistemology has to be a critical discipline preoccupied with uncovering the confrontation present in any type of cognitive discourse, including the scientific one.”⁴

Henrieta Anișoara Șerban

NOTES

1. Angela Botez, *Spiritul filosofic al Oxfordului*, “Revista de filosofie”, XLII, 1, Bucharest, 1995, p. 127.
2. Angela Botez, *Filosofia în paradigma culturii britanice*, Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2004, p. 157.
3. Angela Botez, *Filosofia în paradigma culturii britanice*, Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2004, p. 143.
4. Angela Botez, *Filosofia în paradigma culturii britanice*, Editura Academiei Române, 2004, p. 145–146.

**DU MENSONGE. QUELQUES SOURCES CLASSIQUES
DE LA MORALE POLITIQUE (SOFOCLES, PLATON, MACHIAVEL).
LE CAS DE LA ROUMANIE**

Le 16 février 2005 Gabriel Liiceanu, professeur de philosophie à l'Université de Bucarest a donné, au siège du Collège *La Nouvelle Europe*, une conférence sur le problème du mensonge, dont il parle dans les termes d'une fraude linguistique. L'homme, à la fois libre et vulnérable à la décadence, réalise, par le fait linguistique, un mouvement en deux directions contradictoires: celle de la vérité et celle du faux, ce qui détermine une définition du mensonge comme «moment négatif de la liberté». Le mal, le crime, la corruption sont possibles par l'intermédiaire de l'escroquerie verbale qui les prévoit.

Les textes classiques qui consacrent ce sens du mensonge sont les pièces *Philoctète* de Sophocle et le dialogue platonicien *Hippias Minor*. Le dramaturge antique, argumente avec élégance Gabriel Liiceanu, soutient pour la première fois l'idée que la politique est fondée sur le détournement de la fonction du langage. Pour récupérer Philoctète, abandonné avec son arc miraculeux, Ulysse use de sa ruse, des mots destinés à «dérober» la raison du héros. Il fait appel, pour cela, à Néoptolème, qui riposte violemment au nom de la morale classique, de «première instance», qu'il représente en sa qualité de fils d'Achille. Selon cette morale, le but de toute action doit être le Bien, et l'instrument en est l'action pleine de force et de courage. De plus, le but peut être sacrifié pour ne pas dégrader les instruments: il est préférable que l'on perde, au lieu d'obtenir une victoire sans honneur. Cette équation est fondée sur le code de l'honneur, qu'on verra renaître au Moyen Âge.

Selon l'équation d'Ulysse, le but est toujours le Bien, mais son instrument peut être le mensonge, dirigé par le critère de l'efficacité programmatique. Ce qui fait la différence entre les deux équations se trouve au niveau des instruments: d'une part le verbe perverti, d'autre part l'action pleine d'honneur.

À la suite de cette comparaison, le professeur Liiceanu affirme, d'une manière juste, que l'équation d'Ulysse se trouve à la base de la morale moderne, c'est-à-dire la morale de «deuxième instance», ce personnage annoçant l'âge du politique, qui remplace le naïf monde chimérique.

Hippias Minor, apprécie le professeur Liiceanu, constitue une «excursion ludique sur le territoire du paradoxe», où Socrate va exercer la pratique du sophisme au sens moderne. De ce jeu logico-philosophique on entend que le menteur n'est que «le contraire d'un type déficitaire sur le plan de l'accomplissement». Il est un compétent: s'il a la meilleure connaissance de la vérité, il pourra dire la vérité mais aussi mentir de la meilleure façon. Autrement dit, les performances dans la connaissance du Bien peuvent être accompagnées de performances pareilles dans la connaissance du Mal.

Ces deux forces, dont la valeur est fondatrice pour le monde européen, contiennent un message très condensé du principe machiavélique. Selon Gabriel Liiceanu, l'auteur du *Prince* est un «adaptateur de la conception du Bien».

Machiavel est le premier penseur moderne à concevoir le monde dans ce qu'il est en réalité, comme un espace profane, décadent, où le mensonge règne. Avant cet auteur, le monde se reflétait dans un faux miroir, celui de l'éthique considérée intrinsèque à la Cité et celui de l'éthique divine. Le monde commençait à abandonner le «fardeau métaphysique» de *l'Éthique à Nicomaque* d'Aristote et celui théologique de l'Église pour laquelle le Bien est transcendant. Machiavel montre qu'il faut opérer avec l'hypocrisie de ce qu'on est en réalité. Il affirme que le mal, qui arrange les choses, les faits au monde humain décadent est plus vaste et plus productif que le Bien. Si la «morale de première instance» tremblait devant toute tromperie, la «morale de deuxième instance» (qui, selon Gabriel Liiceanu offre une représentation rétrospective d'Ulysse comme un Prince de la Renaissance) accepte que le Bien peut être protégé par le Mal, à l'aide du Mal. Au nom de cette deuxième morale (celle qui justifie la mort de quelques-uns pour sauver la vie des plus nombreux) on a bombardé Hiroshima et on a envahi l'Iraq, soutient Liiceanu.

Dans ce scénario il existe pourtant une transcendance du Bien, nourrie par le principe d'utiliser le Mal pour sauver ou préserver le Bien.

Au XIX^e siècle, la réplique autochtone de Machiavel est, selon Liiceanu, le Roi Charles I^{er}, qui a régné dans un moment où la corruption était la règle de fonctionnement d'un pays qui se trouvait au début de sa modernisation.

Au XX^e siècle, à cause de l'expérience historique et politique qui a marqué la Roumanie après la deuxième guerre mondiale, «le mensonge perd son sens odysseéen», du fait qu'il n'est plus «une syncope maléfique au service du Bien, mais le Mal mis au service du Mal», «le fondement du système tout entier». Qu'ils soient naïfs ou pleins de foi en ce qui concerne la justesse de la cause, qu'ils se soient engagés dans une cause éronnée jusqu'à la fin, qu'ils soient édifiés en ayant la connaissance de la vérité et en disant des mensonges, qu'ils soient indifférents, ceux qui expriment l'immoralité en Roumanie ou assistent à son emprise, se confrontent à quatre nouveautés du mensonge pendant le communisme: 1. le mensonge idéologique systématique, standardisé, «en divorce de toute fantaisie et créativité»; 2. le mensonge imposé comme vérité par la force et la contrainte, par la terreur; 3. le manque d'opérationnalité du mensonge au sens de la pratique politique fonctionnelle: du moment où il perd sa force trompeuse, le «mensonge n'a plus de charme», car tous en sont conscients; 4. «le caractère envahissant du mensonge: des indicateurs économiques jusqu'aux sentiments et à l'art».

«Le deuxième malheur d'après-guerre» en Roumanie est pour Gabriel Liiceanu «la révolution dérobée»: après le meurtre du tyran (en termes machiavéliques, le prince n'est pas un tyran), sans un procès semblable à celui de Nuremberg, il a été possible de «recycler le mal»: les anciens acteurs ou metteurs en scène sont devenus des hommes d'affaires et des politiciens, et le vol, l'établissement, la corruption ont acquis «une substance ethno-métaphysique». De sorte que faute d'un prince capable de régénérer la vertu civique, la cité attend le tyran (dans la personne d'un Vlad l'Empaleur, par exemple).

Le texte de la conférence, «contaminé de l'angoisse de la nouvelle tyrannie», selon l'aveu de l'auteur, a été écrit dans la période électorale de décembre 2004, mais, malheureusement, il n'a pas perdu son actualité pour la Roumanie.

Parmi les commentaires provoqués par cette conférence, on remarque celui d'Andrei Pleșu, qui proposait de la perspective «d'une technologie et d'une légitimité du mensonge» une histoire de la diplomatie à l'échelle mondiale. Pour les diplomates actuels non seulement le problème du mal, mais le *problème* en général est secondaire. Les interlocuteurs sont mis entre parenthèses, dans un mécanisme dominé par la manipulation et la tromperie.

Selon Andrei Pleșu, de nos jours il n'y a pas de construction, d'assumption réelle de la problématique politique et ceux qui pensent réellement sont très peu nombreux; le dialogue qui n'a pas comme but de poser des problèmes représente un danger pour l'histoire contemporaine. Au niveau chrétien, il existe des analyses subtiles sur les vertus qui peuvent se pervertir en vices (l'angélisme) mais aussi sur les vices convertis en vertus: la concupiscence peut devenir envie de vérité ou de Dieu, et la colère peut se diriger positivement contre le mensonge.

Le professeur Mircea Flonta (de la Faculté de Philosophie de l'Université de Bucarest) fait quelques observations concernant l'orientation conceptuelle du discours: si on prend en considération que de point de vue doctrinaire le mensonge signifie dire d'une manière consciente et avec intention ce qui n'est pas vrai, alors, l'approche de Liiceanu correspond à un type circonstanciel de raisonnement, selon lequel mentir au nom du bien commun et pour le bien commun est pardonnable. Mircea Flonta invoque Kant et Hegel pour qui le mensonge est fondamentalement mauvais. L'ambassadeur suisse à Bucarest, présent à cet événement, a apprécié positivement la qualité de la conférence et a suggéré le besoin d'optimisme et d'espoir dans le contexte de la liberté d'expression de l'homme, qui ne peut être ni entièrement bestial ni entièrement angélique.

En répliquant, Liiceanu précise que son intention a été de montrer le courage de Machiavel d'analyser sincèrement l'état collectif de l'homme. De ce point de vue, le président actuel de la Roumanie, Traian Băsescu, construit des discours qui mettent en évidence le choix de la «variante machiavélique pure», mais s'il ne peut soutenir jusqu'au bout son rôle de prince, alors il va nous accaparer totalement, d'où le danger de «la nouvelle tyrannie».

En étant en grandes lignes d'accord avec Liiceanu, Neagu Djuvara discute de la pureté des personnalités historiques telles que le prince indien Asoka ou Louis le Saint de France. Il faut

accepter aussi l'hypothèse des degrés différents de pureté intellectuelle et morale des dirigeants et regarder l'éthique comme un idéal qu'on doit atteindre pour ne pas prendre une route dangereuse. Contrairement à l'opinion de Liiceanu, Neagu Djuvara considère que le mal peut aussi être un moyen pour atteindre un but positif.

Gabriel Liiceanu complète ses explications en faisant référence aux difficultés de trouver un prince au sens machiavélique, à savoir un bon citoyen qui accepte pourtant le mensonge et le mal nécessaires pour sauver le Bien: la règle est que ceux qui sont bons n'acceptent pas l'utilité du mal, et ceux qui sont mauvais n'acceptent pas d'utiliser leurs moyens au nom du bien commun.

Sorin Alexandrescu fait une distinction entre une morale privée et une morale publique: il y a le bien et le mal pour un certain groupe, mais la perspective sur le bien change la finalité du problème, autrement dit ce qui était bon pour les Achéens ne l'était pas pour les Troyens.

Gabriel Liiceanu reconnaît que pour le lecteur actuel les Troyens sont dans la même mesure bons, mais que l'histoire a «appris» à faire une distinction entre le bien et le mal comme des valeurs qui sont valables pour l'humanité entière, valeurs conformes à l'héritage judaïque et chrétien et à la civilisation européenne, de manière que, par exemple, les Américains qui «exportent en Iraq leur démocratie» n'imposent pas une somme de valeurs à un peuple vaincu, tandis que les Soviétiques, au contraire, exportaient le mal aux pays vaincus.

Eugen Oişteanu parle des dimensions amoral et immoral du mensonge, à côté de la morale proposée par Gabriel Liiceanu; par exemple, les «mensonges instinctifs», qui ne sont ni bons ni mauvais, mais qui existent tout simplement.

Eugen Ciocan part du constat de la sincérité propre au monde actuel (l'invasion des confessions à travers les média, les documentaires, les dévoilements surprenants) et ouvre une interrogation sur l'existence d'une espèce de sincérité comme comportement communautaire qui peut contrecarrer le mensonge généralisé.

Gabriel Liiceanu répond que la «société ne peut être jugée que par sa propre histoire».

Ravissantes et en même temps choquantes, les affirmations de Gabriel Liiceanu sur le mensonge qui prend le corps du politique ne peuvent laisser indifférents ni les politiciens, ni les penseurs du politique qui cherchent la vérité. Celle-ci pourrait passer du niveau de la liaison pleine de grâce entre les concepts, à une alternative meilleure de l'histoire.

Lorena Păvălan Stuparu

MACHIAVEL, GUICHARDIN ET LE PROBLÈME DE LA RAISON D'ÉTAT

Le 21 janvier 2005, la série de conférences organisées mensuellement par l'ISPRI a été ouverte par le professeur Gheorghe Stoica, qui a parlé de la raison d'État, concept encore utilisé de nos jours, mais dont l'apparition est liée à un livre de Giovanni Botero, *Della ragione di Stato* (la première édition de ce livre paraît en 1583). Cet auteur jésuite propose une notion pour un thème important pour la philosophie politique et pour les hommes politiques. Les deux sources qui l'ont influencé sont: Machiavel, qui analyse les conditions de l'exercice effectif du pouvoir et les lois qui gouvernent les peuples; Tacite, qui décrit la manière dont l'empereur Tibère a accédé au pouvoir et a réussi à se maintenir au pouvoir.

Botero diffuse et théorise le concept de raison d'État en parlant de la légitimité d'un régime d'exception par rapport à un idéal de justice. La signification du concept est liée au but de la conservation du pouvoir. L'axe central de ce mécanisme qui assure la conservation du pouvoir se trouve dans la prudence politique, dans la capacité de contrôler et de ne pas provoquer une nouveauté dangereuse pour l'équilibre du pouvoir. Il y a des cas extrêmes qui justifient le recours à la force, mais la règle est d'appliquer cette prudence politique. Celle-ci exprime la vertu du prince dans son essence sur laquelle se fonde l'obéissance des gouvernés. La supériorité du prince justifie cette obéissance, dont Gheorghe Stoica affirme qu'elle ne doit pas être passive. La relation entre la soumission et le pouvoir vient de la légitimité de celui-ci, qu'on peut mesurer en fonction

des performances dans la gestion des affaires publiques. Botero met en circulation ce concept dans une époque marquée par le passage du féodalisme à l'absolutisme royal et par le besoin de celui-ci d'identifier des justifications théoriques pour l'accroissement et l'exercice du pouvoir. La raison d'État a influencé la royauté et a été transformée en véritable art de gouverner.

Gh. Stoica affirme que les prémisses théoriques de ce concept se trouvent chez Machiavel, dans le *Prince* et les *Discours* — où il parle de la conquête du pouvoir, mais surtout des moyens de le conserver — mais aussi chez Guichardin, qui utilise le terme «raison des États». À partir des thèmes traités par Machiavel, il y a des auteurs qui le citent quand il est question d'établir une origine du concept de raison d'État, ce qui n'est pas pourtant correct ou précis.

Machiavel est l'auteur qui rompt avec la tradition scolastique dans l'analyse du phénomène politique. La séparation entre la morale et la politique ouvre la voie de l'analyse de l'art de gouverner un État et des moyens de conserver le pouvoir mais cette fois l'État qui est au centre de l'analyse est conçu par cet auteur dans un sens très proche de celui moderne. Le concept d'État est l'élément commun des différentes formes d'exercice du pouvoir politique — la république romaine, idéalisée par Machiavel, ou les principautés — qui se succèdent d'une manière cyclique. Ce modèle permet à Machiavel d'anticiper une nouvelle époque de gloire pour l'Italie, divisée à cause des disputes politiques. L'intérêt pour les institutions politiques est mis en lumière par le fait que le prince est analysé en tant que représentant de l'État.

Pour Machiavel, la vertu du prince est synonyme de la capacité extraordinaire de mobiliser des énergies dans le but de la conservation du pouvoir. Cette vertu combine la force, la ruse, la persuasion et constitue l'essence de l'art de gouverner et un instrument de la raison d'État. En même temps, à la base d'un État légal il y a de bonnes lois et de fortes armées. L'originalité de Machiavel, soutient le professeur Gheorghe Stoica, vient aussi de la comparaison entre l'époque de la république romaine telle qu'elle est illustrée dans l'œuvre de Tite-Live et l'Italie contemporaine. On discute d'une manière critique le problème du machiavélisme, comme tentation de privilégier les moyens et d'en abuser pour conserver à tout prix le pouvoir, et donc de déformer la conception authentique de Machiavel.

Quant à la conception de Guichardin, Gheorghe Stoica met en évidence que la raison d'État a besoin d'autres justifications aussi, d'ordre religieux, moral, humain, le but de conserver le pouvoir étant insuffisant pour la légitimer.

Ion Bulei, directeur de l'ISPRI, précise les principes de la raison d'État: la prudence, l'équilibre, refus des innovations inutiles, le manque de confiance, la construction d'une certaine image du prince, le bon gouvernement en général.

Ion Goian, chercheur à l'ISPRI, souligne le piège que peut constituer le fait d'établir une continuité entre Machiavel et Botero. Il y a des différences de substance entre les deux. Par exemple, Machiavel met en relation la conquête du pouvoir et le prince, tandis que Botero doit être compris dans le contexte jésuite d'imposer le catholicisme à travers le pouvoir politique. De plus, Machiavel considère que l'État est une incarnation du prince, Botero, quant à lui, fait une distinction entre État et individu, s'agissant d'une gestion du pouvoir.

Dan Dungaciu affirme la nécessité d'établir de quelle morale il s'agit lorsqu'on soutient que Machiavel trace une ligne de démarcation entre morale et politique. En effet, il est question d'une morale d'autre type, qui fonctionne par l'intermédiaire des institutions sans principes et qui se justifie par elle-même. C'est un autre mode de faire de la politique. D'autre part, Botero, représentant du projet jésuite, nous offre une autre lecture de l'histoire, une sorte de divinisation de l'État. De même, il est nécessaire de définir à quel État on fait référence en parlant de la raison d'État.

En réplique, Ion Goian précise que la raison d'État elle-même est celle qui empêche l'application du principe moral autonome. La raison d'État, qui permet la localisation du pouvoir dans l'État, ne peut être une idéologie à portée universelle, on peut la justifier dans des situations exceptionnelles qui exigent une logique exceptionnelle.

Aristide Cioabă s'interroge sur la signification du concept de «raison d'État» dans la politique interne, mais aussi sur la présence de ce concept dans la science politique, parallèlement au concept de «bon gouvernement».

En conclusion, la raison d'État doit être comprise en tenant compte d'un sens de l'histoire et de l'évolution de l'idée de pouvoir. De nos jours, on utilise abusivement ce concept, avec l'intention de justifier un certain type de pouvoir ou des abus commis, mais ces excès dans l'utilisation de ce concept sont considérablement limités par le constitutionnalisme.

Ruxandra Luca

«LA POLITIQUE» DE TRAIAN BRĂILEANU

L'Institut de Sciences Politiques et Relations Internationales a organisé en février 2005 un débat à l'occasion de la parution du livre la *Politique* de Traian Brăileanu aux Éditions Albatros, dans la collection *Etnos*.

Le fils du sociologue Traian Brăileanu, Tudor Brăileanu, Madame Dimisianu, la directrice des Éditions et Constantin Schifirneț, le coordonnateur de la collection ont participé à cette rencontre scientifique. Constantin Schifirneț a présenté la conception sociologique de Traian Brăileanu et l'idée de système qui se trouve à la base de cette conception, tout en montrant qu'un parallèle entre la pensée du sociologue roumain et celle de Talcott Parsons se justifie. De plus, dans le cadre du mouvement d'idées sociologiques contemporaines la conception de Brăileanu paraît anticiper la vision systémique de la sociologie américaine.

Quelques idées importantes ont été exprimées. En partant du concept de classe politique, Brăileanu réalise une déconstruction critique des mécanismes de la démocratie; le politicianisme est un produit direct du régime parlementaire spécifique à la démocratie; la politique, élément intrinsèque de la société, subit une transmutation vers le politicianisme dans le cas de la société roumaine.

Parmi les phénomènes de pathologie des systèmes politique, Brăileanu fait aussi une analyse de la corruption, qui paraît — affirme C. Schifirneț — être liée à la «construction institutionnelle de la Roumanie moderne».

La conclusion inscrit Traian Brăileanu dans la «série» de la sociologie théorique.

Dans les interventions des auditeurs on remarque quelques observations importantes. Madame Dimisianu souligne qu'il existe une «tentation» de qualifier, même d'étiqueter d'une manière excessive les intellectuels roumains de la période de l'entre-deux-guerres comme étant des «fascistes» et de les exclure, sans raison, du débat actuel d'idées justement à cause de cette perception sur eux et sur leur œuvre scientifique. De la sorte, un tel projet éditorial se propose de corriger cette vision erronée.

En partant de la constatation du caractère théorique de l'œuvre de Brăileanu, le professeur Marin Diaconu se prononce pour une sociologie comparée des idées sociologiques.

Dan Dungaciu infirme l'idée que Brăileanu a été isolé à son époque: ce sociologue a eu des disciples, par exemple Leon Țopa, auteur d'une *Sociologie* des communautés paysannes qui n'était pas hors des préoccupations théoriques de l'École sociologique de Bucarest. De plus, la publication *Notes sociologiques* de Cernautzi et le groupe qu'elle a engendré ont connu une ampleur internationale. Dans les pages de cette publication ont paru des textes signés par Gaston Richard, le président de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie à l'époque.

Dr. Ion Goian montre que Brăileanu est un représentant important de la théorie politique roumaine.

Le livre la *Politique* prouve une connaissance profonde de la pensée sociologique allemande. La distinction entre la science du politique et l'art du politique est une idée fertile, car la science introduit à présent l'idée que les fondements théoriques sont suffisants pour gouverner. Dans l'espace roumain, l'art de gouverner constitue dans la période moderne une tentative de structurer une réponse à l'action de dissolution des facteurs externes. Traian Brăileanu théorise la condition de son peuple et du type de nationalisme résulté du projet de réaliser la Grande Roumanie.

Călin Câmpăan

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS

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