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L'IMMAGINE DELLA ROMANIA SULLA STAMPA DEL VENTENNIO[1] (II)

CARMEN BURCEA*

Abstract. *This study investigates the aspects related to the image of Romania in the Italian press during 1922-1943. Published in two consecutive issues, the purpose of the study is to answer to several questions: Who writes about Romania? Which is the typology of the publications where we find information on Romania? Which are the ascendant/descendent curves of the Italian interest for Romania? Which are the recurrent themes of the articles that have as thematic Romania? How does the Direction for the Foreign Press within the National Propaganda Ministry function as "image laboratory"?*

Keywords: *image, press, diplomacy, Romania, Italy.*

III. *Tipologia delle pubblicazioni*

Quale la tipologia delle pubblicazioni su cui compaiono notizie sulla Romania? Oltre che sulla *stampa periodica*[2] o *le testate giornalistiche locali*[3], si registrano tali notizie su vari tipi di pubblicazioni.

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[1] Il presente lavoro intende rispondere a qualche punto di domanda che si apre quasi senza interposizioni: *Chi* sono gli autori di articoli riguardanti la Romania? *Dove* essi appaiono? *Quando* diventa la Romania "interessante"? *Quali* i temi ricorrenti? ecc. Se riuscisse a rispondere almeno in parte alle interrogazioni sopra esposte, il nostro potrebbe dirsi un piccolo apporto per la reale reciproca conoscenza dei due paesi. A prescindere dal fatto che un vero e proprio studio *imagologico* non è di sicuro compito esclusivo dello storico, ma va sempre congiunto con le analisi degli psicologi e i questionari dei sociologi, ci siamo qui limitati a indagare *il dossier stampa* all'interno della problematica dei rapporti italo-romeni fra le due guerre, il quale si dimostra complesso, macchinoso e contorto e richiede la contemporanea connessione con varie fonti d'archivio, raccolte di documenti, diari ecc.

La necessità di evitare certi stereotipi ed alterazioni è in realtà un'esigenza forte, soprattutto nel periodo odierno. Un contributo in questo senso è stato recentemente dato dalla ricerca svolta dalla Fondazione Università IULM il cui risultato fu presentato nell'ambito del convegno *Factorul imagine in relațiile italo-române* organizzato dall'Istituto Italiano di Cultura di Bucarest nel dicembre 2005 [Si vedano gli *Atti* raccolti nel numero speciale della "Rivista Italiana di Comunicazione Pubblica", IX (2007), n. 31 Franco Angeli Editore, Milano].

[2] Archivium Romanicum, Augustea, Civiltà Fascista, Echi e Commenti, Educazione Fascista, Fiera Letteraria, Geopolitica, Gerarchia, Giornale di Politica Letteratura, Illustrazione (L') Italiana, Nuova Antologia, Politica, Rassegna Italiana, Rassegna Nazionale, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, Termini, Vita e Pensiero ecc. Si veda Dora Gulli Pecenko, Laura Nasi Zitelli, *Bibliografia dei periodici del periodo fascista 1922-1945*. Introduzione di Renzo de Felice, Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1983. *La stampa periodica romana durante il fascismo, 1927-1943* a cura di Filippo Mazzonis, Istituto nazionale di studi romani, Roma [1998].

[3] Si veda P. M. Bardi, *I periodici del fascismo*, "Annuario della stampa italiana", a.1931/1932: 24-94. *Bari* — Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno; *Bologna* — Resto del Carlino; *Catania* — Popolo di Sicilia; *Cremona* — Regime

1. *Riviste edite da Enti culturali italiani*

• *Le pagine della Dante* — Società Nazionale Dante Alighieri (1924-1943)

• *Il Legionario*. Organo dei fasci italiani all'estero e nelle colonie — Direzione Generale degli Italiani all'Estero (MAE) (1925-1943)

• *Romana*. Rivista mensile degli istituti italiani di cultura all'estero (1937-1943)

• *Il libro italiano nel mondo*. Rassegna bibliografica (1940-1943) — Comitato per la diffusione del libro italiano all'estero (CLIE), incorporato nella Direzione Generale per gli Scambi Culturali del Minculpop

2. *Riviste per l'Europa Orientale*

• *Europa (L') Orientale.* Organo dell'Istituto per l'Europa Orientale (1921-1943)

• *Rassegna dell'Est* (1925-1927)

• *Rassegna economica dell'Europa mediorientale*. Organo ufficiale dell'Istituto Nazionale per l'Espansione Economica Italiana all'Estero (1925-1930)

• *Rassegna danubiana* (1942-1943)

3. *Riviste sulla Romania/ italo-romene*

• *Rassegna Italo-Romena — edita dalla Camera di Commercio Italo-Romena di Milano e diretta da Jean Antohi e Virgilio Monti (1919-1943)*[4]

• *Romania. Rassegna degli interessi italo-romeni — diretta Michele A. Silvestri (1920-1922)*[5]

• *Ephemeris Dacoromana. Annuario della Scuola Romena in Roma (1923-1945) e Diplomatarium Italicum. Documenti raccolti negli archivi italiani (1925-1939) — sorte su iniziativa dello storico Vasile Pârvan in veste di direttore della Scuola*[6]

• *Rassegna culturale della Romania — edita dalla Fondazione Principe Carol II (1925-1927)*

• *Studi Rumeni (1927-1930) — rivista edita dall'Istituto per l'Europa Orientale, Sezione rumena, diretta da Carlo Tagliavini*[7]

4. *Numeri speciali /opuscoli dedicati alla Romania*

• *Studi sulla Romania* (1923). Il volume, edito dall'Istituto per l'Europa Orientale [Ipeo], si inscriveva nel programma dei rapporti culturali fra l'Italia fascista e i

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Fascista; *Ferrara* — Corriere Padano; *Fiume* — Vedetta d'Italia (La); *Genova* — Secolo XIX; *Livorno* — Corriere del Tirreno; *Milano* — Corriere della Sera, Popolo d'Italia; Secolo (Il), Sole (Il); *Napoli* — Mattino (Il); *Padova* — Provincia di Padova; Veneto (Il); *Palermo* — Giornale di Sicilia; Ora (L'); *Roma* — Giornale d'Italia, Messaggero (Il); Tevere (Il), Tribuna (La); Meridiano di Roma; *Torino* — Gazzetta del Popolo; Stampa (La); *Venezia* — Gazzetta di Venezia; Gazzettino (Il); *Verona* — Arena (L') ecc.

[4] Nel n. 1 dell'annata XXII si legge: "(...) le colonne della rivista hanno ospitato studi ed articoli illustrativi o polemici sui più svariati argomenti: dalla trattazione di temi giuridici ed economici a quella di temi culturali artistici e storici; dalle rivendicazioni nel campo di politica internazionale, come la questione del riconoscimento italiano della Bessarabia, la questione degli optanti ungheresi, i diritti etnici e storici della Romania sulla Transilvania, l'atteggiamento del popolo romeno contro le inique sanzioni imposte all'Italia ecc., alle trattative per la stipulazione di convenzioni e trattati di commercio, di navigazione, per i pagamenti ecc." *Nel ventiduesimo annuale della fondazione della Rassegna Italo-Romena,* "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXII (1942), n. 1, gennaio: 1-3.

[5] Vd. *Roma e Romania*, "Romania", n. 1, 15 giugno 1920, apud Claudio Isopescu, *La stampa periodica romeno-italiana in Romania e in Italia*: 209-211.

[6] V. Pârvan, *Proemio*, "Ephemeris Dacoromana", I (1923): V-IX. Idem, *Proemio*, "Diplomatarium Italicum", I (1925): V-VII.

[7] C. Tagliavini, *Proemio*, "Studi Rumeni", I (1927), n. 1: 1-13.

paesi dell'Europa danubiana e balcanica. Secondo Cezar Petrescu tale gesto sarebbe restato "per molto tempo uno dei più solidi documenti per informare l'estero su di noi"[8].

• Il numero speciale dedicato alla politica economica della Romania dalla *Rassegna Economica dell'Europa Mediorientale,* VIII (1929), n. 9-10, settembre-ottobre, diretta da G.V. Sampieri, collimava invece con le trattative per la stipula di una convenzione commerciale italo-romena.

• *Due Lire di Novelle*, V (1929) — era dedicato agli scrittori romeni. In segno di apprezzamento per il gesto compiuto e di incoraggiamento perché ne fossero pubblicati altri numeri consimili dedicati alla nostra letteratura, Cl. Isopescu raccomandava a Liviu Rebreanu che fosse inviata una lettera al suo direttore, Alfio Berretta (Milano, Via Unione 5)[9].

• Il numero speciale di *Giornale di Politica e Letteratura,* V (1929), quaderno 12[10], veniva considerato da G.G. Mironescu, ministro romeno degli Affari Esteri, come una "prova di amicizia data alla sorella minore"[11].

Sempre Cl. Isopescu, al corrente dell'imminente pubblicazione del fascicolo in quanto collaboratore della rivista, pensava all'opportunità di contraccambiare il gesto:

"A novembre, il mio amico Umberto Biscottini, direttore del *Giornale di Politica e Letteratura* dedicherà un numero di 100 pagine alla Romania (...). La pregherei di dedicare all'Italia un numero della rivista *Gândirea* e di mettersi d'accordo al riguardo col sg. Ramiro Ortiz"[12].

Secondo lui, il direttore Umberto Biscottini, alto funzionario al Ministero degli Affari Esteri, godeva dell'apprezzamento di Mussolini con il cui assenso dedicava il numero di dicembre alla Romania[13] *e insisteva affinché gli fossero trasmessi dei ringraziamenti da parte dell'Accademia Nazionale Romena (Roma, Via Torino 107)*[14].

• *Termini* (n. 34-37/1939)[15]. Il fascicolo bilingue dedicato alla Romania si adeguava alla concezione fascista di collaborazione culturale tra popoli, come fondamento per un'intesa spirituale più profonda e una più ampia collaborazione politica[16].

"Questo numero costituisce un importantissimo contributo ai legami culturali tra l'Italia e la Romania. La scelta del materiale, la forma impeccabile delle traduzioni danno a quest'opera non soltanto un valore documentario, ma l'espressione più viva della spiritualità italo-romena. In questi momenti pieni d'inquietudine per

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8 Cezar Petrescu, *"L'Europa Orientale" despre noi*, "Gândirea", III (1923), n. 7, 5 dicembre: 178.

9 B.A.R., S 45 (1)/ CMLXIV, Claudio Isopescu a Liviu Rebreanu, 1 settembre 1928.

10 Presentato nella rivista "Darul Vremii", I (1930), n. 2: 62-3. Recensito da F[ortunescu] C.D in "Arhivele Olteniei", IX (1930), n. 47-8, gennaio-aprile: 101-2.

11 Lettera inviata alla redazione in data 11 novembre 1929.

12 B.A.R., S 40 (6)/ DCCXCVIII, Claudio Isopescu a Cezar Petrescu, 13 settembre 1929.

13 B.A.R., S 48 (14)/ D, Claudio Isopescu a Ion Bianu, 6 novembre 1929.

14 B.A.R., S 48 (17)/ D, Claudio Isopescu a Ion Bianu, 21 gennaio 1930.

15 Si veda la presentazione del fascicolo nel giornale "Suceava", 25 dicembre 1939 a firma di Leon Țopa, ex-socio della Scuola Romena a Roma.

16 Giuseppe Gerini, *"Prin putere și dreptate România va renaște,* "Termini", n. 34-37 (1939): 644-645.

tutti ci è particolarmente gradita questa manifestazione di amicizia del Paese al quale ci ricollegano la nostra origine comune e tanti ricordi storici"[17].

• *L'Illustrazione Italiana*, XVII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio.

Non poche furono però le opportunità sprecate. Ci limitiamo ad accennare in questa sede ad un solo esempio, allorquando *Il Sole*, tramite il suo rappresentante Lucio Buggelli, propose la stampa di un numero speciale di 16 pagine in occasione della partecipazione della Romania alla Fiera di Milano (febbraio 1927). Nonostante l'addetto economico Eugen Porn avesse trasmesso la proposta al Centro e fissato una tematica e un elenco di eventuali autori, la risposta fu risentita: "a causa del breve tempo non possiamo realizzare il progetto"[18].

5. *Stampa italiana in Romania*
• *Roma (1921-1933) di Ramiro Ortiz*[19]
• *Studii Italiene (1934-1943) di Alessandro Marcu*[20]
• *Italia e Romania nei commerci e nelle industrie. Bollettino ufficiale dalla Camera Italiana di Commercio ed Industria in Romania (Bucarest, 1921-1929)*[21]
• *La Nuova Italia — Settimanale fascista pubblicato a Bucarest*
• *Il Soldato (1943)*[22]

IV. *Curva dell'interesse italiano per la Romania*

Quale il rapporto tra il giornalista e l'oggetto che egli esamina? Dall'esaltazione all'indifferenza oppure all'avversione, dalla comprensione all'intransigenza, all'opposizione o persino alla provocazione, tutti gli stati d'animo sono reperibili. Le circostanze in cui hanno scritto ed il proprio livello di conoscenze sulla cultura locale ebbero un ruolo decisivo nell'elaborazione dell'immagine che proiettarono. Certe volte, la percezione sui romeni si realizza attraverso le convenienze che essi incarnavano. Di conseguenza si registrano dei testi che riflettono un desiderio di comprensione oppure, al contrario, rendono palesi

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[17] Cf. Lettera pervenuta al direttore della rivista, Giuseppe Gerini, da parte del ministro della Propaganda Nazionale Rumena, S. E. Nazionale (Al. Radian), in "Termini", n. 41, gennaio 1940: 905.

[18] ANIC, MPN, *Presa Internă*, Dossier 70, ff. 20-35.

[19] Si rinvia a Claudio Isopescu, *La stampa periodica romeno-italiana in Romania e in Italia*, Roma, Istituto per l'Europa Orientale, 1937: 51-66; Dumitru Cârstocea, *Periodici di cultura italiana in Romania nell'intervallo fra le due guerre mondiali,* "Studii Italo-Române", 1 (1997), n. 1: 151-167.

[20] Veronica Turcuș, Alexandru Marcu (1894-1955) și cultura italiană în România interbelică (Profil bio-bibliografic), Presa Universitară Clujeană, Colecția "Philobiblion", Cluj-Napoca, 1999. Carmen Burcea, Alexandru Marcu and «Studii Italiene», "Annuario dell'Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica", Venezia, n. 4 (2002): 222-233.

[21] Si veda Claudio Isopescu, *La stampa periodica romeno-italiana cit.*: 66-70. Vittorio Briani, *La stampa italiana all'estero dalle origini ai giorni nostri*, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Roma, 1977: 59.

[22] "Il Soldato" era edito su iniziativa dei servizi di propaganda romeni; si trattava al principio di un giornaletto di due pagine contenenti esclusivamente argomenti attinenti la guerra in corso che vedeva sullo stesso fronte l'Italia e la Romania; gradualmente furono introdotti articoli di carattere culturale e fu ampliato a quattro pagine (politica, cultura, guerra, cronaca). Il responsabile era Alfredo Montero, cf. ANIC, MPN, *Informații*, Dossier 912, Bucarest, 20 aprile 1943, Amor Bavaj.

delle opinioni prefabbricate e dei pregiudizi, dei testi che esprimono un bisogno di verità oppure riverberano talune predisposizioni alla sua degenerazione. Al confine tra lo stile letterario e quello scientifico, lo stile giornalistico dovrebbe abbinare l'espressività dell'uno con la meticolosità e l'accuratezza dell'altro. In realtà, invece, succedono spesso dei *dérapage* dei media — cioè una sistematica, errata e spesso troppo densa trasmissione di notizie, il che implica la presenza di andirivieni contenenti iperboli, tautologie, litoti, esagerazioni ecc.

Osserviamo la curva dell'interesse italiano per la rappresentazione dell'immagine della Romania. Gli anni 1926/27, 1933/34, 1936, 1938, 1940, 1942, in particolare, allorché in Italia, nel bene o nel male, si verifica un particolare interesse per ciò che è romeno, a cui si contrappongono dei periodi di ristagno ossia di spostamento dell'interesse italiano verso altre zone, argomenti ed aspetti.

Tra la visita del premier Take Ionescu (1922) e quella del premier Al. Averescu (1926) a Roma, i due paesi hanno cercato di ripristinare un certo equilibrio e di definire i propri obiettivi. Studi ragguardevoli sulla Romania vengono pubblicati in questi anni in riviste specializzate come *L'Europa Orientale, Ephemeris Dacoromana* oppure *Rassegna dell'Est.* Il biennio 1926/27 si riflette sulla stampa del Ventennio sotto il segno di stati d'animo contrastanti: esaltazione — disillusione. Gli anni 1933/34 portano in sé un'altra antinomia che ha alle sue radici fatti di politica estera: silenzio della stampa — violente campagne stampa, il cui apice sarà raggiunto nel 1936 nel contesto della posizione favorevole alle sanzioni verso l'Italia votate dalla Società delle Nazioni in occasione della Guerra d'Abissinia assunta dalla Romania. Il 1938 invece comprime in sé l'antitesi tra il compiacimento italiano per i cambiamenti nella politica interna romena e il disappunto per il delitto Codreanu. I mutamenti internazionali avvenuti nel contesto dello scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale ed in seguito la guerra nell'Est determinano lentamente e gradualmente, tra il 1940 e il 1943, un atteggiamento amichevole, con la punta marcata nel 1942. Tali svolte, chiaramente individuabili nella stampa, vengono registrate, riferite e commentate dai diplomatici di entrambi Stati, come risulta dall'esame dei documenti diplomatici e dei carteggi custoditi negli archivi statali.

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La stipula del Patto di amicizia tra l'Italia e la Romania (1926) sembrava inaugurare un'era d'intesa e di collaborazione bilaterale, che tuttavia non si concretizzò. Il rammarico che ne derivava, anche se per ragioni diverse, è più che evidente da ambi parti:

"(...) Poco dopo l'evaporazione dei primi entusiasmi, romanticamente alimentati alla luce di una fratellanza di sangue, ma poco o nulla da una comprensione reciproca degli interessi che potevano, anzi dovevano avviare le politiche dei due paesi su una via comune, ci siamo venuti trovando in un atmosfera fredda e indifferente, di quella indifferenza però che talvolta nasconde ostilità, o per lo meno, punti di vista in contrasto"[23].

[23] Lilio Cialdea, *Relazioni italo-romene*, "Educazione Fascista", VIII (1930), marzo: 155-158.

Poi, dato che l'Italia tergiversò sulla ratifica del trattato riguardante la Bessarabia, la proposta di dedicare un numero speciale di *Universul* all'Italia[24] non fu ben accolta, il ministro Lahovary ritenendo opportuno posticipare tale gesto[25]. In Italia, dopo l'avvenuta ratifica, Mussolini stesso imponeva alla stampa italiana i limiti dell'atteggiamento da adottare, di modo che fossero evitati dei possibili dissidi italo-sovietici[26].

Successivamente alla poco duratura euforia, la firma del Patto di amicizia tra l'Italia e l'Ungheria da una parte e del Patto di amicizia tra la Romania e la Francia (1927) dall'altra avvia un accesa polemica che si manifesta nella stampa di entrambi stati.

"Averescu mi ha dato lettura di un telegramma di codesto ministro di Romania che segnala viva campagna della stampa italiana relativamente al trattato franco-romeno. Secondo Lahovary, nostra stampa mettendo a raffronto nostra attitudine e quella della Francia nei riguardi della Bessarabia, ne trae nuovi argomenti contro ratifica italiana e denunzia recente trattato franco-romeno come contrastante a politica di pace e di consolidamento (...) Avendo io osservato che anche questa stampa, in occasione della pubblicazione del trattato franco-romeno, aveva pubblicato articoli e commenti sgradevoli per noi, mi disse che tali appunti non potevano certamente farsi ad alcuni dei giornali che rappresentano direttamente o indirettamente direttive del suo Governo: mentre che in Italia tutta la stampa è fascista. Al che replicai che ciò non vuol dire che non è consentito alla stampa italiana una ragionevole libertà di giudizio soprattutto nelle questioni estere (...)"[27].

Tali schieramenti portarono all'appartenenza a dei blocchi antitetici, cosicché ci si interrogava su come fosse "conciliabile l'amicizia italo-romena con l'amicizia italo-ungherese e con la tensione italo-jugoslava?"[28] Le prese di posizione ufficiali non riuscirono a mitigare i toni che ebbero i loro riflessi. Varie postille diplomatiche del tempo, messe a confronto, ne sono testimonianza[29]:

"Il Sottosegretario di Stato del Ministero degli Esteri [*i. e.* — Dino Grandi], che ho visto ieri, mi è sembrato ancora sotto l'impressione prodotta dal tono offensivo per l'Italia palesato da certi giornali nostrani in occasione del trattato di amicizia italo-magiaro. Il Sottosegretario di Stato si lamenta col fatto che l'opinione pubblica romena abbia dimenticato troppo presto il sacrificio del Governo italiano della ratifica del trattato sulla Basarabia pur correndo esso il

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[24] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Internă*, Dossier 70/1927, f. 19. N. Dianu, direttore generale nel MPN all'addetto stampa presso la Legazione romena a Roma.

[25] *Ibidem*, f. 37. E. Porn alla Direzione Generale Stampa e Propaganda presso Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Roma, 28 febbraio 1927.

[26] Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma [d'ora innanzi ASMAE], Affari Politici [d'ora innanzi AP], Romania, Pacco 1514. Telegramma a firma di Mussolini, 8 marzo 1927.

[27] Documenti Diplomatici Italiani [d'ora innanzi DDI], VII serie, vol. IV: 593. Durazzo a Mussolini, *Colloquio con Averescu: sua sgradevole impressione per i commenti della stampa italiana contro il trattato franco-romeno.* Bucarest, 30 gennaio 1927: 464.

[28] Carlo Curcio, *Italia, Romania e Piccola Intesa*, "Critica Fascista", VI (1928), n. 4, 15 febbraio: 77. Idem, *La Piccola Intesa*, "Critica Fascista", VI (1928), n. 13, 1 luglio: 256. Politicus, *Il nuovo patto della Piccola Intesa*, "Rassegna Italiana", XI (1933), marzo: 250-252.

[29] DDI, VII serie, vol. V. Durazzo a Mussolini, *Colloquio con Titulescu: tono anti-italiano della stampa romena.* Bucarest, 4 agosto 1927: 336.

rischio di produrre notevoli cambiamenti nella sua politica con la Russia (...) Ho replicato che in realtà la ratifica non ha portato con sé una catastrofe visto che i rapporti tra l'Italia e i Soviet sono rimasti immutati, che il tono di certi giornali nostri, gestiti da elementi socialisti e democratici sotto la direzione di alcuni redattori ebrei, non sono stati condivisi dagli altri organi di stampa romeni i quali si sono limitati a definire non appropriate le manifestazioni di assai caldeggiante e ostentata amicizia verso i magiari (...) che l'opinione pubblica romena si meraviglia che ci siano tali rumorose manifestazioni a maggior ragione sapendo che in Italia la stampa non è libera come da noi"[30].

Allorquando la stampa italiana tace, la possibile decodifica secondo l'addetto stampa Theodor Solacolu sarebbe la seguente:

"(...) non si interpreti il silenzio della stampa italiana come una mancanza di interesse riguardo gli ultimi eventi politici avvenuti nella Penisola Balcanica, eventi di cui protagonista è il ministro romeno degli Esteri; tale riserva è vincolata e deve essere valutata come una tattica degli artefici legittimati della politica fascista (...). Essa può avere una spiegazione: mentre nell'occidente europeo il ritiro della Germania da Ginevra segna tra l'altro il fallimento della politica mediatrice dell'Italia, nella quale il capo del governo fascista si era personalmente impegnato, nell'oriente europeo uno stato, socio della Piccola Intesa, inizia un'ampia azione che tende a chiarire e pacificare uno dei settori europei più importanti. L'esito di un ministro degli Esteri, ministro cui precedente attività diplomatica nel Occidente aveva già ostacolato l'attuazione del «Direttorio europeo» delle quattro Grandi Potenze, non poteva certamente servire al prestigio dell'Italia e alla causa fascista"[31].

Quando la stampa italiana fa invece il passaggio dal silenzio al risentimento (1933/34), fino al punto da richiedere l'intervento del ministro italiano a Bucarest, la causa di ciò risiede in svolgimenti complessivi così annotati dallo stesso Solacolu:

"Il Ministro Sola ammette che la campagna stampa contro la Romania è squilibrata, ingiusta e tante volte basata su informazioni errati. Però, egli ricorda che per dieci anni la stampa italiana non ha mai aggredito la Romania. Se ultimamente l'atteggiamento è cambiato, esso è dovuto al fatto che la Piccola Intesa, all'interno della quale la Romania, per la spiccata importanza del suo rappresentante, ha un ruolo decisivo, abbia adottato una condotta refrattaria nei confronti della politica italiana (...) Pur essendo la stampa italiana una stampa ispirata e controllata dal governo, non è meno vero che la Direzione Stampa si limita a dare indicazioni generiche sulla politica ufficiale, suggerimenti che spesso hanno un carattere negativo, cioè indicano gli argomenti intrattabili (...) *Lupta* ed *Epoca* hanno

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[30] Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Bucarest [d'ora innanzi AMAE], *Italia*, vol. 62, Telegramma decifrato, Lahovary al ministro degli Esteri. Roma, 16 novembre 1927. La situazione rimase immutata a lungo come si può appurare dallo studio dei carteggi diplomatici: "(...) Grandi non mi ha velato che l'atteggiamento dei giornali di Bucarest, come pure della nostra opinione pubblica, sia stato recepito qui con profondo rammarico visto il gesto dell'Italia nei confronti della Romania", cf. AMAE, *Italia*, vol. 62, I.D. Ghyca al ministro degli Affari Esteri, I.G. Duca. Roma, 20 febbraio 1928. Riferisce l'udienza al sottosegretario di Stato agli Esteri, Dino Grandi.

[31] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 444, ff. 1-6. Theodor Solacolu al sottosegretario di Stato negli Affari Esteri, Savel Rădulescu. Roma, 3 novembre 1933.

manifestato loro sentimenti per l'Italia e Mussolini nei articoli pungenti o violenti. Sola è venuto a Roma col scopo di provocare un cambiamento di tale situazione (...) In seguito al suo intervento, Ciano ha convocato i dirigenti stampa consigliandogli di astenersi dagli attacchi contro il nostro governo oppure personali. Ciano esige però che il governo romeno provveda ugualmente riguardo agli attacchi contro l'Italia, il fascismo e il Duce (...)[32].

A sua volta, il ministro romeno a Roma aveva proceduto a dei colloqui sullo stesso argomento con gerenti di spicco, come il barone P. Aloisi:

"Il principe Ghika (...) voleva sapere se i recenti attacchi della stampa italiana contro la Romania stessero a rivelare un mutamento nei rapporti fra i due Paesi. Mi ha fatto notare che i violenti articoli di cui si preoccupava erano apparsi sui maggiori organi della nostra stampa: *Corriere della Sera, Stampa, Messaggero* ecc. (...)"[33].

...e la fonte romena:

"Come previsto, il comunicato di Ginevra del Consiglio Permanente della Piccola Intesa ha scatenato una violenta campagna stampa (...). Non insisto su questo; da dieci anni ormai lo scandalo della stampa italiana è un fatto che suscita la stupefazione e l'indignazione dei colleghi e degli osservatori imparziali"[34].

Le vicende della guerra italiana in Etiopia e la ferma presa di posizione negativa di Nicolae Titulescu al riguardo, resero ancor più profondi i dissensi italo-romeni. Il 20 novembre 1935 Th. Solacolu informava per telefono di un articolo pubblicato su *Tribuna*, parte di una serie che chiosava sul commercio d'Italia con gli stati sanzionisti:

"La Romania dovrebbe ricordarsi come l'Italia, con la quale si dichiara imparentata per distinguersi nei Balcani, gli abbia dimostrato l'amicizia e come la difficile questione della Bessarabia ne sia testimonianza concreta"[35].

Il diplomatico romeno N. Titulescu divenne a questo punto il nemico dell'Italia, fortemente combattuto sulla stampa italiana, spesso con toni poco elevati, canzonatori e viscerali[36]. Dall'altra parte, invece, si rimproveravano e si seguivano le interpretazioni giornalistiche nella stampa estera del famoso discorso del Duce a Milano nello stesso anno 1936[37].

Allorquando la stampa italiana manifesta un atteggiamento favorevole, come avvenne nel 1938, la causa viene identificata nell'insediamento al potere del governo nazional-cristiano capeggiato da Octavian Goga — autoritario, antisemita, antidemocratico e propenso a schierarsi al fianco dell'Asse Roma-Berlino — la cui descrizione, come "uomo austero, attaccato alle origini latine,

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[32] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 444/1933, ff. 38-43. Ion Lugoşianu, ministro della Romania a Roma al ministro degli Affari Esteri, Nicolae Titulescu. Roma, 24 febbraio 1934.

[33] DDI, VII serie, vol. XIII. Colloquio Aloisi — Ghika, *Nuovo patto della Piccola Intesa e attacchi della stampa italiana contro la Romania*. Roma, 7 marzo 1933: 190-191. Vedi anche Aloisi a Mussolini, *Colloquio con Potemkin: attacchi della stampa italiana contro la Romania*. Roma, 7 marzo 1933: 189.

[34] AMAE, *Italia*, vol. 63, I.D. Ghyca, ministro della Romania a Roma al ministro degli Affari Esteri George Mironescu. Roma, 6 aprile 1933.

[35] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 444, f. 286.

[36] DDI, VIII serie, vol. IV. 444, Colloquio Ciano-Lugoşianu, *Proteste romene per la campagna condotta dalla stampa italiana contro Titulescu*. Roma, 4 luglio: 507.

[37] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 760.

ammiratore dell'Italia, avversario alla politica di Titulescu", è eloquente e atta a spiegare la modifica della condotta:

"Negli ultimi giorni si nota un significativo cambiamento nell'atteggiamento della stampa italiana e nei cerchi ufficiali con riguardo al governo romeno presieduto da O. Goga. In seguito agli articoli firmati da Gayda e da altri giornalisti presenti a Bucarest, visibilmente bendisposti nei confronti della Guardia di Ferro, si valuta che il governo Goga sia una formula transitoria verso una vera rivoluzione nazionale imminente. L'interesse della stampa si era talmente affievolito pressoché non si accennava neanche lontanamente la Romania"[38].

Lo stesso Presidente del Consiglio, O. Goga, rivela di aver preso atto di tale cambiamento:

"(...) posso dire che all'estero il mio governo è stato ricevuto con manifestazioni di buona volontà, ma per ciò che riguarda l'Italia, la sua stampa e la sua opinione pubblica, ho da esprimere sentimenti di profonda gratitudine per le accoglienze fattemi"[39].

A sua volta il Re Carol II riafferma i forti vincoli italo-romeni inalterabili dalle vicende politiche:

"neanche nelle ore penose — e alludo precisamente al periodo delle sanzioni, quando dovemmo sottostare ad una decisione collettiva di cui non si può certo fare colpa al mio Paese — neppure allora l'amicizia fra l'Italia e la Romania si è offuscata. Amo l'Italia e ammiro Mussolini: ecco quello che posso dire agli italiani"[40].

Il salto da un Titulescu ormai rinnegato a un Codreanu febbrile, che dichiara di voler costruire *l'uomo nuovo*[41], è contenuto in uno scambio di battute tra il giornalista italiano Francesco Maratea e il professore Mihail Manoilescu[42]. Le trasformazioni nella vita politica romena, che comportano inerenti diverse opzioni sul piano della politica estera, restituiscono tutta una serie di vincoli essenziali tra l'Italia e la Romania:

"Comunanza di origini, di interessi, di coltura, affinità di sentimenti e di pensiero, coincidenza di ragioni storiche, tutto militava a favore di una fraterna collaborazione fra il popolo italiano e quello romeno. Invece, sia a ragione di influenze estranee, sia per considerazioni di politica estera, la Romania ha creduto di vedere nella Francia, nella Piccola Intesa e nella Società delle Nazioni le uniche possibili garanti dei suoi sacrosanti diritti, delle sue nuove frontiere che le appartengono non solo per diritto di spada ma soprattutto per inconfutabili ragioni storiche ed etniche (...) Oggi, come sempre la Romania torna a guardare verso Roma Eterna, verso la sua grande Madre"[43].

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[38] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 970, f. 97. Rapporto dell'addetto stampa a Roma, Al. Kiriţescu.

[39] Italo Zingarelli, *La nuova Romania nel pensiero di Ottaviano Goga,* (Intervista del nostro inviato speciale col Presidente del Consiglio Romeno, Bucarest, 8 gennaio), "Stampa", 9 gennaio 1938.

[40] Francesco Maratea, *L'arbitro della situazione in Romania, Una visita a Re Carol II. Il sovrano riafferma la sua simpatia all'Italia e la sua fervida ammirazione per il Duce* (per telefono dal nostro inviato speciale), "Messaggero", 18 gennaio 1938.

[41] Francesco Maratea, *La Nuova Romania. Nostre interviste a Bucarest. Il Presidente del Consiglio, in Capo spirituale del nuovo Governo e il Capitano delle "Camicie Verdi",* "Messaggero", 16 gennaio 1938.

[42] Francesco Maratea, *Roma e la Romania Nuova, Nuova conversazione con Manoilesco,* "Messaggero", 7 gennaio 1938.

[43] *Verso la meta*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XVIII (1938), n. 1, gennaio: 2-3.

La condanna capitale per Codreanu, compromette però anche questo momento.

Solo con l'adesione della Romania all'Asse e la guerra nell'est si torna alla normalità:

"Tutta la stampa italiana ha inquadrato in maniera eccellente l'aspetto della nostra guerra contro l'URSS"[44].

Un ritaglio stampa del 29 agosto 1941 riporta l'articolo di G. Terranova sul *Giornale di Genova*, articolo che si conclude con la convinzione che "sia impossibile negare la discendenza romana a questo popolo fraterno afflitto dagli affanni lungo i secoli al quale spetta adesso un destino glorioso ed essenziale per la storia della nuova Europa"[45].

Infine, gli sviluppi della guerra in Russia e la collaborazione italo-romena fanno scattare atteggiamenti addirittura affettuosi da parte della stampa italiana nei confronti della Romania. Dal 1942 si accerta un notevole miglioramento dell'immagine della Romania diffusa in Italia, il che è confermato pure da un appunto del capo del Servizio Speciale d'Informazioni, Ion Lissievici (supplente di Eugen Cristescu):

"Una serie di informatori del Servizio avvertono un forte *significativo cambiamento del modo in cui è percepito il paese nostrano in Italia*. Senza altro l'intervento della Romania nella guerra contro il bolscevismo è uno degli elementi principali di tale mutamento, però i circoli iniziati sostengono che stavolta sia *più di una manifestazione superficiale*. Sembra che i gerenti dell'Italia ci guardino diversamente e le recenti espressioni della stampa, che non cessa con *gli encomi per l'armata e il popolo romeno*, siano una conseguenza di tale metamorfosi"[46].

V. *I temi ricorrenti*

1. *Paese di confine.* Due assi — quello spaziale e quello temporale — avrebbero potuto e dovuto collocare con esattezza la Romania nell'immaginario del lettore italiano. Invece essa è risultata uno spazio al crocevia di civiltà (Oriente/Occidente), percepito in maniera piuttosto asincronica, anche se non mancarono delle età culturalmente floride. Tale collocazione ebbe come conseguenza tutta una serie di caratteristiche e comportamenti: il Cristianesimo di rito ortodosso; la costanza dei romeni nell'autocertificarsi come appartenenti all'Occidente latino della cui cultura continuarono nonostante tutto a nutrirsi; il ruolo di barriera che le venne assegnato lungo i secoli, il che spiega almeno in parte il suo percorso diacronico e l'impressione di una certa arretratezza della Romania; gli sforzi per raggiungere una condizione di sincronia col mondo occidentale; l'eredità fanariota i cui residui persistono nella politica interna.

2. *Retorica sulla comunanza di origini.* Nel contesto europeo post-Versailles, che vide i due paesi contrapporsi, invocare la comunanza d'origine non era che un artificio privo di peso e furono in tanti ad esprimere ciò a parole chiare ed

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[44] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 1245, f. 2. Rapporto per il Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale. 24 giugno 1941.

[45] ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 1230, f. 52.

[46] AMAE, *Fondo Italia*, vol. 70, Capo del Servizio Speciale Informazioni al ministro degli Affari Esteri, Bucarest, 22 agosto 1942.

esplicite. Spesso e in maniera non velata si metteva in risalto il desueto sentimentalismo, incapace di controbilanciare l'assenza di gesti concreti nel presente. I *cliché*, le formule più usate, del tipo *legame indissolubile, nazioni sorelle, popoli imparentati, nazioni affine con stesse origini e radici linguistiche*, possono essere accentuati, in senso positivo o negativo, in funzione del buono o cattivo intento del loro utilizzatore e delle circostanze politiche, economiche, culturali in cui essi vengono emessi.

Gli appellativi o i sintagmi più usitati e magniloquenti per designare la Romania nella stampa italiana erano: *sorella minore, sorella latina, avamposto della latinità nell'oriente europeo, isola latina in un mare slavo* ecc. Questo avveniva però negli articoli che avevano come autori dei romeni o dei filoromeni, o che riportavano le parole di qualche rappresentante ufficiale romeno, oppure comparivano negli anni che segnarono una svolta positiva nei rapporti italo-romeni.

"A coronare di maggiori artificiosità le relazioni tra i due Paesi, non mancavano fioriture sentimentali o retoriche che, per aver l'aria di cimentare l'unione italo-romena, ricorrevano alla lontana comune origine, alla fratellanza di sangue (...) quando l'apoteosi retorica veniva a mancare, di nuovo nella nostra coscienza si risentiva quella insoddisfazione propria di chi vive in un'atmosfera viziata, insufficiente per un più ampio respiro"[47].

Oppure:

"(...) le due nazioni si sentono strettamente unite da un duplice legame, di sangue e di spirito (...) nate dall'unico grembo di Roma madre immortale"[48].

Non poche furono le polemiche filologiche e storiche sull'argomento. I dibattiti sull'eredità romana nell'odierna Romania hanno visti coinvolti noti filologi, come A. Schiaffini, ferventi difensori della causa romena, come G. Lugli, propagatori culturali con tutte le carte in regola, come Al. Marcu[49] ecc. Una presenza costante sulla stampa italiana quale quella di Cl. Isopescu, risaputo come personalità facilmente infiammabile e scontrosa, non poteva non suscitare talune controversie in merito[50].

Quanto spesso viene invocato il passato storico allo scopo di rafforzare il rapporto vigente tra le due nazioni? Come vengono di conseguenza riattivati i miti storici e un'intera serie di simboli a cui si era fatto ricorso nella storiografia romena da parte dei cronisti fino alla Scuola latinista transilvana e dall'epoca di

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47 Lilio Cialdea, *Relazioni italo-romene*, "Educazione Fascista", VIII (1930), marzo: 155-158.

48 Sigfrido A. Barchini, *La Romania del Conducător*, "Politica Nuova", X (1942), n. 4, 15 aprile: 46.

49 Angelo Pernice, *La Dacia e Roma (Le origini del popolo romeno)*, "L'Europa Orientale", III (1923), n. 1: 1-13. Alexandru Marcu, *L'Italia in cerca della latinità dei romeni*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", III (1927), quaderno 10, ottobre: 822-832. E. Padrini, *L'Italia e la latinità dei romeni*, "Fiera letteraria", VIII (1932), n. 1: 7. Gino Lupi, *L'origine dei romeni e il problema della loro lingua,* Tip. Combi, Milano, 1932, 25 pp. (estratto da "Rassegna Italo-Romena"). Marco Pomilio, *Romenia figlia di Roma*, "Rassegna Nazionale", LVII (1935), v. 22: 192-202. Mario Ruffini, *Latinità della lingua romena*, "Termini", n. 32-33 (1939): 611-614. Arrigo Solmi, *L'idea di Roma nella formazione della Romania moderna*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 126-127 (segue lungo i secoli i vincoli della latinità). Giuseppe Lugli, *La romanità della Dacia*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 141-144. Alfredo Schiaffini, *Latinità nell'Europa di sud-est,* "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXIII (1943), n. 2, febbraio: 2-5.

50 Otilia Ştefania Pop Damian, Carmen Burcea, *Bibliografia degli scritti di Claudiu Isopescu*, Atti del convegno „80 anni dalla creazione della prima cattedra di lingua romena a Roma", Roma, 27-28 marzo 2006: 46-60.

Brâncoveanu fino al Romanticismo: la lupa e la Colonna traianea, la Chiesa unita e il cattolicesimo di rito orientale ecc. Tra passato e presente si constata uno *hiatus* (logica conseguenza dei prolungati archi temporali di distacco). Dal bisogno di recuperare è altresì evidente la tendenza a iperbolizzare gli episodi storici che videro l'intrecciarsi di questi due spazi. Il ricorso al passato diviene, in questo caso, un surrogato per la fragilità dei contatti presenti ovvero un fine ed intellettualizzato stimolo per la loro intensificazione. Si verifica una analoga tendenza anche nella stampa fascista? Accanto a singoli episodi, poco noti oppure di minore spessore[51], sono chiamati a corroborare la tesi romena alcuni mitizzati momenti storici: la presenza in età medioevale di veneziani e genovesi sulle sponde del Mar Nero[52] e dei missionari cattolici in Romania[53]; la Chiesa unita[54]; la scuola latinista transilvana[55]; l'età di C. Brâncoveanu[56]; il movimento italianista[57]; il sincronismo della rinascita nazionale[58].

3. *La Grande Romania e le sue regioni vulnerabili.* La Grande Guerra produsse la Grande Romania — è questo il *cliché* ricorrente nelle pubblicazioni periodiche italiane del tempo. Effettivamente la guerra aveva cambiato la fisionomia e lo status della Romania in Europa. In forza di ciò, essa stipula delle alleanze (Piccola Intesa e Intesa Balcanica) atte a farle raggiungere il proprio obiettivo: il mantenimento dello *status quo* europeo quale si era configurato a Versailles. Schiacciata a breve tra troppi totalitarismi e isolata dalle potenze garanti (Francia e Gran Bretagna), essa sarà costretta ad aderire, alla vigilia del secondo conflitto mondiale, all'asse Berlino-Roma e al patto tripartito.

Nel periodo fra le due guerre volti e risvolti della Grande Romania compaiono sulla stampa, fornendo alla pubblica opinione italiana tutti gli elementi di base per comprenderla: vengono indicati suoi *limiti geografici*: il Danubio centrale e meridionale, il Nistro e il Mar Nero[59] e altrettanto la *posizione geografica che le*

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[51] Pietro Silva, *Il Principe Eugenio di Savoia e la liberazione della Transilvania*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 135.

[52] N. Iorga, *Venezia e i romeni*, "L'Europa Orientale", IX (1929) n. 1-2, gennaio-febbraio: 1-24. Idem, *I Genovesi nel Mar Nero*, "Il Comune di Genova", (1925), n. 6, giugno.

[53] George Călinescu, *Alcuni missionari cattolici italiani nella Moldavia dei secolo XVIII*, "Diplomatarium Italicum", I (1925): 1-223. Idem, *Altre notizie sui missionari cattolici nei paesi romeni*, "Diplomatarium Italicum", II (1930): 305-514. Carlo Tagliavini, *Alcuni manoscritti rumeni sconosciuti di missionari cattolici italiani in Moldavia (secolo XVIII)*, "Studi Rumeni", IV (1929/1930): 41-104.

[54] A. Gabor, *Il cattolicesimo unito in Romania*, "L'Europa Orientale", III (1923): 822-824. Rina Pellegri, *Samuil Clain, precursore della latinità della Romania*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXIII (1943), n. 4, aprile: 21-22.

[55] Recensione di Gino Lupi al vol. di Mario Ruffini, *La scuola latinista romena*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXI (1941), n. 3, marzo: 5-7. Mario Ruffini, *Inocentiu Micu Klein (1693-1764),* "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXIII (1943), n. 5, maggio: 5-7.

[56] Mario Ruffini, *L'influenza italiana in Valacchia nell'epoca di Constantin-Vodă Brâncoveanu (1688-1714)*, Milano, 1933, 69 pp. [alcune parti erano già apparse in vari numeri della "Rassegna Italo-Romena"].

[57] Carlo Tagliavini, *Un frammento di storia della lingua romena nel sec. XIX (L'italianismo di Ion Heliade Rădulescu)*, "L'Europa Orientale", VI (1926): 313. Claudio Isopescu, *Il movimento latinista in Romania,* "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XX (1940), n. 3, marzo: 3-4.

[58] Pietro Orsi, *Camillo Cavour ed il Risorgimento della Rumenia*, "Gerarchia", X (1930), n. 5, maggio: 399-404.

[59] Carlo Ciucci, *Situazione geopolitica della Romania di oggi*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 136. A. Saitta, *Il Danubio grande via internazionale*, "Le Vie del Mondo", X (1942): 377-388.

assegna un ruolo cospicuo sul piano politico e strategico[60]. La Romania viene però presentata come *frutto di trattati* [sic!] firmati a guerra conclusa, che contenevano in sé il nocciolo della futura guerra:

"La Grande Romania è stata fatta a spese degli ungheresi e dei Russi. Nel suo atto di iscrizione nel catasto europeo sono segnate così due ipoteche che gravano abbastanza sensibilmente sulla vita del paese"[61].

Oppure:

"Vinta, la Romania guadagnava con la pace territori vastissimi, affettati senza scrupolo dai corpi di Nazioni vicine (...)"[62].

All'interno dell'assetto dello scacchiere sud-est europeo si prende nota di fatti come: *la precarietà della regione*[63]; *le alleanze regionali* che soffrissero di "debolezza congenita (...) data la mancata adesione della Bulgaria e dell'Albania"[64]; *gli interessi italiani nella regione e il ruolo che l'Italia tendeva a ricoprire*[65].

Il tragico anno 1940[66] scosse *le zone vulnerabili* della Romania[67]. Il giornalista Andrea Fabri racconta su "Il Tempo" del 4 luglio 1940 come la Regina Maria, in visita in una scuola, abbia chiesto a un ragazzo quali fossero le regioni che componevano la Romania e la risposta fu "quelle nemiche". L'autore continua col dire che non si sa se la vicenda fosse vera, ma che era comunque eloquente per la situazione in cui si ritrovò la Romania dopo la Grande Guerra in seguito alle annessioni dei territori appartenuti precedentemente a stati limitrofi. In genere, l'atteggiamento italiano è differente in funzione delle singole regioni: *a favore* per ciò che riguarda la Bessarabia, *contro* per ciò che riguarda la Transilvania e la Dobrugia. Le motivazioni fanno ricorso al passato storico e alle stringenti

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60 Piero Puricelli, *Le rapide comunicazioni problema essenziale della Nuova Romania*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 134.

61 Politicus, *Il nuovo patto della Piccola Intesa*, "Rassegna Italiana", XI (1933), marzo: 250-252.

62 S., *La "révolution royale" di Carol, il regime Antonescu e il destino della Romania*, "Politica Nuova", VIII (1940), n. 18, 30 settembre: 514-516.

63 Umberto Nani, *Posizioni politiche nella regione danubiana,* "Critica Fascista", VIII (1930), n. 9, 1 maggio: 166-167.

64 Politicus, *Il cosiddetto "Patto Balcanico",* "Rassegna Italiana", XII (1934), aprile: 342.

65 Umberto Nani, *La funzione dell'Italia nei Balcani*, "Critica Fascista", VI (1928), n. 14, 15 luglio: 268-270. Roberto Forges Davanzati, *L'Italia fascista e la balcanizzazione dell'Europa,* "Critica Fascista", VI (1928), n. 20, 15 ottobre: 382-383. Politicus, *Il progetto Tardieu per la sistemazione danubiana e l'atteggiamento dell'Italia*, "Rassegna Italiana", XV (1932), v. XXX: 331-334. F. Lantini, *L'Italia e il Levante europeo. Jugoslavia, Albania, Grecia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia caucasica*, "Rassegna Italiana", XVII (1934), v. XXXXVIII: 179-196. Antonio Giordano, *L'espansione italiana nei Balcani*, "Rassegna Italiana", XVI (1938), gennaio: 36-42. Idem, *La sistemazione dell'Europa Centro-danubiana e gli interessi politici ed economici italiani*, "Rassegna Italiana", XVI (1938), dicembre: 871-878. Giani Fosco, *Porte italiane sui Balcani*, "Politica Nuova", X (1942), n. 2, 1 marzo: 14-15. D. Jaranoff, *L'Italia nella penisola balcanica (Alcune considerazioni di un geografo bulgaro)*, "Geopolitica", II (1940), n. 5, 31 maggio: 202-205. Renzo Sereno, *L'aspetto storico della Piccola Intesa*, "Rassegna Italiana", XI (1933), aprile: 309-314.

66 Nicola Marchitto, *Romania — dove l'equilibrio balcanico potrebbe cedere*, "Politica Nuova", VIII (1940), n. 3, 15 febbraio:105. B. Cialdea, *La Romania dopo le cessioni all'URSS*, "Relazioni Internazionali", n. 40 (1940): 488-490.

67 Sommi G. Picenardi, *La Rumenia fra le tragedie*, "La Vita Italiana", XXVII (1939), v. 54: 405-415. Salvatore Sibilia, *Bucovina, Transilvania, Bessarabia e Dobrugia nella loro storia e nei loro caratteri geografici*, "Universo", XXI (1940), n. 3: 195-218; n. 4: 249-268. *Cessione della Bessarabia e della Bucovina settentrionale all'Unione Sovietica*, "Bollettino della R. Società Geografica Italiana", LXXIV (1940), v. LXXVII: 573-576.

opzioni della politica estera contemporanea. Per facilitare la comprensione del lettore italiano medio, ogni regione romena in discussione viene indicata geograficamente e paragonata, per superficie e numero di abitanti, ad una sua corrispondente italiana. Così:

"(...) alla Bessarabia corrisponderebbero l'Emilia e la Toscana riunite; alla Transilvania — l'Emilia, Toscana, Marche e Umbria; la Dobrugia — sarebbe poco meno di quella di Lombardia"[68].

Segue qualche cenno storico, quindi dati sulla composizione etnica e religiosa, supponendo che ciò bastasse per contraddistinguere con precisione il quadro:

"Romania, paese che costituisce tuttora il centro nevralgico della situazione balcanico-danubiana (...) dilatatasi a spese dei suoi vicini, diventa uno dei principali paesi conservatori del settore danubiano-balcanico (...). Le aspirazioni russe erano le meno giustificate fra tutte quelle che venivano e vengono avanzate contro la Romania (...). Nel caso della Transilvania si pensa che la soluzione sia un accordo ungaro-romeno — che preveda la cessione all'Ungheria della parte di confine di Transilvania e il trapianto etnico — sull'esempio di quanto si è fatto nell'Alto Adige; mentre la questione della Dobrugia è intricatissima"[69].

4. *Antinomia politica e complementarità economica.* Nonostante la firma di un trattato di amicizia (1926), l'antinomia politica causata dalle diverse scelte di politica estera operate da ciascuno Stato venne riportata nella stampa italiana quasi come un rimprovero da attribuire tutto ai romeni, "colpevoli" di uno sterile sentimentalismo.

"L'Italia non è soltanto un sacrario dei ricordi ove si capita una volta nella vita per ricongiungersi idealmente ad un lontano passato e per bruciare magari un granello di incenso ad una colonna che quel passato testimonia, ma una nazione compatta, intenta a creare il proprio avvenire, decisa di farsi strada nel mondo e pronta a rendersi arbitra della propria giustizia"[70].

Ciononostante, la complementarità economica rimase un dato di fatto che non poteva che cointeressare i due Stati che manifestarono la propria disponibilità a creare e sviluppare alleanze in questo campo (avvenute d'altronde nel 1929[71] e nel 1937[72]).

"Per ciò che riguarda il puro e semplice interesse commerciale italo-romeno, basta accennare alle ricchezze ed alle deficienze delle due Nazioni, ricchezze e deficienze che in campi di primissimo ordine vengono reciprocamente ad integrarsi. La Romania infatti ci può fornire su vasta scala petrolio e suoi derivati, cereali, legname, bestiame, materie cioè che a noi mancano quasi totalmente, come i petroli, oppure sono in deficienza rispetto al consumo nazionale; d'altra parte la nostra industria può fornire alla Romania automobili ed altri veicoli, macchine agricole, tessuti, sete, olive, olio d'oliva, frutta ecc"[73].

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[68] Nicola Marchitto, *Bessarabia, Transilvania, Dobrugia*, "La Vita Italiana", XXVIII (1940), v. LVI, luglio: 55-64.

[69] *Ibidem*.

[70] Umberto Biscottini, *Italia e Romania*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929), quaderno 12: 1241-1244.

[71] Si vedano gli articoli e i servizi apparsi in "Tribuna", "Giornale d'Italia", "Il Popolo d'Italia" a seguito dell'accordo commerciale del dicembre 1929.

[72] *Accordo commerciale tra la Romania e l'Italia del 13 febbraio 1937*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", (1937), n. 4, aprile: 4.

[73] Lilio Cialdea, *Relazioni italo-romene*, "Educazione Fascista", VIII (1930), marzo: 155-158.

Che "Italia e Romania si completino" lo ribadiva lo storico Oscar Randi[74], anche se il rapporto bilaterale era da circoscriversi all'intera area danubiana[75] e da valutare in chiave concorrenziale:

"La Romania è uno stato che può interessare l'Italia. Dico può, perché essa ha la possibilità di fornire all'Italia prodotti petroliferi e prodotti agricoli di cui ha grande abbondanza (...). Ma ha dei concorrenti negli stati vicini"[76].

La Romania veniva principalmente percepita come giacimento petrolifero[77] e come granaio d'Europa[78], ma anche come centro aurifero "già conosciuto dai vecchi e leggendari Daci"[79]. Espressioni come "il suolo più ricco d'Europa (...) un suolo di una fertilità straordinaria" sono ricorrenti sulla stampa italiana. Ma tanta ricchezza avrebbe costituito il presupposto per la sfortuna negli anni del secondo conflitto mondiale[80].

Vengono registrati i tentativi di importazione in Romania del modello socio-economico fascista — il corporativismo — tentativi legati al nome del professor Mihail Manoilescu[81], il quale aveva fondato *Liga națională-corporativă*, con l'organo di stampa "Lumea Nouă", e l'*Institut de Studii Corporative*[82].

Compaiono altresì notizie sulla bilancia commerciale[83] e sulle collaborazioni in vari settori industriali. Ad esempio, il notevole sviluppo che registrò l'industria aeronautica italiana nel Ventennio portò anche in tale campo ad una cooperazione italo-romena: nel 1937 due linee aeree sono state istituite per allacciare Roma e Milano a Bucarest[84], contesto in cui il ministro dell'Aria e della Marina, Irimescu, visitò l'Italia e l'evento fu ampiamente commentato sulla stampa[85].

5. *Presenze italiane in Romania* . Gli esiti della *politica culturale italiana in Romania*[86] — attuata tramite delle strutture abilitate, quali le cattedre di lingua

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74 Oscar Randi, *Le relazioni commerciali italo-romene*, "Critica Fascista", VIII (1930), n. 8, 15 agosto: 147-149.

75 *Idem*, *Relazioni economiche dell'Italia col Bacino Danubiano*, "Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali", V (1938), n. 3, luglio-settembre: 223-233.

76 Amedeo Giannini, *I rapporti economici italo-romeni*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 133.

77 Franco Trandafilo, *Ricchezze del suolo e del sottosuolo romeno*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 137-140. A. Troni, *I petroli della Romania*, "L'Europa Orientale", XXII (1942): 119-128. Salvatore Sibilia, *Il petrolio della Romania e gli sviluppi dell'industria petrolifera romena*, "Universo", XXII (1941): 687-702. G. Caraci, *Il petrolio romeno*, "Le Vie del Mondo", IX (1941): 379-390.

78 D. Lunder, *Un granaio: L'Europa del sud-est*, "Geopolitica", II (1940), n. 4, 30 aprile: 191.

79 Lilio Cialdea, *Un grande centro aurifero transilvano: Baia Mare,* "Il Secolo XX", VIII (1930), n. 3, 5 febbraio: 19-20.

80 Gio-Co, *La Romania ha troppo petrolio per vivere in pace?,* "Politica Nuova", VIII (1940), n. 5, 15 marzo: 137-138.

81 A. Fanfani, *La dottrina corporativa del Manoilescu*, "Vita e Pensiero", XXI (1935), v. XXVI, n. 2: 102-110. Lilio Cialdea, *La Carta del Lavoro in Romania* (Intervista con Michele Manoilescu), "Critica Fascista", IV (1937): 376-378.

82 *Movimenti corporativisti in Romania,* "Universalità Fascista", VI (1934), n. 10-11: 560-561.

83 D. de Castro, Il *commercio estero romeno e gli scambi con l'Italia*, "Autarchia. Rivista mensile di studi economici", III (1941), n. 3: 14-15.

84 Si vedano notizie e commenti sulla linea aerea Roma-Belgrado-Bucarest (5-10 ottobre 1937) apparsi in "Tribuna", "Il Popolo d'Italia", "Il Giornale d'Italia".

85 Si veda la campagna stampa del periodo 5-13 novembre 1937: "Giornale d'Italia", "Tribuna", "Messaggero", "La Stampa", "Regime Fascista", "Piccolo", "Gazzetta del Popolo", "Corriere della Sera", "Corriere Padano", "Lavoro Fascista", "Resto del Carlino", "Giornale di Genova", "Secolo XIX".

86 *Cultura italiana all'estero. Romania,* "Romana", IV (1940), n. 11: 711-713. Carlo Tagliavini, *La cultura italiana in Romania,* "Romana", VI (1942), n. 8-9: 528-535.

e letteratura italiana[87], l'Istituto di Cultura Italiana[88], la Società Nazionale Dante Alighieri[89], le riviste di cultura italiana edite in Romania, la libreria italiana ecc. — venivano debitamente riportati sulla stampa. Prevaleva comunque l'idea di concorrenza con il predominio francese per una egemonia culturale e, in seguito ad essa, anche politica sulla regione.

"(...) ecco la Francia con la sua anima, con la sua cultura, le viene in aiuto (*i.e.* — alla Romania). Non essere grati? — dicono i più. E l'Italia? Ha fatto pochissimo ieri, anche perché forse non poteva fare di più. Ma quello che sorprende, fa poco tuttora"[90].

La figura di maggiore spicco del fenomeno culturale italiano in Romania appare indubbiamente Ramiro Ortiz, "scarsamente aiutato dal R. Governo Italiano"[91], mentre il fulcro della cultura italiana in Romania rimane in tutto quest'arco di tempo l'Istituto di Cultura Italiana, fondato dallo stesso Ortiz e assunto solo in un secondo mom dallo stato, il cui numero di iscritti non cessa di aumentare (1936 – 1000; 1937 – 1300; 1939 – 2000), come rileva il ministro italiano a Bucarest, Ugo Sola, concludendo fieramente: "Cifre che lo rende l'ente straniero culturale più efficiente"[92].

Le colonie italiane in Romania costituiscono un soggetto ancora tutto da indagare, anche se vari studi in merito sono stati pubblicati di recente. La stampa del Ventennio lo ha trattato con tutta la dovuta attenzione[93]. Così si viene a sapere che le colonie permanenti costituitesi tra il 1880 e il 1890 erano ubicate a: Greci, Măcin; Iaşi (friulani); Cataloi, Dobrogea (veneti); Cernavodă, Iacobdeal (pugliesi). Al 31 dicembre 1924 risiedevano in Romania poco più di 13.200 italiani[94]. La loro importanza cresceva in forte connessione con l'idea dell'*esportazione del fascismo*, un'idea verso la quale si è inizialmente manifestata in Romania

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[87] R. Ortiz, *Una cattedra di lingua e letteratura italiana all'Università di Bucarest*, "L'Europa Orientale", III (1923): 828-831. *Dati sull'insegnamento italiano in Romania*, "Romana", II (1938): 535-537. Claudio Isopescu, *Lingua e letteratura italiana in Romania*, "Augustea", XV (1941), n. 1: 10-12; n. 2: 20-23.

[88] R. Ortiz, *L'istituto di cultura italiana di Bucarest*, "L'Europa Orientale", V (1925): 833-835. Ugo Sola, *L'istituto di cultura italiana in Romania*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", LXVI (1939): 171-172. *Istituto di cultura italiana a Bucarest,* "Il Libro Italiano nel mondo", II (1941), n. 1-2: 99-101.

[89] Si veda la rivista "Le Pagine della Dante": *Studenti italo-rumeni alla Dante*, 1925, n. 5: 105. Paolo Boselli, *Italia e Rumania*, 1927, n. 2: 22-23. *Una significativa iniziativa italo-rumena* [una riproduzione della colonna di Traiano], 1931, n. 6: 202. *I corsi della «Dante» a Bucarest*, 1932, n. 4: 133-134. *Nuovi corsi d'italiano a Jassy,* 1932, n. 6: 249. *Iniziative della «Dante Alighieri» in Europa*, 1933, n. 3: 84-85 ecc.

[90] Adiemme, *In cerca della Rumenia (corrispondenza dall'estero),* "Educazione Fascista", V (1927), n. VI-VII, giugno-luglio: 412-414.

[91] *Italia e Romania*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", III (1927), quaderno 2-3, febbraio-marzo: 215-216.

[92] Ugo Sola, *L'Istituto Italiano di Cultura Italiana in Romania*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 171-172.

[93] *La mano d'opera italiana in Romania e la nostra penetrazione commerciale in Romania*, "La Vita Italiana", IX (1921), v. XVII: 41-50. *La mano d'opera italiana in Romania*, "Minerva", XXXI (1921), v. XLI: 115-116. V. de Sanctis, *L'emigrazione italiana in Romania*, "L'Europa Orientale", III (1923): 688-97. P. Schiarini, *L'emigrazione italiana in Romania*, "Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana", LVII (1923), v. LX: 437-42. N. Bănescu, *La "Roma Nuova" alle foci del Danubio*, "L'Europa Orientale", III (1923): 580-5. E. Porn, *La partecipazione italiana allo sviluppo dell'economia romena*, "Rassegna dell'Europa Mediorientale", II (1926), n. 5: 22-24. Claudiu Isopescu, *Un villaggio italiano in Romania*, "Augustea", V (1929): 655 (Cataloi-Galați). G. Caraci, *Colonie italiane in Romania*, "Rivista Geografica Italiana", XLII (1935): 38-40.

[94] Riccardo Riccardi, *Lineamenti geografici della Grande Romania,* "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", 1929: 1245-1274. (p. 1258). Giuseppe Caraci, *Colonie italiane in Romania*, "Rivista Geografica Italiana", XLII (1935), fasc. I-III, gennaio-giugno: 38-40.

una "malfidenza generale", dato che "il movimento fascista, inteso subito e imitato dagli ungheresi, apparve in Romania come una specie di intesa italo-magiara, contraria agli interessi della nuova Grande Romania"[95].

Le tracce della cultura italiana in Romania. Sorprende non poco che a rilevare gli influssi italiani sulla cultura romena (nei diversi ambiti: teatro[96], letteratura[97], insegnamento[98], arte[99], lingua[100], diritto[101] ecc.) oppure a rilevare gli episodi romeni di personalità come Arturo Graf[102], Vegezzi Ruscalla[103] ecc. sono stati quasi sempre i romeni. Come d'altronde a firmare articoli su singole personalità culturali romene marcate dalla cultura italiana — D. Golescu[104], G. Asachi[105], D. Zamfirescu[106] ecc. Ogni qualvolta uno studioso italiano elabora un articolo del genere il filtro è, quasi immancabilmente, quello politico[107].

6. *Presenze romene in Italia.* Il tema della *cultura romena in Italia* fu argomento prediletto e riservato a esperti studiosi conoscitori della Romania come R. Ortiz, Cl. Isopescu, A. Garsia[108], G. Bertoni[109], G. Lupi[110], M. Bartoli[111]. Tema ricorrente sono le notizie sulla raffigurazione dispiaciuta della Romania come "colonia della cultura francese".

Il fulcro della propaganda romena in Italia fu l'Accademia di Romania[112]. Significativi, anche se brevi, sono i cenni sull'insegnamento della lingua romena

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95 Oscar Randi, *Il fenomeno fascista nella Jugoslavia e nella Romania*, "Critica Fascista", III (1925), n. 4: 71-73.

96 Claudio Isopescu, *L'Italia e gli inizi del teatro dramatico e musicale romeno*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1348-1378.

97 Idem, *L'Italia e le origini della letteratura romena*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929), quaderno 2-3, febbraio-marzo,: 212-231.

98 Alessadro Marcu, *L'Italia nella storia dell'insegnamento rumeno*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", IV (1928), quaderno 7-8, luglio-agosto: 717-724. Idem, *Le origini padovane dell'Università di Bucarest*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929), quaderno 2-3, febbraio-marzo: 256-258.

99 Nicolae Iorga, *L'arte romena e l'Italia*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1282-1288.

100 Giulio Bertoni, *Lingua romena*, "Nuova Antologia", (1937), v. 389: 244-247. Ladislao Gàldi, *Contributo alla storia degli italianismi della lingua romena,* "Archivio Glottologico Italiano", (1939): 114-131. A. Silvestri-Giorgi, *L'Italia e la lingua romena*, "Meridiano", VIII (1943), n. 20: 6.

101 Andrei Rădulescu, *Tendenze romene verso il diritto italiano*, "Studi filosofici giuridici dedicati a Giorgio del Vecchio", 1931. Idem, *L'influenza italiana sul diritto romeno*, "L'Europa Orientale", XXI (1941): 93-121.

102 Alessandro Marcu, *Il soggiorno di Arturo Graf in Romania*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", III (1927), quaderno 4, aprile: 265-273.

103 Teodor Onciulescu, *Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla e i Romeni*, "Ephemeris Dacoromana", IX (1940): 351-445.

104 Claudio Isopescu, *Il viaggiatore Dinicu-Golescu in Italia*, "L'Europa Orientale", XII (1932), n. 5-8: 251-280.

105 Idem, *Giorgio Asachi a Napoli e la sua Italia*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura",V (1929), settembre: 883-897.

106 Idem, *Il poeta Duiliu Zamfirescu a Napoli*, "Atti della Reale Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti"; N.S, XIII (1935): 35-57.

107 La critica letteraria di Ada Calzavara alle poesie di Perieţeanu di soggetto italiano ad esempio (*Taormina, Vesuvio, Sorrento, Pompei, Genova, Palermo, Mar Ionio, Postumia, Venezia, Palazzo Firenze, Il Duce*) è, sia pur leggermente, soggetta alla politica , Cf. Ada Calzavara, *L'opera lirica di I. Gr. Perieţeanu,* "Termini", (1939) n. 29: 564-566.

108 Augusto Garsia, *Cultura romena in Italia*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1400-1412.

109 Giulio Bertoni, *Versioni italiane di scrittori romeni*, "Archivium Romanicum", XV (1931): 598-603.

110 G. Lupi, *Rumenia*, in Letterature straniere, "Bibliografie del Ventennio", Irce, Roma, 1941: 309-345.

111 Matteo Bartoli, *La spiccata individualità della lingua romena*, "Archivio Glottologico Italiano", (1942): 1-13.

112 Giuseppe Lugli, *La R. Scuola Romena di Roma*, "L'Europa Orientale", III (1923): 831-833. Idem, *L'Accademia di Romania fondata a Valle Giulia,* "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 173-174. E. Michel, *L'Accademia romena in Roma*, "L'Italia che scrive", XIII (1930): 273.

in Italia[113] e sulle traduzioni[114]. Vengono poi annotate le partecipazioni romene alle fiere svoltesi sul suolo italiano[115], alcune delle quali con ottimi risultati per l'immagine della Romania, come ad esempio il *Padiglione romeno* alla XX Fiera di Milano[116].

Un notevole desiderio di sapere suscitarono le *feste tradizionali romene*[117] e l'*arte popolare romena*[118] con le sue peculiarità. È reperibile in questo ambito, che colpisce in sommo grado lo straniero che visiti il paese, una terminologia non sempre traducibile oppure parafrasabile con riferimento all'abbigliamento tradizionale (*opincă, fotă, catrință, altițe, maramă, sutană,ițari, chimir, sarcă, suman*); ai canti o alla musica popolare (*doină, lăutar*); ai balli tradizionali (*hora* — "una danza satirica [sic!] che rassomiglia al saltarello in uso specialmente nelle Marche"[119]; *călușari; Drăgaica*); all'architettura rurale (*celar, tindă*) e religiosa[120] ecc.

Al "sommo poeta" Mihai Eminescu si dedicano biografie[121] e articoli in cui si cerca di mettere in risalto i suoi nessi con la cultura e la lingua italiana, il fatto di aver conosciuto le opere di Dante e magari di Leopardi e di aver cantato Venezia:

"Poteva un poeta così innamorato delle bellezze naturali non amare l'Italia? All'università di Vienna comincia a conoscere l'italiano e gli sembra «la musica di Dio»"[122].

I riferimenti culturali sui romeni sono inevitabilmente selettivi e la loro selezione è indubbiamente significativa. Le traduzioni eseguite, certi motivi letterari o talune creazioni artistiche portano con sé l'immagine del paese e della cultura d'origine. La Romania diventa così il paese di Enescu, di Iorga, di Brâncuți ecc. Le investigazioni si possono effettuare anche sull'asse diacronia/sincronia con l'Occidente. Nell'ambiente filosofico, ad esempio, Mircea Eliade è perfettamente

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113 "L'Italia", XX (1931), n. 300, 18 dicembre. "Il Sole", X (1931), 16 dicembre: 2. "Tribuna", 4 febbraio 1938, *Un dar al regelui Carol pentru studenții din Napoli*. "Tribuna", 14 maggio 1931; "Il Lavoro Fascista", 16 maggio 1931. "Il Tevere", 16 maggio 1931. "Il Popolo di Roma", 15 maggio 1931. "Il Giornale d'Italia", 15 maggio 1931. "La Voce di Mantova", dicembre 1931. E. Padrini, *Lingua e letteratura romena in Italia*, "Meridiano di Roma", VII (1942), n. 38: 6.

114 Giulio Bertoni, *Versioni italiane di scrittori romeni*, "Archivium Romanicum", XV (1931): 598-603.

115 Nello Tarchiani, *Fiera internazionale del libro a Firenze*, "Emporium", (1922), v. LVI n. 333: 175-184. *Mostra della Romania* (p. 181). Ugo Nebbia, *Quattordicesima Biennale veneziana*, "Emporium", (1926), v. LX, n. 356: Romania: 483-485. A. Pallucchini, *La mostra d'arte popolare romena a Venezia*, "Emporium", (1943), v. 97: 123-128. Si veda anche: ANIC, Uniunea Camerelor de Comerț și Industrie [UCCI], Dossier 48/1928, *La stampa italiana sulla Fiera di Milano*.

116 Visitato dal ministro Thaon di Revel (Cf. "L'Illustrazione Italiana", n. 17/1939), il Re Imperatore, il ministro Dino Alfieri (Cf. "L'Illustrazione Italiana", n. 18/1939). al. mar., *La Romania alla Fiera di Milano*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 17, 23 aprile: 791-794. *S. M. il Re Imperatore al padiglione romeno*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 18, 30 aprile: 840.

117 Petre Iroaie, *Il Natale e il Capodanno nella poesia popolare romena,* "Meridiano", VI (1941), n. 3: 9; Idem, *La filosofia nel canto popolare romeno,* "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", XVII (1941): 393-402 ecc.

118 Mario Ruffini, *Arte popolare e tradizioni del popolo romeno*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXI (1941), n. 6: 2-6. Gjika Bobich, *Arte popolare in Romania*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 145-150.

119 Venere Isopescu, *I costumi nazionali romeni*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929), quaderno 12: 1330-1334.

120 *L'architettura religiosa romena*, "Minerva", XXXVII (1927), v. 47: 344-345.

121 Ada Calzavara, *Eminescu a Venezia*, "Termini", (1938), n. 25-26: 521-523.

122 E. Padrini, *Michele Eminescu*, "Termini", (1939), n. 34-37: 770-771.

sincronizzato con alcuni suoi contemporanei italiani (Giuseppe Tucci, Giovanni Papini) con i quali intrattiene d'altronde un sostenuto epistolario.

Sono rilevati *i contributi romeni in vari campi artistici:* letteratura[123] (diventano conosciuti al pubblico italiano i nomi di: M. Sadoveanu, L. Rebreanu, Cezar Petrescu, H.P. Bengescu, Gib Mihăiescu, Camil Petrescu, Ionel Teodoreanu ecc.); critica letteraria[124]; musica[125] (Sabin Drăgoi, Mihail Jora)*;* scultura[126] (rappresentata dagli artisti quali Dimitrie Paciurea, Constantin Brâncuși, Ion Jalea, C. Medrea, O. Han, Militza Pătrașcu, Mac Constantinescu)*;* pittura[127] (N. Grigorescu, Șt. Luchian, Arthur Verona, Theodor Pallady, Nicolae Dărăscu, Cecilia Cutzescu-Stork, N. Tonitza); teatro[128] (sono discusse produzioni quali *Răzvan și Vidra* di V. Alecsandri, *Apus de soare* di B. Șt. Delavrancea, *Vlaicu Vodă* di Al. Davila, *Letopiseții* di M. Sorbul, *Năpasta* di I.L. Caragiale, *Meșterul Manole* di O. Goga, *Cruciada copiilor* di L. Blaga, *Gaițele* di Al. Kirițescu, *Pavilionul cu umbre* di Gib Mihăiescu, *Manechinul sentimental* di I. Minulescu, *Titanic vals* di Tudor Mușatescu, *Danton* di Camil Petrescu, *Ciuta* di Victor Ion Popa).

Non ci si sottrae all'autocritica per ciò che riguarda l'ignoranza italiana. R. Ortiz scrive:

"Come si vede esiste in Romania un movimento letterario assai più importante di quanto non si creda, un movimento letterario, che non è lecito ignorare. Negli ultimi anni, grazie al prof. Isopescu e ai suoi scolari dell'università di Roma, molto si è fatto in Italia per farlo conoscere al nostro pubblico. Ma c'è ancora molto da fare. Molti autori romeni non sono ancora tradotti. I nostri editori sono avvisati. Alla scoperta dunque d'una nuova terra letteraria!"[129]

E Augusto Garsia ribadisce:

"Certo, il popolo italiano non si può dire abbia mai saputo troppo la storia dei romeni; ma questo popolo ha sempre apprezzato e amato, conoscendo per quanto vagamente — ch'era anch'esso figlio di Roma (...) E ora un invito strapaesano: non dimentichiamo questi romeni, che sono così vicini a noi, così nostri. Buon sangue non mente!"[130]

7. *Francofobie.* La questione della concorrenza francese nella regione danubiano-balcanica in genere e in Romania in particolare fu una nota dolente per l'Italia. Lo testimonia da un lato il continuo bisogno di seguire i movimenti francesi, di

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[123] Mario Ruffini, *Il romanzo nella Romania del dopoguerra*, "Termini", (1939), n. 34-37: 725-727. Salvatore Sibilia, *Panorama letterario romeno*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 4, 22 gennaio: 163.

[124] Demetrio Găzdaru, *La letteratura popolare romena con speciale riguardo alle fiabe*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1312-1329. R. Ortiz, *Correnti nella letteratura romena contemporanea*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1289-1296. (elenca anche le più importanti riviste letterarie romene). Pompilio Constantinescu, *La poesia romena contemporanea*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1297-1311.

[125] Liviu Russu, *I Romeni e la storia della musica*, "Termini", (1939), n. 30-31: 592-593.

[126] Tudor Vianu, *La scultura romena*, "Termini", (1939), n. 34-37: 735-742.

[127] Giorgio Oprescu, *La pittura in Romania dopo il '900*, "Termini", (1939), n. 34-37: 779-784.

[128] Paolo I. Papadopol, *Il teatro romeno contemporaneo*, "Termini", (1939), n. 34-37: 792-799. Gheorghe Mihail Zamfirescu, *Il teatro romeno contemporaneo*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1379-1392. *Panorama del teatro romeno*, "Minerva", XLV (1935): 619-621.

[129] Ramiro Ortiz, *La poesia romena contemporanea*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1335-1347.

[130] Augusto Garsia, *Cultura romena in Italia*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929): 1400-1412.

appropriarsi del modello, di confrontarsi con esso e di paragonarvisi[131], e dall'altro lato la recriminazione da parte dell'Italia di ogni atteggiamento succube della moda parigina mostrato da questi popoli.

"Belgrado, Bucarest, Sofia... Camminando per le vie principali di queste capitali più o meno balcaniche, una delle cose che vi colpisce è la variopinta quantità di volumi esposti nelle vetrine dei librai: dall'ultimo libro di viaggi di Paul Morand all'ultimo fascicolo di *L'Europe Nouvelle*, che porta da Parigi le idee politiche, così come la *Vie Parisienne* porta il «dernier cri» della mondanità. La Francia coltiva e sviluppa in tal modo lo spirito d'imitazione che poi finisce con l'essere di dipendenza, offrendo modelli di stampo gallico (...). I cervelli si sono così imbevuti d'idee francesi. Il libro è stato uno strumento di penetrazione formidabile"[132].

Il dissidio franco-italiano era già di vecchia data, ma Versailles lo aveva ormai proiettato in un contesto europeo.

"Dal giorno dell'armistizio, la Francia si è scelta spontaneamente, da nessuna ragione costretta, l'Italia come una forza avversa, da comprimere, da ostacolare, da immobilizzare"[133].

Stupisce come persino una crisi avvenuta nella politica interna romena fosse interpretata in funzione della rivalità tra la Francia e l'Italia nella regione:

"Il nocciolo del dissidio fra Brătianu e Averescu sta nella precedenza da dare alle idee contenute in queste due parole: Francia e Italia oppure Italia e Francia"[134].

Pure in un contesto che si supponeva rilanciasse i rapporti italo-romeni e offrisse una prova in più col dedicare alla Romania un numero del "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", si tornava sull'argomento:

"Forse quando molti romeni di più di quel che non siano oggi, si saran' persuasi che la strada che conduce da Bucarest a Roma non deve necessariamente toccare il meridiano di qualche altra capitale d'Europa (...) allora molte artificiali barriere crolleranno ed apparirà senz'altro perspicuo il danno di certe alleanze (...). Ora non bisogna nascondere che in Italia accanto all'amicizia per il popolo romeno, sicuramente viva e spontanea, c'è l'impressione che stiamo battendo due strade diverse e non per colpa nostra"[135].

Nel 1942, tuttavia, all'apice cioè dell'amicizia italo-romena, la domanda chiave in un'intervista ad Al. Marcu riguardava la maniera in cui l'Italia intendesse prendere il posto della Francia come paese-guida[136].

8. *Casa Reale.* Mentre la scena politica italiana è dominata da Benito Mussolini, che getta un'ombra sulla Casa Reale italiana, la Romania ha continuato ad essere una monarchia costituzionale, i cui rappresentanti sono stati noti all'opinione

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131 *La propaganda italiana e... francese in Romania nel settembre 1928*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", IV (1928), quaderno 10, ottobre: 1109-1110.

132 Guido Pucci, *L'Italia fascista nell'Europa Orientale*, "Educazione Fascista", VIII (1930), dicembre: 687-692.

133 Giuseppe Bevione, *Le relazioni fra Italia e Francia,* "Gerarchia", X (1930), n. 6, giugno: 438-443.

134 Oscar Randi, *La crisi ministeriale romena Averescu-Brătianu*, "Critica Fascista", V (1927), n. 15, 1 agosto 1927: 286-289.

135 Umberto Biscottini, *Italia e Romania*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929), quaderno 12: 1241-1244.

136 Enrico Santamaria, *Italia e Romania collaborano sui campi di battaglie e nel campo spirituale*, "Provincia di Como", 4 novembre 1942.

pubblica attraverso la stampa. Se al Re Ferdinand, "un timido, irresoluto, quasi terrorizzato dallo zio Carol I", la stampa italiana accordò un'attenzione speciale soltanto nel momento della sua scomparsa[137], che ebbe come conseguenza l'istituzione di una reggenza, ben diversa si presenta la situazione nel caso del suo primogenito. A Carol II si dedicano ampi spazi sulla stampa del Ventennio. Dai brevi cenni biografici (menzioniamo in questa sede una biografia *all'italiana* firmata da Cl. Isopescu, in cui si ricorda il pellegrinaggio del 1913 del principe a Roma come "il più dolce ricordo della sua giovinezza; la sua prima visita in Occidente"[138]), al dibattito intorno alla "questione carlista"[139] e alle foto e marachelle del "Re Playboy"[140].

Il ritratto della regina Elisabeta de Wied venne schizzato da Giacinto Cottini, che ebbe modo di conoscerla di persona a Sinaia:

"amò sostituire lo scettro del potere con quello dell'intelligenza e della bontà (...) «Muma răniților» L'Italia le stese le braccia consolatrici e la Regina non fu sorda all'affettuoso invito" [dopo la scomparsa della figlia][141].

La regina Maria (Maria di Sassonia Coburg Gotha) invece è caratterizzata come:

"sangue freddo, spirito di decisione, perseveranza (...) tollerante in materia religiosa, continuerà a professare il protestantismo, ma nessuna avversione proverà mai per la chiesa romena che ha battezzato i suoi figli, né per il cattolicesimo di re Carol I o Ferdinando I"[142].

Elena Lupescu (Ester Gruenberg) "gode" di molti riferimenti nella stampa italiana e di appellativi come Pompadura[143] oppure "ninfa Egeria"[144], ma tra i tanti articoli si distingue la descrizione fattane dal giovane giornalista, poi celeberrimo, Indro Montanelli[145].

9. *Personalità romene — abbozzi di ritratti.* Alcune delle personalità romene che ebbero un ruolo rilevante per lo sviluppo dei rapporti italo-romeni nel periodo interbellico sono al confine tra cultura e politica o, per meglio dire, abbinano i due campi: lo storico Nicolae Iorga — primo ministro (1931) ed il filologo Alexandru Marcu — ministro della Propaganda (1941-1944).

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137 Carlo Curcio, *Re Ferdinando di Romania*, "Critica Fascista", V (1927), n. 15, 1 agosto: 297-297. Umberto Nani, *La vecchia e la nuova Romania*, "Critica Fascista", V (1927), n. 22, 15 novembre: 426-428.

138 Claudio Isopescu, *Carol II, re della cultura romena,* "Termini", (1939), n. 34-37: 716-719.

139 Spectator, *Carol, re,* "Secolo XX", VIII (1930), n. 12, 20 giugno: 9-10. Italo Zingarelli, *La Romania sotto Carol II*, "Nuova Antologia", LXXV (1940), v. 411: 379-389.

140 *Re Carol di Romania a Londra*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVII (1938), n. 48, 27 novembre: 935. *Re Carol di Romania che sta compiendo un crociera sul Mediteraneo a bordo del suo panfilo "Luceafărul", ospite a Rodi*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 33, 13 agosto: 279.

141 Cottini Giacinto, *Elisabetta regina di Romania,* "Secolo XX", XXI (1922), n. 2, 1 febbraio: 141-146.

142 *Vita di una regina: Maria di Romania*, "Minerva", XLVII (1937), n. 15, 15 agosto: 453 (recensione ad un articolo di René de Weck, apparso sul "Mercure de France"). Sulla regina Maria si veda anche: Ada Calzavara, *La regina Maria di Romania*, "Termini", (1939), n. 30 e 31, febbraio-marzo: 762-765. La recensione al libro autobiografico *Povestea vieții mele* [Maria di Romania, *Storia della mia vita*, Mondadori, Milano, 1936, 434 pp.] apparve in "La Cultura Moderna", settembre 1937, cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Politica externă*, Dossier 873, f. 49.

143 Si veda l'articolo diffamatorio e pieno di offese pubblicato *su* "La Stampa", 23 febbraio 1935.

144 S., *La "revolution royale" di Carol, il regime Antonescu e il destino della Romania*, "Politica Nuova", VIII (1940), n. 18, 30 settembre: 514-516.

145 Indro Montanelli, *Duduia va a corte*, "La Lettura" (rivista mensile del "Corriere della Sera"), XL (1940) : 970-974.

Il migliore conoscitore dell'Italia e degli italiani nell'epoca, Nicolae Iorga fu allo stesso tempo il più attivo ed efficace propagatore dell'immagine della Romania in Italia.

"Nel cammino percorso dalla nostra patria e dalla Romania per avvicinarsi e conoscersi sempre più e meglio, è indubitato che fra le guide più attive e intelligenti un posto preminente spetta a Nicola Iorga"[146].

Tramite la sua opera in veste di storico si realizza non solo un sincronismo, rilevato dal suo amico, filologo e professore all'Università di Padova, Vittorio Lazzarini[147] e riferito spesso sulla stampa italiana[148], ma si superano i confini nazionali tanto da farlo "uno storico di fama mondiale"[149]. Di conseguenza, "il fenomeno Iorga" arriva a non appartenere più "solo ai Romeni, ma all'umanità e specialmente ai popoli latini"[150]. Un suo ritratto venne così schizzato da O. Randi:

"persona retta, incorruttibile, superiore ai partiti, modesta in quanto la sua sola ambizione è quella di servire la patria (...). Col buon esempio, colla persuasione, colla dolcezza, colla forza in caso di bisogno, egli migliorerà le sorti del suo popolo"[151].

Parimenti Alexandru Marcu[152] ha intrapreso un cammino a doppio senso: ha voluto far conoscere al Duce parte della sua intensa attività[153] e allo stesso tempo ha voluto far conoscere ai romeni il pensiero politico del Duce[154]. Per queste ragioni non solo la rivista che egli diresse — *Studi Italiani* — godeva dei sussidi italiani, ma anche alcune sue pubblicazioni[155]. Le sue doti intellettuali,

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146 Gino Lupi, *Un romeno studioso dell'Italia: Nicola Jorga*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XX (1940), n. 5, maggio: 4-5.

147 "Conobbi Nicola Jorga all'Archivio dei Frari [in Venezia], in quelli anni 1890-1892 in cui la sala di studio del grande Istituto era frequentata da stranieri di varie nazionalità, intenti ad un instancabile lavoro di ricerca, avvicinati l'un l'altro da spontanea cordialità, quasi segno, nel campo degli studi, di una collaborazione europea", cf. Vittorio Lazzarini, *Nicola Jorga*, "Archivio Veneto", LXXI (1941), v. XXIX: 205-207.

148 Enzo Loreti, *L'Università estiva "N. Iorga" in Romania*, "Lettura", XXIX (1929): 550-551. Gino LUPI, *Nicola Iorga e Vălenii de Munte*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", agosto 1930. M. Viterbo, *La Romania del prof. Jorga*, "Augustea", VII (1931): 261-262. Mario Ruffini, *Nicola Iorga e i suoi contributi alla storia italiana*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", VII (1931): 322-333.

149 Oscar Randi, *La crisi romena e il ministero di Nicola Jorga*, "Critica Fascista", IX (1931), n. 10, 15 maggio: 195-197.

150 Ştefan Pascu, *Nicola Iorga genio della latinità*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XXI, n. 12, dicembre 1941: 1-6.

151 Oscar Randi, *Le elezioni romene*, "Critica Fascista", IX (1931), n. 13, 1 luglio: 257.

152 Arturo Marpicati, *I premi San Remo ad autori stranieri*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", (1940), n. 19, 12 maggio: 663-664. *Il Gran Premio San Remo per autore straniero al romeno Alessandro Marcu*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XX (1940), n. 3, marzo: 8.

153 1933, novembre: omaggio del piccolo Dicționar Român-Italian; 1934, gennaio: omaggio della traduzione *Decameronul*, con illustrazioni di Mac Constantinescu; 1934, novembre: omaggio della traduzione *Răposatul Matei Pascal* de Pirandello; 1935, marzo: omaggio "Studii Italiane" e della traduzione dantesca *Paradisul*; 1937, ottobre: omaggio al Duce del libro Itinerar Adriatic; 1939, maggio: omaggio opuscolo Cuvinte despre Italia: "Al suo alto protettore il Duce Benito Mussolini consacra queste pagine di convinto elogio"; 1940, febbraio: omaggio al Duce, Ugo Foscolo — "nuova prova di costante devozione alla Cultura Italiana in Romania"; 1940, 18 aprile: omaggio della rassegna "Studi Italiani"; chiede udienza tramite il segretario del Duce, Osvaldo Sebastiani; 1941: omaggio Predappio di Al. Marcu, cf. ACS, *Segreteria Particolare del Duce*, b. 514.991, Marcu Al. (febbraio 1940-giugno 1943).

154 *Ce a spus Mussolini*. *Antologie alcătuită de Alexandru Marcu*. Omaggio al Duce dall'Autore: "A Voi Duce queste pagine di antologia in cui i Romeni ritroveranno tutto Voi e la Vostra stirpe, mentre stanno scrivendo la loro pagina di sangue e di gloria nella propria antologia, dedica con immutata fede, Al. Marcu. Novembre 1942", cf. ACS, *Segreteria Particolare del Duce*, b. 514.991, Marcu Al. (febbraio 1940- giugno 1943).

155 Bucarest, 5 dicembre 1942: sussidio di 10.642 Lire per "Scrisul Românesc" quale corrispettivo delle 400 copie della "Antologia Mussoliniana" di Al. Marcu, Cf. ACS, Mcp, Sovvenzioni, Dossier Marcu Al.

che giustificavano pienamente la sua posizione nel mondo accademico, come capo cattedra d'italiano all'Università di Bucarest, dopo la partenza per l'Italia di R Ortiz, e la sua abilità nel farsi strada nell'ambito politico fino a raggiungere l'incarico di Sottosegretario di Stato al Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale, lo hanno reso un personaggio-chiave assai interessante attraverso il quale si potrebbero spiegare tanti episodi dei rapporti italo-romeni.

Capi di dicasteri o leaders politici, come pure fatti di politica interna romena trovano ampio spazio sulla stampa italiana che vede la pubblicazione di ritratti, commenti e notizie varie su: Take Ionescu[156], Al. Marghiloman[157], Alexandru Averescu[158], Ion I. C. Brătianu[159], Iuliu Maniu[160], Nicolae Iorga[161], Constantin Argetoianu[162], Nicolae Titulescu[163], Gheorghe Tătărescu[164], Corneliu Zelea Codreanu[165], governo Goga-Cuza[166] con la sua effimera esistenza di soltanto 44 giorni, segnato dall'approvazione di leggi antisemite, Armand Călinescu[167], ministro degli Esteri Grigore Gafencu[168], dittatura legionaria[169], Ion Antonescu[170],

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156 Oscar Randi, *Take Ionescu*, "La Vita Italiana", XI (1923), v. XXI: 324-338.

157 Idem, *Alessandro Marghiloman e la politica romena*, "La Vita Italiana", XIII (1925), v. XXVI: 27-35.

158 „Uomo avveduto ed energico, irrequieto, ma non troppo; audace, ma non impulsivo; meditativo, ma pronto", cf. Amedeo Giannini, *Profili di uomini politici. Il maresciallo Averescu*, "Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali", V (1938), n. 4, ottobre-dicembre: 456-458.

159 Umberto Nani, Brătianu, Pasic, Venizelos, "Educazione Fascista", VI (1928): 588-595. Carlo Curcio, *La morte di Brătianu e la situazione romena,* "Critica Fascista", V (1927), n. 23, 1 dicembre: 457.

160 Definito "modesto ma tenace"; "tenace, ma non fanatico", cf. Oscar Randi, *Giulio Maniu e la politica transilvana*, "L'Europa Orinetale" III (1923), n. 2: 87-88. Idem, *Romania. Il salto dai Brătianu a Maniu*, "Critica Fascista", VI (1928), n. 23, 1 dicembre: 443-444. Idem, *La Romania attuale*, "Critica Fascista", VIII (1928), n. 5, 1 marzo: 88-89. "modesto ma tenace"; "tenace, ma non fanatico".

161 Il governo di unione nazionale capeggiato da N. Iorga sconcerta per la discrepanza tra il prestigio culturale e scientifico e il suo insignificante peso politico, cf. Oscar Randi, *La nuova crisi ministeriale romena*, "Critica Fascista", X (1932), n. 13: 255-256. Giocondo Grilli, *Il ministro Iorga e le elezioni romene*, "Politica", XIII (1931), giugno-agosto: 213-217.

162 Politicus, *S. E. Argetoianu a Roma e i rapporti economici italo-romeni,* "Rassegna Italiana", XV (1932), vol. XXX: 46-47. Vd. Articolo elogiativo con breve nota biografica e fotografia sul *Giornale d'Italia*, 26 dicembre 1931 — del periodo in cui C. Argetoianu fece un viaggio in Italia (24 decembrie-7 ianuarie 1932).

163 "uno dei re di quella Ginevra che è in molti casi l'anticamera di Parigi (...) vecchio lupo della Società delle Nazioni (...) astuto combattente", cf. Politicus, *Titulescu a Parigi,* "Rassegna Italiana", XI (1933), maggio: 447.

164 Si veda la campagna di stampa dei primi giorni del novembre 1937, riguardante il governo di Gheorghe Tătărăscu: Popolo d'Italia, Popolo di Roma, Messaggero, Giornale d'Italia, Gazzetta del Popolo, Tribuna, Messaggero, Vedetta fascista (Vicenza), Corriere Emiliano, Arena, Corriere Padano (Ferrara), La Gazzetta (Messina), Il Popolo di Friuli (Udine), La Provincia di Bolzano, Il Telegrafo (Livorno), Gazzetta di Venezia, L'Avvenire d'Italia (Bologna), Corriere Marcanto (Genova), Il popolo di Brescia, Il Brenero (Trieste), Il Gazzettino (Venezia), Il Mattino (Napoli).

165 Berto Ricci, *Codreanu*, "Critica Fascista", XVII (1938), n. 4, 15 dicembre: 62. B. S., *Codreanu*, "Politica Nuova", VI (1938): 719-720.V. Lilli, *Il mio amico Codreanu*, "Lettura", XXXIX (1939): 21-24. I. Gherghel, *Lotta e vittoria di Corneliu Codreanu*, "Meridiano", V (1940), n. 38: 9. Claudio Isopescu, *La nuova Romania. Spiritualità ed etica legionaria,* "Termini", n. 51-52, novembre-dicembre 1940: 1057-1061. Pamfil Șeicaru, *La rivoluzione verde in Romania*, "Gerarchia", XX (1940): 629-634. Mariano Pintus, *Il trionfo di Codreanu,* "Conquiste d'Impero", VIII (1940), n. 22-24, settembre-ottobre: 247. *Cornelio Codreanu*, "Rassegna Italo-Romena", XX (1940), n. 11, novembre: 1-3.

166 Romulus, *Il nuovo governo nazionale in Romania*, "Nuova Antologia", 73 (1938), v. 395: 210-212.

167 *Uomini e avvenimenti del giorno. Il Presidente del Consiglio Romeno, Armand Călinescu, assassinato da superstiti membri dell'ex Guardia di Ferro*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 40, 1 ottobre: 509.

168 *Le giornate romane del ministro romeno degli esteri S.E. Gafencu*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVIII (1939), n. 19, 7 maggio: 860.

169 M. Sani, *La Romania legionaria*, "Secolo Nostro", X (1940): 462-471. M. Sani, *La Romania si sveglia*, "Conquiste dell'Impero", X (1940): 152-154

170 "l'uomo nuovo come il Duce per l'Italia", cf. A. G. Trueva, *Figure dell'ora presente*: *il maresciallo Antonescu*, "Minerva", LII (1942): 325-326.

Patriarca Miron Cristea[171], capo della "Straja Țării", T. Sidorovici[172], ministro della Propaganda Nazionale, Constantin Giurescu[173] ecc.

10. *Immagini recensite, raffigurazioni e fotografie*

Come vengono percepiti i romeni? Gli stereotipi (cioè l'immagine che viene evocata naturalmente allorquando si tratta dei romeni) vanno analizzati in un contesto comparativo. Va fatta però la distinzione fra vissuto e mediatizzato. Nel primo caso, si perviene a dei riscontri del tipo: maccheroni versus *mămăligă*, passione versus *omenie*. Nel secondo, invece, l'immagine sui romeni nello spazio italiano nel periodo prescelto si basa su aspetti geografici, politici e storici. In altre parole, il quadro naturale, abbinato agli elementi politico-storici, crea l'immagine della Romania come il paese balcanico confinante con la Russia dei Soviet, il che le conferisce un ruolo geopolitico e strategico di spicco. A definire il profilo identitario dei romeni concorrono i paesaggi e le bellezze naturali (Mar Nero, Carpazi, Delta del Danubio), ma anche l'arte e la letteratura, le personalità politiche e le leggende (*Miorița*) ecc.

Alcune delle immagini diffuse sulla Romania ed i romeni furono *indagate e negate* dalle autorità romene. Il libro di Italo Zingarelli, *Der Gross Balkan* [Wien, 1927], fu proibito in Romania dalla Direzione della Polizia e Sicurezza dello Stato del Ministero degli Interni[174] in quanto dispregiativo per l'intera regione dei Balcani e ostile verso la Piccola Intesa. Lo stesso avvenne col libro *Dal Baltico al Mar Nero* [ed. E. Cavalleri, Milano, 1934] di Silvio Maurano, cui diffusione in Romania fu proibita dal Servizio della Censura (presso l'Ufficio Stampa Estera, Direzione Stampa e Informazioni del Ministero degli Affari Esteri)[175] in quanto contenente giudizi negativi del tipo: "*borghesia* stanca e corrotta che impedì il progresso della Romania; *popolo* paziente e colpito; *paese* estremamente fertile, condannato alla povertà e sterilità a causa di una maledizione divina".

"Saggio un po' affettato e caotico" fu considerato invece *La grande Romania* [Alpes, Milano, 1931] di Paolo Terrazzi[176].

Un'altra categoria sarebbe quella delle immagini *analizzate ed apprezzate,* realizzate attraverso dei libri a firma di Mario Ruffini — *La Romania e i romeni* [Treves, Milano, 1939], considerato la migliore produzione a favore della propaganda romena in Italia in quanto loda la tolleranza e la pazienza dei romeni; compiange l'analfabetismo, il consumo di alcool, il sistema sanitario; sottolinea gli aspetti gioiosi della vita rurale (canti, balli e l'arte popolare)[177] oppure di

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[171] *Figure e avvenimenti della settimana: Patriarca Miron Cristea*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XVII (1939), n. 11, 12 marzo: 509.

[172] *Il ministro Sidorovici a Roma e a Napoli invitato da Ettore Muti, ministro Segretario di Partito per visitare le sedi della Gioventù Italiana del Littorio*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XIX (1940), n. 8, 25 febbraio: 222-223. G. Lupi, *Gioventù romena in linea*, "Termini", (1940), n. 42-43, febbraio-marzo: 939.

[173] *Uomini, cose, avvenimenti. L'arrivo a Roma del ministro della Propaganda Romana, sg. Giurescu, ricevuto da S.E. Tavolini, ministro della Cultura Popolare*, "L'Illustrazione Italiana", XIX (1940), n. 16, 21 aprile: 539.

[174] ANIC, Mpn, *Studii și Documente*, Dossier 7, f. 3-13; 15

[175] ANIC, Mpn, *Propaganda*, Dossier 313/ 1929-1937, f. 25.

[176] Recensione di Augusto Garsia, "Fiera Letteraria", VIII (1932), n. 7, 14 febbraio: 6.

[177] ANIC, Pcm, Dossier 222/1939, f. 4-6.

Guido Landra — *I Romeni* e *i problemi della razza in Romania*, opera valutata come notevole "indagine analitica sui vari tipi razziali romeni (...) che pone in evidenza la distribuzione geografica del popolo romeno nei suoi vari tipi razziali e dimostra come esso, circondato da popoli slavi e turanici rappresenti un'oasi di romanità nell'Oriente europeo"[178].

Dal libro di Raffaele Riccardi, *La Romania* [Zanichelli, Bologna, 1928], *collocato in una via di mezzo*[179], emerge l'immagine che più si avvicina alle raffigurazioni generiche del popolo romeno, segnato dalla sua storia che lo ha reso più forte, dalla sua tradizione popolare, in cui si rispecchia l'impronta malinconica e dalle condizioni economiche, che lo stimolano ad essere creativo:

"I Romeni in genere sono laboriosi e pazienti, un po' fatalisti, valorosi in guerra, piuttosto malinconici di carattere, vivaci e versatili d'ingegno"[180].

Secondo lo stesso autore, il cibo tipico e più diffuso, tanto da diventare un contrassegno nazionale sarebbe la *mămăligă,* il pendant dei maccheroni[181].

Le fotografie ricorrenti sulla stampa italiana del Ventennio riguardano: simboli (il bassorilievo della colonna traianea), edifici (Calea Victoriei, Palazzo Reale, l'Ateneo, Palazzo della Camera dei Deputati, il castello reale di Sinaia), feste (la festa della benedizione delle acque — il lancio della Croce nel fiume Dâmbovitza), i costumi nazionali dei contadini romeni, i monasteri di Moldavia, i villaggi romeni e il patrimonio ovino e bovino, ritratti della famiglia reale e dei politici.

VI. *Un laboratorio d'immagine: Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale — Direzione per la Stampa Estera*

Attraverso dei documenti d'archivio tuttora inediti, investighiamo l'azione dello Stato romeno nell'ingranaggio dell'auto-rappresentazione o del ritocco della propria immagine. Ci sono delle repliche oppure articoli divulgativi che promanano da questi agenti? Si possono provare casi di sussidi a pubblicazioni italiane da parte delle autorità romene (come pure accade viceversa)? In quale misura le immagini che compongono questo "gioco dell'alterità" instaurato tra Roma e Bucarest vengono progettate nei laboratori del Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale oppure in quelli del Ministero degli Affari Esteri? Tenteremo di ricostituire l'immagine che la propaganda romena bramava esportare. In parole povere, si tratta di identificare ciò che i romeni stessi, in veste di collaboratori per varie pubblicazioni italiane, mettono in luce di modo che siano guardati favorevolmente.

Esportare all'estero un'immagine ufficiale metodicamente elaborata era compito della Direzione per la Stampa Estera, che funzionava all'interno del Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale. I traguardi della propaganda romena all'estero erano i seguenti: tutelare gli interessi dello Stato romeno, renderli noti

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178 Recensione di R. C. , "Universo", XXIV (1943): 354.

179 Recensione di C. Tagliavini, "Studi Rumeni", IV (1929/1930): 160-161.

180 Riccardo Riccardi, *Lineamenti geografici della Grande Romania*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", V (1929), quaderno 12: 1245-1274 (p. 1255).

181 "Gli stessi italiani dovevano imparare ad accettare l'etichetta derivante dalle loro usanze alimentari: «Come non ammettere che da certi aspetti esteriori della vita di un popolo si impara a conoscere qualche cosa

nella giusta luce, tenere al corrente il governo romeno sull'andamento dell'opinione pubblica estera, informare l'opinione pubblica straniera riguardo al quadro globale del paese e agli obiettivi mirati, creare una tendenza possibilmente favorevole nell'opinione pubblica straniera, contrastare la propaganda straniera avversa alla causa romena. Tutto ciò si auspicava che si potesse concretizzare anzitutto tramite la stampa, anche se un ruolo assolutamente non trascurabile ebbero anche la radio, le conferenze, le mostre, i convegni internazionali, le proiezioni cinematografiche, le associazioni culturali, la divulgazione di opere scientifiche, le traduzioni, gli eventi sportivi e la promozione turistica[182].

La Direzione per la Stampa Estera procedeva al *monitoraggio della stampa italiana.*

Un articolo pubblicato da Herbert L. Mathews su "New-York Times" del 12 marzo 1933 riferiva come "in Italia c'è molto più che censura (...). Tutti i giornalisti e tutti gli editori italiani sanno cosa si aspetta da loro"[183]. Infatti, le *norme giornalistiche* erano dettate dal Duce stesso, in veste di maestro d'orchestra:

"Dovete conoscere qualsiasi cosa per essere poi in grado di poter ignorare tutto quello che deve rimanere sepolto in silenzio ed esaltare invece, nel miglior modo, tutto quello che deve servire alla causa fascista!"[184]

Stesse notizie venivano riferite a Bucarest dal ministro romeno a Roma Dimitrie Ghica, in seguito al suo colloquio con Vittorio Emanuele III, il Re d'Italia, in occasione della presentazione delle lettere credenziali:

"(...) Sua Maestà mi ha riferito suo piacere di aver conosciuto il Sig. Titulescu (...) Il resto dell'udienza fu consacrato, da parte del Re (il quale cerca tenersi lontano dalla politica), ad alcune considerazioni generali riguardanti il ruolo della stampa ed il reclutamento dei giornalisti. Il Sovrano ha confessato di essersi convinto di come la stampa può diventare uno strumento assai pericoloso attraverso il modo in cui presenta all'opinione pubblica gli eventi quotidiani e, con un espressivo gesto della mano, ha mostrato che in Italia regna un controllo severo in questo senso"[185].

Il *regime della stampa in Italia* viene osservato e descritto così da Magda Cuza, segretaria dell'Ufficio Stampa a Roma nel 1940:

"In Italia, dove la stampa è sotto il controllo diretto del governo, è molto difficile fare distinzione tra le pubblicazioni, divise per favorevoli e sfavorevoli, dato che — dalle notizie senza importanza, fino ai reportage politico-diplomatici e articoli di fondo — assolutamente tutto quello che si pubblica nella stampa italiana è controllato dal Ministero della Cultura Popolare"[186].

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della sua anima ed a penetrare meglio nella sua cultura e nel suo spirito? Ecco perché non bisogna arrossire di vergogna a constatare che, per esempio, i *maccheroni* sono diventati un cibo ormai internazionale: anzi noi diremmo che la cosa ci soddisfa pienamente perché sta a significare che qualche cosa riguardante il nostro gusto siamo riusciti ad imporla al mondo». Cf. Mario Labroca, *La propaganda e gl'italiani all'estero*, "Critica Fascista", XI (1933), n. 5, 1 marzo: 85-86.

182 ANIC, Mpn, *Personal*, Dossier 55, f. 43. Normativo.

183 Cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 481, f. 26.

184 ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 444, f. 6.

185 AMAE, *Italia*, Vol. 62: I. D. Ghyca per il Ministro degli Affari Esteri I.G. Duca. Roma, 16 febbraio 1928.

186 ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier, 1148, ff. 10-13. Rapporto firmato Magda Cuza. Roma, 23 marzo 1940.

Per ciò che riguarda *il regime degli addetti stampa italiani* è rilevante il rapporto redatto da Theodor Solacolu[187]. Tale documento indica che in Italia non esiste un corpo degli addetti stampa a sé stante[188]; le nomine avvengono secondo criteri molto elastici, il più delle volte non dalla Direzione Stampa del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, ma dai capi stessi delle missioni diplomatiche all'estero; non ci si richiede un titolo speciale, possono essere giornalisti, ma anche avvocati, scrittori oppure diplomatici di carriera; riferiscono al capo di missione e non alla Direzione Stampa; vengono stipendiati dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri; la durata della loro missione non è limitata.

In Romania invece, in linea di massima, il ruolo della Direzione Stampa (suddivisa in Stampa Interna ed Estera) consisteva nel leggere e tradurre gli articoli concernenti la Romania oppure, con un certo qual peso, nelle analisi di politica estera[189]. Le mansioni specifiche della Direzione Stampa Estera erano quelle di: guidare e coordinare i servizi stampa romeni esistenti presso le legazioni ed i consolati romeni all'estero; di mantenere il contatto con gli inviati stampa accreditati in Romania; di compilare un notiziario giornaliero per la stampa estera[190]. Rilevante era altresì il ruolo svolto dalla Direzione Studi e Documenti in quanto dal dicembre del 1941, a seguito delle disposizioni impartite dal ministro Al. Marcu, redigeva un bollettino bibliografico mensile con valutazioni su tutti gli opuscoli, studi, articoli editi all'estero riguardanti la Romania[191].

Gli incarichi degli addetti stampa e culturali inviati all'estero consistevano nel: riportare notizie sugli articoli inopportuni pubblicati nel territorio in cui erano assegnati[192], screditare le notizie sovversive[193], monitorare costantemente la propaganda avversa[194], inserire articoli benevoli (spesso ricevuti dal centro) e promuovere gli opuscoli che documentavano la tesi romena riguardo al dissidio con l'Ungheria[195], istituire contatti con dirigenti e redattori di periodici[196],

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187 ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 75/1927-1941, ff. 14-16. Rapporto firmato Theodor Solacolu. Roma, 9 dicembre 1927.

188 Istituito con R.D. del 3 febbraio 1936.

189 ANIC, Mpn, *Personal*, Dossier 58, Referto firmato I. Dragu, 11 febbraio 1939.

190 ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Internă*, Dossier 129, f. 40.

191 ANIC, Mpn, *Propaganda*, Dossier 2546, f. 104.

192 Taluni articoli di questo genere furono purtroppo firmati da romeni stessi, come nel caso di Samuil Alexe un comunista stabilitosi in Italia, da dove condusse una campagna ostile alla Romania su giornali come "Il Piccolo", "La Sera" di Trieste, la "Gazzetta del Popolo" di Torino, "Il Telegrafo" di Livorno ecc., segnalato alle autorità italiane dalla Legazione romena a Roma, cf. ASMAE, AP (1919-1930), Romania, Pacco 1514, fasc. 6762. Fermi, arresti ecc. Nota del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Ufficio Stampa rimessa per il Ministero dell'Interno. Roma, 28 novembre 1927.

193 Si veda, ad esempio, la nota tramite la quale la Legazione romena a Roma segnalava un articolo favorevole all'Ungheria nel problema degli optanti (Giovanni Micelli, *La vertenza ungaro-romena*, "Vedetta d'Italia") e chiedeva al Ministero il *nulla osta* per poter inviare una nota di protesta alla redazione, allegando il materiale informativo in merito, cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Presa externă*, Dossier 47, f. 1.

194 Esisteva già il cosiddetto *Serviciul de Supraveghere a Ştirilor*. Allo stesso fine agivano però anche *Serviciul Special de Informații, Direcția Generală a Siguranței* oppure *Marele Stat Major, secția a II-a*.

195 Per esempio: Z. Păclișanu, *L'Ungheria contro le sue minoranze etniche.* G. Vâlsan, *La Transilvania nel quadro unitario del territorio e dello stato romeno.* I. Conea, *L'unita geopolitica dello Stato Romeno.* Em. Bucuța, *Il Danubio Romeno.* M. Ruffini, *Il problema della romanità nella Dacia Traiana.* Gh. Brătianu, *La questione romena nel 1940; Teorie e realtà della storia ungherese; L'Italia e la Romania nella realizzazione della loro unita nazionale* ecc.

196 Non mancò l'autocritica per come fu eseguito tale compito: "Il contatto delle due Legazioni [*i.e.* — presso il Quirinale e la Santa Sede] con i rappresentanti della stampa e della cultura italiana è pari a zero. Sono

agevolare la divulgazione di articoli firmati da personalità locali, mettere a loro disposizione le biografie e le fotografie dei personaggi del giorno, creare un registro — di personalità che manifestano atteggiamenti favorevoli/ sfavorevoli/ suscettibili nei confronti della Romania, coltivare le simpatie per la Romania tramite l'invio di pubblicazioni, proposte di onorificenze, banchetti, regali caratteristici[197], organizzare viaggi dei giornalisti italiani in Romania[198] e dei giornalisti romeni in Italia[199] ecc. Un compito quindi non semplice, sia di terreno che di ufficio, sia tecnico che pratico.

Purtroppo, il loro esito era sempre soggetto al clima dei rapporti politici vigenti e la delusione di non essere corrisposti si fece spesso sentire.

"(...) i più hanno scordato presto assai di essere stati in Romania e alcuni come Terranova e Guglielmotti hanno scritto righe che qualsiasi romeno non potrebbe giudicare altro che gravi offese"[200].

Tali inviati all'estero dovevano possedere una serie di prerequisiti essenziali: titolo accademico, formazione classica, conoscenza di lingue straniere,

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dovuti dei sforzi incessanti, allorquando ero a Roma, per determinare il mio ministro [*i. e.* — Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen] a invitare alla Legazione personalità di spicco come V. Gayda oppure Malgari, il direttore del grande quotidiano *Messaggero*. Per le insegne d'onorificenza nemmeno un accenno, pur essendo gli italiani avidi assai, mentre la Legazione d'Ungheria li commoveva con tali gesti", cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Externă*, Dossier 1148, Relazione firmata Al. Kiriţescu, ff. 71-78.

[197] Nel 1943 le ricompense per i giornalisti italiani sostenitori della causa romena erano per forza adattate al momento difficile della guerra: "stecche di sigarette oppure alimenti". Cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Propaganda*, Dossier 2744, f. 3. Dragoş Vrânceanu a Al. Marcu, 21 maggio 1943.

[198] Tali visite erano riportate sulla stampa italiana: "Molto vivamente attesa nella Capitale rumena è la visita di un gruppo di illustri giornalisti italiani, capitanati dal senatore Enrico Corradini. Per l'occasione il Teatro Nazionale di Bucarest sta preparando sollecitamente la rappresentazione di «Giulio Cesare» del geniale scrittore e nazionalista italiano, nella versione rumena di Alex Marcu", cf. (aemme), *Italia e Romania*, "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", a. III, quaderno 1, gennaio 1927: 78-79. Segue poi *Il Congresso della Stampa Latina tenutosi a Bucarest nell'ottobre 1927* — occasione in cui tenne una conferenza il giornalista Mario Simonetti, capo redattore di "La Victoire", cf. "Giornale di Politica e Letteratura", a. IV, gennaio 1928.

Il più proficuo incontro resta però quello del 1942 quando Guido Fontanelli — *Lavoro Fascista*, Lido Cajani — *Popolo d'Italia*, U. Gugliemotti — *Tribuna*, Gianni Cabella — *Il Secolo*, Bruno Bacci — *Nazione*, Enzo Bacino — *Mattino* ecc. eseguono una visita guidata dall'addetto stampa Amor Bavaj e dal suo omologo a Roma, Vladimir Ionescu. Tale visita genera un articolo "din ordin", pubblicato in *Curentul* del 6 giugno 1942 in cui gli ospiti vengono presentati in maniera encomiastica: "gli inviati di un popolo col quale siamo apparentati nel sangue e spirito (...) che mirano conoscerci il paese, il lavoro, lo spirito e l'anima (...) che sanno discernere le realtà dalle sembianze e hanno il coraggio di dissipare i preconcetti; fratelli di calamaio che riferiranno ai loro lettori le impressioni di questo viaggio". Resa così nota, l'informazione verrà ripresa, nei giorni successivi, da tutti i giornali, cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Internă*, Dossier 649/1942, ff. 4, 8, 11, 17. Dall'altro canto, al loro rientro in patria, i giornalisti italiani in udienza dal ministro Al. Pavolini riferiscono gli esiti positivi della visita e pubblicato una lunga serie di articoli sulla Romania. Cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Externă*, Dossier 1213, ff. 464-7 (relazione di Vladimir Ionescu, 9 luglio 1942) e ff. 573-4 (relazione di Amor Bavaj, 15 settembre 1942).

[199] I romeni contraccambiarono la visita dei colleghi italiani sempre nel 1942 (autunno), circostanza in cui Claudio Isopescu impartiva consigli per il protocollo: "Ti prego di dire a Vladimir Ionescu che al ricevimento previsto all'Ufficio Stampa di qua deve invitare a Giuseppe Ceccarelli di *Tribuna*, prof. Almirante di *Tevere* e *Quadrivio*, Cornelio di Marzio di *Meridiano di Roma*". Cf. B.A.R., S 45(60)/CMLXIV, Claudio Isopescu a Liviu Rebreanu, 18 ottobre 1942.

In seguito a questa visita si sarebbe costituita a Bucarest una associazione italo-romena dei giornalisti, nuovo organismo italo-romeno che mirava soprattutto ad approfondire i legami spirituali e professionali fra i giornalisti dei due paesi, Cf. "Rassegna Italo-Romena", a. XXIII, n. 1, gennaio 1943: 15.

Nel fondo *Romania* (b. 190) del Minculpop (ACS, Mcp, Dgp) ci sono invece notizie riguardanti il viaggio dei giornalisti romeni in Italia nell'aprile 1936, organizzato dall'Unione Culturale Italo-Romena di Milano.

[200] ANIC, *Emil Panaitescu*, Dossier 14, f. 4 [pagina di diario del 21 giugno 1943].

specializzazione giornalistica oppure in discipline come propaganda, rapporti con l'estero, economia politica ecc. Si auspicava che essi frequentassero dei corsi speciali della durata minima di un anno presso un'Accademia di Scienze Diplomatiche da istituire presso la Facoltà di Giurisprudenza[201]. In più, si dava per scontato che l'archetipo del propagandista implicasse la coesistenza di tratti come: dedizione alla causa che egli rappresenta, spirito attivo, fiuto politico, competenze giornalistiche, comprensione dello specifico del paese cui è destinato, capacità di adattamento al *background* locale, accortezza e, non da ultimo, carisma. In sintesi, era determinante il valore intrinseco dell'agente.

In Italia inizialmente ci fu un unico ufficio stampa, presso la Legazione romena a Roma (1918), nel 1929 se ne aggiunse un altro presso il Consolato di Milano, mentre nel 1940 il territorio italico fu suddiviso in Nord Ovest (Milano, Torino, Genova) — Nord Est (Firenze, Bologna, Udine, Trieste) — Sud–Roma. A fine luglio del 1940 presso il Segretariato Generale del Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale si era costituito un Ufficio di coordinamento dell'attività degli addetti stampa[202]. Nel settembre dello stesso 1940, il delegato italiano a Bucarest informava il Ministero della Cultura Popolare Italiana che "recentemente è stato creato in Roma un Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda Romeno che si è installato nell'Albergo Bocca di Leone, di cui fanno parte Titus Vifor Panaitescu, Claudio Isopescu, Ion Gherghel, Horia Vintilă, Magda Cuza e Otilia Ghibu"[203].

Sul numero opportuno di addetti stampa a Roma le opinioni non convergono. Al. Kirițescu ipotizzava che bastassero un consigliere e una segretaria, mentre il suo successore Panaitescu Vifor chiedeva che fossero assunti degli ex soci dell'Accademia di Romania in Roma: Ștefan Pascu, Dinu Adamesteanu e Vladimir Clain[204].

Compiti siffatti hanno svolto: Aron Cotruș, Teodor Solacolu, Eugen Porn, Alexandru D. Georgescu, Fr. Munteanu-Râmnic, Al. Kirițescu, Marcel Zinelli, Ion Biciolla, Titus Panaitescu Vifor, Claudiu Isopescu, Pimen Constantinescu, Dragoș Vrânceanu, Vladimir Ionescu, Vintilă Horia, Ion Gherghel, Al. Gregorian ecc.

Gli articoli presumibilmente di ispirazione ungherese[205], la propaganda revisionistica[206] e gli attacchi della stampa italiana rappresentarono un tema assai delicato che spesso suscitò reazioni al vertice della diplomazia romena (N.

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201 ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Internă*, Dossier 574/1941-2, ff. 4-7.

202 ANIC, Mpn, *Studii și Documente*, Dossier 99, f. 32.

202 ANIC, Mpn, *Studii și Documente*, Dossier 99, f. 32.

203 Cf. ACS, Mcp, Romania, b. 192.

204 ANIC, Mpn, *Presa Internă*, Dossier 1148, f. 78 [Rapporto Al. Kirițescu. Bucarest, 22 settembre 1940]; f. 79 [Rapporto Panaitescu Vifor. Roma, 9 ottobre 1940].

205 AMAE, *Italia*, Vol. 62. Ministro della Romania a Roma, I. D. Ghyca al Ministro degli Affari Esteri, George Mironescu. Roma, 28 dicembre 1929:

"Mi permetta inoltrare a Sua Eccellenza la corrispondenza di Vienna (cioè, come al solito, scritta dall'Ufficio Stampa della Legazione d'Ungheria a Vienna...) apparsa su *Tribuna* di ieri sera 27 dicembre col titolo: *Piccola Intesa e la Russia. Auguri di una dittatura in Romania* (...) con la d'altronde ben nota tendenza di mettere in risalto che la Piccola Intesa non ha che un programma negativo, di vigilare l'Ungheria e creare contrarietà (...)".

206 DDI, VII serie, vol. XVI. Ciano a Colonna, Sapuppo e Preziosi. *Commenti della stampa italiana favorevoli ad un eventuale riarmo dell'Ungheria e della Bulgaria*. Roma, 23 marzo 1935: 837.

Titulescu[207], G. Gafencu[208]), contrattacchi sulla stampa romena[209] oppure divieti di diffusione sul territorio romeno di certe riviste edite in Italia[210].

A distanza di tempo e all'infuori dell'atmosfera sorprende quanto ci si illudesse della forza della parola — tanto è vero *latina* — come strumento cercato di propaganda nell'opinione pubblica italiana:

"(...) Ho riflettuto tante volte in passato, indifferentemente dai nostri rapporti politici con l'Italia, che non possiamo che approfittare col attirare la simpatia dell'opinione pubblica italiana. La possibilità di realizzare questo ci si offre forse adesso con la visita dei giornalisti italiani in Romania. Il metodo che valuto utile sarebbe la diffusione sulla stampa italiana di un testo romeno, redatto con lessico di origine latina, preferibilmente quasi equivalente al lessico italiano. Il contenuto potrebbe essere un saluto di un paesano di un villaggio di Ardeal per i giornalisti italiani, un messaggio della stampa romena oppure proprio del ministro della Propaganda Nazionale o del premier (...) L'effetto sarebbe triplice: 1. Milioni di lettori di giornali leggerebbero un testo in una lingua straniera sorpresi di intenderlo perfettamente. Una certa propaganda magiara, rappresentata anche da un cospicuo numero di pubblicisti italiani, che sostiene che noi non siamo latini, sarebbe seriamente controbilanciata. 2. Il fatto provocherebbe dei dibattiti a nostro vantaggio. 3. Nell'opinione pubblica italiana spunterebbe un sentimento d'affetto per una nazione il cui idioma assomiglia tanto all'italiano (...)"[211].

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[207] DDI, VIII serie, vol. IV: 424. Bova Scoppa a Ciano, *Proteste di Titulescu per alcuni articoli ostili nei suoi riguardi pubblicati dal Giornale d'Italia e dal Regime Fascista*. Ginevra, 2 luglio 1936: 481.

Il ministro italiano a Bucarest riferisce quanto gli è stato detto dal Titulescu: "la stampa italiana, che è controllata e che quindi scrive con autorizzazione del Governo, aveva pubblicato ieri: 1) che finché egli Titulescu sarà ministro degli Esteri ogni rapporto amichevole fra l'Italia e la Romania sarà impossibile; 2) che egli era peggio che un bandito e non di razza bianca ma figlio di un negro e di una asiatica (...)

Ma la cosa che più mi esaspera — ha aggiunto Titulescu — è che il *Giornale d'Italia* affermi che non si è mai creduto alle mie manifestazioni di amicizia. Oggi l'Italia domanda la mia testa ed io devo naturalmente difendermi. So di non aver commesso nulla che giustifichi una simile reazione di così inaudita violenza. Vi prego perciò di dire al vostro Governo: 1) che mi pento amaramente di tutto quello che ho fatto finora per l'Italia, ivi compreso il discorso tenuto in Consiglio martedì scorso, nonché di tutto quello che ho detto in seno alla Intesa Balcanica per impedire che essa assumesse posizione contro di voi in Assemblea; 2) che nessuna notizia proveniente dall'Italia passerà più sulla stampa romena; 3) che mentre mi proponevo di agire in favore vostro a Ginevra, agirò con silenzio e restando fermo sulla stretta difesa del Patto. Titulescu era eccitatissimo e nel leggermi le frasi riportate dal *Regime Fascista* aveva gli occhi pieni di lacrime e la voce commossa".

Vedi anche DDI, VIII serie, vol. IV. Colloquio Ciano-Lugoşianu, *Frasi offensive pronunciate da Titulescu nei confronti dei giornalisti italiani.* Roma, 11 luglio 1936: 566.

[208] DDI, VIII serie, vol. XII: 645. Ghigi a Ciano, *Rammarico di Gafencu per gli attacchi della stampa italiana*, Bucarest, 22 luglio 1939: 483.

"Questo Ministro degli Affari Esteri mi ha anche personalmente, a titolo amichevole e confidenziale, espresso il suo rammarico per la pubblicazione di taluni giornali italiani — ed in particolar modo della *Stampa* di Torino (...)".

[209] DDI, VII serie, vol. VII. 495. Preziosi a Mussolini, *Reazioni della stampa romena ad un articolo del Popolo di Roma.* Bucarest, 18 giugno 1929: 485.

"Agitazione stampa romena per l'articolo del *Popolo di Roma* ed altri giornali italiani non ancora è sopita (causa — solidarietà italiana con tesi revisionistica ungherese) (...) un giornale liberale rileva come ogni volta in cui i naturali sentimenti di reciproca amicizia fra l'Italia e la Romania sembrano inserirsi sul piano politico, un cattivo genio si accanisce immancabilmente a di nuovo disturbarli (...)".

[210] Per esempio l'articolo pro revisione del Trianon di Antonio Marassavich, *La missione storica dell'Ungheria, Europa Orientale* (1937): 97-141. Cf. ANIC, *Direcția Generală a Poliției*, Dossier 157/1937, f. 1. Ministero dell'Interno. Ispettorato regionale di Polizia — Cernăuți. Oppure un articolo sulla Transilvania pubblicato sul *Popolo d'Italia*, in quanto segnalato come sovversivo. Cf. ANIC, Mpn, *Presa internă*, Dossier 574/1941-2, ff. 155-6. Rapporto SSI, 16 dicembre 1942, firmato *Sursă de încredere.*

[211] ANIC, Mpn, *Propaganda*, Dossier 2437, ff. 179-180. Relazione di Liviu Hulea. Bucarest 6 iunie 1942.

L'idea non era chiaramente nuova. Il fondatore del giornale "Universul", Luigi Cazzavillan, l'aveva messa in pratica con successo a Bucarest in una pubblicazione bilingue[212]. Stesso artificio fu utilizzato nel gennaio 1933, in occasione dell'inaugurazione della sede di Valle Giulia dell'Accademia di Romania in Roma. E l'effetto che ebbe sul Duce venne annotato dal ministro Ugo Sola, allora appena destinato a Bucarest. N. Iorga stesso se ne servì al Congresso di Studi Bizantini svoltosi a Roma nel 1937. Restarono però approcci sentimentali che non avevano niente a che fare con l'andamento politico, l'unico a tranciare i rapporti.

Conclusione

La stampa, ovvero "il quarto potere", si dimostra una preziosa fonte storica. In questa funzione, i giornali vanno considerati "i documenti del giorno" in quanto racchiudono la parola dei contemporanei sulla realtà contingente. Per relativizzare la fonte dai condizionamenti cui è sottoposta è necessario però comprendere innanzitutto il contesto in cui il giornalista rende noto ed interpreta l'avvenimento, individuare cioè gli ingredienti che egli mescola con i fatti (i vincoli politici, le convinzioni ideologiche, la formazione culturale, le esperienze personali, l'orgoglio e l'interesse nazionale ecc.). Bisogna poi tener conto del fatto che a volte il giornalista è al contempo protagonista, quindi un testimone partecipativo o addirittura un mediatore culturale. Inoltre, quando riferisce immagini relative ad un altro paese, come nel caso specifico del nostro studio, la conoscenza della lingua, oppure il semplice "vivere sul posto", anche per brevi periodi, diversifica il registro delle tematiche abbordate, le tonalità e l'insieme dell'approccio.

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212 "*Fraternitatea italo-romana, diar politic literar septemanal*" (La fraternità italo-romena, giornale politico-letterario settimanale), diventato "*Fratia romana-italiana*" (Fratellanza romeno-italiana). (Bucarest, 1881-1885). Si veda Claudiu Isopescu, *La stampa periodica...*: 28-37.

CELEBRATING THE POPULIST AND CARICATURING THE OFFICIAL

JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH*

Abstract. *Michael Moore's visual document-Fahrenheit 9/11- is not only a statement that flouts from within the United States suppression of individual liberties but also a statement through which Moore seeks to undo the very premises upon which the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq were based. His populist view has the power to countermand the "good" versus "evil" binary system of representation upon which the United States discourse on terror typically relies to legitimate its practice. Michael Moore's 2004 film Fahrenheit 9/11 is a visual and narrative tour de force that critiques everything from the controversial conditions under which George W. Bush assumed the US presidency to President Bush's handling of his so-called war on terror.*

Keywords: *Michael Moore, Fahrenheit 9/11, "good" vs. "evil", discourse on terror.*

In his film, *Fahrenheit 9/11*[1], Michael Moore "forges a new ground"[2] in documentary film-making. His film can be placed "... within the tradition of the 'committed documentary': a genre rooted in depression-era films that not only chronicled social problems but also advocated reform. Moore gives this [tradition] a new twist, inserting himself as both the narrator of and humorous character in the film-techniques that allow him to communicate with a broad audience."[3] Michael Moore's humorous tactic is used as a tool through which he mocks, turns upside down and ridicules the U.S. official discourse on terror. His moral-based approach in the face of the 9/11 crisis considers what the U.S. used to legitimize its global war on terror to be a completely biased act behind which lurked a pure interest in business and profit-making. His populist view emerges

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[1] *Fahrenheit 9/11* is academy award-winning 2004 documentary film. In this film, Michael Moore turns his eye on George W. Bush and his War on Terrorism agenda. Moore explains how Bush failed to take immediate action to defend his nation, only to later cynically manipulate it to serve his wealthy corrupt ambitions.

[2] Jill, Watt. "Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11: How One Film Divided a Nation." www.acessmylibrary. *Com.* 20 January 2009. December 2007. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-33839294_ITM>

[3] Moore, Michael, Fahrenheit 9/11. www.MichaelMoore.com. 20 July 2008. <http://www.fahrenheit911.com/>

to stress the dystopia of a wide range of Americans regarding U.S foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. Through his horrific footage of the destruction U.S. foreign policy brought to Iraq, Moore's story tells us not only about "a lost hope [in the midst of such a crisis but of] betrayed expectations [on the part of everyday] Americans to believe in the integrity of their leaders. [This is] the emotional and moral core of *Fahrenheit 9/11*".[4] This chapter, accordingly, argues that the impact of the "cultural trauma of 9/11 is [tousled] by Michael Moore to destabilize state-sponsored avenues of that trauma's own propagation and that [mockery] constitutes an important mode in this process of destabilization."[5]

Moore's cynical vision in *Fahrenheit 9/11* revolves around two central themes: first, mocking the United States government because it had come to power through illegal means, namely the "disenfranchisement of 16000 Floridians."[6] Second, its culmination in the death of about three thousand people in the 9/11 attacks, which in turn led to the death of thousands more people in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here, Moore points to the fact that this was a forthright example of "a human-engineered catastrophe underscored by an immense and traumatic loss of civilian life;"[7] his cynical tone celebrates a moment of rupture as well a break in through United States foreign policy, inasmuch as it is a site of political resistance to a morbid government whose "dubious ethical nature"[8] had become apparent since the United States 2000 presidential election.

In *Fahrenheit 9/11*, Michael Moore questions "everything from the controversial conditions under which George W. Bush assumed the US presidency to President Bush's handling of his so-called 'war on terror'".[9] The neoconservatives' rise to power with the fortuitous elections of George W. Bush constituted a symptomatic moment of radical change in United States history: a change whose devastating impact affected not only the American people but Iraqis and Afghans as well. Portraying the state as absurd and corrupt through cynicism constitutes Moore's strategic arsenal with which he challenges the U.S. state apparatus. Moore's form of comedy, as Fleischmann Aloys asserts in his article "The Rhetorical Function of Comedy in Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11", has the power to bolster... the subject's sense of urgency. [It] lessens the audience's identification with the American state apparatus, and also traces in an altered configuration, and onto the Bush administration, the potentially traumatic anxiety that fuels... laughter. Far from being undermined by the horror of the World Trade Centre tragedy, the comedy of Moore's film is driven by it: the cultural trauma of September 11th provides the impetus that Moore uses to destabilize its own impact...[10]

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[4] Weber, Cynthia. "Fahrenheit 9/11: The Temperature Where Morality Burns." *Journal of American Studies*, 40 (1). p. 113-131. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=AMS>

[5] Aloys Fleischmann, "The Rhetorical Function of Comedy in Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11", <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-33839294_ITM. >

[6] Moore.

[7] *Ibid.*.

[8] Weber.

[9] *Ibid*.

[10] Fleischmann, Aloys. "The Rhetorical Function of Comedy in Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11", www.acessmylibrary.com. December 2007. 20 January 2009. <http://www.accessmylibrary. com/coms2/ summary_0286- 33839294_ITM>

His comedic form sets up a lattice that opens a space for the subject to face up, however briefly, the means by which she or he is compelled to submit to the ideological command[11] of state apparatuses.

In the midst of the cultural trauma of September 11th, Michael Moore's scathing documentary offers such a comprehensive assault on the failings, lies and deceptions of the United States government led by George W. Bush. In one remarkable scene, Moore shows that in his first eight months in office before September 11th, George W. Bush was on vacation. On 9/11, when informed of the first plane hitting the World Trade Centre, President Bush was in an elementary school in Florida. As Bush starts reading *My Pet Goat* to young school children, his chief of staff enters the room and whispers in the President's ear, informing him that the "nation is under attack"[12] as a second plane has just crashed into the Twin Towers in New York. Bush remains expressionless; he spends almost seven minutes listening to children read after hearing of the September 11 terror attacks. Moore's blatant portrayal of George W. Bush's passiveness after hearing about the collapse of one of the Twin Towers reveals not only Bush's incompetence to lead the nation at times of crisis but his government's inability to protect its domestic population as well. So bewildering "is the seven minutes of actual footage of President Bush looking confused and disjointed in the face of his nation's crisis... He appears to be in an almost paralysed state,"[13] not knowing upon whom he should put blame, despite the many claims of his administration vis-à-vis the 9/11 attacks.

In the midst of the crisis, Bush keeps wondering why he has not held even "one meeting since taking office to discuss the threat of terrorism... Why he failed to notice a threat advisory on 6 August 2001 headed Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US?"[14] Whispering in total loss, Bush seems to be wondering about who might have screwed[15] him. "Was it that guy [his] Daddy's friends delivered a lot of weapons to? Was it that group of religious fundamentalists who visited [his] state when he was a governor? Or was it the Saudis? Damn! It was them. I think I had better blame it on this guy,"[16] Bush finally asserts. Though 15 of the hijackers were proved to be Saudis after the U.S. investigation of the 9/11 attacks, none of them wound up being prosecuted by the Bush administration. Depicting this scene, Moore makes it clear that capitalizing on Osama Bin Laden to justify the U.S. global war on terror was an act of conspiracy that camouflaged George W. Bush's deep-seated business ties with the Saudis.

What is exciting and often moving about *Fahrenheit 9/11* has to do, Geoffrey O'Brien asserts, "... with the materials, many of them archival and many not seen before... materials that linger and expand in the mind in ways that go far

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[11] *Ibid.*.

[12] Moore.

[13] Bruce Harding, "Fahrenheit 9/11: Bruce Harding Reviews Michael Moore's Controversial Documentary on the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy", <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/ summary_0286 -7200483_ITM >

[14] Moore.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Ibid.*

beyond the sometimes casually deployed debating points."[17] *Fahrenheit 9/11* serves as an eye-opener for American people. It urges them "to see and hear more than the government and the various news channels allow them to see and hear"[18] about what is going on in reality. Praising Moore's film, Geoffrey O'Brien states that "we need to play back the tapes to refresh our memory of what seems consigned to instant oblivion even as it unfolds. We need to see those images — of Americans and Iraqis alike wounded and dying, for example — that American television tends to withhold, as if the reality of the war could thereby be kept at bay."[19] Michael Moore's attempt to unveil what had been happening since George W. Bush's election in 2000 is only one possible account; but by its skilfully woven pattern as well as the "archival material, [it] encourages a more dynamic, more confrontational approach to the images that surround us, anything to break through the numbing effect of the endless flow of TV news broadcasts and official bulletins that has become something like the wallpaper of a distorted public reality, a stream of images that moves forward without ever looking back."[20]

Interestingly, Moore's moral voice in *Fahrenheit 9/11* is powerfully "embedded in a particular collective category. This latter is the relatively downtrodden economic and social class that does not form part of George W. Bush's 'base.'"[21] Embedded in such collectivity, Moore's voice emerges to counter the very mechanism through which the state tends to manipulate the thinking of its own subjects. It is this particular collective category of a subjugated social and economic class to which Moore urges resistance to the discourse of mastery. In so doing, the authority of the discourse of mastery turns out to be resisted through a peripheral force that seeks to challenge the very premises upon which both the U.S. domestic and foreign policies are based. Unlike the U.S. claims that the war on terror was dedicated to the stability and the protection of civil societies, Moore ironically asserts that "the war effort is [in principle] planned to keep society on the brink of starvation. The war is always waged by the ruling group against its own subjects and its victory[22] is the victory of the power elite and the owners of capital.

Fahrenheit 9/11 is however far more than just a damning castigation of George W. Bush as a political figure; through his skilful footage, Moore has shown the world what the horrors of war are like. The film "graphically details the consequences of the most difficult decision a US president has to make; the decision to send young American men and women into harm's way."[23] The traumatic effect of this is clearly exemplified by Lila Lipscomb's melancholic tone in the face of her son's murder in Iraq. "My son is a good boy; he has not done anything"[24] is a statement that could be said by any mother in a similar situation. In parallel

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[17] Geoffrey O'Brien, "Is it all Just a Dream?", <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17315.>
[18] *Ibid*.
[19] *Ibid*.
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] Harding.
[22] Moore.
[23] Milan Vesely, "Fahrenheit 9/11", <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-13136208_ITM. >
[24] Moore.

with this, Moore shows the footage of a distressed Iraqi mother crying out for Allah to avenge the loss of her son in an attack in Iraq. Showing this scene, Michael Moore "powerfully displays that the Iraqi enemy, so demonised in the run-up to the war, is also human; that the enemy also has mothers and wives traumatised by decisions that, if made for the wrong reasons, can inflict the sort of pain that no person who has not suffered in a similar situation can comprehend."[25] *Fahrenheit 9/11* is thus such a force that touches on the human effects an ill-conceived war had on the lives of Americans and Iraqis alike. The film insists that the Bush administration has thrown contemporary America — the land of so much that is precious and valuable — into the heat of unipolar egoism and elitist-based imperial adventurism.[26]

Only, the most critical part of Moore's *Fahrenheit 9/11* deals with George W. Bush's unfair war on Iraq, which was built upon the illusion of Saddam Hussein's support of Al Qaeda as well as his possession of weapons of mass destruction. The claim that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, which Bush's state apparatus capitalized on to legitimize the war on Iraq, represents for Moore a flagrant example of an imperial hubris that had no parallel in the history of the United States of America. Highlighting the results of this historic decision, Moore's *Fahrenheit 9/11* shows its heartbreaking effect on Iraqis and Americans alike: both peoples suffered the horrors of war. Depicting this, Moore's identification with the destructive impact of war in and outside the United States of America acts as a humanitarian force that brings into light the very ethics upon which human relations should be based. Echoing Frantz Fanon — "no to the butchery of what is most human in man: freedom" — Moore's vision regarding U.S. policies either in relation to the American people or their Iraqi counterparts seems to be permeated with a similar moral weight. The core of Moore's vision celebrates this moral outrage in the face of a morbid government which had destroyed much more than it had claimed to build.

Fahrenheit 9/11, accordingly, acts as a reminder for ill-informed Americans. Moore's uncovering of the United States' corrupt policies through archival material is intended to open the Americans' eyes to the fact that the reasons behind the U.S. global War on Terror "were profoundly muddled by poor intelligence and naked self-interest..."[27] Showing pictures that Americans might never have seen before gives Moore's argument not only power, but authenticity as well. His insight opens up a space for critical reflection as well as understanding of the very mechanisms through which state apparatuses tend to manipulate the thinking of their own subjects. What Moore seems to suggest, then, is that no allegiance should be pledged to such a corrupt government simply because, as Einstein said after World War I, whatever the reasons are, "war cannot be humanized. It can only

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[25] Vesely, Milan. "Fahrenheit 9/11", www.accessmylibrary.com. 13 January 2009. 01 Aug. 2004. 13 January 2009. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-13136208_ITM>

[26] Harding, Bruce. "Fahrenheit 9/11." www.accessmylibrary.com.. 01-Nov. 2004. 20 January 2009 <http:/ / www. accessmylibrary. com/coms2/summary_0286-7200483_ITM>

[27] *Ibid*.

be abolished."[28] For history is not simply what is "inflicted on us by the powers that be. History is also a history of resistance;"[29] history can be resisted as well as rebuilt, hence, for Michael Moore, just as Howard Zinn points out in is influential article "The Uses of History and the War on Terrorism," everything "we do is so important. Every little we do, every picket line we walk on, every letter we write, every act of civil disobedience we engage in... everything we do in the direction of a different world is important... Change comes about when millions of people do little things, which at certain points in history come together, and then something good and something important happens.[30] Moore's view articulates this very idea because his message for Americans is to awaken America to the ideal of what should be the source of action and meaning in its future politics.

Moore's *Fahrenheit 9/11* is thus penetrated through a powerful moral force; it insists on the fact that war is a "lot more gruesome"[31] than anybody might think. It kills, it destroys, and it devastates the subjects and objects of war alike. As Moore invokes, through an American soldier's painful tone, "you cannot kill someone without killing part of your soul."[32] One can feel this most acutely when the enemy poses no real threat; this is — as Moore skilfully shows us in *Fahrenheit 9/11* — the feeling of most of the United States troops in Iraq. Dedicated to serving their country, what American troops discovered in Iraq was much more than a lie, for, after all, what their government built on to legitimize the war was a lie, and so what they ended up doing in Iraq turned out to be all at the service of that well-fabricated lie. In the face of such a trauma, all they could hope for, as Moore informs us through Lila Lipscomb's heartbreaking tone, is that they come back to their normal lives soon and that Americans do not "re-elect that fool again."[33]

Moore's reliance on such minority voices as exemplified by Lila Lipscomb's son in Iraq is intended to unveil white America's deep-seated prejudices about its black counterpart; those who suffer most at the hand of the U.S. elite are usually the first ones that step up to defend their country. What an irony! In one scene Moore uses a footage that shows recruitment officers targeting African American youths' enlistment in the Army. Through a parallel footage, we see Michael Moore trying to convince Congressmen to have their own kids enlisted to fight in Iraq. Ironically, Moore concludes that not a single Congressman wanted to sacrifice [his] child for Iraq. [But,] who could blame them? [I] have always been amazed that the very people forced to live in the worst parts of town...go to the worst schools and who have it the hardest are always the first to step up to defend that very system [;] they offer to give up their lives so that we can be free [and] all they ask for in return is that we do not send them into harm's way unless it is absolutely necessary.[34]

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[28] Howard Zinn, "The Uses of History and the War on Terrorism", <http://www . democracynow. org/ 2006/11/24/ howard_zinn_on_the_uses_of. >

[29] *Ibid*.

[30] *Ibid*.

[31] Moore.

[32] *Ibid*.

[33] *Ibid*.

[34] *Ibid*.

Moore's scrutiny of the cultural trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks through a racial veil is intended to awaken White America to what had been, for so many African Americans, a brutal reality before 9/11. The shadows of fear and terror that America cast on American citizens after 9/11 had been long experienced by Blacks in apartheid America.

Significantly, what is special about *Fahrenheit 9/11* is that it portrays the horrified repercussions of war from two different perspectives: one related to the American people themselves, the other related to Iraqis. The film's binocular outlook depicts the impacts that an ill-defined war had on the lives of Americans and Iraqis alike. *Fahrenheit 9/11* reminds us of the fact that war is no more than a human engineered act that serves the interests of political elites at the expense of the well-being of ordinary people. Political elites always think about what people want and they do the opposite or, as stated in *Fahrenheit 9/11*, "we thought about what they wanted us to do and we did the opposite."[35] While a government, as declared in the Unite States Bills of Right, is instituted among men in order to protect as well as to serve the common good of its subjects, the U.S government turned out to negate the very purposes for which it existed by turning moral America upside-down. In the face of such a predicament, Moore emerges as a voice of resistance to remind America of its moral past and the virtues of its democratic idealism.

This is the moral force of Moore's vision in *Fahrenheit 9/11*: It laments the past through a corrupt present and advocates reform and change in the face of the ignorance that has overcome America. Ignorance, for Michael Moore, is the true enemy of America. What Moore seems to suggest in his visual document, then, is the fact that the U.S. moral ideals have been violated by the U.S. power elite and that the international Conventions, which had been binding on the international community ever since the second world war, have been abrogated by the US military machine in the post-9/11 era. In contrast to the United States Clash of Civilizations' rhetoric and Adam Curtis visual representation of it, Moore's concern about the state of civil liberties in American post-9/11 policies as well as about the impact an ill-defined war on terrorism had on the lives of Iraqi people suggests that war should always be condemned. War is always waged by the power elite to serve pure economic goals. Following from this, Moore makes it clear that the crusading justifications that followed the U.S. global war on terror, as the next chapter argues, were economically stimulated rather then civilizationally or culturally motivated.

Fahrenheit 9/11, which we are told by Michael Moore in a voice-over, is the "temperature at which freedom burns."[36] It is essentially a critical account of President Bush's leadership and his decision to go to war in Iraq after the bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. In this film, Michael Moore questions the U.S. government's corrupt practices from Bush's controversial

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[35] Moore.

[36] Watt Jill, "Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11: How One Film Divided a Nation", <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-33839294_ITM>

electoral success in 2000 to the invasion of Iraq 2003. Moore's courage to question the illegitimacy of U.S. policies after 9/11 led the U.S. decision makers to question not only his film's credibility but his patriotism as well. Mobilized by a powerful humanitarian objection, Moore's influential film had "touched off an explosion of anti-Bush sentiment across the nation"[37] by reminding America of its moral force, which was abused by a sick political elite in the post-9/11 era. Moore "boldly proclaims that state censorship arrived in the U.S. on 9/11, and America's best hope for a better future is to remember its past- not the McCarthy era but the more immediate past of the Bush presidency- so that Americans will not repeat it."[38] In the face of the Bush administration's new form of McCarthyism, Michael Moore manages to throw out the very manichaeism characteristic of the U.S. "Clash of Civilizations" — based discourse on terror converting it into an internal conflict between "moral America"[39] and its immoral counterpart.

In *Fahrenheit 9/11*, Michael Moore argues that state censorship in America carried on from Bush's fake success in Florida – 2000 – all the way through 9/11, to the bombardment of Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq. Beginning with the president's controversial win of Florida in the 2000 elections when he defeated Al Gore, Moore believes that Bush's victory was due to his brother Jeb Bush being the governor and the disfranchisement of some 16,000 black Floridian voters, which caused the state's electoral votes to go to President Bush. For him, the 2000 presidential elections constituted a forthright example of "deliberate fraud"[40] and an unprecedented suppression of individual liberties. In a telling scene, Moore shows African-American congressmen and women castigating US senators for being unwilling to sign their petition, which demands a reconsideration of what happened in Florida. Turning a deaf ear on them, Moore sarcastically states that as far as presidential elections are concerned in America, [i]t helps if your brother is the governor of the state in question... Make sure that your campaign chairman is also the vote-count woman and that her state hires a company to knock voters off the rolls who are not likely to vote for you... This talk about legitimacy is overblown... Even if numerous independent investigations prove that [George W. Bush did not win the election,] it will not matter, as long as [his] daddy's friends on the Supreme Court [say so]. While I disagree with the court's decision, I accept it. What we need is acceptance.[41]

As one reads through Moore's ironic tone, one gets to discover that he is critical not only of Bush's fake success in 2000, but also of the power of decision-makers to abuse sacred institutional forces such as the Supreme Court. Moore asserts that it was the "Supreme Court not the people of the United States"[42] that decided the 2000 presidential elections. "I object" Moore heatedly insists through Al Gore' words but "what we need is acceptance."[43] This is a statement through

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[37] *Ibid*.
[38] Cynthia Weber, "Fahrenheit 9/11: The Temperature Where Morality Burns", published on Jan. 2006 in the *Journal of American Studies*.
[39] Weber.
[40] Michael Moore, *Fahrenheit 9/11*, <http://www.fahrenheit911.com/.>
[41] *Ibid*.
[42] *Ibid*.
[43] *Ibid*.

which Michael Moore aims at uncovering America's institutional corruption as well as its suppression of basic democratic rights: the individual's right to inquiry as well as his right to elect the right person for government as propounded by major intellectual figures of enlightenment philosophy not to mention America's eminent founding fathers.

Moore's reference to state censorship that followed the events of 9/11 is clearly manifested in his film's title as well as his discussion of the United States execution of the Patriot Act.[44] While Bush's election marked an unprecedented electoral event in the United States, 9/11 constituted a dramatic turning point from America's democratic tradition, as articulated in the United States Constitution and the Bills of Rights. Responding to the events of 9/11 involved not only the United States suppression of individual liberties but other nations' right to sovereignty as well. Reacting to the so-called Al Qaeda terrorist attacks, America found in the Patriot Act a powerful means through which it could gain public support for its longstanding interests in core regions of the world. For the U.S. power elite, "the patriot Act allow[ed] for searches of medical and financial records... computer and telephone conversations... even for the books you take out of the library. But people we spoke to say they are willing to give up liberties to fight terrorism... it is sad but it has to be done. You could understand why police needed to spy."[45] The patriot Act meant an "uncritical support of whatever actions the President deems appropriate."[46] Therefore, questioning an ill-defined global war on terrorism was considered to be completely unpatriotic.[47] This was the case even for American academic circles, namely American universities. The educated elites, charged with assessing the risks to academic freedom and free inquiry posed by the nation's response to the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon,[48] were hardly able to respond effectively to United States policies as they were often accused of being unpatriotic.

Interestingly, the state of academic freedom following the events of 9/11 parallels with a striking likeness what happened during the McCarthy era. Scaring, firing and blacklisting those who dared critique the government's policies was used a means to curb any sort of domestic resistance to U.S. policies: a fact that forced professors and administrators, especially those belonging to the AAUP, to "ignore... the stated ideals of their calling and override... the civil liberties of the colleagues and employees in the service of such supposedly higher values as institutional loyalty and national security."[49] In the wake of 9/11, with memories

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[44] Jill, Watt. "Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11: How One Film Divided a Nation." *www.acessmylibrary. Com.* 20 January 2009. December 2007. <http://www.accessmylibrary. com/ coms2/ summary_ 0286-33839294_ITM>

[45] Moore.

[46] Erick Foner, "The Most Patriotic Act.(support civil rights, United States", <http://www. accessmylibrary. com/coms2/ summary_ 0286-10225918_ITM>

[47] *Ibid*.

[48] American Association of University Professors, "Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis (2003)" published on Oct. 2003 by *the American Association of University Professor,* <F:\AAUP Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis /(2003).htm>

[49] qtd. in Stephen Whitfield, "Academic Scoundrel Time." Published on 3 Sep. 1987 in *Reviews in American History,* <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2702048?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, p. 481.

of the McCarthy era in mind, the American Association of University Professors founded the Special Committee on Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis. A number of "imperatives led to the creation of the committee. Among them, still-vivid memories of the McCarthy era yielded an awareness of the degree of vigilance needed to avert a recurrence of the excesses of that time: the sweeping claims of threats to national security, the rampant accusations of guilt by association, and the unchecked powers of law-enforcement agencies."[50] The AAUP committee affirmed that the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press and the freedom of religion, which constitute the pillars of America's democratic ideals, had been jeopardized by the U.S. claims to national security and home safety measures. Following from this, the AAUP insisted on the necessity "to save rather than to jettison what had been won through years of courage and effort... because freedoms lost are difficult to regain."[51]

The U.S. implementation of the Patriot Act and its impact on the state of civil liberties in the aftermath of 9/11matches with a striking likeliness the Communist Control Act (1954). A cardinal assumption underlying it had been the fact that "the Communist party constituted a real and an immediate threat to the nation's security and that the way to meet this threat was through repression."[52] Therefore, by trying to suppress the alleged threat of domestic Communism, opposition to McCarthyism "had been... thoroughly identified with Communism... [I]t was no longer possible to challenge the basic assumptions of American foreign policy without incurring suspicions of disloyalty..."[53] on the part of United States government. Just as is the case with Islamic fundamentalism now, McCarthyism involved a long-term paranoia of an external danger that was believed to have tried to destroy America from within.

Having emerged as one of the most powerful political, economic, and military powers in the world, the United States found in Communism the right ideological enemy upon which to capitalize in the post-war era. Using the same rhetoric characteristic of George W. Bush's orations after the events of 9/11, by the late1940s the U.S. power elite warned: "issues that face us are momentous... There are now many Communists in America. They are everywhere — in factories, offices, butcher shops, on street comers, in private business — and each carries in him the germs of death for society."[54] Using fear to bludgeon the mass mind with the Communist threat constituted an all powerful force through which the government sought to justify to the masses the legitimacy of an epic battle

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[50] American Association of University Professors, "Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis (2003)" published on Oct. 2003 by *the American Association of University Professor,* <F:\AAUP Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis /(2003).htm>

[51] *Ibid*.

[52] Robert Griffith, "The Political Context of McCarthyism, " published on Jan. 1971 in *The Review of Politics*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406357?origin=JSTOR-pdf>

[53] Ellen Schrecker, "The Legacy of McCarthyism", . <http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/schrecker-legacy.html>

[54] qtd. in Lewis, Chris. "The Anti-Communist Crusade and the Rise of McCarthyism", published on Oct. 2002. by *Sewall Academic Program; University of Colorado at Boulder*, <http://www. colorado. edu/ AmStudies/lewis/ 2010/mccarthy.htm>

against the so-called external forces of "evil" threatening its unity. For the United States of America, the "evil enemy without became the prime force through which to exercise or tame the devils lurking within. This relationship between the external conditions of political power had played a significant role if largely hidden role in the dynamics that ha[d] fuelled the conflict..."[55] with the Soviet Union and, most recently, the Arab-Islamic world.

Significantly, in the wake of September attacks, most people swung behind the idea that terrorism was an imminent threat to the United States' internal unity. Americans supported the Patriot Act because they believed that it was going to save American civilization from decay. In the aftermath of 9/11, Dwonna Goldstone affirms in her article "An African American Professor Reflects on What 9/11 Meant for African Americans, and Herself", "for the first time perhaps in the United States history, African Americans feel 'American' no longer just included white folks. The term American has always been synonymous with white, but for a brief moment, the ambivalence that so many of us have felt"[56] in this country had faded away. Sadly, though, having thought that the events of 9/11 united them with white America, African Americans' sense of unity was not to last for long. Soon after 9/11, they were again rejected by the white folks and accused of being unpatriotic. As Dwonna Goldstone states in the following passage, Many of us used to return to our old status as a catalyst, an opportunity to speak out for change. Though political dissent had been a luxury after September 11, African Americans were at the forefront of challenging the united-we-stand orthodoxy that held that the United States was engaged in a war of unquestionable good against inexplicable evil, and that bombing Afghanistan was both moral and justified. We were often accused of being unpatriotic, of not loving America[57].

But this, Dwonna Goldstone goes on to say, did not surprise African Americans, given what Frantz Fanon has insightfully pointed out concerning the way "the dominant group responds when the subjective group expresses a criticism about the dominant group's behavior or moral codes."[58] For Fanon, "whenever a man of color protests there is alienation. Whenever a man of color rebukes there is alienation."[59] Painful as it sounds to be, Dwonna's tone invokes the feeling of a real trauma and a total sense of alienation. How come that she is alienated after having contributed, along with her African American associates, to the building up of United States history? Life teaches us that history remembers best those who have contributed to it, but no such a thing turned out to be powerful enough to awaken the United States' conscience after 9/11. Life for the United States' power elite wound up being no more than business, for which the powerful is the most likely to survive.

Investing *Fahrenheit 9/11* Lila Lipscomb's trauma in the face of her son's murder in the United States war on Iraq invokes the same sentiment of an

[55] Harvey, p. 74.
[56] Goldstone.
[57] *Ibid*.
[58] *Ibid*.
[59] qtd. in Goldstone.

African American destroyed by the so-called battle between "good" and "evil". What Lila Lipscomb epitomizes in *Fahrenheit 9/11* is not simply a woman mourning the loss of her son but also "the moral centre of a betrayed America."[60] As Cynthia Weber asserts in her article "The Temperature When Morality Burns," [t]his U.S. 'we' has been betrayed... [b]ecause... all Americans have been lied to by the Bush administration. This apparently is the only reason Americans supported the suspension of some civil liberties by passing the Patriot Act and they supported the Bush administration's war in Iraq. [However,] because the U.S. 'we' can see the Bush administration for what it is, it can look ahead to think about what this U.S. 'we' wants to be in the future. What Fahrenheit 9/11 tells is that the US 'we' does not have to relive this nightmarish prevision of four more years of the Bush administration. Instead the US public can vote George W. Bush out of the White House[61].

For Cynthia Weber, just as for Benjamin Franklin, "[t]hey that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."[62] In *Fahrenheit 9/11*, Lila Lipscomb's voice, which embodies the "moral centre of America,"[63] is intended to remind America of its morality-based ideals. It is invested by Michael Moore to object to the state's flagrant violation of human rights, "... whether domestically (by increased surveillance of peace activists and other everyday Americans) or internationally (through the Bush doctrine of preemption). In making these objections the film raises everyday Americans' consciousness about the crimes committed against them in state practices and embracing Moore's brand of consciousness raising as political activism."[64] In the midst of state surveillance and censorship that arrived in America in 9/11, Lipscomb's voice emerges to celebrate a pure sense of patriotism. She is not "against America";[65] she is rather against Bush's so-called war of an unquestionable "good" against an inexplicable "evil", in the midst of which lies America's obsession with business control and profit-making.

Michael Moore's strategic investment of Lila Lipscomb's and his own voice in *Fahrenheit 9/11* can be seen as a local voice of resistance that aims at uncovering the United States suppression of individual liberties domestically and its unfair intervention in other nations' sovereignty internationally. Both Moore and Lipscomp mourn America. They stress the fact that of "the many lessons of American history is that civil rights and civil liberties[such as] freedom of speech, [the right] to criticize the government, equality before the law, restraint on the exercise of police powers"[66] are the legacy of a long-term process of struggle: a legacy which includes the ability of abolitionists to hold meetings and

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60 Jill.

61 *Ibid*.

62 American Association of University Professors, "Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis (2003)", published on Oct. 2003 by *the American Association of University Professor,* < F:\AAUP Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis /(2003).htm>

63 Weber.

64 *Ibid*.

65 Jill.

66 Foner.

publish their views in the face of mob violence; by labor leaders for the power to organize unions, picket and distribute literature without fear of arrest; by feminists for the right to disseminate birth-control information without being charged with violating the obscenity laws; and by all those who braved jail and worse to challenge entrenched systems of racial inequality[67].

Clearly, life for these people was approached in terms of how much one could put into it rather than how much one could get out of it. For them, to throw these achievements away was an act of barbarity that had no parallel in American history.

Michael Moore's visual document-*Fahrenheit 9/11* — however is not only a statement that flouts from within the United States suppression of individual liberties but also a statement through which Moore seeks to undo the very premises upon which the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq were based. His populist view has the power to countermand the "good" versus "evil" binary system of representation upon which the United States discourse on terror typically relies to legitimate its practice. According to Moore, the United States declaration of its global war on terror was ideologically-oriented. And the discourse underlying it was intended to camouflage the violent manipulation and exploitation of powerless nations. Caught up in a Manichean worldview, the official discourse on terror, as is celebrated by the U.S. power elite, turns out to be resisted through Moore's/America's moral force. Moore's outrage in the face of U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq as well as the state censorship that followed it is intended to challenge the "dubious ethical nature"[68] of the United States official discourse on terror. War according to Moore not only kills people on the other side of the border but kills part of the killer's soul as well. The killer in the face of his atrocities turns out to kill part of his inner being. In this sense, the act of killing becomes a brutal sort of violence not simply against "them"/Muslims but also against "we"/ Americans. The U.S. war on Iraq is, accordingly, not only an act of violence that destroyed other people's entire civilization but an act of violence that killed part of America's moral history as well.

Interestingly, the "good" versus "evil" binary system of representation upon which the United States typically relies to legitimate its practice seems to be converted in *Fahrenheit 9/11* into an internal conflict between the "good" versus "evil" inclinations of the "Self"/America. That is to say, the very deviant "Self"/ America that projects its dark illusions on an imaginatively "evil" "Other" turns out to be powerfully resisted by the moral part of its being. Michael Moore's moral fervour in the film seems to articulate this viewpoint vis-à-vis America. Overthrowing the US stark logic of hierarchy regarding the legitimacy of an epic battle between "good" and "evil," Moore' s voice in the face of America's predicament emerges to remind Americans of the necessity to defy the United States' hostility over its moral history. Employing intellect and imagination in understanding and representing the world turns out to be the only alternative

67 *Ibid*.
68 Weber.

means through which he urges people to resist the conditions of their ideological domination or subjection by the U.S. propaganda system.

In summation, Michael Moore's 2004 film *Fahrenheit 9/11* "is a visual and narrative tour de force that critiques everything from the controversial conditions under which George W. Bush assumed the US presidency to President Bush's handling of his so-called 'war on terror."[69] Moore's influential film "stresses the dubious ethical nature of the Bush administration's post-9/11 policies, especially as they redefine the US relationship between freedom and censorship. In so doing, he challenges the Bush administration's constructions of US morality as ultimately elitist and self-serving, substituting his own populist, class-based moral America (n) in its place."[70] Moore's populist view is not only well-led but effectively articulated as well. It is articulated in a way that Moore wants the "moral centre of America"[71] to be the source of action and meaning underlying its future politics. Ridiculing, mocking and turning down the Bush administration's policies following the attacks of 9/11, as the next chapter argues, constitutes a powerful strategic arsenal through which he urges people's resistance to their conditions of ideological domination by the state apparatus.

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69 *Ibid*.
70 *Ibid*.
71 Weber.

POLITICAL OBJECT OR SUBJECT? THE DFDR AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE ROMANIAN STATE

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Abstract. *Taking into account the development of the relationship between the DFDR and the Romanian state it becomes obvious that the aim of the founders to develop the DFDR into a sovereign voice of the Germans in Romania towards the German and Romanian governments was only partly fulfilled with regards to Bucharest. Although the DFDR was the government's exclusive partner with reference to its citizens of German nationality, this did not provide only advantages for the Germans.*
The DFDR and the remaining Germans have mainly remained to be a political object of others in many political aspects and that they could not consistently develop sufficient means to show independent profile to become a political subject.

Keywords: *Political Object, Political Subject, DFDR, minority organisation.*

Introduction

Most studies on German minorities in Eastern Europe are largely confined to their past, i.e. particularly the pre-1945 era or to the exodus of Germans from the region. However, relatively little academic attention has been dedicated to what remained of German cultural life in Eastern Europe, and even less to the attempts to re-establish and preserve German cultural life. For obvious reasons the exodus of the 1980s and early 1990s seriously diminished German cultural presence throughout the region, particularly in Romania, the country surveyed by this analysis.

Nevertheless, even a smaller German presence has had an effect on cultural and political affairs in the region's countries. Having in mind that even smaller ethnic minorities and communities than the remaining 60-75,000 Germans in Romania have found appropriate academic attention, I found it very promising to focus doctoral research on the effects of the German cultural and political

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activities in post-communist Romania since 1989. In particular, the focus of the study shall be on the *Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România (F.D.G.R.)/ Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien (DFDR)*, an organization representing the minority German communities in Romania.

It will show that the main challenge to the DFDR during the past 20 years of its existence has been the incompatibility between its explicit intention to act as an a-political organisation, and its implicit will to be an active political subject that made it more and more act like a political party. The overarching question will be: how did the DFDR manage to reconcile the apparent contradiction within the fundamental political changes in post-communist Romania?

For this purpose the political setup of post-communist Romania will be discussed and analysed in detail in my thesis. Both the political system of Romania and the most important objects of Romanian political life will be focal points of the analysis. How did political life in Romania develop after 1989? How did majority parties respond to ethnic minorities? How have the DFDR's successes been received by the major political parties?

In this context it is the aim of this essay to show the role of the DFDR during the post 1989 political transition in Romania, and its relationship to the different Romanian governments of that period. I will, therefore, in my thesis trace the relations of the DFDR to the Romanian state, highlight how the different Romanian governments affected the DFDR's politics, and finally, assess the DFDR's chances of pursuing its objectives under changing political circumstances. The scope of this essay will be limited to the period 1989-2004.

On the Romanian side the focus will be on legal and administrative aspects within the central bureaucracy. The particular political interests that ethnic Romanians had in actively integrating the German minority into the Romanian state system will also be addressed. On the German side I will discuss the situation within the DFDR, its hierarchy and how its decisions were made. The interaction between the different existing positions, their political implications and their gradual changes function as inter-connecting threads throughout this essay.

Could the main aim of the founding fathers of the DFDR to enable the German minority of Romania to become a political subject be realised, or did they stay an object of other forces after 1989?

Historical background

In view of their experiences in Ceaușescu's Romania, many Germans in Romania found it difficult to believe in a more promising future as a result of the events of 1989. Even the so-called revolution of 1989 did little to make them any more optimistic about their native country. Moreover, the political changes of 1989 also brought about a mass exodus of Germans from nearly all other now ex-communist states of Eastern Europe. Germany, about to reunify itself during this period, was not prepared for this exodus and tried in vain to canalize this situation by implementing laws to regulate immigration from the East.

However, this had the opposite effect on the actual immigration. Many Germans from Eastern Europe pushed even harder to emigrate because of fears that the gate to Germany might be closed forever.[1]

Since Germany had started to 'buy out' ethnic Germans from Romania in 1978, the structures of German villages in Romania and their cultural life had been considerably weakened before 1989. Ceaușescu's cynical remark that 'the Germans and the Jews are my best capital'[2] had become the sad reality of the 1980s. This led to an annual emigration of up to 15,000 Germans 'bought' by Western Germany for 12,000 German Marks 'per head'. Israel pursued a similar policy with the Jewish émigrés from Romania.

Consequently, the exodus of 1989-90 was the apparent final chapter in a long history of emigration; for example, between 1950 and 1987, over 200,000 Germans had left for Germany and Austria, over 160,000 subsequent to the accord of 1978 which had fixed the modalities of German emigration from Romania.

For the German minority other issues also contributed to their tendency to leave Romania for Germany after 1989. First, the period immediately after the revolution did not bring about what the Germans had expected and hoped for. Inflation was rampant. Although the shortage of goods available in shops had been reduced for propagandistic reasons, it was still not possible to buy much. These economic problems exacerbated an important psychological factor, the insecurity of merely being a minority. Some of the bloodiest incidents of the 'revolution' took place between pro-Ceaușescu forces and the army in Timișoara, Sibiu, and Brașov, i.e. towns with a relatively high proportion of German inhabitants. This feeling of insecurity further intensified by the Romano-Maghiar clash in Târgu Mureș in March 1990 and the vandalism miners of the Jiu Valley exerted in Bucharest in Iliescu's name in January and June 1990 and in September 1991. Moreover, the rapidly increasing number of burglaries, partly accompanied by murders, looting, and arsons added to the 'push' factor for leaving Romania.[3] Altogether, these factors led to the result that of the about 200,000 Germans in Romania before 1989, 111,150 were officially registered as recognised immigrants in Germany at the end of 1990. Adding this number to the result of the Romanian poll of 1992 (119,462) shows that the Germans had been about 230,000 before 1989. Already during the first eight months after the change of December 1989 132,400 Germans had permanently left Romania for Germany or Austria.

According to individuals interviewed, the reasons for leaving Romania were numerous. However, most common was the fear of losing their ethnic and cultural identity as Germans. Many interviewees expressed concerns about the decline of German schooling, discrimination, destruction of villages following Ceaușescu's 'Systematisation' programme and the ensuing economic, political and social problems and hopelessness of Romania. However, one of the main push factors to leave was due to the fear of remaining and losing contact with their community;

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[1] Reichrath, 'Wem gilt die Empfehlung 1201?'.
[2] Hoffstadt and Zippel, *Reiseland Rumänien*, p. 76.
[3] Gabanyi, 'Bleiben, gehen, wiederkehren?', p. 246.

of losing their German identity.[4] In particular the tendency of intellectual elites, such as priests, teachers, and academics, to emigrate had a symbolic effect on ordinary Germans in Romania.[5] According to the Honorary President of the DFDR, Professor Paul Philippi, everybody or none was for centuries the practiced slogan of the Transylvanian Saxons and when teachers and priests left they indirectly also pulled the rest with them.[6]

Finis Germanorum in post-communist Romania?

Given this background, the establishment of the DFDR was far from being an easy or conventional undertaking. The German minority was in a deep process of reshaping itself. The Romanian-German writer Eginald Schlattner is talking about this experience that prompted him to write two novels in his retirement, bringing him success in the German-speaking world and both recognition and notoriety in his native Romania when he says: 'the commotion of summer 1990 inspired me. Then, ethnic Germans left Romania for Germany in droves, and I was left on the railway station platform helpless and perplexed to witness it.'[7]

The fall of communism produced at least one unhappy result in Romania: After some 800 years of living together with Romanians and other nationalities in this East European country, ethnic Germans began returning to their ancestral homes. Statistics tell the story. In the last communist-era census, taken in 1977, 350,000 Germans were recorded in Romania. By 1992, their population had dropped by two-thirds. By 2002, it stood at 60-80,000, just 0.3-0.4 percent of the country's 22 million people. Several scholars, like George Gutu, a professor of German literature at the University of Bucharest, see this drain of Germans as "an *exodus lethalis* [deadly exodus]" for the German cultural life.[8]

But this is only one part of the story. German life in Romania has been seeing already so many times as being literally dead. This was the widespread opinion after WWI and still more after WWII. Even the Austrian-Hungarian "Ausgleich" of 1867 and the subsequent loss of Saxon privileges evoked feelings of a *Finis Saxoniae*, the end of the Saxons of Transylvania. The earliest apocalyptic prediction even comes from one of the most important politicians of his era, Johann von Herrmann, who was convinced that the reforms introduced by the Austrian emperor Joseph II will without any doubt lead to the definite end of the Saxons in 40 to 50 years.

All these predictions have one thing in common: they originated from outside the remaining German communities of Romania. The remaining Saxons, Swabians and the other groups themselves had a strong will to re-establish and to re-organise what they believed to be their future after 1780, 1867, 1918, 1945 and even now, after 1989. Especially in Western Europe and in Germany there is by

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[4] Interview with Mr. Hansmartin Borger, Sibiu, 24 March 2003.
[5] Stark, 'Heimat in Osteuropa', p. 107-108.
[6] Interview with Professor Paul Philippi, Sibiu, 1 April 2003.
[7] Păduraru, Deutsche Welle, *German Novels*, 24 February 2004.
[8] *Ibid.*

far more written on the *Finis Germanorum* in Romania than it is on the remainders and activities after 1989. It is far too simplistic, to summarise everything happening after 1989 as being the very final chapter of a long history, or to ignore German cultural presence after 1989 completely.

Unfortunately the risk for them to be discredited by wrong assertions as having right wing convictions is rather high, which 'is one of the reasons why the topic of German minorities in Eastern Europe was absolutely feared by post-war German academics'[9].

The DFDR and its role during the democratic start-up 1989-1992

When the DFDR was founded in Sibiu on 28 December 1989, its patrons could not foresee the full extent of the upcoming exodus. Its founders and especially the three members the DFDR had in the 'Provisory Council of National Unity' which preceded the first elected parliament in May 1990 (Dr Hermann Fabini, Sibiu, Dr Thomas Nägler, Sibiu, and Erich Pfaff, Timișoara) wanted to set up an organisation representing the Germans after the revolution in a time they supposed to be the transition to democracy and the change towards a better future. The DFDR should be open to all ethnic Germans, but also to non German individuals who shared the DFDR's aims. This broad basis should help to prevent the return of bad experiences from the past and it should also support the main aim to 'make the Romanian and German governments talk with us and not about us and to help the German minority become more a political subject and less an object of others.'[10]

In doing so, the DFDR should both act as a cultural and as a political organisation, but not as a party. Thus, it is possible for members of the DFDR to join political parties, as long as they do not hold a leading post in them, or in the DFDR.[11] Needless to say, that this nexus of interests can not be easily realised. The aim to act as a voice of the German population of Romania and to look after their vital interests entails a clear political dimension and it seems as if the DFDR became more and more like a political party during the past 20 years. As a minority organisation with one, but only one, MP in the Romanian Parliament it could only ensure its interests to be realised by seeking alliances with major political parties. Having in mind the centralised political system of Romania and the scattered settlement structure of the Germans all around Romania its task becomes even more intense.

Thus, I would argue that the main challenge of the DFDR during the past 20 year of its existence was the conflict between its explicit intention, to act as an a-political organisation, and the necessities of its task and its explicit will to be an active political subject which made it more and more act like a political party. My thesis is that the DFDR's permanent discourse of 'creating an entity in

[9] Seewann, 'Kommunismus und Minderheiten', in: *HZ*, no. 1835 (11 July 2003), p. 5.
[10] Professor Philippi, Guest Lecture, University of Regensburg, 22 November 1998.
[11] This is possible due to § 1, 5 and 11 of the constitution of the DFDR, dating from 1 February 1991.

internal unity and loyalty to the Romanian state' allowed it to combine both aims, although they seem to be so very incompatible with each other. I would argue that in doing so the Saxon tradition of heading towards an 'Ausgleich' with the ruling forces played a major role.

Analysing the relationship between the DFDR and the Romanian state during the past 20 years this issue becomes most essential. Given the relatively tense situation for minorities directly after the revolution of 1989 with the clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians and the exodus of more than 50 per cent of the Germans, the first presidency of Ion Iliescu (1989-1992) was a somewhat problematic period for the DFDR. Its internal structures were yet to be found and its internal recognition was only secured amongst the remaining Saxons of Transylvania. The Swabs of the Banat were not very inclined to recognize this 'Saxon organisation', the Swabs of Satu Mare were just in the process of redefining themselves as Germans and the Bukovina Germans and the Germans of the Regat were still in a deep lethargy. So the first three years the DFDR were in fact confined to Transylvania and there mainly to Sibiu. This fact enhanced the insufficient relationship to the Romanian government in Bucharest. While other minority groups like for example the Hungarians[12], the Roma[13] or the Ukrainians[14] had set up their offices in Bucharest the Germans decided due to their settlement structure and their history to keep their organisational centre in Sibiu. This decision made the communication with the leading circles in Bucharest even tighter. The centralisation of the Romanian administration and the at that time more than unsatisfying transport und telecommunication system even worsened the situation. Having these facts in mind it seems not to be surprising that the DFDR could not implement much of its interests during that period. Successful lobbying was next to impossible and also Germany and Austria had not set up their close relations to the DFDR yet. Moreover, also the partly hostile Romanian minority policy during these first three years of the post-communist era made its contribution to this alienation between the DFDR and the Romanian government. The DFDR's situation could be partly improved by the very good relationship between Germany and Romania. The 'treaty regarding partnership and friendship' between Germany and Romania which was signed on 21 April 1992 included generous provisions and offers a broad range of options for Germany to actively improve the situation of the German minority in Romania. Although the DFDR is not explicitly mentioned, the articles 15 and 16 deal with it indirectly since they guarantee the right of the German minority to organise its post-1989 political life without major Romanian interference. Article 16 even concedes the right to Germany to support her minority by all material and monetary goods which she regards necessary to secure the future of the Germans in Romania. The treaty was designed for the duration of ten years, but it is automatically extended for other five years each time none of the partners ends it beforehand.

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[12] Democratic Hungarian Union of Romania, UDMR, founded on 25 December 1989.
[13] Party of the Roma, PR.
[14] Union of the Ukrainians, UU.

Internally many of the DFDR's decisions were made at the top simply because its membership was just too busy with the process of either leaving the country for good, or with accommodating themselves in what was supposed to be the so-called democratic reality of post-communist Romania, to get really involved. Since also most of its organisational structure was yet to be set into place the membership's involvement in the DFDR's decisions was next to nought and nearly everything was determined from top to down. Given these circumstances, the leadership of the DFDR under the founding president Dr Thomas Nägler, a historian from Sibiu, and its MP Ingmar Brandsch from Mediaş, put its major focus on creating an organisational entity in unity which could speak for the whole German community in Romania and which could also accomplish with the requirements of Romanian law.[15] In doing so one of its first steps was to improve the understanding amongst the different German groups in Romania and to create an effective federally organised apparatus mirroring the very heterogeneous structure of the Germans. This policy could both fulfil the expectations and the psychological feelings of the shaken remaining Germans of getting a 'cultural and political home' in an insecure time as it could satisfy the needs of the Romanian state which wanted to deal with one single partner in settling all issues regarding the German minority.

In particular the Romanians' conflicts with the Hungarian minority during the early 1990s and the shocking reality of the ethnic wars in neighbouring Yugoslavia, made the leadership in Bucharest very sensitive towards all sort of signs of territorial autonomy let alone growing independence. Its main thrive was therefore, to contain such movements as soon as possible. Especially during this period loyalty to Romania was regarded as the most appreciated stance of an ethnic minority. Having manifold internal problems, the Germans could easily fulfil this expectation since they did not head towards regional autonomy, like the Hungarians. Thus, their different aims alienated the Hungarians from the Germans and the German position towards the Romanians was partly seen by the Magyars as being 'collaborationist'. These problems still influence their relationship nowadays. The interests of the 1.7 million Hungarians and that of the then up to 120,000 Germans were just too different to be compatible with each other. Also their attitude towards themselves and their position in Romania is utterly different. The Hungarians still see themselves as being the state's primary people and the Romanians as having taken Transylvania away from them. Most of the Hungarians share the opinion expressed by a representative of the UDMR who said about Romania and the Romanians: 'We did not immigrate into Romania from somewhere. In fact, Romania came to us'.[16] Thus, the presumably unsolvable question 'who was first in Transylvania' becomes most essential between these two ethnic groups. The

[15] Tontsch, p. 160. According to Romanian law the organisations of the National Minorities are not parties, but organisations in the sense of societies. This entails the possibility of stricter controls by the state. Nevertheless, the organisations of the National Minorities are treated like parties when it comes to national and local elections. From: Article 4, chapter 2, of the Law Nr. 68 from 15 July 1992 with regards to elections to the Houses of Parliament, in: Tontsch, p. 195-196.

[16] Meier, 'Zwei verschiedene Minderheiten', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 December 1993, p. 16.

Germans on the contrary, have always been a minority in what is today's Romania. At the latest after the Ausgleich 1867 they accepted their role as being a minority with an explicit minority identity. The Hungarians though, seem as if they still had not accepted the realities of Trianon. Thus, it was also much easier for the DFDR to fulfil the expectations of the Romanian state and of their own people. For the Democratic Hungarian Union of Romania (UDMR) of the Hungarian minority it would have been lethal to seek a compromise of such kind with the Romanians. For the DFDR it was the most successful tactics to pursue an 'Ausgleich' with the Romanians by stressing the Germans' loyalty to the state, more or less mirroring their behaviour with the Hungarian authorities after 1867. Stressing unity as a minority both helped the DFDR and the Romanians who had a strong interest to cooperate with the Germans via one single organisation. In the case of the Hungarians this was completely different since their unity stressed by the UDMR has always been explicitly anti-Romanian, as also the Romanian state developed a more hostile stance towards the UDMR during this early period.

The DFDR and its role during the first official presidency of Iliescu (1992-1996)

In the September 1992 elections the former FSN, now called the DFSN[17], garnered a relative majority of seats in parliament. This was the result of having to compete with the first Prime Minister's (Petre Roman) new opposition party, the 'new' NSF, which gained about 10% of the votes. Since these elections did not provide Prime Minister Nicolae Văcăroiu with an absolute majority in Parliament, the DFSN had to seek some sort of cooperation which was most easily found amongst nationalist and neo-communist groups. To prevent bad publicity raised by this, especially abroad, the DFSN changed its name in July 1993 from DFSN to PDSR. But neither the way of governing the country nor those governing it had changed.

For the DFDR all of this was not very promising. Internally, the first President Dr Nägler had to resign due to serious health problems and also its relationship to the Romanians was becoming increasingly difficult due to the influence of chauvinist parties like Georghe Funar's nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity (P.U.N.R.) and the neo-communist Socialist Labour Party (PSM) on the government's minority policy. Professor Paul Philippi, then professor of Protestant theology at the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Sibiu became the new president of the DFDR. Professor Philippi's main aims were the consolidation of the Germans as an ethnic group, the improvement of their relationship to the Romanians, a better understanding with the Hungarians and other minorities and the DFDR's recognition by Germany and Austria in their relations to Romania. Positive achievements during this period were that the internal organisational structure could be built up and the tensions between the Swabians and the Saxons could be limited. The membership's involvement could also be improved by introducing annual membership summits in Sibiu. Additional regional summits were planned to be

[17] Democratic National Salvation Front.

held on the regional levels in Timişoara, Suceava, Bucharest, Satu Mare and Sibiu. Moreover, the membership was given the opportunity to directly appeal to the DFDR centre in Sibiu. A particular success during these four years was the fact that the DFDR could realise the amendment of the bill regarding veterans of WWII. The new bill now also recognised Germans from Romania who fought in the German Waffen-SS as 'national Romanian veterans' providing them with more generous provisions[18]. The second very important factor which improved the position of the DFDR was the fact that it could secure its seat in Parliament on its own by receiving the necessary number of votes in the 1992 elections. Only the Hungarian UDMR and the 'Democratic Union of the Roma from Romania' managed to do so as well and to win 5 per cent of the votes required for an ordinary seat in parliament.

Interesting enough both successes could be realised because of the DFDR's permanent appeal to be in favour of national unity. The DFDR's slogan that national unity and standing in for minority rights are just two sides of the same medal proved to be successful. In the case of the constituency of Sibiu it could also bargain from the distinctively different identity and self perception of the Transylvanian Romanians who partly seem to have more sympathy for a German from 'amongst them' than for a Romanian from the Regat, where the governing DFSN's candidate came from.[19] In Sibiu the DFDR's aim to represent a minority and the majority was seen as an opportunity for the town's Romanians to bargain from the supposedly special status the DFDR enjoys in Parliament. It seems also as if the specific Transylvanian identity is stronger than the ethnic identities, at least in the case of the Germans and Romanians in Sibiu.

However, one essential aim could not be realised. The Minority Protection Bill the DFDR and the other minorities had brought into parliament in 1993 could not be implemented. This was partly the minorities' own fault because they could not find a common draft to be suggested together with the Hungarians. Those wanted to have far more far reaching provisions in the bill than the small minorities. The Hungarian's demands for territorial and group autonomy rights was unacceptable for the Romanians who were even more sensitive towards such issues, still reminding the clash of Târgu Mureş in 1990. The lack of common position on the side of the minorities made it relatively easy for Romanians to rip off this lack of unity. With regards to another very important issue, the restitution of the expropriated soil and houses, the progress made was more than disappointing. Some Germans were even asked at restitution courts 'whether they had brought their plots with them when they came from Flanders'[20] Given such incidents, it is not surprising that the emigration was still going on between 1992 and 1996. However, these incidents were somewhat softened by the appeal of the first Romanian Prime Minister, Petre Roman, that 'Bucharest is extremely interested that the Germans stay in their home areas and would indeed hope that at least some of them would return.'[21]

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[18] Siebenbürgische Zeitung, year 44, 15 July 1994, p. 1.
[19] See: Mitu, *Geneza identității naționale la românii ardeleni*.
[20] *Siebenbürgische Zeitung*, year 44, 15 September 1994, p. 1 ff.; the case of Susanna Schropf.
[21] *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 11 April 1991, no. 35528.

The DFDR and its role during the presidency of Constantinescu (1996-2000)

The change of presidency and government in 1996 from the post-communist FSN/PDSR to a conservative alliance 'Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR)', consisting of the National Peasants' Party-Christian Democratic (PNȚCD), the Democratic Party (PD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Social Democrat Union (USD) and several other small parties, supported by the UDMR changed many things for the DFDR, but it also was better prepared for political changes than it was in 1992. Professor Philippi's efforts to organise the internal structure in an effective and hierarchal but nevertheless federal structure paid off. The DFDR was very swift in using the chances offered by the new political circumstances. Given this better organisational setup it seems more than surprising though, that the DFDR's election results were less than satisfying. All in all, the 1996 elections were a disaster for the DFDR. The DFDR lost more than 10,000 votes compared with the 1992 elections (1990: 38,768 votes, 1992: 34,685, 1996: 23,888). The constituency of Sibiu could not be won again. Instead the Banat Swabian Horst-Werner Brück could collect more votes in Timișoara than Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock in Sibiu. Brück did not win the constituency of Timișoara, but made use of the 5 per-cent provision for minorities, offered by the Romanian law. The DFDR centre under President Philippi tried to use its setback in a constructive way. Professor Philippi transformed this actual defeat into a signal towards the Swabs of Timișoara to show that the Saxons are willing to share their influence with the other German groups.

This Saxon defeat turned out to be even less problematic for the Saxons since Mr. Brück already gave up his mandate in 1997 to become the new Attaché for economic affairs in the Romanian embassy in Bonn. Therefore, Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock could return into parliament after just one year of absence. On the other side the elections were also a big success for the DFDR. The drastically more minority friendly opposition alliance CDR won the elections and Professor Emil Constantinescu, the Chancellor of the University of Bucharest, was elected president and successor of Ion Iliescu. The CDR incorporated the UDMR into the newly formed government and a Ministry for National Minorities was established which was to be led by a member of the UDMR (György Tokay). Now Professor Philippi's efforts to improve the relationship between the Hungarians and the Germans were paying off. Due to the very close contacts the UDMR had established to Professor Philippi[22] and to the DFDR the State Secretary of the Hungarian Minister was given to the DFDR. This post was handed over to the member of the Forum 'Altreich' (Regat), the Biologist Dr Klaus Fabritius from Bucharest. The Hungarians refused the first nominee of the DFDR, Wolfgang-Eberhard Wittstock who had to pay in this moment for his too friendly stance towards the formerly ruling PDSR. The coming four years turned out to be a big step forward for the DFDR. The overall attitude towards minorities became much

[22] Professor Philippi is fluent in Hungarian.

more open minded and indeed more friendly. Treaties with Hungary and the Ukraine were signed and also the tensions between Hungarians and Romanians could be relaxed. The active involvement of the UDMR in governing the country had its very positive effects. Nevertheless, due to the lack of unity amongst the different minority groups it was still not possible to pass the long prepared minority protection bill in parliament. Also the government's lack of experience in governing the country and the defiant and subtle resistance of the still most influential and ubiquitous communist cadres against government policies made the three conservative Prime Ministers Victor Ciorbea (PNȚCD), Radu Vasile (PNȚCD) and Mugur Isărescu (independent) fail when attempting to solve Romania's most vital problems. Nevertheless, for the DFDR and the other minorities the conservative government was way better than the preceding post-communists and their nationalist allies. Especially the year 1999 brought some very positive results for the DFDR. The proceedings of the restitution of socialised property was regulated and simplified by a law passed in parliament. Many Germans could benefit from this and did not have to go through all instances to get their property back. Nevertheless, there are still cases of discrimination. Internally, the DFDR could move into its newly renovated party centre in Sibiu which is located in a house given back according to restitution law which was owned by the Austro-Hungarian Officers Club of Sibiu before 1944. Aiming for an improvement of its lobbying, the DFDR let the more representative parts of the classicist style manor to the UDMR's and the PNȚCD centres in the county of Sibiu. The large mirror hall was partly let to the municipality of Sibiu for formal receptions and the annex was let to the German-Romanian joint venture 'Frankfurt-Bukarest Bank'. To improve its funds and to reduce its dependence on Romanian and German subsidies further restitutions were renovated and let to other companies. In addition to that the DFDR opened two residences for old aged people and a bookshop[23] for German and Romanian literature which also locates Sibiu's official tourist information. The books and information material are printed in the DFDR's own printing office[24] and published by its publishing house[25]. During these four years the DFDR could definitely benefit from the improved climate towards ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, this was not easy in reality. Professor Philippi's entire diplomatic skills were needed to keep the DFDR on line with the expectations of the Romanians at the top of government and those of the Hungarians who led the Ministry for National Minorities whose direct partner the DFDR was. Now the DFDR's two fundamental principles of stressing internal unity and loyalty towards the Romanian state had to be supplemented by a third, the attempt of seeking an 'Ausgleich' with the Hungarians without endangering the first two vital constants of the DFDR's survival strategy. Especially the politically extremely stormy year of 1998 which saw three Romanian governments also became a year of fundamental changes within the DFDR. Professor Philippi resigned from his post as President after his 75th birthday in November 1998.

[23] Buchhandlung Friedrich Schiller.
[24] Honterus Druckerei.
[25] Honterus Verlag.

Being the DFDR's MP in the Romanian Parliament it was almost a matter of principle that Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock was to succeed him. Due to his political position which is very close to that of the PDSR he both alienated the ruling CDR and especially the UDMR who had rejected him as a state secretary in the Ministry for Minorities in 1996. To remedy this situation, the DFDR's executive committee appointed Professor Philippi for the newly created post of an 'Honorary President' and promoted the President of the German Youth Organisations in Romania[26], Mr. Benjamin Józsa, whose mother is German and whose father is Hungarian as the new 'Personal Referent' of Mr. Wittstock. This signal was well received in Bucharest and Professor Philippi was further on dealing backstage with many sensitive issues regarding the DFDR's relationship to the UDMR and to the DCR.

The DFDR and its role during the second official presidency of Iliescu (2000-2004)

The result of the 2000 elections could not really surprise people with some political experience. A disillusioned population turned back towards supposedly easier solutions and old 'recipes' offered by the post-communist PDSR and its front man Ion Iliescu who also won the presidential elections. The shocking detail which was by far less obvious was, however, that Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the populist leader of the anti-Semitic and extremely nationalist 'Greater Romanian Party' (PRM) could both score second in the presidential elections and in the parliamentary elections. He even forced Iliescu into a second round of the presidential contest. However, the by far most unexpected result of the 2000 elections on the side of the DFDR was its own outcome. With its 40,981 votes it could almost double its votes after the setback of 1996 and it scored 19th of 69 political formations running in these elections. Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock won the constituency of Sibiu and also Sibiu's mandate for the Senate went to a member of the DFDR, Dr Hermann Fabini who was a candidate on the list of the PNL. Nevertheless, sometimes history repeats itself, just with different results. Did the DFDR face an election disaster and get an influential government position in 1996, so was the result 2000 the exact opposite. The election result was fantastic, but the governmental post was gone and with it the whole Ministry for National Minorities. The PDSR established a Ministry for Information of the Public instead and integrated a 'Department for Interethnic Relations' with a State Secretary at the top. This post was given to a Romanian. The DFDR was given an 'Under Secretary', as were the UDMR and the Party of the Roma PR. On the side of the DFDR this post was given to Mr. Ovidiu Ganț (Timișoara). Moreover, five mayors (most importantly Mr. Klaus Werner Johannis, Lord Mayor of Sibiu, four in the Județ of Satu Mare), members of local councils (six seats in the city council of Sibiu and four in the Sibiu Județ council) could be won in the local elections. The interesting fact of these elections is, however, that there is no

[26] Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Jugendverbände, ADJV.

positive discrimination in favour of the DFDR. The DFDR has to win its post in direct competition with other parties. Thus, it is even more impressive and surprising that the DFDR managed to beat the PDSR in Sibiu. In the City Council of Sibiu the DFDR did not put enough candidates on its list since it did not expect such a landslide victory. Thus, it could not claim two of its actually won seats and had to cede them to other parties. Analysing the more than surprising results of the 2000 elections, it becomes once again obvious with regards to the local elections in Sibiu, that many Romanians prefer to support the DFDR and its policy and that they are inclined to decide in favour of a Transylvanian German if they have the choice between a German from amongst them and a Romanian from the Regat. The 2000 elections also had a premier on the field of direct cooperation between the DFDR and the UDMR. Both formations decided to have common lists of candidates in areas where the Hungarians lack strong presence. So the UDMR and the DFDR ran together in the county of Caraș-Severin in the Banat mountain region. On the field of national politics the situation of the DFDR and of the UDMR became again more complicated since the new government under Prime Minister Adrian Nastăse did not assign the same priority to ethnic minorities as the preceding governments used to do. Now the lack of a Minority Protection Law shows all of its negative implications. Especially small minorities are entirely subjected to the government's good will. The 1993 established 'Council for the National Minorities' has only an advisory role for the government and it is in addition to that only able to formulate its proposals in a unanimous mode and cannot remedy the situation. This was also the reason that the UDMR had already left it in 1995 calling it a 'fig leave of the Romanian government'. The only role of this institution is the distribution of government money. This procedure 'reminds more to the Gregor von Rezzori's Maghrebinian Tales than to serious political discussions' as Mr. Hansmartin Borger, the representative of the DFDR, summarises it.[27]

Concluding upon the major changes following the 2000 elections they implicated two major challenges for the DFDR: massive growth of responsibility on the local level and growing support of the population, but decreasing direct options of influencing the Romanian government's policies towards minorities. As paradox it may sound, but these changes did not strengthen the DFDR as many observers have judged it. It weakened its position. The ruling PDSR which renamed itself in PSD[28] in 2002 used all of its influence and central power via the centrally imposed prefects to 'turn local politicians in its favour'. This phenomenon is widely known as 'political tourism' in Romania and strengthens the governing party's position even more. A study of the 'Institute for Public Policy'[29] regarding the dynamics of the party affiliation of mayors in Romania in 2000 and in 2003 shows the massive migration of mayors to other parties. After the local elections of 2000 1,050 mayors of altogether 2,957 mayors (35.5%) were members of the PDSR/PSD. Only three years later the PSD has 1,947 mayors (65.4%, +29.9%),

[27] Interview with Mr. Hansmartin Borger, Sibiu, 22 September 2003.
[28] Social Democrat Party.
[29] Institutul pentru Politici Publice, IPP.

i.e. 897 more than in 2000. Except for the PSD only the UDMR (+1.5%) and the nationalist PUR (+1.0%) could marginally win.[30] All other parties lost essentially to the PDS. This does not seem to happen just by incident. And in fact, also in the City Council of Sibiu such movements are reality. This means that the DFDR mayor Klaus-Werner Johannis hast to find a modus vivendi with the majority since he is judged by the population by his deeds for which he needs the backup of his council. He only gets this support of the council if he makes deals with the PSD majority. Already the old Romans had a proverb for such situations: beneficium accipere est libertatem vendere, to accept benefits means to sell ones liberty.

I would argue that the DFDR sold its last rest of liberty by signing the protocol of cooperation with the DFDR in 2002. Now it manoeuvred itself entirely into the status of a political object of the PSD. The originally very successful tactics of stressing loyalty with the Romanian state as a first duty of a minority combined with a search for alternative partners and the appeal to internal unity exercised by Professor Philippi's leadership throughout six years would have done much better for the future.

Conclusion

Taking into account the development of the relationship between the DFDR and the Romanian state it becomes obvious that the aim of the founders to develop the DFDR into a sovereign voice of the Germans in Romania towards the German and Romanian governments was only partly fulfilled with regards to Bucharest. Although the DFDR was the government's exclusive partner with reference to its citizens of German nationality, this did not provide only advantages for the Germans. Since the DFDR's position is mainly depending on the good will of the government and its financial subsidies and since the status of the DFDR is not secured by a minority protection bill, the only way to take influence on the government's stance is an indirect one. The DFDR's interests are mostly then included into government policies if either Germany and Austria back up the DFDR or if the Romanian government needs its minorities for certain political ends. The Germans have a special role amongst the minorities since they are the third largest group and they have an influential lobby in the west.

Thus, not real active influence makes the DFDR less an object than a subject, but Germany's role or direct Romanian interests improve its status. Certainly, at the end of the day, one might say, this is the same and only results count, but this is only true for the short run. In the long run the DFDR will have to seek alternative avenues of safeguarding its interests.

Concluding, the Romanian tactics of including minorities and especially the Hungarian UDMR into the government has been extremely fruitful. Cooperation and integration of minority organisations into the government provides them with direct access to decision making and therefore enhances their acceptance by both the Romanian majority population as well as by their own constituencies.

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[30] 'Wie demokratisch ist die Sozialdemokratische Partei?', in: *ADZ*, year 12 /no. 2832, 10 March 2004, p. 3.

However, partly Romanian governments also use this situation for 'Divide et Impera' policies vis-à-vis minority organisations. As long as e. g. the DFDR stresses its loyalty and subordination to the Romanian government it is supported in its wishes and problems. Special bonuses like the bilingual place signs which are often refused to the Hungarians, even in towns with Hungarian majorities (e.g. Cluj) are generously granted to the Germans even if they are a tiny minority in the re-named villages and towns. But having in mind the structural weaknesses of the German minority and its low number this combination of stressing unity and loyalty is the only half-way successful option for the DFDR to at least partly realise its interests. Moreover, it is also an option for showing at least some supposedly strength to signal its membership that the DFDR is in fact not an object of others but can successfully represent their interests. This policy of 'showing power' should also contribute to autosuggest strength to its members to stay in Romania.

Nevertheless, drawing a conclusion upon these facts it can be summarised that the DFDR and the remaining Germans have mainly remained to be a political object of others in many political aspects and that they could not consistently develop sufficient means to show independent profile to become a political subject. If it partly does, this is only with special backing up by Germany or on a regional basis in its strongholds (Sibiu, Brașov, Mediaș, Bistrița, Sighișoara, Sebeș, Satu Mare, Radăuți, Vișeu de Sus, Timișoara, Caran-Sebeș and Reșița). However, as the example of Sibiu shows, this can lead to enormous jointly Romanian-German successes like the cultural capital of Europe in 2007.

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BEYOND WESTERN HUMANISM: HISTORY MATERIALISED, RESISTANCE RELOCATED AND THE ALTERNATIVE TRANSLATED

LAYACHI EL HABBOUCH*

Abstract: *The various uses of the notion of history within the scope of western humanism have diverged along the lines of common sense documentation, scientific description, narrative representation and discursive manipulation. While history is viewed by the common sense approach as a set of hard-and-fast facts, which are authorised by the transparency of historical documents themselves, it takes on the configuration of an objective discipline, with the surge of instrumental rationalism characteristic of the Enlightenment, that is thought to be able of formulating historical truths through the efficient use of a scientific method that guarantees their validity, authenticity and reliability. This is why it has become urgent to focus on the textual circulation of the cultural other in discursive situations of cultural encounters with the west, the cultural other as an agent of representation whereby alternative discourses of difference to Orientalism can be discovered, negotiated and interrogated beyond the power hierarchies of Occidentalism as an instance of countrdiscourse.*

Keywords: *Common sense, postcolonial, Enlightenment, Renaissance, Occidentalism, cultural other.*

The debate of whether history is a science or an art has been a contentious field of inquiry in Western academy ever since the eighteenth century. Historians have been systematically and steadily divided between two major orientations that have evolved with radically different approaches. The first, an outcome of the philosophy of enlightenment, has consistently viewed historical writing as a scholarly, scientific discipline. This is while the second has analytically dealt with it as a free act of interpretation and as a tropological exercise of narration.[1] Such a contentiously vital debate is of major critical significance to track, trail and

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[1] Georg G. Iggers, "Historiography between Scholarship and Poetry: Reflections on Hayden White's Approach to Historiography", in *Rethinking History*, vol. 4 Issue 3, Dec. 2000, p. 373-374. Though Iggers offers an illuminating juxtaposition of the two antithetical traditions, he seems more inclined to back up the postmodern position on history, but with critical thinking.

describe the development of the notion of history as has been defined, circumscribed and delimited by Western humanism. This is not meant as an ultimate end to be legitimized, sustained and reinforced, but rather as a crucial background to be not simply reviewed, contextualized and illuminated, but also challenged, re-modified, and resisted in the light of the anti-enlightenment tradition represented by Michael Faulcould, whose "emphasis on power and discourse provides new perspectives on what happened in history".[2]

Before the eighteenth century, historical work was yet intensively and extensively retarded as it fetishised historical documents and showed an obsession with historical facts within the limited perspectives of naïve realism.[3] Such a pre-modern view was mainly founded on the possibility of immediate access to history as a set of definite and final facts. It is worth-noting in this regard, that such a position lacked any theoretical insight and depended heavily on a common sense approach whereby historical documents were not viewed as mediated constructs of the past, but the past itself in its total manifestation and lucid articulation. The eighteenth century, with the rise of instrumental rationalism characteristic of the Cartesian vision constituted the junction at which "a new re-orientation took place in the quality and the character of historical perception and conceptualization, which distinguished modern from pre-modern historical discourse".[4]

With the rise of Western modernity in the eighteenth century, scientific perception of the "objective" world became the most prevalent mode of thinking. That consistent perception was basically founded on the power of human agency as guaranteed by the potential of reason. The new spirit of science totally eradicated the pre-modern mode of thinking, which was essentially based on subjective meditation, religious perception and metaphysical worldview. Due to the emergent discourse of science as a newly self-imposing methodological perspective," the objective" world and the physical environment started to be treated as highly organized phenomena to be studied with a sense of accuracy, precision and exactitude as offshoots to the prevailing paradigmatic discourse of science. Such a shift in perception, launched by the spirit of enlightenment, made the "positivist" view of the world increasingly more dominant and gradually more prevailing. It started with physical sciences, also called exact sciences, which made use of the scientific approach to define their objects of study systematically, rigorously and "objectively". Such a radical transition into a newly "scientific era", which was accompanied within the scope of western humanism by a great confidence in the power of science to

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[2] Peter Jackson, "Why I'm a Foucauldian", in Journal of Social Issues in South East Asia, vol. 21, Issue 1, April 2006, p. 114. Peter Jackson wrote this article as a reaction against Curaming's critique of his Foucauldian perspective to study the modern Thai cultural history. By so doing, he undermines the Derridian perspective Curaming mobilized to critique his work.

[3] Keith Jenkins, *Re-Thinking History*, (London: Routledge 1991), p. 2. it is worth nothing that Jenkins adopts the postmodern version of history.

[4] Georg G. Iggers, "Historiography between Scholarship and Poetry: Reflections on Hayden White's Approach to Historiography", p. 373. It is important to note that Iggers provides some stringent critiques for both modern and postmodern views of history, the most important of which is that history is essentially an act of wrining within both traditions. By doing so, they exclude other forms history and memory that are inscribed in oral sites of representation. Still, he shows a strong inclination towards the promotion of the post-modern perspective.

set up final and clearcut truths through the consistent examination and constant articulation of the underlying principles, crucial rules, and basic laws that organically govern natural phenomena. Hence, the world started to be seen as no longer an ambiguous mystery to be treated with inscrutability, anonymity and obscurity. It was thought, considered, if not believed to lend itself to systematic articulation and "scientific" explanation through the powerful use of human reason.

Ever since the eighteenth century, scientific perception with its "positivist implication", gradually invaded areas of research and fields of study related to man, leading to the foundation of what has become known as human sciences, preferably called human studies if one takes into consideration the challenging re-modification of science as discourse in the post-structuralist paradigm. Within this framework of the transition of the scientific approach from exact into human areas of research, it is generally assumed that "in the eighteenth century there emerged a new way of looking at history which involved new ways of writing history. Although never universally accepted, and increasingly questioned already in the late nineteenth century, this outlook dominated historical writing well into the second half of the twentieth century when it was effectively challenged and widely modified".[5] The newly challenging outlook was noticeably marked by and significantly based on the identification, description and definition of history as an academic and scientific discipline.

With the flowing surge of the scientific method into human areas of research, history acquired, gained and got hold of the confident status of an academic science and a rigorous discipline. Hence, a newly challenging approach to the quality and character of historical perception evolved gradually and consistently to become an established tradition in Western historiography. Such a new approach took a positivist position on history, an outcome of modernism as a movement that emanated from the philosophy of enlightenment, and hence it can be described as a modernist approach. What is peculiar about it is that it broke away from the normally traditional and conventionally common-sense view of history, which was basically informative, and which conceived of historical documents as transparent spaces that reflect the past in its complete totality and inclusive authenticity. By so doing, it set up a radically new vision that was primarily founded on, and chiefly marked by the acceptance, implementation, if not adoption of a scientific method to reconstruct historical truths objectively. Such historian as Jorn Rusen and his students, Horste Water Blank and Freiderich Jeager epitomise this stance as professional academics: history as a scholarly scientific discipline that enjoys total discursive autonomy. Rusen, as Iggers contends,Embeds the history of historical study into the broader historical framework linked to the Weberian conception of rationalization as a key characteristic of the occidental world. Rationalization in the sphere of historical inquiry takes the form of scientification, in the transformation of history into a scientific enterprise, not only in the sense of rigorous scientific conceptualization but also professional organization. Although the science of history, for example in the sense of Rusen who spoke of "elevating history to the rank of a science",

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 388.

is different from the hard sciences in the softer kind of explanations and conceptualizations it employs, it is nevertheless more than merely historical scholarship. For Rusen, three concepts are closely related, "scientification," professionalization and modernization.[6]

Historical writing for Rusen is basically identified and mainly delimited as not simply a scholarly work, but also, and more importantly, as a modern scientific exercise and professional act of academic inquiry. Such attributes of history were but outcomes of and offshoots to rationalization that characterized marked out and defined the enlightenment tradition. Following Compt, the positivist who continued the tradition of instrumental rationalism, as Asa Briggs and Patricia Calvin confirm that, "just as astronomers had found the principles governing the notions of the stars, historians will discover the laws which govern mankind. Nothing is anomalous, nothing is unnatural, and nothing is strange. All is order, symmetry and law."[7] The systematic underlying structures of history as a rule-governed discipline could be defined in clear terms only by the modern professional historian who possesses, adopts, and manipulates a scientific approach to the act of writing history-historiography. Only then would the history of man "be taken out of the hands of "biographers, genealogists, collectors of anecdotes, chroniclers of counts, of princes and of nobles, and would be written only by those whose habits fit then for the task".[8] The key characteristic of scientification was the authorisation and empowering of history to become a "disciplinary matrix" that is commonly unified by a hard and fast mode of analysis of and a definite toolbox for writing the past. The immediate outcome of that perspective is professionalization which guarantees the applicability of the common standards of historical writing, which can be defined and delimited only by an elitist group of academic historians. Only, then, can history be elevated to become a modern science that can analyze its area of research with "objectivity and impartiality".

It is important to stress that historicism, as a modern movement whose major contribution lies in it insistent conception of history as a science, has considerably revolutionalized the field of historiography. It has, at least, re-modified the common sense view of historical objectivity whereby historical discourse was taken to be making a non-problematic and unmediated reference to the past as a real, concrete and tangible entity. In so doing, it has recast, disoriented, if not reoriented historical knowledge to be a construct of the past, but not within the perspective of a direct and immediate access to the past as a real entity in its materiality, but rather within the framework of a rigorous method of analysis-said to be strictly scientific-that can be used efficiently, effectively and productively to recover the ultimate truths of the past as final facts, but only and solely by the community of historians as and elitist group of professional academics. Such a powerfully consistent focus on the method of analysis to reconstruct the past has redefined historiography — the writing of history — to make it abide by the

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6 *Ibid.*, p. 374-375.

7 Asa Briggs and Patricia Clavin, *Modern Europe 1789-1989*, (London and New York: Longman, 1997), p. 199.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

requirements of the systematic study characteristic of scientific disciplines. The ultimate aim behind that powerful consistency has been the reconstruction of the past "objectively and impartially." Hence, historical objectivity becomes, not a product of, or an offshoot to the fetishised document as the immediate locus of truth in its naïve terms, but rather as an upshot to a rigorous mode of analysis that presents itself as a reliable undertaking that defines such truth as a certified, approved, endorsed and authorised entity.

It is worth noting that my use of the notion of history will go beyond the modernist approach which tends to define it as a scientific discipline that enjoys discursive autonomy. This discursive position on history was, in fact, a powerful Western cultural moment which roughly started in the eighteenth century, but developed consistently to become a canonical tradition in the twentieth century. It developed hand in hand with the spread of scientific method into human sciences. For instance, Eliot as a modernist poet and critic, tried to identify the poetic process by projecting a sort of scientific understanding to poetic creation. That led him to coin such an interesting poetic and critical concept as the "objective correlative". Ferdinand De Saussure, on the other hand, was the first to deal with human language in scientific terms. History in this regard, was no exception. Modern historians viewed this new spirit of science as empowering for their field of research. Accordingly, they took up, implemented and adopted a scholarly and scientific approach to articulate history with a sense of discursive autonomy. This Western myth of autonomous disciplines is no longer sustainable nor is it to be taken for granted. Viewing history as a "disciplinary matrix" makes of it an elitist practice that can be articulated only and solely by the professional academic historian. In the times of cultural studies, such hierarchy is no longer tenable, justifiable or even defensible.

Against the above scholarly and scientific position towards history emerged the challenging perspective of postmodernism, best epitomized by such critics and historians as Haydn White. As George Iggers argues,The key assumption on which White's argument in meta-history rests is that in any field of study not yet reduced (elevated) to the status of genuine science, thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode in which it seeks to group the outline of objects inhabiting its field of perception the knowledge. The consequence is [...] that the knowledge at which the historian arrives is conditioned by the linguistic mode in which he\she operates. In choosing conceptual strategies by which to explain or represent his data... the historian performs an essentially poetic act, in which he prefigures the historical field and constitutes as a domain upon which to bring to bear the specific theories he will use to explain "what was really happening.[9]

This statement clearly shows that White, according to Iggers, has gone beyond the scientific, or rather pseudo-scientific approach to history into a more poetic view of it. Like other new historicists, he has consistently backed up the notion of reconstructing history as an act of interpretation that is founded on free creativity

[9] Georg G. Iggers, "Historiography between Scholarship and Poetry: Reflections on Hayden White's Approach to Historiography", p. 376.

and narrative inventiveness. Accordingly, the past turns out to be, indeed is converted to be merely a set of tropes and a collection of figures that are arranged, ordered and reimagined by the historian to perform an essentially poetic act of relative re-interpretation or tentative reconstruction of the pasts. As Noël Carroll argues, "history (history writing) is first and foremost a verbal artefact, therefore, an apt object of scrutiny from the perspective of literary theory."[10] The underlying implication of such a postmodernist statement is that the historian has to manipulate the language of the literary critic to be able to do his work with efficiency and demonstrate pertinence. This is because, as Carroll further argues, "historical writing involves figures of speech, such as metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, history and irony."[11] This basically essentialist aspect of figuration that marks out language is what actually makes immediate access to historical reality in its material form unfeasible, impracticable, if not almost impossible. Equally important, it denies the possibility of approaching the past as a site that can be reconstructed scientifically, objectively and impartially.

Due to the central role language plays in the act of writing history, post-modern historians such as White assume that history is a verbal mode of discourse that should be studied and analyzed as a set of figures and a collection of tropes. Accordingly, as Marshall Grossman, explaining White's position, puts it, "no history can be evaluated without attention to the explanatory implications of the narrative form, which is imposed on the data, not immanent in it"[12]. It is important to note in this regard that the analysis of narrative strategies becomes very essential for the reconstruction of the past as a fundamentally linguistic construct, which is founded on a perpetual "displacement of meaning from the level of referentiality to a level of secondary signification, in this case the underlying narrative structures of historical discourse".[13]

The major contribution of the post-modern view lies in its perpetually insistent emphasis on the idea of writing history as an act of interpretation that is forever displaced, re-modified and re-inscribed as an infinite continuum of reconstructed myths. Such a plural perspective remains a privilege to be taken seriously in that both the factual as well as the scientific approaches to historical reality is subverted, critiqued and fragmented into a contradictory set of linguistic representations and narrative constructs. Yet, it runs the risk of reducing the past into a set of myths or a collection of linguistic games. The tentative conclusion to be drawn is that the post-modern position on history essentializes the tropological nature of language and fails to see into the material processes that shaped up the past

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[10] Noël Carroll, "Tropology and Narration", in *History and Theory*, vol. 39, October 2000, p. 396.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

[12] Marshall Grossman, "Hayden White and Literary Criticism: The Tropology of Discourse," in *Language & Literature*, vol. 17, Issue 4, Fall 81, p. 425. By adopting White's postmodern position on history, Grossman reinforces the position of the literary critic as a privileged authority on the articulation of history. By so doing, he fails to see history as an act of interpretation that is inscribed in sruggles over power and representation. Hence, writing history becomes more complex if we take into consideration the overlapping processes of definition and exclusion that further complicate historical agency.

[13] Wulf Kansteiner, "Hayden White's Critique of the Writing of History", in *History & Theory*, vol. 32, Issue 3, 1993, p. 274.

as a site of struggles over power and representation. By so doing, it becomes a mere aesthetic perspective that fails to foreground the political significance of the past as a discursive space of struggles over power and the act of representation itself. The historian is guided, directed and led by the primary concerns of the literary critic who is able to deploy and make use of his literary and linguistic box of tools to analyse the narrative strategies characteristic of history telling. That is to say, the historian's construction, or rather reconstruction of the past can be hampered, troubled and held back by his or her failure to manipulate, master and control the language of literary criticism.

Before moving into the Faucouldian perspective of history, not as an end in itself, but rather as a means to bridge the transition into the postcolonial position, it is important to note that both the modern and the post-modern attitudes towards history remain essentially Eurocentric. History is not a context-free, timeless objective discipline, nor is it a mere verbal act of narration. It is rather a discourse that forcefully involves exercises of power and systematically overlaps with other modes of expression and modalities of representation. It is flexible and mobile enough to the extent that it can be reconstructed and reinvented through texts, not necessarily historical, as discursive spaces of power that manifest complex processes of inclusion and exclusion. This view which undermines the idea of a clear-cut definition of history is what Foucault renders with subtlety when he states: "Perhaps history has no place, in fact, among the human sciences, or beside them: it may well be that it maintains with them all a relation that is strange, undefined, ineffaceable, and more fundamental than any relation of adjacency in a space would be"[14].

Viewing history as "the mother of all the sciences of man," Foucault redefines it to be an indefinite modality of representation or an indeterminate mode of expression that can find its articulations in various disciplines and diverse discourses. What makes the Foucauldian view of history powerfully pertinent is his highlight of its involvement in power struggles as a mobile and flexible form of knowledge. Going beyond the structuralist teleology that views history as a subject or a discipline that can reconstruct the past objectively and impartially, Foucault refers to history as a "space of power" and a "field of force" where all modalities of representation and forms of expression involve ways of organizing the past by some authoritative agencies, whereby the quest for privileges motivate specific inscriptions and particular configurations of truth. Such constituencies subtly include as well as exclude certain modalities of truth; they emphasize as well as peripherize some consistent ways that reinforce the interests and privileges of those who control the act of representing history.[15]

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[14] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, Trans. Archivi Alinari (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), p. 367.

[15] Jamal Eddine Benhayoun, *Narration, Navigation and Colonialism: A Critical Account of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century English Narratives of Adventure and Captivity*, (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2006), p. 36. I had an interesting debate with J. Benhayoun whose insightful remarks were very useful to the discussion of the notion of history in the Foucaultian perspective. I just keep wondering why he should end his book with a statement on Foucault.

It is true that Foucault did not dedicate any specific work to deal with history as such, but his contribution lies primarily in going beyond White's position to liberate history from the mythical constraints of the tropological strategies of narration and the figurative mechanisms of storytelling. He shows a perpetual interest in the genealogical aspects of discourse and the institutional foundations of forms of truth that are inseparably enmeshed in exercises of power and acts of authority. His primary focus is on the correlation between knowledge, truth and power: Truth is not outside power [...] it is reproduced only by virtue of multiple forms or constraints-each society has [...] Its general politics of truth, that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and the procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.[16]

History as a form of knowledge gets the status of discourse whereby truth becomes a set of organized rules that produce, regulate, delimit, and circumscribe a complex series of statements of power. It is the power of social and cultural institutions at the background which draws lines between what is true and what is not. This process of inclusion and exclusion, brings the debate full circle back to the problematic interlinks and challenging correlations between discourse, history, society and power. This extremely important perspective of Foucault was at the genesis of the rise of postcolonial consciousness as a set of discursive, critical and cultural practices that are politically mobilised to undo, unlearn, indeed subvert and critique the predictably mainstream linearities and conventionally normalised legacies of Euro-centrism. As Iain Chambers contends,The post colonial invokes a historical and theoretical encounter in which all are invited to review and reconsider their worldly and differentiated position in the articulation and administration of historical judgment and cultural definitions. Here the post colonial presents itself as a theoretical and political space that permits the excavation of the ground of the occidental knowledge, as both an arrangement of disciplines and a specific historical disposition of truth [...] it is that history that constructed "my home," permitting me to speak; and it is commencing from that history that I seek to respond and acquire a responsibility.[17]

As a critical voice and intellectually critiquing position the postcolonial vision is mainly founded on and basically marked by the critical revision and the revisionist critique of occidental knowledge, not as an ultimate end in itself, but as a means to critically revisit, reinvent, if not bring into the limelight the suppressed histories and the subaltern cultures that Western humanism has consistently subjected to various forms of domination, subjugation and exclusion. By so doing, history is not to be viewed as "merely partial. It is also partisan".[18] With the politics of location in mind, the postcolonial historical subject has no other way out but

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[16] Keith Jenkins, *Re-Thinking History*, p. 31-32

[17] Iain Chambers, "History after humanism: responding to postcolonialism," *in Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 2, Issue 1, Apr., 99, p. 37.

[18] Michael Hardt, "The eurocentrism of history", in *Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 4, Issue 2, Jul., 2001, p. 243.

to rewrite his or her own displaced, distorted and forgotten history whereby European archives are not to be viewed as ultimately final, true and accurate, but rather to be studied, analysed, negotiated and interrogated as sites of representation that can allow for retrieved otherness and recovered difference: There is no longer an outside to the history of Europe nor an outside to the history of capital. The histories of all regions of the world tend to be conceived as moments, repetitions, or permutations of the history of Europe... all histories in other words tend to be mediated by the history of Europe. Historical thought itself, or at least its dominant academic mode, has thus become an agent of Eurocentrism.[19]

Though the history of Europe, an outcome of Western humanism, tends to be taken for granted as totalizing, universal and final, such a worldwide ideological import is not to be passively reinforced, unreceptively fostered and submissively legitimized. It could critically be resisted, discursively subverted and expansively re-modified, not out of an ethical "enmity" characterising Occidentalism, but rather out of belated productivity marking out postcolonialism, that is to say, it is possible to reproduce, reinvent, recover and retrieve the other histories that have been silenced, suppressed and misrepresented by European historical and cultural processes of biased domination and one-sided archiving. The political aim of such discursive resistance is "to provincialize Europe — to displace it from the center of our conception of historical time, to refuse its universal mediation".[20]

The ground breaking work which started that process of redefining Western humanism is said's *Orientalism*. It is undeniable that this seminal work is at the genesis of what is known now as postcolonial studies. All that has followed by such critics as Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, Khalid Bekkaoui, Jamal Eddine Benhayoun and many other postcolonial critics are but footnotes to Said's vision of resistance to Euro-centrism. That insightful vision of resistance to Euro-centrism is a critical and political ambition that has re-oriented academic research to take a serious critical interest in the relationship of power between East and West, the Self and the other as perpetuated by the Orientalist discourse. Said's use of the concept discourse in the Foucauldian sense to study the phenomenon of Orientalism has an important political implication. As is well-known, Foucault's whole project is meant to critique the whole Western legacy of enlightenment as a complex network of modern statements on human agency, reason and power. As an anti-enlightenment philosopher, Foucault focuses on the birth of modern institutions and highlights the way they create instances of the Other (of reason) such as woman, fools and patients. It is important to note, however, that the Other of Europe within Foucault's work is yet the product of European rational subjectivity itself.

Edward Said, with a post-colonially inflected consciousness, makes use of, transforms and relocates Foucault's paradigm of discourse and power to redefine the notion of the Self and the Other from the perspective of the excolonised. The Other of Europe is modified to be the Orient as an offshoot to European enlightenment and colonialism. That postcolonial critical awareness marks the embryonic stage

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 243.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

that has started the whole process of postcolonialism as a set of discursive, cultural and critical practices meant to redefine, challenge and destabilise Eurocentrism. The major contribution of Said is his critique of Orientalism as a mode of representation that has led to colonialism. Such a vision is challenging, innovative and ambitious but Said's mode of analysis remains unitary, homogenous and essentialist. His extensively-known limitation is his consistent denial of the native's resistance. The Orient for Said,was silent, available, to Europe for the realization of projects that involved but were never directly responsible for the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images or more descriptions devised for it. Earlier I called such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental silence the result of and the sign of the West's great strength, its will to power over the Orient[21].

Said's claim is that the Western subject entertains an almost timeless position of power, whereas the native other turns out to occupy a position of an almost total silence. Homi Bhabha is among the first postcolonial critics to significantly react against, destabilise and interrogate Said's vision of the native's powerlessness, helplessness and vulnerability. For him, according to Khalid Bekkaoui, "the native manages to dismantle the edifice of colonial authority and create [...] a space which is closed to the paranoid position of power, beyond the reach of authority."[22] Although Bhabha manages to locate resistance as a discursive feature within the colonial text, he reduces resistance into just an effect in the colonizer's split up imagination. By so doing, he fails according to Bekkaoui to locate resistance as a self-conscious political act whereby the native interrupts, disturbs and reorders Western hegemony and manages to achieve mastery.[23]

The above cited discursive practices of resistance have consistently developed into an established tradition, whose common political aim is undoing, dismantling and critiquing Euro-centric political, cultural and historical practices of representation and power. They belong to, indeed form part and parcel of the conventional post-colonial stance, whose major critical focus has been on the subversion of colonial discourses and critique of Orientalist representations with a perpetual attempt to destabilise colonial power and retrieve the native's points of view. That is an extremely interesting postcolonial critical tradition that has to continue, targeting both colonial and postcolonial contexts with the aim of disrupting imperial ideologies, reordering colonial archives and unsettling western powerbased images and tropes of the self and the other that are basically founded on hierarchy and exclusion.

Nevertheless, due to the urgency of the contemporary troubled reality of conflict and confrontation between Islam and the West, a new opening up in postcolonial

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[21] Edward Said, „Crisis [in Orientalism]." In David Lodge, ed., *Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader*, p. 295-309. Longman,1988.retrievedfrom:http://sun3.lib.uci.edu/~scctr/Wellek/said/1988.html

[22] Khalid Bekkaoui, *Sings of Spectacular Resistance, the Spanish Moor and British Orientalism*, (Casablanca: Najah El Jadida, 1998), p. 63. Bekkaoui's consistent focus on locating sites of resistance within colonial texts aims at retrieving the native's point of view. That tradition of the subversion of colonial discourse from within is an important critical stance. Yet, I do believe that another tradition of subversion from without is urgently needed to widen the postcolonial perspective: subversion through focus on alternative discourses of difference in subaltern texts, cultures and histories.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

political practices of reading is urgently required to renegotiate difference between the East and West, and the Self and the Other. This new postcolonial critical opening up has to re-modify the notion of resistance against Euro-centrism. Resistance from within is on the move, fostering the tradition of subversion, and reinforcing the paradigm of counter-discourse to colonialism. Yet, resistance from without has to find its place to fortify a new tradition of alternative discourses to Orientalism. Hence, it is considerably important to switch from the way Westerners represent Muslims, for instance, into the other way around. In so doing, the native is elevated to the status of the cultural "Other", an agent of representation. However, this is not meant to legitimise the Occidentalist perspective, which is, in fact, derivative of the legacies of power inherent in Orientalism.

It is revealing to go back to Said's approach to Orientalism as discourse whereby the Oriental Other is reduced into a mere object of study for Westerners to be controlled, dominated and subjugated. Such an objectifying stance has become vulnerable to challenge. Said himself, due to various critiques of Orientalism, re-modifies his notion of the native's silence into the culture of resistance as a new perspective in *Culture and Imperialism.*[24] This alternative corrective is premised upon the principle of exteriority that is temporally definite, the postcolonial context in its chronological sense. Resistance in this regard becomes an act of rewriting colonial narratives with the aim of striking back. Using what he calls "contrapuntal reading", Said re-orients his position on resistance to interrupt, redefine, and recast colonial texts from the stand point of postcolonial writings as counter-narratives. Indeed, Said engages in "contrapuntal reading, reading back from the point of view of the colonized."[25] That is an extremely important critical modification as an upshot to autoreflection and self-evaluation. Yet, it remains confined, constrained and circumscribed by the specific temporality of the postcolonial moment as a belated point of departure to re-read or rather rewrite the colonial legacy from the perspective of the excolonised' suppressed native other, a moment of belated discovery that is motivated and inspired by the crippled aspirations of postindependence liberation, the frustrating ambitions of national emancipation and the disappointing disillusionments of third world deliverance from colonial cultural representations. Accordingly, Said's view of "resistance from outside" is governed by his exclusive focus on colonialism and its aftermaths to the exclusion of the pre-colonial Renaissance times. Indeed, the Renaissance period was marked out by powerful cultural stereotypes that characterized Western discourses on Otherness, and extensively legitimized colonialism as a potential project, a political reality later.

Postcolonial writers like Taib Salah and James Ngugi, who adopt the strategy of subversion, wrote their narratives to dismantle Western stereotypes that

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[24] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 255. Tayb Salih's *Season of Migration to the North* for instance is articulated by Said as a counter-narrative that re-writes Joseph Conrad's *The Heart of Darkness*.

[25] Mortimer Mildred, "Edward Said and Assia Djebar: a contrapuntal reading", in *Research in African Literatures*, vol. 36, no. 3, Fall 2005, p. 58. What this article tries to do is to read Djebbar and Said's personal trajectories (Contrapuntally). Mortimer applies Said's concepts, namely the concept of contrapuntal reading to articulate the Algerian novelist's writings.

matched the process of colonialism with a heavy consciousness of striking back. Pre-colonial writers such as Ahmed Bin Quasim Al-Hajjari, in his interesting travel narrative, *Kitab Nasir al-Din ala al-quawm al-kafirin* (1611-1613)[26], for instance, on the other hand, adopt a similar strategy, but to dismantle those same stereotypes which efficiently legitimized that very same process. Yet it is important to highlight that there are, at least, two major qualitative differences between the two situations and stances. First, while postcolonial writers wrote against "the solid background" of mainstream colonialist texts, pre-colonial writers wrote against the "soft background" of their Western-based experiences of travel and cultural encounter with the Christian other. Second, whereas the formers took the strategy of counter-narration as an end to reinforce counter discourses to Western hegemony and power, the latter adopted a similar strategy, but as a means to promote alternative discourses of difference to the Orientalist mindset. The tentative conclusion to be drawn is that Said's framework of "resistance from outside is to be extended to include counter-narratives of resistance against Western power that emerged during the pre-colonial era, interestingly enough from an outside cultural tradition whereby the oriental other takes the position of agency and hence controls the act of representation: such a vision can help think beyond the discursive confinements and constraints of the colony and displace its centrality via the circulation of alternative discourses of cultural difference in the construction of the self and the other.

The investigation of Arab and Moroccan travel narratives on the west could be at the genesis of a new form of resistance against the power structures characterising Orientalist discourses of difference that are based on hierarchy and exclusion, and which are yet in heavy circulation both within global settings as well as local contexts, religious and political discourses of violence that tend to reproduce the old images that associate Islam with brutality, backwardness and evil. Such a challenging perspective urges the necessity of taking circulation as a point of departure to provide alternative discourses of difference on global scales to the mainstream linearities and conventional legacies of Orientalism. However; this is not meant to promote the occidentalist vision which appropriates the powerbased polarities of colonial discourse as if the whole process was meant to reverse the Manichean oppositions inherent in Orientalism as a set of ethnic, linguistic and cultural modalities of representation and modes of disvision. The ultimate aim is rather to subvert, destabilise and critique such an essentialist view of cultural difference. That brings into focus the critical importance of translation as a resourcefully intercultural act of transnational negotiation, an effectively per-formative process of glocal exchange and a shaping practice of

[26] Ahmed Bin Quasim al-Hajari, *Kitab Nasir al-Din ala al-quawm al-kafirin* (1611-1613) in Nabil Matar's *In the Lands of the Christians: Arabic Travel Writing in the Seventeenth Century*, New York: Routledge, 2003. This is assumed to be the first Moroccan travel experience to Europe which inaugurated Moroccan travel tradition on the west, which is marked out by dialogue with the Christian other from the position of defeat. It is amazing how Bin Quasim engages in a religious and cultural dialogue with his Christian and Jewish counterparts without showing denunciation, and demonstrating versatile knowledge about both Christians and Jews. This is unlike his counterparts, who show a lot of cultural stereotypes about Muslims.

efficiently cultural dialogue between the self and the other, the west and the Muslim world, the global and the local, the victorious and the vanquished.

Nabil Matar's basically introductory, but influentially seminal work of translating Arabo-Islamic experiences of travel to Europe into English as a global language, a forgotten archive, for instance, could be said to be at the genesis of such a new critical opening up[27], which, first and foremost, aims at undoing and deconstructing Bernard Lewis' postulated assumption that Muslims have historically lacked interest in and curiosity about the Christian Other. As he argues, "it is all the more remarkable that, despite the long confrontation of Islam and Christendom across the Mediterranean from Spain through Cecily to the Levant, there should have been such a complex lack of interest and curiosity among Muslim scholars about what went on beyond the Muslim frontiers in Europe."[28] This is evidently an essentially culturalist postulation that is meant to promote, endorse and reinforce the "clash of civilisations thesis", which is itself meant both politically and academically, in turn, to further legitimise western forms of power and maintain neo-colonial configurations of knowledge in extensively and intensively heavy circulation. Such an essentialist and fetishlike assumption seems to be consistently aestheticised, constantly depoliticised and thoroughly decontextulised to be effective through an efficiently systematic coalition between academic research, which deploys the myths of objectivity and impartiality characteristic of scientific discourse, and political decision making, which makes use of such myths to authenticate, authorise, and sustain the credible and believable fictions, indeed the effectively mediatized and efficiently performative facts, of the new empire: an empire that defines itself against Islam as the potential threat that is to be kept under total surveillance.

The contemporary troubles of conflict and violence between Islam and the west call for the urgency of constant negotiation, perpetual interrogation and long-lasting deconstruction of Muslim position on the problematic issue of cultural difference. Such negotiation and interrogation processes can be more efficient and performative if they are based on cultural foundations and historical bases. This is possible through the systematic translation and consistent publication of Arabo Islamic texts where cultural encounters with the west are documented, saved and recorded. Such circulation would be useful to go beyond the western stereotypical view of the Muslim other whereby cultural prejudices are tested against the background of textual, discursive and cultural representations that

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[27] Nabil Matar's, *In the Lands of the Christians: Arabic Travel Writing in the Seventeenth Century*, New York: Routledge, 2003. This book remains a seminal point of departure to relocate the postcolonial paradigm of resistance that is meant to destabilise the power structures of colonial discourse. By translating some Arabo Islamic travel narratives on the west into English as a global language, Nabil Matar aims at promoting dialogue between the west and the Muslim world on cultural and historical foundations, a critical opening up that goes beyond the ethical, religious and political views on such dialogue, which remain flattening and reductive in that they homogenise differences and aetheticise contradictions and inconsistencies.

[28] Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, (New York & London: Norton, 1982). It was this book which led Nabil Matar to translate Arabo Islamic travel texts on Europe in his *In the Lands of the Christians: Arabic Travel Writing in the Seventeenth Century.That is meant to subvert and critique Beranrd Lewis's assumption that Muslim scholars have always lacked interest in and curiosity about Christian Europe.*

keep shifting according to the circumstances of history and politics. So, the translation and publication of such Arabo Islamic texts as discursive sites of cultural encounters with the west on global scales can transform, make over and modify the mutually separatist discourses of difference between Islam and the west. By so doing, the dialogue goes beyond the aesthetic inclinations of politicians and the ethical tendencies of religious communities into the cultural dimensions of academics and critics, and by extension of media promoters and people, that are founded on continuities as well discontinuities in the complex course of history, dimensions that can help remodify and reshape people's modes of interaction and practices of communication in their everyday lives.

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CONVERSATION IN MODERN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY

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"For to be free and to act are the same."
Hannah Arendt

Abstract. *Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Hannah Arendt developed challenging ideas about conversation in modern social and political theories. Habermas's shift of concern is clear from hermeneutical theory at first, to rationality, following in the lead of enlightenment claim to a universal reason and principles, is aimed to support his arguments for the dignity and the right of man through communicative and conversational activity. Rorty's radical pragmatism and relativism led him to attack any universal principle whether it calls itself reason or truth or principle. In What is Freedom? Hannah Arendt's argument is in line with the idea of conversation in the above sense, but different in that her approach to it is genealogical.*

Keywords: *Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Hannah Arendt, social and political theory.*

Introduction

Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Hannah Arendt developed challenging ideas about conversation in modern social and political theories. Habermas's shift of concern is clear from hermeneutical theory at first, to rationality, following in the lead of enlightenment claim to a universal reason and principles, is aimed to support his arguments for the dignity and the right of man through communicative and conversational activity. Rorty's radical pragmatism and relativism led him to attack any universal principle whether it calls itself reason or truth or principle. It is on this basis that Rorty prefers the use of words such as "useful", "better" and "justifiable", replacing others such as "good", "rational" and "true". For Rorty, as for analytic philosophers, it is through re-description, creation and reinvention of new uses of words in place of old concepts in conversation, that evolution is

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achieved gradually in human culture. Following Richard Dawkins's concept of meme with analogy to replicating genes in biology, Rorty makes use of it by extending its important role in what he calls cultural politics. In *What is Freedom?*, Hannah Arendt's argument is in line with the idea of conversation in the above sense, but different in that her approach to it is genealogical. Arendt's traces the origin of the concept of freedom in the sense of concrete practice and as fact, to show that it appeared with Christianity as an inner experience of will power, only to become later as mere security in political theory. In the above essay, Arendt presents the idea of public space and freedom by inverting the late antiquity concept of freedom as the realm of inner space, into a public and concrete shared space, defined as an act in so far as the subject of politics is praxis, and its raison d'être is freedom as primarily experienced action.

A — To begin with, Habermas' conception of rationality means that reason can no longer be grounded transcendentally, as if it were necessary for the possibility of human experience and communication. For modern man, rationality exists as aesthetic as well as communicative. His early conception of aesthetic rationality constitutes a bridge to link the gap between discursive reflection and lived experience. His dialectical presentation of modern philosophy from Marx to Freud is clear in his book *Erkentis und Interesse*. Later his interest in everyday affairs and in the importance of language in conversation, stands in opposition to theories in natural sciences. That is to say, for him social theories focus on inter-subjectivity and conversational practices. For him the validity of social theoretical paradigm is never decided solely on the basis of empirical evidence but also by its capacity to interpret contributions of tradition to give rise to new possibilities of meaning for society today.

From Descartes till Heidegger, most of Western philosophical tradition is turning around the subject or theory of knowledge, namely those philosophers who propounded systems: from the cogito, to Leibniz's *Monadology*, Kant's critical project of limits of human reason, along Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's *Dasein*. Western philosophy was a philosophy of subjectivity. With Habermas, there is the emergence of a new orientation away from the concern with subjectivity. The latter is opened on inter-subjectivity, but still under Kant's universal claims of rationality. He was struggling to grips with the central paradox of modern life in the loss of freedom, meaning and respect for human dignity. He is deeply affected in his youth, as were others, by the postwar trauma and finds in Schelling reconciliation between nature and spirit that offers a critique of dualism (subject versus object or res *cogitans virsus res extensia*) as is advanced by Descartes and Heidegger. It is Nietzsche who directs his attention to the fact that alienation and decadence of modern age as social rather than metaphysical cause. Therefore, he turns to a systematic effort to found social practices on the basis of social critique in a theory of knowledge-constituting interest. He is convinced that communicative action is the proper way to resolve the problem of fragmentation and alienation and to invent new possibilities for social rationality that is conversational and based on mutual understanding, consensus, rather than on Descartian dualism and violence.

Throughout his works he is interested in how social integration is possible. The latter may take place between two persons, and may be enlarged to association in civil society and to the whole society at large. The possibility of integration as such, may be achieved only in public space. Surely he is brining to earth the dream of the idea of universal peace and of society of nations that Emmanuel Kant proposes in his *Idea of Universal History*. In Habermas's main work, *Theory of Communicative Action*, just as in *Ethics of Discussion* and *Ethics and Communication*, he attempts to construct a theory of communication in place of the philosophy of consciousness and the theory of knowledge. This is what he calls the use of rationality in public space. In his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, he attacks all theories that do not aim at or believe in the possibility to achieve communication and understanding of different active agents as speakers who try to convince, and active hearers who are listening and arguing. In his article, "Explanation of the Concept of Communicative Action", Habermas attempts to clarify his social theory by presenting the basic concepts on which he builds it, namely, mutual understanding, consensus, teleological act (*Zwecktatigkeit*), world of life (*Lebensweld*), and strategic act.

His critique of the philosophy of consciousness lies in the fact that it does not develop a clear idea of social action, but remained limited to the classical Aristotelian conception of it as teleological act that so many modern philosophers call the ethics of prudence, aiming (Zweck) at success or felicity only. Habermas distinguishes between different modes of actions, only to posit the communicative one that plays the most important role, since it is related to language as much as to tradition and culture. He acknowledges the basic role of social action from the point of view of those engaged in discussion, for the sake of mutual understanding in itself, rather than within the view of the approach of the theory of action that considers it from the point of view of the subject of consciousness. In this connection, Habermas calls the instrumental action aiming at success, when it is considered as technical rules, effective to the extent of their merging with things and events; he calls a strategic action that aims at success, when we consider it as rules for rational choices, evaluating its efficiency according to its influence on the decisions of rational partners; finally he calls communicative action, when the levels of the aims of the partners engage in communication not related to basic needs of both but in relation to acts of mutual understanding.

The role of conversation for Habermas then means reciprocity and more freedom from constraints that are present in normative regulating ideal speech in the communicative action, as in the pragmatics of Wittgenstein, Austin, Searl and the truth function semantics of Carnap, Dummet and others. Recognizing the difference of methodology in sciences, he claims rationality for methodology in social sciences when he defends "the possibility of objectivity and rationality in interpretation"[1]. His reflection in the nature of elocutionary speech acts, posits the primacy of conversational over strategic action.

Rorty shares with Habermas his concern in politicizing epistemology, that is

[1] David Ingram, *Habermas and Dialectic of Reason*, (London: Yale University 1987), p. xv.

to say, surpassing the theory of knowledge within the subject, to ethical and political interaction with others. Therefore it turns out to be that what matters "to the search for truth to be the social (and in particular the political) conditions under which that search is conducted, rather than the deep inner nature of the subjects doing the searching"[2]. Habermas's philosophy of inter-subjectivity inscribes itself in a project that does away with reflection that looks inwards as that of Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics and Derrida's critique of logo-centrism. Like Habermas, Rorty argues that what is wrong with the project of reflection, is that it hopes to do what can be achieved only by expanding the transmission and circulation of new uses of words and enlarging the scope and membership of a conversation. Thus, the philosophy of inter-subjectivity does not take metaphysical truth, nor inner refection for its *telos;* rather, it centers on a practice characteristic of liberal societies when it treats as valid what can be agreed upon by the public, articulated conversationally, leading to consensus. It does not delve into the privacy of subjects; instead, it goes straight to the public concern.

B — Since Wittgenstein's considerable contribution to philosophical logic relates to what he calls "the problem of life", with emphasis on how we use concepts in daily life, philosophy started to be activity rather than theory. That is to say, its task is confined to logical clarification of thought, as Wittgenstein makes it clear in proposition 4-III in his *Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus*. Later analytic philosophers shifted from logical investigations or logical positivism, to focus on language games and on multiple contexts and diversity of uses in language, where the content of an assertion varies from utterer to another and from audience to another. The noticed variability of language uses makes such entities as intrinsic properties impossible. That is why Wittgenstein attempts in his early phase to try to articulate the idea of a universal grammar of language, in order to make speakers aware of facts, attracting attention to the idea that all matters are, above all, a linguistic affair, in his mathematical and systematic theory, which is based on the problem of meaning. Wittgenstein observes that philosophical discourse is shown to be nonsense: In his above mentioned work he said that" La plus part des propositions et des questions qui ont ete ecrites touchant les matieres philosophic ne sont pas fausses, mais sont depouvues de sens"[3]. Similarly, Quine suggests that "the very notion of "meaning" was a hangover of Aristotelian essentialist"[4].

Following the achievements of the linguistic turn and the analysis of concepts that modern philosophy after Wittgenstein focuses on, Rorty explains that analytical view of concepts is, like persons who are never the same twice, always developing. According to Rorty, one can change concepts only by changing usages, but one can not get a concept right once and for all. He very often refers to the inferentialist philosopher, like Robert Brandon. The latter who shows in his book, *Making It*

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[2] Richard Rorty, '*Habermas, Derrida, and Philosophy*', in *Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 309.

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, trans. Gilles Gaston Granger, (Paris: Gallimar, 1992), p. 51.

[4] Richard Rorty, "*Analytic and Conversational Philosophy*" in *Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers*, volume 4. Cambridge, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 122.

Explicit, "that our knowledge of objects makes almost no reference to experience"[5] and that concepts, on the model of person, help philosophy of language to be built on the claim that a content of a sentence is in constant flux and change. On this view, the inference drawn from a sentence is the only content it has. According to Brandon, inferential properties are not built into a structure of language; rather, they are always changing as individuals and communities revise and change their patterns of linguistic behavior. Therefore, analytic philosophers do not more than describe usages, and perhaps make recommendations of change, by reinventing and allowing for possible ways to create new words that maybe taken up in usual conversations and consequently will be added to the repertoire enriching cultural conversations and communication.

Rorty argues that the view of Brandon would force one to give up the notion that concepts such as" knowledge" or "morality" or "mind" or "justice", "have permanent structural features that philosophers can discern and the vulgar may not have noticed"[6]. However, non-analytical philosophers, like Thomas Nagel, building their self-image on the hope of stable concepts, accuse analytic philosophers of denying the existence of fixed entities called "concepts" or "meanings". In their attack, the formers reduce the work of philosophy professors, such as Rorty to mere conversation. Rorty, would accept this accusation if "mere" is omitted, and he is welcoming the idea that philosophy professors are practicing cultural politics when they suggest changes in the use of words, and put new ones in circulation, that will make conversation more fruitful. Hence there is the rise of the tasks of revisionists, re-descriptions, and re-inventors in the field of human sciences, above all in linguistic practices and culture. What led to the impasse and crisis of such an idea, as the one "truth" in Plato and Hitler's ideology, is the absence of freedom and, above all, the evolution of the repertoire of language to be open on new possibilities of justifying one's opinion and using words in different ways. Rorty agrees with William James, in defining the "true", the "right", when the latter remarks that "The true ... is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving"[7]. Rorty is convinced that in revising and in re-describing things in new words, the enlargement of the individual and cultural self-descriptions take place in culture and therefore influences peoples' behavior. The issue then, is not to find out what anything is "really" like, but to help grow up and make people happier, freer and more flexible, rather than close up paths for mutual interaction. Attention then should be paid to human rights and human dignity through opening up new horizons for conversation.

In most of his books, Rorty's main point is democracy, with a strong emphasis on pragmatism, in the service of social theory. What he is primarily concerned with, is the defense of minorities and the marginalized like "blacks" and females, by subverting all claims to absolute truth. His hero is the American pragmatist,

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[5] Richard Rorty, "*Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations*", in *Truth and Progress*, p. 122.
[6] *Ibid*., p. 123.
[7] William James, *Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 106.

John Dewy. Trained in analytic philosophy, he agrees with Davidson and takes the linguistic turn as the royal road to criticize most of the ideas of continental philosophy, which are essentialists like Descartes' and Plato's. Rorty also attacks the exponents of rational universal reason, like Kant and Habermass. Instead, Rorty takes the context, the use, the interest and the relativity of all social situations, and their validity is accepted only in so as they are justifiable and respond to the need of the public. Rorty considers human beings, in the Darwinian sense, to be clever animals, and that they are different from other animals in the complexity of their behavior that can be changed for better coexistence with others in happiness, and progress for all, if not for the maximum humans. His pragmatism is the search for adjustment to our fellow humans which he calls, together with similar pragmatists, the search for acceptable justification and eventual agreement. In undermining traditional essentialists, Rorty suggests "to substitute this search for the traditional descriptions of the quest for truth"[8].

I think there is no better way to qualify Rorty as a pragmatist who claims his close affinity to the American tradition, above all William James and J.Dewey, than the sketch Pascal Engel offers in his dialogue with the former, *What is the Use of Truth?*. Engel sums up Rorty's position on truth in seven points: 1 — The notion of truth does not cover any essence nor designates a metaphysical property or any object of truth. 2 — The traditional realist notion of truth as a correspondence between a proposition and reality (*adequatio*) is devoid of meaning. 3 — The debate between realism and anti-realism is hollow. 4 — The problem is to justify the statement and that distinction between truth and justification boils down to agreement between members of a community. 5 — Being empty, the concept of truth cannot be a norm of scientific or philosophical enquiry. 6 — Having dismissed truth as a mythical notion, what remains for study is the causal relation between us and the world. 7 — Once truth as correspondence and objectivity are rejected, there remains the promoted pragmatic value, namely tolerance, liberty, and the sense of community. Engel draws the conclusion that Rory's unshakable conviction is that "the values of social utility should predominate over the values of truth."[9] It is clear from the above sketch that according Rorty, agreement and conversation are the royal roads to human happiness, and the effort to justify claims in every context, leads to the change of the old words. Rorty sees the innovation in the use of words itself necessitates, in the future, the task of continuous re-description, once the words fall flat and become crystallized in narrow usages, as to discourage any novelty or freedom to dream of a better life.

The importance of circulation and transmission of the suggested or recommended use of words in conversation is not only taken from Hegel's comparison with persons of the ever changing concepts in history of philosophy, but also from recent researches in biology, namely Richard Dawkins' notion of

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[8] Richard Rorty, "*Ethics without Principles*", *in Philosophy and Social Hope*, (London, Penguin, 1999), p. 72.

[9] Richard Rorty and Pascal Engel, *What is the Use of Truth*? Edit. by Patrick Savidan and trans. by William McCuaig, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007), p. 8.

memes in his book *The Selfish Genes.* A meme means a unit in culture such as tunes, catch-phrases, clothes fashion — way of building arches etc. Dawkins uses memes in analogy with genes as mimicking or replicating features in similar complex genes, but sometimes they are traitors or variants not copying the same features. Rather, a set of genes select new possibilities from the available reservoir called gene pool, waiting there for millions of years, where molecules are still flouting chaotically in the primeval soup. For Dawkins, what is unusual about man can be summed up in one word: namely culture. For him "cultural transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically conservative, it can give rise to forms of evolution"[10]. Dawkins says that language "evolves" by non-genetic means, at a rate of speed and magnitude faster than genetic evolution. Analogically, Rorty argues that by the invention new memes, cultural mutations can be achieved. The example of language is only one out of many memes such as ceremonies, art, engineering dress etc. In addition, the analogy between scientific progress and genetic evolution by natural selection is made clear by Karl Popper in the evolution and discoveries of natural sciences in his book, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. Popper's book "contains the basic idea of critical rationalism, which explains why all our knowledge of facts is fallible and why we learn, not from expectations that are fulfilled but from expectations that fail"[11]. Popper also clarifies that for propositions to be scientific in natural scientific theories, they must be not true but refutable. Later Popper transferred the basic ideas of critical rationalism to political philosophy, in his *The Open Society and its Enemies.*

The important point here is that since memes have power in forming new cultural features, by transmission and circulation from one generation to another, and from one brain to another being, by creating new possibilities and changing the use of old words or creating new ones, cultural memes will orient the future and they will open new vistas and dreams of a better social life and human happiness. For Dawkins, as for Rorty, it is the circulation of newly reinvented words, which suit the interests of the present needs of post modern society, which is important, through the use of new words in cultural conversation as a decisive strategy.

C — In her article *What is Freedom?* Hannah Arendt, in defining the subject of her essay, that is, freedom as an act, speech and performance of free humans, she finds it important to make a historical survey to find out the roots of the concept and its becoming. Thus she rejects the philosophical concept of freedom as a phenomenon of thought and intellection by which one can reason oneself out of the world. The model of the philosopher here stands for late antiquity, the Stoics and medieval thought altogether, where the philosopher, controlling his desires, remains remote from the political affairs of the city. The solitary philosopher has as, an objective, the quest of Plato's *Eidos*, Aristotle Eudemonia or the Stoic *ataraxi*: absolute freedom from the sensible world or living in accordance with the

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[10] Herbert Keuth, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, Trans. J.C.B. Mohr, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4.

[11] Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 1989.

measure of nature. She equally dismisses the Christian notion of free will because it usurps the realm of the outer space where there is the inner sterile battle against oneself. For Arendt, both the above conceptions of freedom have no grounds in political experience as an act, speech and direct conversation.

She argues that philosophical tradition of late antiquity almost agrees that freedom begins where men abandon the space of political life. Such a freedom is not shared with others and is not an act performed but a relation to oneself and an intercourse with oneself: an inner dialogue that later takes a sterile form of thought after Socrates in Neo-Platonism, especially Plotinus who influenced St Augustine. When Christianity takes up the concept of freedom as a variant of dialectics, it becomes a conflict within the confines of inner space, as in St Paul's and St Augustine's strife between what one would do and what one does.

Arendt locates the roots of the will-to power in modern European states as a development of the strife of the Christian will that emerges first, with the notion of free arbiter. While the Greeks reflects on moderation and necessity to only tame the dark powers of the irascible and the titanic abysses of the concupiscible parts of the soul, they are not aware of the will as a distinctive faculty. For the above tow Christian saints, the will of man appears as if it were "two wills present for it partly to will, partly to *nill*"[12]. They discover that the will — power is an organ of self-liberation but found it lacking at the same time. In other term, Arendt argues, it is as if the I-will is blocked by the I-can and the "the moment men willed freedom, they lost their capacity to *be* free"[13]. It is in this context that Arendt makes emphasis on the virtue of courage to give voice to one's opinions in public space just as she criticizes the political thought beginning with Plato. The latter's political philosophy was based on political philosophy was based on the opposition to *polis* and its citizenship.

Leadership is a privilege for those who know how to rule themselves. One could add here, that later under Roman empire, the situation was just more liberty but still the artisan was excluded from enjoying the same status as the wise and the mindful citizen next to him. In his *Enneads* book II, Plotinus says: "There are two kinds of life here below, one for the good and wise and one for the mass of men, that for the good and wise being directed to the highest point and upper region, and that for the more human sort being of two kinds again; one is mindful of virtue... but the common crowd is there, so to speak, to do manual work to provide for the necessities of the better sort"[14]. On this view, Arendt points out that freedom as the locus of politics has no place in Greek philosophy, and liberty has no relation to politics. The latter makes its entry into the history of philosophy only later, since it is relegated to the inner domain of me and myself before. Arendt arrives to the conclusion that freedom has become free will and is applied to political realm. Later freedom becomes a political problem as well, because of the philosophical change from action to *liberum arbirium,* the ideal of freedom ceased to be love, equality and courage and beomes sovereignty

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[12] Hannah Arendt, "*What is Freedom*"?, *in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, (New York, Penguin Books, 1968), p. 161.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[14] Plotinus, *Anneads II*, Trans. A. H. Armstrong, (London, Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 257.

Arendt goes on that the appearance of freedom needs the above virtues and that it coincides with the performing act. She inverts Parmenides saying, "For Being and *Logos* are the same" into "For to be free and to act are the same"[15]. She attacks modern liberalism in its excess of individualism and she undermines J.J. Rousseau's notion of the sovereign indivisible power based on the model the Christian will. Rousseau hods that in a state, "the citizens had no communication one with another... each should think his own thought"[16]. In fact Rousseau's individual modal needs only a form of association to protect and defend his property to "force" him, as he says, to be free. In "Facing a Man to be Free", a section in his book,

The Social Contract, he wonders where this form of association can be found, "and by which (form of association) every person, while united with All, shall obey only Himself, and remain as free as before the union?"[17]. One can understand the continuation of the concept of freedom that Arendt makes clear in its limitation to security, in modern liberalist individualism. How could Rousseau think otherwise, if he takes himself not concerned with everything on this earth as he says, in his *Meditations of a Solitary Walker*?: "Everything is henceforth foreign to me. I do no longer have any neighbors, fellow men or brothers in this world. I live here as in some strange planet on to which I have fallen from the one I knew."[18] Perhaps Rousseau, Nietzsche would chuckle and say that, while writing about the idea of a social contract, was only protecting himself from the leviathan of Hobbes, and wanted to be left meditating in security about the lost divine city of St Augustine!

In her defense of public space, Arendt highlights the role of conversation that takes place in the exchange of opinion and she endorses the Kantian *Sapere auder*, going back to the Greek moment that witnessed the birth of the status of "freedom" for the few, performed in the agora as a meeting place . Yet this liberation of the few from necessities of life can not be the status of authentic freedom as she defines it. The latter needs a common public space in the company of all others in equality to take place. She seems to agree with Hegel's moment of objectivity, that is, of participation in the government and city affairs, as an overcoming of the egoistic moment of being sheltered in security, with family and property. For Hegel as for Arendt, objectivity is the highest stage of self-consciousness after animality and subjectivity. She attempts to show the origin of the will to power and the step to overcome it with courage, in performing the concrete act of speech and conversation in an open public space. Arendt points out to the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries political theories which identify political freedom with security. The latter is the domain of preserving and securing the life process, the interests of societies and individuals. Thus freedom as

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[15] Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[16] Jean J. Rousseau, "*Forcing a Man to be Free*" in *The Social Contract*, edit by Crane Brinton, in *The Portable Age of Reason*, (New York , The Viking Press , 1956), p. 163.

[17] H. Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[18] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Meditations of a Solitary Walker*, Trans. By Peter France, (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 6.

communicative facts, taking place in public agora, is discarded, and politics is relegated to a marginal phenomenon as security "which could permit an undisturbed development of life process of society as a whole"[19]. Thus such an explicit claim was announced by Charles I that politics "is not for having to share in government, that is nothing to them (citizens)"[20].

Hannah Arendt concludes that a community based on the sovereignty would not build on a stand but on quicksand, that is to say, on tyranny. She seems to highlight Hegel's point of objectivity of consciousness in the moment of its concrete universality that lies behind the above essay, but with emphasis on public space and conversation, rather than abstract concepts. She is in line with Habermas when they call for a revision of concepts and make a critical reading of the Western metaphysical tradition. Habermas' approach is unlike the radicalism of Rorty. He steers "between the twin dangers of a nostalgic return to or a radical critique of metaphysics"[21]. That is to say, while Habermas strips Western tradition of its metaphysical way of thinking, he remains critical only to preserve the idea of reason. Unlike Rorty's radical approach, when he suggests the changing of the old concepts wholesale, Arendt shares with Rorty and with Habermas the critical revision, but she lays emphasis on the unveiling of the origin of the key concepts, here the notion of freedom. In her approach she comes close to Heidegger's deconstructive method and to his attracting attention to forgotten key concepts and how they where not thought of in their deciding the destiny of the West. Along history, theses key concepts like Being, keep changing their content as freedom here.

Conclusions

Arendt suggests then that in the absence of freedom, one is harboring liberty in the subjective sense of Hegel, and one is only living in security, like a chicken caring for one's own family egoistically, as Dawkins says about the egoistic genes, unless directed and forced towards altruism. On this view, one is lacking the true virtue of an authentic citizen, who enjoys freedom with and among others, when she performs, acts, and practices conversation in public space. One can notice how subversions of the concept of freedom followed one after the other, together with the use of language and conversation, replaced ancient passivity and non-action as the goal of *Eudemonia* or absolute freedom. Action was transferred from Plato's perennial wisdom, where vision of the intelligible liberates from the sensible, to the Christian battle inside oneself as false modes of egoistic thoughts , to the hegemony of the subject of knowledge or consciousness in modernity, and finally to exterior space where inter-subjective conversation as communicative action takes palace. By degrees, the shift of real virtue moved downwards in a process from beyond to interiority, to find itself finally out articulated

[19] H. Arendt, p. 150

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

[21] William Mark Hohengarten, in Introduction to Trans. of Jurgen Habermas' *Post-metaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, (London, the M I T Press London, 1922), p. VII.

as praxis, discussed and justified as opinion, whether in communicative action in Habermas, or as circulating re-invented cultural concepts with Rorty, or with Arendt as political freedom and action in public space. All of the three modern thinkers seem to promise the same ethical dream of justice and happiness, that Plato inaugurated, but in different garbs, in their rejection the role of true knowledge, inner space and subjectivity, heralding the birth of new socio-political theories based on conversation.

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DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT AT THE CROSSROADS BETWEEN MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM

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Abstract. *The purpose of this essay is to examine the major text of early critical theory, and critical theory in general, namely Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1973) and its relative affinity to postulates of modernism i.e. postmodernism in social sciences respectively. To do that, this essay will focus on the (related) categories of rationality (Reason) and the human subject (the Self) as they have been expounded in Dialectic of Enlightenment and in modernist/postmodernist paradigms (Barry 2002, Eagleton 1986, Sarup 1993, Waugh 1992). The attempt to establish points of convergence i.e. divergence from the postulations of these two paradigms will show that the text of Dialectic of the Enlightenment is situated at the very crossroads between modernism and postmodernism.*

Keywords: *Dialectic of Enlightenment, Enligthenment Self, Enligthenment Rationality.*

The project of Dialectic of Enlightenment

That the "curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 35-36) is the main topic of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The exposure of the core corruption at the heart of the Enlightenment project — which however for Horkheimer and Adorno still remains inseparable from the project of social freedom — and the Enlightenment's release from the entanglement in blind domination (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. XIII) are the work's main tasks. The betrayal of the Enlightenment bears one major mark: both the process of perfectibility of knowledge and the process of emancipation of mankind — the process of individuation — have become inextricably entwined with the relations of domination. The price is paid by the nature of cognition and the nature of the subject that have emerged. Enlightenment, which is ultimately still "the only kind of thinking that is sufficiently hard to shatter

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myths" has become self-destructive, has failed to realize its potential and has betrayed its own project. "With the abandonment of thought, which in its reified form of mathematics, machine, and organization, avenges itself on the men who have forgotten it, enlightenment has relinquished its own realization" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 41).

To help cure its ills, Horkheimer and Adorno urge the Enlightenment to begin to contemplate itself, to gain self-consciousness. They warn that its utter lack of self-reflection precipitates its degradation. "Science itself is not conscious of itself; it is only a tool. (...) Science is technical practice, as far removed from reflective consideration of its own goal as are other forms of labour under the pressure of the system" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 85). „If enlightenment does not accomodate reflection on this recidivist element, then it seals its own fate. (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. XIII). Because the history of domination has shaped rationality, and because rationality replicates this domination in the regulatory schematism of its thinking that becomes bereft of contemplation of substantive goals, the Enlightenment has ruthlessly „extinguished any trace of its own self-consciousness" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 4). Therefore, the Enlightenment „*must examine itself*, if men are not to be wholly betrayed" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. XV).

Enlightenment rationality

Conceiving of "the cultural history of modern man" primarily as "the history of the constitution of the human Self", which is the Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno postulate that at the beginning of that history the Being was split into the Self and the Other, which is nature (Blühdorn 2000, p. 60-61). Having constituted nature as the Other, the emerged subject began to conceive of it as representing "a threat to the Self" so the nature turned into "the paragon of heterodetermination (...) and in the interest of human self-determination it had to be brought under rational control" (Blühdorn 2000, p. 61). Domination of nature has become inevitable and necessary in the name of man's self-preservation. The focus of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is however not on physical subjugation of nature, but "on the underlying level, that is the intellectual means of domination of nature. They argue that in the name of human emancipation from nature, and for the maintenance and defence of the human Self *vis-á-vis* the threatening powers of nature, reason has adopted a specific form, which they call *formalised* or *instrumental* reason" (Blühdorn 2000, p. 61). This enlightened rationality, Kant's "understanding without the guidance of another person", is, according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1973, p. 81), the one which systematizes "individual data of cognition into a system (...) a hierarchical construction of concepts," in line with the rule of coherence and "subsumption under principles" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 82) producing the unity of scientific knowledge. The repetitive and synthetic nature of knowledge in contemporary society renders everything which it analyzes a mere material to feed on. Each and every thing seems mere chaos before the enlightened reason with its formalism comes to

know it. Thereby, each time, it displays its instrumental relationship toward the object to be known — the relationship of domination. The indissoluble connection between society and domination is reproduced in the categories of thought. "The true nature of schematism, of the general and the particular, of concept and individual case reconciled from without, is ultimately revealed in contemporary science as the interest of industrial society. Being is apprehended under the aspect of manufacture and administration. Everything — even the human individual, not to speak of the animal — is converted into the repeatable, replaceable process, and into a mere example for the conceptual models of the system" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 84). To emancipate himself from nature, man has increasingly through history come to develop cognitive faculties, in a way that enabled him to master things, rather than comprehend them in their otherness. More and more, the cultivation of reason came to mean not the true knowledge of a thing, but mere formalism, whereby the old "diffuse ideas" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 14) came to be subsumed under the one "dissolvent rationality". "The individuality that learned order and subordination in the subjection of the world, soon wholly equated truth with the regulative thought without whose fixed distinctions universal truth cannot exist", banishing „the knowledge which really concerned the object" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 14). The result of permanent identification of things with abstract schemes results in the eternal return of the same, whereby "nothing may at the same time be identical with itself". The political function of that is perpetuation of the *status quo*.

Modernist and postmodernist affinities of Dialectic's project and its view on Enlightenment rationality

The very project of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is modernist. The object of the book is to warn about and reflect on the aberrations of the Enlightenment project and not to abandon it. Postmodernism, especially in the form of Jean-François Lyotard's assertions about the postmodern condition (Sarup 1993) proclaims that all 'grand narratives', including liberation of humanity and speculative unity of all knowledge (Sarup 1993, p. 137) are dead and have lost their validity in the postmodern condition, condition which is defined precisely by the absence of such 'grand narratives'. Drawing on the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein about communication, as a system of incommensurable language games, postmodernists such as Lyotard stress "fragmentation — of language games, of time, of the human subject, of society itself" (Sarup 1993, p. 147). In the Wittgensteinian model, discourses become incommensurable "because each subset of discursive rules regulating certain kind of discourse imply different cognitive, historical or ethico-political criteria which preclude one from passing judgement about one from the standpoint of another set of criteria or consequently deciding 'between rival interpretations'" (Sarup 1993, p. 150). Adopting such an approach to knowledge, Lyotard (*ibid.*) views no language game as "privileged" ("for example the cognitive one, enjoying the privileged position "*vis-a-vis* questions of historical truth and ethical accountability", *ibid.*, p. 153). "There is no metalanguage. No one can grasp

what is going on in society as a whole. He seems to be saying that there is no one system of domination." (Sarup 1993, p. 145). Lyotard tends to "think of rationality as a limiting framework", says Sarup (1993, p. 155). Both categories of unitary domination and unitary rationality are abandoned and lose their meaning. With the death of the Enlightenment, the project of citing its degenerations and perversions in order ultimately to save it loses its rationale. In light of the pluralist outlook adopted by postmodern theory of knowledge such as Lyotard's, it becomes clear that Horkheimer and Adorno pile arguments against Enlightenment rationality's uniformity, rather than unity. There is no indication of plurality of relationships of domination or plurality of incommensurable rationalities in their argument. The thesis about the Enlightenment rationality and its debasement instead perhaps displays the typically modernist "search for a deeper truth behind surface appearance" (Sarup 1993, p. 131). The revelation of the principle of domination as the one at the core of uniformity of scientific rationality and its connection with individuation is akin more to the "pathological itch [of modernism] to scratch surfaces for concealed depths" (Eagleton 1986, p. 134) than to the postmodernism's "repudiation of any theory "going beyond" surfaces (Sarup 1993, p. 146) or its ontological plays and "poetics of ontology" (McHale 1987 in: Waugh 1992: p. 213).

However, on the other side, the exposing of Enlightenment reason as ultimately instrumental and subservient to technology and economy overlaps precisely with the diagnosis of the character of knowledge in the postmodern condition. According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1973, p, 4), "knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance with the world's rulers"; "technology is the essence of this knowledge." It "does not work by concepts and images, by the fortunate insight, but refers to method, the exploitation of others' work, and capital." It is instrumental, a slave to efficiency and utility, and in the final instance to economy, betraying the true nature of man's cognitive potential. In a very similar vein, the observations of Jean-François Lyotard's on the instrumentalization and technocritization of knowledge insist that at the stage of late capitalism "the 'performativity principle' is really all that counts" (Eagleton 1985 in: Waugh 1992, p. 153). "Lyotard calls attention to capitalism's 'massive subordination of cognitive statements to the finality of the best possible performance'". Eagleton (*ibid.*) quotes Lyotard's statement that 'the games of scientific language become the games of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right.'[1] That "the acquisition of knowledge is dissociated from any notion of training of individual minds and ceases to be an end in itself, becoming instead a means for acquisition of power to control the information" (Sarup 1993, p. 137) is also a concern of Lyotard.

The modernist struggle for meaning

What is lost in the instrumentalization and schematization of knowledge and rationality itself is awareness of meanings, of qualities, and of substantive goals. There is no consideration of substantive goals because "reason is the organ of

calculation, of planning; it is neutral in regard to ends; its element is coordination" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 88). Reason has become just "a purposeless purposiveness which might thus be attached to all ends" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 89). "On the road to modern science, men renounce any claim to meaning. (...) Substance and quality, activity and suffering, being and existence: to define these concepts in a way appropriate to the times was a concern of philosophy after Bacon — but science managed without such categories. They were abandoned as *idola theatri* of the old metaphysics." (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 5) Enlightenment wanted to do without "any illusion of ruling or inherent powers, of hidden qualities. For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect." (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 6). Synthetization and unity are the ruling principles of enlightenment, serving to explain away the particular. For the enlightened reason, things are transformed into matter, history to fact and multiple forms to "positions and arrangements." Real thought has been abandoned, the one that makes use of all cognitive powers rather than allow only the systematizing and schematizing logic to be equated with cognition and permitted to devoid things of their particular, multiple, social, historical and human, qualities. The totalizing logic of the enlightened reason gives up "the whole claim and approach to knowledge: to comprehend the given as such; not merely to determine the abstract spatio-temporal relations of the facts which allow them just to be grasped, but on the contrary to conceive them as the superficies, as mediated conceptual moments which come to fulfilment only in the development of their social, historical, and human significance" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 26-27). The actual meaning of things is always immersed in historical, cultural and other contexts in which it is embodied. „Just as the Enlightenment expresses the actual movement of civil society as a whole in the aspect of its idea as embodied in individuals and institutions, so truth is not merely the rational consciousness but equally the form that consciousness assumes in actual life" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. XIV). Along with this situatedness and irreducable particularity, what is also banished from schematized and reified thought are emotion, religion and art, which become safely demarcated "from everything deserving of the title of knowledge or cognition" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 91). They become autonomous realms allowed to exist but not to be called knowledge. Enlightenment "limits cold reason in favour of immediate living, yet makes this no more than a principle inimical to thought. Under the cover of this enmity, emotion and finally all human expression, even culture as a whole, are withdrawn from thought; thereby, however, they are transformed into a neutralized elements of the comprehensive ratio of the economic system — itself irrationalized long ago" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 91).

One of the contrasts between modernism and postmodernism, is, as has been said, the relationship towards depth and surfaces. Postmodernism rejects "the existential model of authenticity and inauthenticity, the semiotic opposition between signifier and signified, the Freudian model of latent and manifest, and the Marxist one of appearance and essence. These 'depth' models have been replaced

by a conception of practices, discourses and textual play" (Sarup 1993, p. 181). What emerges is thus "a new form of superficiality". Even when both modernism and postmodernism point at the loss of truth or meaning in modern age, their attitude towards this loss is starkly different. Whereas modernist attitude is very much that of nostalgia, regret or scandalousness (Barry 2002, p. 83, Eagleton 1986, p. 133), the attitude of postmodernism is that of acceptance, acquiescence. "The modernist nostalgia over origins is replaced by a dismissal of them; the frustration of being unable to resolve a dilemma gives way to an acceptance of the impossiblity of making any sense whatever of the world as a whole" (Wilde 1987 in: Waugh 1992, p. 16). From the ironic standpoint of a modernist (Eagleton 1986, p. 143) it seems that postmodernism teaches us that "if only we could kick our metaphysical nostalgia for truth, meaning and history, of which Marxism is perhaps the prototype, we might come to recognise that desire is here and now, fragments and surfaces all we ever have, kitsch quite as good as the real thing because there is in fact no real thing. What is amiss with old-fashioned modernism, from this perspective, is just the fact that it obstinately refuses to abandon the struggle for meaning." In the light of this construction of abandonment or persistence of the struggle for meaning as the point of contrast between modernism and postmodernism, the text of *Dialectic* safely falls under the heading of modernism.

Enligthenment Self

For Horkheimer and Adorno, the historical emancipation of the Self achieved at the price of subjugating nature implied at the same time the destruction of the Self (Blühdorn 2000, p. 65). Domination of nature for the sake of emancipation and in the name of self-preservation becomes "an obstacle to subjective self-realisation. It alienates the human subject from itself. Alienation from nature and alienation from the Self are the dialectical counterpart of emancipation and self-determination" (Blühdorn 2000, p. 65). Paralleling the fact that the progress of knowledge has been paid for by the loss of awareness of qualities, the process of individuation of men has been paid for by "the acknowledgement of power as the principle of all relations" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 9). "The system the Enlightenment has in mind is the form of knowledge which copes must proficiently with the facts and supports the individual most effectively in the mastery of nature. Its principles are the principles of self-preservation. (...) The burgher, in the successive forms of slave-owner, free entrepreneur, and administrator, is the logical subject of the Enlightenment" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 83). The price to be paid for the prevailing relationship of domination that comes to permeate all other relationships is that the human subject himself becomes "ossified". "The rulers experience existence, with which they need no longer concern themselves, only as a substratum, and hence wholly ossify into the condition of the commanding self" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 35). "Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 9). The price paid by subjectivity to self-preservation and adaptability

as the norm is its own loss. If the reason loses a part of itself by becoming subservient to the technical progress and its clarity and calculability, the subjectivity too falls victim to the demands of self-preservation as the norm.

Just as the unity (uniformity) of reason is the result of unceasing subsumption, so rejection of "the identification with another" results in the identity of the self. "It is the identity of the spirit and its correlate, the unity of nature, to which the multiplicity of qualities falls victim". For Horkheimer and Adorno, the unity (uniformity) of the self is equally false as the unity (uniformity) of knowledge. The identity of the self is determined by its repressed opposite: "the identity of the self is so much a function of the unidentical, of dissociated, unarticulated myths, that it must derive itself from those myths" (DE, p. 48). The progress of the Self as exemplified by Odysseus as the prototype modern bourgeois subject, is the progress through "the prehistoric world" that has been "secularized as the space whose measure the self must take" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 46). The Self constitutes itself only in the project of self-preservation, whereby the adventures in the prehistoric world become "dangerous temptations removing the self from its logical course", they become "'misleading', in contradistinction to the unequivacal purposiveness of his own self-preservation, and his return to his homeland and fixed estate" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 47). In other words, "the self does not constitute the fixed antithesis to adventure, but in its rigidity molds itself only by way of that antithesis: being an entity only in the diversity of that which denies all unity" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973, p. 47). For the modern subject, just like for modern science, multiplicity of qualities is lost for the sake of a false unity (uniformity).

The false unity of the subject Horkheimer and Adorno talk about is rather modernist than postmodernist, inasmuch as it still does not conceive the radical postmodern disunity and disconnectedness of a subject who fails to "link up into a coherent sequence" (Sarup 1993, p. 147). "The depthlessness characteristic of postmodernism does not mean alienation for a postmodern subject, because there is no longer any subject to be alienated and nothing to be alienated from, 'authenticity' having been less rejected than merely forgotten" (Eagleton 1986, p. 132). Such subject does not feel "anguished or derisive" because of the loss of "normative traditional humanism" (*ibid.*). In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, however, the implied "remembrance of nature in the subject, in whose fulfilment the unacknowledged truth of all culture lies hidden" implies that alienation and fulfilment still remain the valid categories for the human Self. That the man is still able to remember the repressed true nature of "multiplicity of qualities", "diffuse ideas" and the "unidentical, dissociated" parts of himself and should strive to effect "the 'non-identical' integrity of the Other *vis-á-vis* the Self" (Blühdorn 2000, p. 66) is a description of the subject that differs in essence from postmodern insistence on radical separateness and situatedness of subjects *vis-á-vis* their local contexts and the irreconcilably paradoxical and contradictory nature of the Self. The modernist model of the subject as 'split' in the Freudian sense rather than integrated (Sarup 1993, p. 131), alienated in that sense from its true nature, provides a better framework for situating the conception of subjectivity that emerges from *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

The modernist appeal

The tone in which Horkheimer and Adorno present their argument is embittered, non-acquiescing, non-reconciled. The gravity of statements and their succinctness have the effect of a grave warning. The biting tone of their criticism of Enlightenment has only one aim — to move men to action, to create a concern, to issue a revolutionary call for immediate change, and ultimately — to save Enlightenment, to help set it on the right track again. Exposing the betrayals and aberrations of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno condemn and repudiate the existing state of affairs. Their bitter observations that the Enlightenment serves to legitimize the *status quo* is indeed one of the most serious accusations against the humanity's project of scientific and technical progress. In that their tone of foreboding is aimed not only toward description but toward instigating immediate transformation of reality (influenced by Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that 'philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it' critical theory has always displayed a normative concern in "immanent possibilities for social transformation", continuing the modernist line of thought extending "from Kant, through Marx, to contemporary critical theorists such as Habermas" (Burchill et al 2001, p. 138)), it betrays the text's modernist allegiances. Among other things, this tone of urgent and stern warning undoubtedly can be better aligned with "high seriousness of the modernists" than with the "contemporary ideals of play" (Wilde 1987 in: Waugh 1992, p. 16). If „the conditions that made possible the modernist imagination of crisis have now gone by the board" (Wilde 1987 in: Waugh 1992, p. 17) in postmodernism, then the tone of warning about the urgency of crisis that is so alarming in *Dialectic* situates this text prevailingly in the modernist paradigm.

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MODERN VERSUS POSTMODERN: ROMANIA AND THE EAST-WEST RHETORIC

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Abstract. *This study approaches that, from a postmodern point of view, history sheds skins and regenerates so that it can recommend itself to the general public as (historio)graphy; as (un)conscience vindicates itself as the subject of creativity and life. The benefice for this exuviating action on history is represented by the threaded stylistic unity, between interior and exterior, the transparent profile of a double there — under which traces are crammed (as in a hypermarket of history), crowd in strategies without objectives, undeterminable. Briefly, a code of the simulacra is installed — with terms, notions, concepts — offered as treatment, supplement, existential brand, and panacea. The physiognomy of the new Eastern reality from the vernacular area related to the period after December 1989, "virused" by postmodernity (even if, apparently, it absorbs as well some well preserved traditional elements), remains a relatively new construct, that corresponds to different realities, as a consequence of the ideological, technological, social, psychological, esthetic, philosophical, etc. mutations, after our — de facto! — Integration in the intellectual and economic West European community.*

Keywords: *Modern* vs. *postmodern*, *East-West rhetoric*, *post-totalitarianism*, *geographical limits*, *traditionalism* vs. *Europeanism*, *centre* vs. *periphery.*

Within the limits of any post Marxist perimeter, history is perceived as a process, especially through the involvement in the event, as assuming a lack of fulfillment and its effects. History as discontinuity, as perpetual postponing, as a used and worn out term that is semantically molded, requires being (re)written in capital letter. History nourishes the live memory of humanity, an emotional memory (in fact subjective, selective and intensely mediated), dominated by the distinction sedentary — nomad, placed either in the East, or in the West, farther or closer, on the coordinates of a common European geography.

In spite of its geographical pseudo-limits, from the point of view of *civilization*, or from that of *identity*, Europe continues to maintain itself in the flux of a

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"twilight zone", a drift, between internal postmodern reality and the external, modern / pre-modern one. Geometrically, Europe draws fix landmarks between close vicinity and the rest of the world, by the attraction of the communitarian model that it represents, based on the modern concepts of *order, prosperity and diversity*, but all that with the remaking at the regional scale, an imperial system in a postmodern version.

The explanation is, according to Edgar Morin[1], that Europe did not become a geographical notion, unless it doubled its identity with a historical notion! Modern Europe becomes the result of a metamorphose: from the *Europe of the States* to *Europe of the Nation-States*, from the *Europe of "balance of powers"* to *Europe of deregulation and unleashed forces*, from the *Europe of commerce* to *industrial Europe*, from the *Europe of Apogeal* to *Europe of Abyss*, from the *Europe master of the world* to *provincial Europe.* Whether the West covers Europe, the Europe covers and overcomes the frontiers of the so-called West[2], as well towards the geographical West, as toward the geographical East, verifying the hypothesis according to which, Europe contains in itself the polarity *oriental / occidental*, determining the interference of the West and of the East, their dialogue, their mutual cultivation. However, the dialogue is doubled by a series of provincial micro-cultures, the consequence of the micro-ethnical texture of Europe.

Here one has to notice that, following the desiderate of a *Schicksalgemeinschaft*[3], between the East and the West another concept is (inter)posed, that of *East-Central Europe*, as a space placed to the Eastern part of Central Europe, oscillating between multicultural and ethnic, with some well preserved parts, as a part of a museum of the recent European past[4]. Parallel languages (one of the Westerners, the other East-Central Europe) can be sighted within the discourse of intelligentsia as a result of two methods of assessment, with reference to the awareness of the gap of differences: the disparity between the entities concerned with ethno-culture and those building civil and juridical institutions as type of difference installed between the West and East-Central Europe.

The past of the area situated at the confluence of Central Europe with Eastern Europe and the South East Europe proves that cultural interferences or cultural unity were always doubled by diversity. With one mention: after 1989, the former communist states are marked by two symbols: Visegrád and the Balkans.

According to Maria Todorova[5], the history of the term *Balkanism* (starting from the arbitrary designation of a geographical area and to the development in the West of the relations with the so-called "tribalism" of the Balkan society)

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[1] Edgar Morin, *Gândind Europa (Thinking Europe)*, Trei Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002.

[2] According to Edgar Morin (*Thinking Europe*, Trei Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p. 62), USSR was at the same time, Western and Eastern, European and Asian, and Stalinism — a Westernized "oriental despotism".

[3] A term such as *community of destiny* offers to a nation, identity and unity even if it is meta-national.

[4] Victor Neumann, *Ideologie și fantasmagorie. Perspective comparative asupra istoriei gândirii politice în Europa Est-Centrală* (*Ideology and Phantasmagoria. Comparative Perspectives on the History of Political Thought in East-Central Europe*), Polirom Publishing House, Jassy, 2001.

[5] Maria Todorova, *Balcanii și balcanismul (Imaging the Balkans)*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000.

precedes the stigmatizing and stigmatized history of the Balkan space determined from this perspective. The *Balkans* becomes an arbitrary construct, and *Balkanism*, an Eurocentric discourse of the depreciation turned into alterity. With the observation that, for Maria Todorova, the "invention" of Central Europe does not mean the emancipation of Central Europe from Soviet guardianship, but a new *marginalization* depicted for the Balkans!

The founding of a "*Pax Sovietica*", of a "*Pax Titoica*", of the *Berlin Wall* and the spatial reorganization frenzy that has followed, represents only the latest case among recurrent phenomena. The efforts of contemporary world tend, by dilating the Western European Community area, to restore the lost status of *peaceful union*. As a prescriptive doctrine, the realist conception of international relations continues to be quite relevant, despite the advancements of democracy in the 70s and 80s. The historical half of the world functions according to the realistic principles and the *post historical* half must resort to realistic methods when it has to do with the party is still immersed in history.

According to Hans-Georg Gadamer[6], the element that separates the East and the West returns in force, much more forceful than the primacy of the unifying binder. Except that Eastern Europe has produced in the spirit of sciences the same presence that had the western cultures of Europe. According to Gadamer, this off-balance share does nothing but to deepen the disproportional scope of historical consciousness, as a mark of difference.

Post historical world became a possibility where the desire for "leisurely self-preservation", was placed above the willingness to risk a battle for prestige. A competition in which the universal and rational recognition replaced the struggle for domination!

Between East and West: Romania and the incomplete modernity

The relation between the central areas and the periphery, between Western civilization and primitivism ("Oriental barbarism", in the terms of Titu Maiorescu) required to be (re)written from a dual perspective of recessiveness, as a pressure of a rather structural than of a concurrent type. What one has nevertheless to remember is the dissolution of the idea of history as "unitary discourse".

According to Edgar Morin[7], Europe is now dismantled, becoming just a fragment of West, thrown to the periphery of History, becoming a province. The provincializing of Europe requires, paradoxically, the overcoming of the nations, obliging at two conversions: the first, the localization beyond Nation, the other, reduces to province. Europe must bear the metamorphosis at once into Province and into Meta-Nation.

Legitimated by paralogies, such "conversions" doctrine and action driven are wrapped around the premises of a political, economic, cultural, geographical

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[6] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Elogiul teoriei. Moștenirea Europei (The praise of theory; The inheritance of Europe*), Polirom Publishing House, Jassy, 1999.

[7] Edgar Morin, *Gândind Europa (Thinking Europe)*, Trei Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002.

"competition", while we have to underline that, these hierarchies ought to remain well separated from each other and, imperatively, to establish an *isostenic* balance among them. This competition would allow faster development of new independent forms of behavior and action.

Historically, such principles of ethics have fostered the idea of connecting the Romanian space with Europe, amid consensus contingencies as a / some doctrinal difference(s) between *Europeanists* and *traditionalists* — currents that will occur before the Second World War, essentially, as *liberal / neo-liberal* or *conservative* doctrines. Among these one may place the doctrine of *agrarian Romania*, as a third world, situated between the principles of capitalist individualism and / or socialist collectivism. The digressive change of "fast forward movement" aimed at economic and social development, a move followed by the urbanized and industrialized West.

The Europeanists emphasized the organic nature of fundamental structural changes in Romania, as well as the necessity to further economic integration and cultural life integration of the country in the European context, the secularization of education and public life, tolerance and individual freedom, the participation to the European politics and culture, landmarks within the process of completion of a European synchronization.

Modernity was seen by them as a socio-cultural complex of factors that include modern democracy, urbanization, industrialization, an equitable distribution or even tolerable distribution of property within society, free exchange of goods and ideas, the social mobility of individuals between social strata, the secularization of education and public life, tolerance and individual freedom, the participation in politics and European culture, all as elements through which the process of European synchronization was finalized. A theorist as important as Eugen Lovinescu elaborated his theses concerning the formation of modern Romanian civilization[8] through a criticism sustained against the agrarian current and the traditionalist current contesting the legitimacy of the process of modernization of the Romanian structures and argue for a differential path of development that preserves the archaic and rural characteristics of Romania. These Lovinescian statements considered as "romantic" and "reactionary" the efforts of agrarian currents to find in the feudal Romanian past the necessary elements for an indigenous civilization, on the background of a resistance of the factors characteristic to the old regime, threatened in their the dominance / existence by the democratization of public life by the action of the Liberal Party.

According to Eugene Lovinescu all the currents of modernist ideas were the focus of the criticism of the process of the genesis of modern Romania, denouncing its imitative, anti-traditional character, adverse to organic self-development.

In such a context, the process of modern civilization was not evolutionary, but revolutionary, dual, developed by Romanian elites through *imitation*: underdeveloped nations have simulated the advanced ones and the village

[8] Eugen Lovinescu, *Istoria civilizatiei române moderne* (*Modern Romanian Civilization History),* vol. 3, Bucharest, 1926.

imitated the town. *Imitation spreads, in the spirit of Enlightenment*, only from top to bottom, from the superior level to the inferior level. Lovinescu appreciated the historical evolution of modern Europe as a competition among the democratic and innovative ideas promoted by the urban elites, on the one hand, and the patriarchal and reactionary ideas, sustained by the rural classes, on the other. In this context, *the aspirations and hopes of rural groups could be considered politically, moderate and specific*. But whatever the nature of the economic needs of rural areas addressed to the political system, social and cultural values of the rural population will remain strongly traditional.

Against this background (of liberal elitism), the *law synchronization* proposed even an alignment to major Western centers, considering that the primary responsibility for creating the modern Romanian civilization would remain of *bourgeoisie* and *intelligentsia*, the only ones able to introduce, naturally, all the elements of Western civilization within Romanian modernity space. Describing the faltering progress of Romanian culture which, until early 20th century, could not detach itself definitively from the stigmata of "Oriental Barbary", since for Titu Maiorescu the relining with the West should only take place with the overcoming of the "cultural shine": "according to the statistics of the foreign forms, Romanians master nowadays almost the entire Western civilization. We have politics and science, we have journals and academies, we have schools and literature, and we have museums, conservatoires, we have theatre, we have even a constitution. But, in reality, all these are lifeless productions, pretentious claims without foundations, bodiless ghosts, illusions without truth, and thus the culture of Romanians higher classes is null and valueless, and the abyss that separates us from the low ranks people becomes deeply from one day to the next."[9] Modernization, in this perspective, seems un-natural for Maiorescu, as he considers that only on the Romanian essential terrain the future forms of Romanian culture could emerge.

Within the vision of Adrian T. Sârbu[10] Romanian modernity, under the credit of the hypotheses of the *forms without content*, would be, first of all, as a construction, an implant of institutional and mentality forms without the possibility that this social and political construction of identity to be vindicated, directly, in a causal manner, by the immanent logic of the Fund, of the social, political and cultural processes. So as not to remain trapped in such a conservative well known sentence, we consider that the precedence of form, as a "Fanstasmatic referential" over the content represents a constant of the fact that it appears effectively as a result of "a procedure", or "processing". In the option of Adrian T. Sârbu, in producing Romanian modernity, the "form" in the relation entertained with the "content", will appear as a will to modernization. Considering the struggle to become embodied

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[9] *Titu Maiorescu, Opere I-II* (*Works*), Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.

[10] Adrian T. Sârbu, *Ispitele post-umanismului, postmodernitatea ca adevăr al modernizării românești (Temptation of the post-humanism, Postmodernity the truth of the Romanian Modernity),* in *Tribuna* Review, 18-24 September 1997.

into the reality of a date(d) social articulation, we notice that it prioritize the "form" as will to gain a face and a concrete occurrence through a hasty, impatient, convulsive and violent action against the "content". Deciphered with ease, the Romanian version of modernity proposed by Adrian T. Sârbu, does not represent anything else than the "local version of the will to power of the Western metaphysics": the will to power in its neurotic and often hysteric hypostasis.

Analyzing the situation of Romanian society, Sorin Alexandrescu, Adrian T. Sarbu, and others consider that in Romania there was an organically formed bourgeoisie. Bourgeois self-consciousness, articulated in specific emancipator ideals, ready to be set via the socio-political and cultural institutions, preceded the actual reality, of a socio-economic nature, of this class. Under the circumstances where the modernization of the Romanian context meant (due to historical conditions, geopolitical, etc.), first of all, emancipation (which manifested in achieving a communitarian ideal first determined as "national"), the ones which have "forged" ideology of modernization were, directly, the intellectuals. After completing the form of the modern Romanian State subsequent to the First World War, internally, the new economic reality (favored by creating a single national market and by the strengthened political sovereignty) would have been allowed unrestricted development of a matured industrial bourgeoisie, and this way we could expect, finally, a "genuine social take off of modernity" (encouraged by the fact that, globally, modern bourgeois order turned to its "imperialist" hypostasis).

Yet, the ideological shift of the Romanian bourgeoisie did not happen. Communism, as noted Sorin Alexandrescu and Adrian T. Sârbu, is no exception to the characteristic "law" of modernization of Romanian society. Let us think how well fit the Romanian pattern the alliance and syncretism operated by Ceaușescu's regime, a sort of neo-Stalinist politics with inserts of Maoist cultural revolution and most brutal, gnarr nationalism.

It became nowadays extremely difficult to accept the idea according to which, communism, as a social-political ideology, was realized in the Leninist-Bolshevik version (of socialist revolution) at the "weakest link", in the less developed countries. Related to the Western model, it meant a type of accelerated development, a forced march, a modernization "burning the stages" (what does not mean anything else than the distortion, not as much of the stages, as of the order of generation of the social real!). This so-called modernization was produced "through a brutal and pharaoh-like work of social engineering" of societies from the East European periphery. As Adrian T. Sârbu noticed**,** there cannot be a more flagrant proof for the hypothesis that indicates real socialism as merely *a different path*, another rout of modernization (an idea sustained even since the 60s in the analysis of Raymond Aron).

From this perspective, the communist (inter) reign had only to "extract a method" of operation for this type of Romanian modernity, at the cost of a stimulation to paroxysm of the method. Thus was created, paradoxically, within the socio-political and cultural Romanian landscape, the premise of a truncated and malformed construction, that of a modernity-simulacra!

The East virused by postmodernity

For Katherine Verdery[11], *recovered history* is (over)lapped on dead bodies, cadavers in motion, with a posthumous political life in the service of creating a universe of renewed meanings.

Their political work stays in instituting conceptions on morality by attributing the responsibility and the punishment, the renewing consecration of space, the redefinition of the temporality of daily life, the alignment of people in the line of alternative forefathers[12] forcing us assist *to the reburial of cadavers that claimed new tombs* (Günter Grass[13]), to the (re)configuration of community in cocoons.

One sees, it seems, even with the naked eye, as *history sheds skins* and regenerates so that it can recommend itself to the general public as *(historio)graphy*; as *(un)conscience* vindicates itself as the subject of creativity and life.

In a mutual contamination of recording of the *event* and skin shedding process associated with *history*, which is admitted through the category of *singular cocoon* emits pretentious claims to a *special historical narrative*, a *Geschichte selber*. Such an assault of the *event* on *history* would target, in principal, the blurry status of the balance among the *individual memory* and the plurality of the *collective memories* exfoliated off the "weak experience" where *history* becomes its own subject. Or, in agreement with the nostalgic life of the initial letter in miniatures, one could witness an *exuviating action operated on memory* and the *inscription of its minute narratives on thin onion skins*.

The benefice for this *exuviating action* on history — postulated by the prophet of postmodernity, Nietzsche, from the heights of the pulpit of a deconspired world — is represented by the threaded stylistic unity, between interior and exterior, the transparent profile of a *double there* — under which traces are crammed (as in a hypermarket of history), crowd in strategies without objectives, undeterminable. Briefly, a *code of the simulacra* is installed — with terms, notions, concepts — offered as treatment, supplement, existential brand, and panacea.

It is a fact unanimously accepted that Romanian modernity crosses a process of extinction along with the exaggerated screening of the ideological character of the historical references. The hypothesis according to which the idea of *history* as progressive accomplishment of humanity, as an unitary process of progressive accomplishment of humanity, is mirrored in a series of Romanian post December 1989 interventions, gathered in no. 1-4, volume 2/1994 entitled *Postmodernism, postcommunism, posthistory*, edited by *Xenopoliana*, the bulletin of the Academic Foundation "A.D. Xenopol", from Jassy.

The conviction of the historian Al. Zub is that, in Eastern Europe, postmodernity "coincides with post-totalitarianism", with the observation that a limited definition of the term, more exactly, of its meaning, was not localized yet within the historical and political, present day discourse.

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[11] Katherine Verdery, *Viața politică a trupurilor moarte. Reînhumări și schimbări postsocialiste (The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change),* Vremea Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 197-198.

[13] Günter Grass, *Decojind ceapa (Peeling the Onion)*, Polirom Publishing House, 2007, Jassy, p. 316.

Al. Zub overtakes the references used by the Western postmodern thinkers and considers that one can discuss, also in the Romanian case, the "crisis of the epistemic model".

As such, the relation modernity / postmodernity presupposes *a weak rapport* where the crossing over to the landscape of reality is understood as a modification of a relationship overbid by the political discourse gathered under a rhetoric and conventional title, of the "forms without content". From the perspective expressed by Adrian T. Sârbu[14] Romanian modernization, analyzed with the hypothesis of the forms without content, appear, first of all, as a construction, an implant of the institutional and mentality forms, but without the possibility that this identity and social-political construction to be reclaimed causally by the immanent logic of the background and of the social, political and cultural processes.

The analyses of A.T. Sârbu and Sorin Alexandrescu, bring to the fore the "ingredients" for the establishment of Romanian modernity, wondering to what extent our transition to an "unprecedented modernity" (already codified in the phrase "original democracy") can be considered as an immediate plunge into postmodernity. A.T. Sârbu proposes implicitly either the direct assimilation of current results concerning Western modernity, considered carrying a direct value with a universal scope, or the relation of the current Romanian society to the "peasant background" — by the residual identification or by a radically new type of relate to this fund.

Thus, the prefix-*post* from the phrase "Romanian postmodernism" indicates, on the one hand, a break with modernity, as well as its nostalgia, on the view modernity only intends to escape its own logics of development, the idea of critical evolution toward a "new foundation".

Romanian postmodernism becomes from a political point of view ambivalent, with a double codification: as well accomplice, as contestant toward any closing phenomenon, inviting the participation in debate on nature and on the directions transformation of the current societies, in a globalizing context.

*The physiognomy of the new Eastern reality from the vernacular area related to the period after December 1989, "virused" by postmodernity (*even if, apparently, it absorbs as well some well preserved traditional elements), remains a relatively new construct, that corresponds to different realities, as a consequence of the ideological, technological, social, psychological, esthetic, philosophical, etc. mutations, after our — de facto! — Integration in the intellectual and economic West European community. *At stake there is the option for a different form, whose principle of coagulation will not be an organic one, but mechanic, leveling only the surface, by assimilation wrapped around generalized, stereotyped, mechanized abilities and reflexes the product of a relaxing and relaxed culture, indifferent to hierarchies and canonized or canonizing values.*

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[14] Adrian T. Sârbu, *Ispitele post-umanismului, postmodernitatea ca adevăr al modernizării românești (Temptation of the post-humanism, postmodernity the truth of the Romanian Modernity),* in *Tribuna* Review, 18-24 September 1997.

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LÉGITIMATION PHILANTHROPIQUE DU CAPITALISME POSTCOMMUNISTE EN ROUMANIE[1]

ANTOINE HEEMERYCK*

«Voler en grand et restituer en petit, c'est la philanthropie».
Lafargue P., 1887

Abstract. *This article tries to shed lights the role of the philanthropic foundation in the process of moral legitimization of the business class in Romania. In this aim, I analyse two contrasted examples of entrepreneur: on the one hand, a businessman from the establishment and on the other hand an outsider.*

Keywords. *Romania, businessmen, philanthropy, moral legitimization.*

Dans le cadre du développement postcommuniste, la Roumanie joue le rôle de tiers exclu en dépit d'une intégration récente à l'Union Européenne. Dès les années 1980, elle va subir un processus de déclassement qui débute avec la découverte du plan de systématisation des villages roumains[2]. Entre le tyrannique couple de dictateur, le faux charnier de Timisoara, la «minériade» de la place de l'Université, les enfants errants de la gare de Bucarest dans les années 1990, la corruption structurelle des élites, de la justice (etc.) et le refus de se plier immédiatement après la chute du régime nationaliste-communiste aux exigences des États de l'ouest, la Roumanie semble être le mauvais élève des pays de l'est postcommuniste, subissant une relégation assez clairement identifiable sur un plan international et vivement ressentie sur un plan interne.

Si l'on se penche sur la situation interne, on peut rapidement dégager un profil sociologique très inégalitaire, voire baroque. Le droit du travail y est largement fictif, les affaires de corruption rythment la vie des médias de marché — eux-mêmes appartenant à des affairistes-philanthropes véreux.

L'économie et la société sous le communisme devaient être soumises au pouvoir politique et au parti, l'intégration des structures capitalistes a donc introduit des changements extrêmement violents à tous les niveaux de la société.

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[1] Cet article s'appuie sur une recherche de cinq mois à Bucarest.

[2] Une association sera créée à cet effet en Belgique avec des ramifications dans toute l'Europe, l'Opération Village Roumain.

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La privatisation de l'État et des biens publics qui a donné lieu au pillage systématique des ressources de l'État et privées (la restitution des propriétés communisées a été et est toujours l'objet d'un vol à grande échelle) a créée des opportunités favorisant l'émergence d'une classe sociale dominante composée d'affairistes-politiciens. Certains sont issus de l'ancienne nomenklatura communiste, d'autres sont issus des partis politiques de l'opposition à ces héritiers, ce à quoi il faut ajouter les vrais opportunistes. C'est un phénomène médiatique répandu dans tous les pays de l'est même si médiatiquement les oligarques russes semblent occuper le devant de la scène. Cette catégorie sociologique nouvelle est apparue sur la scène publique s'enrichissant à des degrés extrêmes en une quinzaine d'années, exhibant parfois ce statut avec un cynisme pleinement assumé, alors que des pans entiers de la population restaient dans un état de précarité extrême.

On peut se demander comment une telle situation a pu voire le jour après la disparition du camp communiste, et comment cette classe a pu se stabiliser aussi rapidement surtout qu'en Roumanie, dans les années 1980, la population avait été acculée à la famine. La question est donc celle de la légitimité politique du capitalisme et des capitalistes dans sa version roumaine. Or, depuis les années 2000, d'autres institutions, elles aussi placées sous l'autorité de ces affairistes, ont vu le jour: les fondations philanthropiques. Ces établissements inscrits dans le «blanchiment moral» [Guilhot N., 2004] du capitalisme sont étroitement liés à cette obligation de légitimer la position de domination de ces nouvelles élites par une voie périphérique.

Ce qu'on se propose dans le cadre de cet article, c'est de questionner le rôle de ces organisations dans la légitimation des projets des grands philanthropes, les ressources sociales, politiques, culturelles, économiques et symboliques qu'elles mobilisent. Dan cette optique, on tentera de mettre en lumière la spécificité de cette catégorie d'affairistes devenus philanthropes. On commencera par évoquer leur biographie, puis on évoquera les différents secteurs d'investissements de ces acteurs afin de montrer comment on devient un philanthrope. Enfin on se penchera plus directement sur les fondations, bureaucratie de la vertu, et leur programme qui n'est en aucune manière contradictoire avec le projet de société porté par ces acteurs. Ce sont ces modèles que l'on identifiera au terme de ce parcours rapide.

Le sujet est vaste. Il implique d'opérer des limitations. Par conséquent, on ne prendra ici que deux exemples relevant de deux extrémités du monde des affaires, celui d'un capitaliste relevant de *l'establishment* postcommuniste et celui d'un *outsider*. Ces deux exemples sont représentatifs de deux groupes sociaux en concurrence. Cette comparaison qui restera schématique devrait nous permettre de tirer quelques analyses faisant converger ces deux cas.

Dan Voiculescu et Gheorghe Becali: deux affairistes philanthropes

Dan Voiculescu est né à Bucarest en 1946. Issu d'une famille originaire d'un milieu social modeste, il passera son enfance dans un quartier de la banlieue de Bucarest — *Bariera Vergului*. Nous sommes alors dans l'après guerre et les conditions de vie sont extrêmement précaires dans ces zones ressemblant à ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui les bidonvilles.

George Becali est d'une décade plus jeune que D. Voiculescu. Il est né en 1958 à Zagna, dans une famille Aroumaine. Il appartient à une famille de bergers aisés et à une minorité ethnique (comme produit social et non pas comme essence réelle) qui a réussi, pour une part, à actualiser des formes de solidarités communautaires tout au long de son histoire. Ces formes sont hiérarchisées aujourd'hui et recoupent des stratifications de classes, en tout cas en ce qui concerne ce personnage.

Ces biographies font entièrement partie des mythes fondateurs qu'entretiennent ces personnages ou qui sont entretenus par des acteurs médiatiques: d'une part sur le plan de l'autoréalisation de soi comme *self-made man*, et d'autre part sur le plan de la communauté de destin ou plutôt d'origine que cela projette dans l'imaginaire sur le mode de: «Nous avons tous été pauvres, nous avons donc quelque chose en commun». Ce dernier côté est d'ailleurs plus exploité par George Becali. Ces présentations ne sont pas cachées. Au contraire, elles sont exploitées par ces personnages ou par les institutions qu'ils dirigent.

Les relations de Dan Voiculescu avec les services de surveillance et d'encadrement de l'ancien régime communiste sont de notoriété publique. Le président actuel Traian Basescu appartenant à un parti concurrent l'appelle systématiquement par son nom d'agent de la Securitate: Félix le chat. Elles sont de première importance. Cet homme a possédé le capital social et la science de réseaux nécessaire à la réalisation efficiente de la transition au capitalisme. Il était aussi bien au courant des modes de fonctionnement de l'économie puisqu'il a notamment étudié à la faculté de commerce extérieur et a obtenu plus tard une thèse de doctorat en économie. Sous le communisme, il travaille dans une entreprise dans le domaine du commerce extérieur et ultérieurement deviendra professeur d'économie. On peut remarquer ici que D. Voiculescu se présente *a posteriori* comme un concurrent extérieur aux milieux des capitalistes actuels. Venant d'un milieu modeste, il est le personnage principal d'une histoire contre l'adversité qui s'est construite par la persévérance, le travail et l'innovation. Bien sûr, le côté fictif de cette mise en scène, qui colle un peu trop parfaitement à des biographies comme celle de Henry Ford — elle-même sérieusement escamotée —, doit être soulignée. Ce respect biographique est non moins révélateur des exigences normatives de son milieu social de référence et des représentations en publique car ces personnages sont surexposés médiatiquement.

George Becali est plutôt un opportuniste qu'a vu naître la chute du communisme, qualité essentielle en 1990 lorsqu'on se trouve comme lui sans un solide bagage de relations politiques et de connaissances économiques. Cependant, au cours de la période communiste, il vendait des produits laitiers au noir. On peut donc faire hypothèse que lui-même a accumulé, au cours de cette période, une compétence dans le rapport aux services de l'État. C'est à partir du moment où il aura gagné un capital suffisant dans des petites affaires diverses qu'il réalisera sa fortune dans l'immobilier. L'immobilier est, là comme ailleurs, l'un des secteurs qui est le plus touché par la spéculation dans le monde et où s'observe donc les formes les plus accrues du capitalisme financier. Bucarest est le lieu d'un véritable pillage depuis que les institutions locales sont en charge de restituer les propriétés accaparées sous le communisme.

Gigi Becali n'a pas le raffinement d'un Dan Voiculescu et de l'ancienne garde des personnages bien éduqués de l'ancien régime. Il montre avec beaucoup moins d'ambages et de retenus sa qualité d'*outsiders*. Il fait partie des *lumpen* capitalistes, les capitalistes voyous. Chaque vulgarité, erreur de grammaire, de prononciation, de perte de contrôle est à la fois un acte de défiance vis-à-vis de l'élite la plus stablement inscrite dans le secteur politico-économique de la Roumanie et un appel à la solidarité projective avec les classes populaires.

La fondation Voiculescu a été créée dès les premières années de la chute du communisme tandis que celle de George Becali a été fondée très récemment. C'est encore une différence notable qui montre que Becali est passé par une voix périphérique, déviante même, pour devenir un des empereurs du capitalisme roumain. Becali a participé à de nombreuses séances médiatiques distribuant des billets (de 500€ parfois) à différentes personnes.

L'investissement dans les médias de masse

La fondation Voiculescu grâce à son fondateur possède tous les instruments de l'empire économique nécessaire à une bonne publicité. Dan Voiculescu possède un vaste empire médiatique[3]. On ajoutera à cela un ensemble de partenaires effectivement révélateurs d'un portefeuille de relations exhaustives et variées. Le sénat étudiant, *online student*, *StudentCV*, *studentie.ro*, *Job.ro students*, le Centre de préparation en informatique, l'Université de Bucarest, *Escoala.ro*, *Mojob.ro*, *gradinite.com*, *baby ambiant*. Ce portefeuille est d'autant plus le bienvenu qu'il permet de faire fonctionner le sponsoring pour les financements directs ou relatifs (c'est-à-dire non directement matérialisés): pour la logistique et la publicité. Que l'on pense par exemple à une exposition d'objets d'arts «paysans» et un partenariat avec un musée devient indispensable. D'ailleurs, le Musée du village roumain Dimitrie Gusti et le Musée du paysan roumain, tous deux sis à Bucarest, sont parmi ses partenaires. N'omettons pas des partenaires aussi importants que Carrefour ou l'Université de Bucarest.

Tous les exemples évoqués ici montrent que l'on est dans une stratégie d'intégration dans des milieux sociaux *a priori* aussi éloignés que les entreprises multinationales et les universités roumaines. La Fondation Voiculescu pour le développement de la Roumanie est une entreprise philanthropique qui fonctionne sur le mode de la rationalité dans le domaine de la morale.

Les médias ont un rôle plus particulier et ne sont pas vraiment en position de revendiquer leur autonomie par rapport à la fondation pour une bonne et simple raison: le président de la fondation est le propriétaire de ce *Holding*. Leurs actions sont concertées. Par exemple, les cérémonies organisées par la fondation peuvent bénéficier de la popularité des présentateurs d'émissions télévisés très populaires et de la publicité d'une large part des médias télévisés. Ces médias représentent une véritable force de frappe dans la guerre pour la conquête d'une publicité et la recherche d'une légitimité populaire. Les spots publicitaires diffusés ne relèvent guère de l'amateurisme, mais bien plutôt d'un professionnalisme perfectionné. Elles relèvent donc, comme toute publicité, de la logique marchande.

[3] Composé de plusieurs chaînes télévisées, de nombreux quotidiens et de revues hebdomadaires.

Gigi Becali, une fois encore, est passé par un circuit secondaire pour se faire connaître dans les médias et gagner en popularité. C'est lui qui s'est d'abord fait connaître avant de fonder son établissement philanthropique. Il a racheté en effet le prestigieux et très populaire club de football du Steaua Bucarest, un bien extrêmement rare sur le marché du prestige entre capitalistes quoique, à la différence de la quasi-totalité des pays occidentaux[4], seuls des capitalistes *outsiders* investissent dans les clubs de football. D'autres lui ont emboîté le pas, mais doivent se contenter de clubs qui sont un grade en dessous du Steaua du point de vue de son exposition et de sa place dans l'imaginaire national[5]. Bien sûr, ce n'est pas là un phénomène spécifiquement roumain. Toujours est-il qu'en devenant le patron du Steaua Bucarest, G. Becali s'est donné les moyens d'être surexposé médiatiquement. Il est exposé à la masse des supporters du club qui ne se limite pas aux tribunes du stade, ce qui lui donne une première assise populaire massive. Mais, il est aussi devenu un interlocuteur privilégié des médias. Des postes télévisés spécialisés dans le sport l'invitent régulièrement sinon quotidiennement à donner son avis sur à peu près sur tout et n'importe quoi. Les médias de marché sont très friands de scandales qui ont pour eux l'avantage de faire monter leur audimat et donc leurs retombées financières, et de ce côté-là Gigi Becali n'est pas en reste.[6] C'est même un trait de caractère distinctif, une marque de fabrique de cet homme que d'affirmer sa domination auprès de ses subalternes et de ses concurrents. Dès qu'il est question de ces concurrents, il répète: «Je suis plus riche que lui.» Cela peut éreinter, à quelques occasions, sa réputation. Comme par exemple lorsqu'il traite avec mépris l'entraîneur de son équipe, son parrain, le très populaire joueur de football George Hagi. Mais quelques semaines après avoir observé les tribunes vides du club, la popularité était revenue au pas de la porte.

Ce qu'on voit à travers ce comportement, c'est une forme d'expression du pouvoir de l'élite économique débridée dans la forme, mais dans le fond, il n'est pas fort différent des groupes sociaux dont il relève. Ces explosions de caractère passablement cynique prennent aussi la forme d'une revanche sur ses adversaires, et c'est peut-être ce qui les rend plus acceptables. Gigi Becali a une allure de patron voyou. Il n'a pas fait d'études à l'instar d'un D. Voiculescu et n'a pas connu les joie de la vie de la grande noblesse d'État communiste et postcommuniste. C'est l'archétype de *l'outsider* dans une de ses formes les plus pures, bien plus que Dan Voiculescu, malgré les efforts de ce dernier pour mettre en avant certains aspects de sa biographie qui le différencient de son groupe social d'appartenance. Cette revanche sur l'oligarchie des partis politiques roumains est un motif de premier rang pour comprendre la légitimité qu'induit l'exercice de cette domination spécifique.

Ce personnage peut scander que ses modèles sont le voïvode Mihai Viteazul[7] ou l'empereur Napoléon Bonaparte pour montrer son caractère conquérant, il

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[4] Rappelons que Roman Abramovici, le multimilliardaire russe, possède le club de football londonien de Chelsea et que l'un des clubs de Milan est la propriété de Silvio Berlusconi. On pourrait multiplier les exemples.

[5] Rappelons que le Steaua Bucarest est le seul club roumain à avoir gagné une coupe européenne de football. Dans un pays où l'exclusion de l'Union Européenne est vivement ressentie dans le tissu intersubjectif de la société, on comprendra son importance.

[6] G. Becali a récemment développé un projet de création d'une chaîne télévisée autonome.

[7] Michel le Brave en français.

ressemble plus à un profil typique de capitaliste en provenance d'un horizon social situé hors de *l'establishment*. Toutefois, la référence à Michel le Brave a également une fonction instrumentale pour lui donner d'une part, l'image d'administrateur d'une justice divine pour le peuple et contre l'oligarchie; et d'autre part, un rôle dans l'unification des masses populaires derrière lui dans cette lutte divine. Il est aussi, dans cet ordre de manipulation symbolique, une Némésis réincarnée. Il s'inscrit aussi dans la communauté imaginaire de la société en faisant appel à des références traditionnelles. Ces références religieuses, on va le voir, s'étendent à tous les niveaux de l'activité de George Becali, mais reflète aussi le poids de la religion comme lien social dans la société roumaine d'aujourd'hui. Notons-le dès à présent: il n'invente pas cette référence culturelle, il se l'approprie.

L'intégration aux partis politiques

Dan Voiculescu est le fondateur du Parti humaniste roumain (PHR). Ce parti a été refondé, il y a quelques années, en Parti conservateur roumain (PCR). Le PCR est un parti politique minoritaire qui a passé son existence postcommuniste du côté du Parti social démocrate à quelques rares infidélités près. Étrange situation donc, dictée par une structure d'opportunités qui en dit long sur l'état de la politique en Roumanie, que de voir un parti qui se situe dans la ligne d'une espèce de droitisme réactionnaire (en réaction à) s'associer avec un parti de gauche. «Hiérarchie des valeurs, concurrence libre, économie libre, patriotisme, tradition chrétienne, famille, individu, ordre et légalité» voici quelques-unes des valeurs promues par ce parti politique microscopique. On peut les traduire autrement en soulignant par exemple que ce socle idéologique est constitué par le nationalisme et l'idée de marché. On a bien affaire à un parti politique conservateur. Quant à l'idée d'ordre de légalité, elle pourrait, dans des conditions moins sérieuses, prêter à sourire tant la constitution et l'accumulation d'un capital de millions ou de milliards d'euros en Roumanie ne se fait pas par des voies uniquement officielles et légales, loin de là.

George Becali a, de son côté, quasiment racheté un parti politique. Le Parti nouvel génération (PNG) qui s'est allié depuis peu avec le Parti chrétien démocrate. Le Parti nouvelle génération, en 2008, «milite pour la reconstruction morale de la Roumanie sur la base des principes de la croyance en dieu, l'amour du proche, le décalogue biblique et les valeurs chrétiennes-démocrates». «Le PNG va promouvoir conséquemment la politique dans l'intérêt publique, basée sur la morale chrétienne, l'éducation dans l'esprit de Jésus et l'amour du proche.»[8] À côté de cela, le programme du parti évoque à peu près tout ce qui peut être évoqué en termes d'agenda politique, de la concurrence loyale à l'aide aux personnes âgés, en passant par la promotion des jeunes, sans oublier le développement des infrastructures publiques. Tout cela bien évidement en militant «*pour une limitation du rôle de l'État dans l'économie»* et une «*tranparisation*» (de transparence) du système fiscal roumain et une réduction de la cote d'imposition et de la TVA. Nonobstant les antinomies de ces propres pensées politiques sérieusement

[8] Surligné dans le programme 2008 pour les élections parlementaires.

brouillées ou plutôt sans fondement, le programme réalise un grand écart en faisant des appels du pied à un électorat de gauche en évoquant l'aide sociale et cherche l'électorat de droite en introduisant la thématique de la baisse des impôts appartenant traditionnellement aux partis de droite, le tout fonctionnant, cela va sans dire, sous l'égide de Jésus, de Dieu et des dix commandements.

L'achat ou la fondation de partis politiques forme un second point d'entrée et de renforcement pour ces acteurs de leurs pratiques économiques et philanthropiques. Elle peut aussi leur permettre de gagner une immunité grâce à l'élection parlementaire, ce qui n'est pas rien lorsqu'on connaît l'opacité des mécanismes qui leur ont permis de s'enrichir. Le parti est une machine est nécessaire à la stabilisation des capitalistes postcommunistes. De plus, entrer dans la politique est une stricte continuité de l'ambition de ces personnages d'imposer leurs volontés aux autres ou en d'autres termes de sédimenter leur position de domination. La publicité qu'offre les postes télévisés, les partis politiques lors des campagnes, qui plus est à une échelle nationale, font partie d'un même ensemble de pratiques et de consciences polarisés sur la lutte de pouvoir. On peut également influer de cette manière directement sur les lois, comme dans le cas des politiques fiscales. Tournons-nous plus précisément vers les fondations de ces deux hommes d'affaires.

La fondation Dan Voiculescu pour le développement de la Roumanie

La fondation Dan Voiculescu pour le Développement de la Roumanie est sise à l'Académie des sciences de Roumanie à côté du Palais du peuple. L'obtention d'une location dans un lieu si prestigieux, situé à côté de la maison du peuple, ne va pas sans faire grincer des dents certains scientifiques, qui voient, à juste titre, dans cette présence une immixtion des partis politiques dans les affaires de la science. Assez étrangement d'ailleurs l'adresse indiquée par la fondation n'est pas celle de l'Académie des sciences mais d'un club de peinture pour les jeunes situé non loin de là. Penchons-nous sur les activités de cette fondation.

La fondation développe un programme d'assistance sociale à domicile pour quatre-cents cinquante personnes âgées en situation de difficultés ou d'invalidité. Pour ce faire, elle a mis en place des partenariats avec les directions d'assistance sociale de Bucarest, soit autant de partenariat, au niveau local, avec l'État. Elle assure une formation aux personnes (la fondation dit «candidats») en charge de l'aide à domicile qui pourront, par ce biais, devenir des diplômés d'assistance sociale. Pour cette catégorie d'âge, la fondation apporte son soutien à une association de retraités dans un arrondissement (n°4) de Bucarest dont le maire, Cristian Piedone, appartient au Parti conservateur. Et ensemble, ils ont organisé une fête pour ce club en offrant des cadeaux aux meilleurs danseurs. Dans le même arrondissement, les mêmes acteurs ont organisé des fêtes pour les noces de diamants de plusieurs couples.

Le principe sous-jacent à ce type d'opération est de se construire un statut politique de médiateur du lien social et de sa reconstitution. Les liens entre le parti politique sous la direction de Dan Voiculescu et la fondation montre que l'on est dans le cadre d'une même entreprise.

La fondation offre aussi des récompenses très copieuses (à hauteur de trois cents mille Ron[9]), nommées «prix Voiculescu», chaque année. Il «est accordé à un citoyen dont l'effort a contribué visiblement et significativement à la croissance matérielle et spirituelle de la société roumaine» selon la fondation. On touche ici déjà à l'idée d'excellence et de performance. Or, ce fil conducteur idéologique est aussi prolongé dans les programmes concernant les plus jeunes, car la fondation possède également un club d'excellence pour cette catégorie d'âge. Sa mission consiste à sélectionner des enfants dotés de pouvoirs formidables, supérieurs à la moyenne dans des domaines comme le dessin, la peinture, les mathématiques etc. L'objectif est de former une élite capable d'aider la Roumanie à se mettre sur le bon chemin de la modernité politique et capitaliste. Un sociologue, psychologue — académicien — a été recruté à cette occasion pour justifier avec une étiquette scientifique les programmes politiques de la fondation. On rappellera ici, qu'une telle idée, d'intelligence naturelle est d'une franche absurdité. Le minimum de connaissance sociologique implique de connaître l'effet pygmalion, nommé aussi effet Rozenthal et les travaux de la sociologie de l'éducation dans la reproduction des inégalités. C'est aussi dans ce sens que la fondation organise des forums de l'emploi, pour recruter «les meilleurs».

Mais, ces cautions scientifiques sont exemplaires des modifications induites par la pénétration de la philanthropie dans plusieurs domaines. Dans ces champs scientifiques, culturels, universitaires, certains acteurs vont saisir cette perche pour modifier leur position dans la hiérarchie du champ scientifique à leur avantage et en adjoignant par ce biais un système supplémentaire de légitimation statutaire. On retrouve ce type d'acteurs dans tous les champs dans lesquels est la fondation impliquée: les musées, les universités, les mairies…

En fait, l'un des piliers idéologique de la Fondation Voiculescu est basé sur une transposition de l'idée de performance dans le marché à l'ensemble de la société. C'est un élargissement de cette grille idéologique qu'elle réalise. Et elle double cela d'un conservatisme social clairement assumé: si chacun est à la place de son intelligence, alors la contestation n'a plus de raison d'être, le corps social est légitimement figé. Ce qui implique aussi que le patron de cette fondation est lui-même à sa place et qu'il a mérité l'exercice de la domination, et que cela ne saurait lui être retiré pour d'autres raisons. *Exit* les sciences sociales, *exit* le politique.

Toutefois, les efforts philanthropiques de ces hommes d'affaire montre justement un autre côté de ce phénomène: la conjuration du sort qui veut que leur domination soit toujours incertaine. D'où une quête d'expiation. Car c'est bien ce que révèlent ces investissements en argent et en temps.

Une autre sphère où opère cette quête de légitimité va être investie: la sphère des traditions culturelles et du folklore entendue au sens de Hobsbawm. C'est en ce sens que la fondation organise chaque année des fêtes ou des événements culturels en partenariat avec des musées. Ce n'est là qu'une activité périphérique, mais indispensable pour ces fondations philanthropiques. En effet elle permet d'entrer dans l'espace «culturel» national et de revendiquer son activité pour le bien de

[9] On dira pour simplifier qu'un € est équivalent à 4.2 Ron.

la nation, dans un esprit patriotique, sans avoir pour cela aucun mandat politique. Cela lui permet de cadrer son activité dans le temps (histoire de la Roumanie ancienne) et dans l'espace (espace roumain). Dans le domaine de l'organisation de ces fêtes traditionnelles, on peut citer «l'exposition des traditions — Le mariage chez les roumains» organisé le 27 octobre 2007 au musée National du Village Roumain Dimitrie Gusti. Le projet a pour but «de promouvoir les traditions et les habitudes roumains qui signalent la particularité du peuple roumain dans l'espace de l'Union Européenne». C'est également dans une quête de dépassement de la position secondaire de la Roumanie dans le champ occidental que s'inscrit cette action, et en même temps dans la revendication identitaire. En 2000 déjà, le 22-24 octobre, la fondation avait organisé un événement artistique — *Colindatorii*[10] — dans le but de «conserver et continuer les habitudes roumaines populaires». Cette année, la fondation a mené plusieurs programmes avec le musée du Paysan Roumain. Elle bénéficie de la caution des dirigeants de ces institutions publiques.

La fondation Chrétienne G. Becali

La fondation chrétienne G. Becali en est encore au niveau de l'expérimentation, même si — observations *in situ* à l'appui — celle-ci a déjà atteint un degré de professionnalisme avancé. Les liens institutionnels qu'elle a mis en place sont moins forts, le temps en est peut-être responsable, mais on ne peut négliger aussi la réputation sulfureuse de son patron au nombre des causalités qu'on peut énumérer pour éclaircir cet état de fait. De même, atteindre un degré de professionnalisation aussi rapidement tient à une pratique organisationnelle importé du monde de l'entreprise. Le côté burlesque et ubuesque du personnage Becali le fait souvent oublier: c'est également grâce à une intelligence prédatrice qu'il a réussi à devenir un des personnages clés de la scène médiatique, politique et économique roumaine.

La fondation est située dans une parallèle à la rue *Lipscani* au centre de Bucarest, mais elle possède de nombreuses antennes à travers tout le pays qui se confondent avec le parti politique PNG. Le décor est fort différent dans cette fondation de celle joyeuse et très professionnelle de la fondation D. Voiculescu: des gens âgés, visiblement en très mauvaise santé, y côtoient des personnes sans revenus, des petits entrepreneurs. L'ambiance n'y est donc pas au beau-fixe.

G. Becali a commencé à œuvrer dans la philanthropie d'une façon visible dans les médias, il y a quelques années à l'occasion des inondations cycliques en Roumanie. L'idée a d'ailleurs fait son chemin depuis puisque un nombre impressionnant de politiciens, au cours des dernières inondations au nord de la moldavie (la région roumaine) en 2008, ont défilé dans les zones sinistrées.

G. Becali a distribué de l'argent aux personnes restées sans toit s'attirant aussi une image médiatique importante. Il finançait également des activités diverses individuellement: financement pour des études à l'étranger, financement pour

[10] Il s'agit de personnes qui vont de porte à porte chanter ces chants traditionnels (*colindele*) au moment des fêtes de noël.

une opération de santé à l'étranger. Les activités de la fondation sont tout naturellement orientées vers ces secteurs d'intervention. Le secteur le plus important est sans doute celui de la santé. Nombre de personnes au seuil de la mort demandent des financements pour être opérées en dehors de la Roumanie. Et le président de la fondation est un médecin. Cette orientation va de pair avec une croyance dans la science dans le domaine médicale: on parle de la technologie des cellules sources et souches par exemple, et des liens importants avec des institutions spécialisées en Chine ont été institués. Il s'agit d'un tel secteur d'activité qu'on évoque très sérieusement à la fondation la construction d'une clinique G. Becali à Bucarest. Si d'aventure ce projet, à la manière de Rockefeller à son époque, venait à voir le jour, cela ferait de George Becali le philanthrope le plus abouti de Roumanie.

Ponctuellement, des cérémonies sont organisées à la télévision où des personnes reçoivent de la main de George Becali les sommes d'argent nécessaires à leur traitement clinique, comme dans une tombola. Lors de la dernière édition, dans l'émission télévisée *Naşul* (le parrain), il critiqua ces «gens qui ne sont pas humains» soulignant par-là sa propre vertu.

Tout un ensemble de micro-financements sont aussi réalisés par la fondation, pour une tombe ou un caveau, ce qui est d'une extrême importance en Roumanie si l'on connaît l'importance de la relation aux morts; nombre de personnes demandent un financement pour terminer leurs maisons. Ces actions ne sont pas inscrites aux rapports d'activité.

Cet établissement de la vertu investit aussi largement dans l'aide sociale et alimentaire dans les quartiers les plus pauvres de Bucarest et plus généralement dans les zones désagrégation sociale et économique. Des biens sont distribués par les antennes locales des partis politiques qui sont aussi des antennes de la fondation. Cela montre bien que la fondation est une annexe d'un parti politique. D'ailleurs, les bénéfices de ces actions philanthropiques ne se sont pas fait attendre: les résultats du Parti Nouvel Génération à Bucarest aux dernières élections municipales l'attestent. Pourtant, les antennes du PNG peuvent également servir de relais logistique à la fondation. Par exemple, si dans une zone éloignée de la fondation une demande leur est adressée, un membre de PNG peut aller prendre contact avec ces personnes dans le besoin. Les liens entre la fondation et le parti sont si forts qu'en fait ils semblent être les deux faces d'une même pièce. Le président de la fondation Becali s'est présenté, sans succès, en 2009 aux élections parlementaires à Bucarest, ce qui montre que cet établissement peut-être un excellent tremplin pour se construire une solide image dans la population et *in fine* être élu à un poste à responsabilité publique.

Sous l'angle de l'exploitation du capital culturel, la fondation Becali et G. Becali personnellement investissent des sommes d'argent considérables dans les bâtisses religieuses orthodoxes[11]. Et cela à un niveau territorial extrêmement vaste. La fondation Becali est, de ce point de vue, exceptionnelle: elle intervient à l'extérieur de la Roumanie, en Europe. Elle se différencie de la fondation Voiculescu qui

[11] Les indicateurs de confiance dans les institutions en Roumanie sont d'une solidité déconcertante. L'église orthodoxe est au premier rang depuis des années avec l'armée. Les derniers sont le parlement, et non loin de là les Organisations non gouvernementales qui ne comptent pas les fondations philanthropiques.

travaille à l'intérieur des frontières de la Roumanie. Par exemple, la rénovation des monuments orthodoxes du mont Athos en Grèce a été financée par ce personnage. D'autre part, Gigi Becali a promis qu'il financerait la rénovation de l'église orthodoxe Saint-Nicolas de Bruxelles, église qui a été racheté par l'État roumain. Cela montre, au passage, que l'État et la philanthropie savent faire bon ménage. Cette teinture religieuse est sûrement le lien social prédominant sur lequel entend s'appuyer George Becali et sa fondation, et qu'ils promeuvent en même temps. Dans le bureau du président, sur le mur, derrière son bureau, on voit une grande affiche de G. Becali regardant l'imposante croix orthodoxe en bois qu'il tient dans ses mains. Dans son «palais» résidentiel, on peut voir une représentation grandeur nature de Jésus Christ crucifié en or paraît-il. Ce qui est réalisé par cette mise en exergue du religieux, c'est l'unification d'une communauté de croyants par delà les frontières, un lien social, culturel et politique, car Becali gagne aussi en suffrage populaire spécifiquement auprès de l'exil roumain. C'est donc une manière de réintroduire le lien national et traditionnel, mais au milieu de pratiques politiques et économiques dont la vocation prend son sens dans le milieu des affaires. C'est une recherche d'alibi moral et en même temps d'une unanimité dans la population. Voilà pourquoi G. Becali peut-être s'imagine en Mihai Viteazu. C'est dans ce champ que G. Becali va tenter de se rapprocher de la population, de créer une communauté qu'il va aider à se renforcer pour ensuite conserver une position d'aplomb et recueillir ses suffrages. C'est une manière de faire accepter également à la communauté de croyant un ordre de la société où les colossales fortunes peuvent s'accaparer des positions sur une communauté de destins en les tirant vers leurs propres intérêts. Cela impose en effet aux églises dans ce domaine d'accepter cette aumône et ce que le personnage emmène comme représentations avec lui, ce qui n'est pas le moindre des paradoxes pour ces entreprises de morale. Rares sont en effet les entreprises qui acceptent de pardonner automatiquement des personnages aux capitaux individuels de méfaits et d'immoralité aussi étayés que ceux des philanthropes postcommunistes.

Conclusion

On peut en guise de conclusion revenir à Lafargue et à sa maxime, mise en exergue au début de ce texte: «Voler en grand et restituer en petit, c'est la philanthropie». Il est vrai qu'un bon philanthrope d'affaire est nécessairement un bon capitaliste. Les fondations philanthropiques ont besoin de capitaux et d'investissement pour fonctionner. D'où une dépendance et une empreinte fortes laissées par le fondateur sur les pratiques de la fondation. De ce point de vue, la Roumanie n'est pas encore au niveau des USA, où l'on peut parler de renforcer les investissements philanthropiques les plus efficaces et corollairement d'abandonner les moins rentables. Pourtant la logique économique et sociale est prégnante.

La philanthropie d'affaire repose sur des inégalités et des rapports de domination qu'elle va reproduire mais par une extension à d'autres domaines (prise en charge «sociale», éducation, culture, religion, science etc.). Ces domaines connexes sont eux-mêmes des produits de la socialisation de leur fondateur et un reflet de leur

propre société. D'où leur aspect «naturel» pour les acteurs locaux. Ce passage ne va pas se faire par des voies explicites, même si elles sont conventionnelles. C'est par le biais d'un gouvernement des inconscients faisant appel à des émotions qu'elle s'impose. Qui peut s'opposer en effet à un homme ou une femme millionnaire ou milliardaire donnant de l'argent face à la misère? Le sentiment partagé d'empathie qu'une telle pratique médiatisée génère efface la condition objective d'imposantes inégalités qui est à son origine. Elle désarme la critique par l'usage d'une gouvernance des émotions et des inconscients. Le premier niveau humanitaire [Hours B., 1998] va être redoublé par un niveau d'exploitation du capital culturel pour populariser le philanthrope et s'inscrire dans le patrimoine culturel, dans un niveau de consensus le plus général possible.

Mais la philanthropie réalise plus qu'une neutralisation dans l'imaginaire. Elle implique d'abord la reconnaissance du dominant en tant que dominant même pour ses bonnes œuvres. Ensuite, ce don va engendrer une dette diffuse qu'il est impossible de rembourser, un retour sur investissement dont on attend les intérêts. Sauf peut-être si l'on considère le vote aux élections et le pardon que l'on va accorder aux grands philanthropes pour leur comportement au plus loin de toute moralité puissent servir de monnaie d'échange. C'est dans ce sens que la philanthropie des affairistes est à la fois une quête du salut, de légitimité et d'imposition idéologique qui entraîne avec elle toute la dynamique d'un système qui résiste pourtant difficilement à une morale même résiduelle. La recherche d'absolution formelle se transforme en extension réelle des zones de contrôle des capitalistes.

Terminons cette brève incursion dans la philanthropie d'affaire roumaine par une anecdote. En 2009, G. Becali a été arrêté à son domicile tôt le matin par la brigade antiterroriste. Celui-ci a fait récupérer par sa brigade d'hommes de force sa voiture volée. Il est accusé d'avoir instruit une «justice privée» sera interdit plusieurs mois durant de quitter le territoire roumain. Cela posait problème puisqu'entre-temps il est devenu parlementaire de l'UE. Cet épisode illustre en partie un modèle de société en jeu dans lequel les affairistes-politiciens-philanthropes se verraient prendre en charge le politique sans mandat, comme dans un féodalisme capitaliste. D'ailleurs, on peut se demander s'il n'existe pas une analogie voire une continuité entre la compétence dont ont fait preuve ces acteurs pour faire fructifier un capital grâce à la privatisation de l'État et leur pratique sur le plan philanthropique qui ressemble à une privatisation politique.

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CULTURAL DIPLOMACY TODAY NEW STEPS TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA

LUCIAN JORA*

Abstract. *This study launches and responses to the following questions: What distinguishes Cultural Diplomacy form Propaganda and what would be the demarcation line which separates them? When Cultural Diplomacy degenerates in Propaganda and with which effects? What is the new environment and variables which impose today a new approach towards cultural representation? How can we measure the effectiveness of Cultural Diplomacy?*

Keywords: *Public Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy, Lobbyism, International Relations.*

The term "*Cultural Diplomacy*" is often a euphemism for state political "*Propaganda*". However the proliferation of information in open societies (and not only) makes it more difficult for governments to control information. The end of the Cold War did not meant "*The End of History*" but in fact it meant a new era when the cultural diplomacy as a form of public diplomacy became in some respects preeminent towards classical intergovernmental diplomacy. The spread of democracy in many countries which went hand in hand with an unprecedented access to news and information, more recently the internet and the rise of several non governmental actors whose voice can constrain several governments are evolutions which impose a reconsideration and adaptation of an old theoretical framework. Most ideas absorbed today by people are beyond the classical instruments of national government control. The new environment within the international system impose new approaches. Among the most important shifts we can consider: a) The international actors are increasingly non-traditional and NGO's are the new important players in the arena, b) There are new mechanisms to communicate with world publics characterized by real-time, interoperability, non state control namely the internet and satellite television, c) The demarcation line between domestic and international politics in terms of

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international effect is more than ever diluted, d) New concepts are used to cover the new approaches. The "*old*" universal concept of "*Propaganda*" is often replaced with specific specialized terms most of them borrowed from marketing, such as "*Branding*". In the information era, the power to inform to modify images, to spread across the globe ideas and ideologies has been specially designated with a new concept, "*soft power*"[1]. Soft power is important for the Cultural Diplomacy because the concept is based on the idea that within the international environment for an actor the attractiveness of its culture can prove to be a more powerful influence tool than its economic and military strength. There are new comers in the old game of power. Some major international NGO's have their own international agenda, branding and cultural diplomacy type campaign. Although their actions are supported by various states they have their own priorities, interests and policy agendas. The term "*soft power*" directly proportional with the international image, and build by cultural diplomacy various actions has moved from the international relations scholarly papers and debates to the concrete state political agendas.

Cultural diplomacy is most often incorporated into the more broaden concept of *Public Diplomacy*, (in English language sources). Public diplomacy refers to a diplomatic discourse and negotiations addressed to the general people not to a government, with other words negotiating not with foreign country official representatives but directly to its citizens. The term was used for the first time in 1965 and adopted immediately as a good substitute for *Propaganda* and *Psychological Warfare*. The real new relevance for the image making and representation of culture came with after the end of Cold War once the contribution of ideas and cultural models was widely recognized as a tool as powerful as the latest generation weapons. The generalization of mass information through satellite television and latter internet added a new dimension to the art of cultural representation towards a foreign audience.

Cultural diplomacy to be distinguished from *Propaganda,* must involve reciprocity. But can we talk about reciprocity when we have do deal with unequal partners? It can be a matter of proper balance. Also true that often the refusal of participation in a reciprocity exchange program is motivated by lack of confidence, and complexes of inferiority towards the strength of own culture. Strategic communication involved in cultural diplomacy strategies when aiming short term political goals when use persuasion techniques often become cultural propaganda. This evolution from cultural diplomacy to propaganda can be perceived when just like in a political campaign it develops a set of comprehensive messages and symbolic events and to reinforce them. Cultural diplomacy means above everything performing *art for art.* It is not advertising, or branding although the term "*branding a nation*", constructing a country brand has become popular and even a successful business for different media groups. Advertising involves the capacity to synthesize in basic simple concepts what is considered as most representative for a certain national culture, and then repeat it again and

[1] See Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004.

again, like advertising any other market product. Although the market experts are using this technique for decades the results are questionable (not to say opposite) in the case of more sophisticated concepts as those involved by a nation's branding and representation.

Some analysts would sustain that public/cultural diplomacy may become propaganda when used for "*immoral*" purposes. A risky statement as it would drag the debate towards and endless road: what is moral and immoral in politics and international relations.

Public Diplomacy/Cultural Diplomacy sometimes is conceptualized as a form of *Psychological Warfare*, at least in its *Propaganda* dimension. Anyway *Psychological Warfare* defined as the use of communication with the enemy's public to achieve an objective in war time, is an uncomfortable and exaggerated label for *Public Diplomacy* even for the cases of "*silent diplomatic wars*". It implies the use of aggressive communication and symbols to break the enemy's will and determination to resist or to attack. Although not excluded, the association between *Psychological Warfare* and *Public/Cultural Diplomacy* is so damaging to the whole subject that most analysts would rather avoid it.[2]

Probably one of the most obvious distinctiveness between cultural diplomacy and propaganda is the genuine search for mutual influence, the two ways flow of cultural influence, and above all the willingness of those studying the target audience to adapt and to accept being transformed by the target audience in order to facilitate the mutual understanding. Studying the audience in order to create more effective ways to influence them is practiced since immemorial times but it was not cultural diplomacy in its today's meaning. In these approaches the dialogue was often practiced, but not in order to negotiate something or to find the lowest common denominator, but as a skillful pedagogical technique to facilitate the audience's acceptance[3]. In a *zero sum game* perception there is no place for genuine dialogue. In this case the biggest problem for practitioners (in our case cultural attaches) seems to be the ignorance of the opposite side's audience. In this scenario the practitioner's mission is to convince the foreign audience about the indisputable arguments of its cause. In the case of many small and poorer countries we may have a case of misrepresentation and incapacity to deliver enough information. But in the case of bigger actors often public diplomacy does not fail to deliver large amounts of information. Rather, it has failed to deliver information convincingly. The leaflet style propaganda and declamatory messages which are not engaging dialogues is ineffective. The infectiveness is even more accentuated when it address the ordinary people a story which is not pleasant to their ears.

Moving cultural diplomacy beyond propaganda implies: an understanding of the "*enemy*" audience, confronting hostility towards own culture with balanced arguments, proving to the target audience that their opinion is relevant, counts and can make a difference in a debate. Public diplomacy is a part of the political

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[2] Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, April 2007, p. 20.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 20.

game, and its Cultural Diplomacy component must not just simply deliver a message to an audience; it has to obtain a desirable result. Getting a desirable result is again not simply about delivering what the cultural attaches think the target foreign audience would like to hear but about the need to acknowledge that the listener's point of views is acknowledged and discussed.

Another traditional dimension of cultural diplomacy involves developing relationships with key individuals through exchanges, training, conferences, and access to local media channels. In order to be effective these relationships have to be developed not chaotic or just by interpersonal feelings and intuition but between peers (politicians-special advisors, business people-cultural entrepreneurs or/and academics).

Several cultural diplomacy campaigns are rather design to conquest and convince the own public opinion that something is done and there are plenty of arguments to favors the own point of view instead of creating the type of discourse which would persuade skeptical audience and would sound unconvincing back home. Also not only the politicians but the media as well in a certain country may select and debate only what they and the public are pleased to hear. For example the evolutions in the Republic of Moldova took by surprise the Romania public opinion in the early 90's simply because they were use debate the ex Soviet union trough the Romanian national ideology lenses ignoring essential evolutions which would affect the beautiful simplicity of the Romania national ideology model. More or less the same happened in open societies as well. The US public opinion was unaware and shocked by the violent outreach and massive popular support of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The cultural (the Islamic ideology, the imposed western cultural model) and the political ingredients (basically the US supported, Shah's oppressive regime) were largely unknown and not debated in US being the part of a scenario unpleasant to the American public's ears. Once again carrying out successful strategies of public diplomacy is difficult if you do not have ears for things you do not want to hear. The algorithm "*your information versus my information*" performed often failed to provide the expected results in relation to some deep rotted culture as the Islamic one even when carried wit the advantage of mastering some 80% of the world media space (as it was the case of US during the Cold War).

As advertising executives (Adam Lury and Simon Gibson) put it: "*The answer is not more information, but a different form of engagement*." The words of U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Charlotte Beers: "*Our goal is not what you say, but the response that you desire*", may prove if not an immediate change at least the acknowledgement that something didn't work properly with the old approach and need to be replaced by new strategies.

In the specific case of US public diplomacy towards the Islamic world (and not only) it has to take into account the frustration created by the perceived one-way flow of culture from the West. The belief that national customs and identities are replaced by an unidirectional, continuous, massive and accelerated

influx of cultural products (including the English language, fashion, habits and lifestyle) create frustration which need to be addressed. First the newly created TV and Radio station in Arabic financed for cultural diplomacy reasons by the US Administration need to promote apart form Western political values and fashion, traditional Islamic cultural values trough examples of generosity and tolerance, in a manner which in medium term perspective may create a sense o acknowledged respect and confidence in those sources[4]. Historical evidence demonstrates that, usually when cultural communities feel under thereat the best approach towards integration relies in confidence building measures. If the Islamic audience will ever perceive the Western media as protecting through its content the Islamic authentic and truly traditional values, they may turn to it as to a credible source of information. Even if is naïve to consider that in a medium term perspective any Western cultural diplomacy strategy will succeed in making the Muslim traditional communities feeling culturally protected by the Western media and cultural strategies, it has to be the target at the horizon for any public/cultural diplomacy medium and long term strategy. It has to be the case not only because it may prove as been more effective and providing a better value for money but above everything because this kind of approach only would be compatible with the Western self perceived fundamental values such as: democracy, egalitarianism, open society, multiculturalism and political pluralism[5].

To insure effectiveness some practitioners advocate the concentration on "*niche diplomacy*".[6] Usually Norway is given as an example of a country whose voice and presence is multilaterally respected namely because its prioritization on a core message: *Norway as a force for peace*. Of course apart from a real vocation and a long tradition of neutrality other comparative advantage like the Nobel Peace Prize was also wisely exploited. Niche diplomacy involving concentration on a certain aspects of international agenda for conflict prevention and development, as well as on a certain public does not mean to provide a certain discourse and attitude which is inconceivable for other environments. Formulating public messages for a niche audience with a content which is offensive for other audiences is an operational mistake. Any public message sooner or latter will reach the general audience interested in the subject.

The quality and credibility of the messenger is equally important to the quality and credibility of the message as such. The source has to be trusted and respected in the environment of the target country. NGO's or cultural associations of Diasporas are better suited to carry messages which usually are carried by ambassadors or governmental officials.

The leverage of public diplomacy messages trough all the communication channels recommended by the recent debates and think tank groups in fact bring

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[4] The US plans to launch a 24-hour Arabic satellite news channel to compete with Al Jazeera.

[5] An interesting strategy can be noticed in the case of France. In the last years it seems to have developed a new approach. The *solitaire actor* confident in the power of influence of French language and culture, promoting until recent the French exceptionally switched towards multiculturalism in a *common front* of small nations having to face the cultural hegemony of US and English speaking world. The multilingualism strongly championed by France in the EU is also a part of the strategy.

[6] Leonard Mark, *Diplomacy by other means*, in: *Foreign Policy*, New York, Sep./Oct. 2002, Issue 132, p. 48.

nothing new to the debate. What may bring a new approach would be the periodical audience research, done properly may pay the effort and founds because often "*it is not what is said that counts, it is what is heard.*"[7] It is a challenging task because deep rooted prejudices may find a conspiracy or an offensive content in virtually any kind of message.

The importance of dialogue, the importance to listen, to offer to the adversaries the possibility to express their arguments, is a good antidote against accusations of arrogance and a tool to win credibility and new audience.

The educational and cultural exchanges, more than 35.000 sponsored every year by the US State Department (in 2003)[8] added to the estimated total US $12 billion of international exchanges of any kind involving US although unparallel by any other nation don't seems to be enough to compensate the sever decline in trust, sympathy and confidence US is facing in the last 6 years. The arguments offered by Christopher Ros[9] that 50% of the leaders of "*global coalition*" in the war against terrorism are former participants in various exchange programs is unconvincing as far as we don't see a direct connection between the participation in exchange programs with US and a country decision to join the US lead coalition. Also some of the most notorious terrorists are in fact Western educated with a good knowledge of the Western values and culture. This is not necessary related with the last decades US support for Israel. In US is also often quoted the case of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood the Egyptian writer Sayed Qtub after benefitting from a one year exchange visit in US in 1948. What would have be seen with admiration and envy by a European (consumerism, easygoing lifestyle, openness) was decadent in the eyes of Sayed Qtub. The subject was heavily debated in the last years considering the consequences towards what is to be the most effective way to do public/cultural diplomacy, namely the exchange programs. Pre exchange programs to familiarize potential exchange candidates with the western values and lifestyle, relaxing visa systems were among the immediate solutions proposed. All of them are disputable in terms of real efficiency. How to improve the experiences of exchange students and minimize the counter-productive effect remains an open question.

The new mediums of information, the new demography, the unprecedented mobility of the people, the unprecedented access to information sources of any kind creates not only opportunities for dialogue and mutual knowledge but also a new deeper gap between expectations and possibilities to fulfill them with all the consequences in terms of accentuated frustration and political radicalism and extremism.

Diasporas now are larger than ever, and although for security reasons they are rarely recruited in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, they can contribute in terms of cultural and language skills to narrow the communication gap. Diasporas even if referred to the same ethnic group in terms of cultural representation mean

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[7] Christopher Ross, *Pillars of Public Diplomacy-Grapping with International Public Opinion*, Harvard International Review. Summer 2003 Boston, p. 27, EBSCO Publishing.

[8] *Ibidem*.

[9] *Ibidem.*

different things in different places which involve different approaches. The most quoted case is the one of US Italian Diaspora influence towards the political evolutions in post WWII Italy.

The major practical questions both practitioners and theorists are trying to give an answer is the impact and efficiency of a Cultural Diplomacy action. Metaphorically for many analysts attempting to evaluate cultural diplomacy can seem: "*like a forester running out every morning to see how far his trees grow over night*"[10]. Although we are not that radical and models with viable indicators can be founded even for the distant past, an awareness of the inevitable distortions is a must. For Nichollas J. Cull[11] the size of the audience may be less relevant than the influence of the audience. We would say that even this well known example is too simplistic. The influence of the of the audience may be a variable for a short term perspective (propaganda like) while the number of audience may be one of the essential ingredients (among many others) for more in-depth, fruitful results (cultural diplomacy relevant) results in a long term perspective.

The cost of the US Foreign Service monthly magazine in Russian "*Amerika*" on the USSR's black market may have been an a good indicator of success. Nowadays some annalists propose the use of special designed monitoring software with emphasize on strategic languages, (like Farsi for example) to count the number of accesses certain materials, blogs, comments etc. No doubts a useful tool.

The systematic listening, research and analysis on multiple societal levels of the answer perception and reaction to a cultural diplomacy message, is a precondition for its proper analysis interpretation and conversion into realistic results, acceptable both by the civil society and high level policy practitioners.

Some recent quoted cases of foreign policy consultation like those Canada whose government is posting on line draft policy documents on public diplomacy and country image representation abroad to allow interested citizens to contribute to their development, in fact are not new. It was a practice also used in the interwar period, when such documents were popularized by the official press then, interested citizens were debating and contributing with advises and proposals. The feedback coming from the general audience towards the policies of the Romanian Ministry of Propaganda in 1939-1940 whose archive files I personally researched, is in general not constructive. Cultural diplomacy needs to be performed by specialized personal today just like in the past.

We would conclude by adding some remarks regarding one of the most disputed issues of the agenda. The one of effectiveness measurement, with paramount importance when it comes to claim more founds and attention.

The use of the new measurement framework has, however, helped to identify some links between activities, outputs and progress towards the outcomes we are seeking to achieve.

A key principle has been that 'the systematic approach to planning can be

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[10] Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, April 2007, p. 45.

[11] *Ibid.*

expected to deliver benefits even if it proves to be impossible to establish strong causal links all the way along the chain from *inputs* to longer-term *outcomes*.

There are several acknowledged difficulties in measuring the effects of cultural diplomacy. The most often quoted are: the long-term perspective; the attempt to measure concepts which on their own are unclear and whose content is still debated, the general tendency of the *raporteurs*, cultural attaches to attribute changes to their own activities and recent efforts. Working measurable concepts like, trust, mutual understanding, attitudes, prejudices just like anything related to the mentalities is difficult to measure and the variable used will always be a mater of debate. Some practitioners like Louise Vinter and David Knox[12] consider the question of attribution as the most difficult challenge in terms of own actions effectiveness. Several events, organisations, and influences contribute at the same time to the shape of attitudes and beliefs. The easiest way to measure the effectiveness would be to count the results as a balance between inputs (time, funds, human and material involvement, neglecting other actors) and outputs (number of visitors, number of sold magazines and favourable articles etc).

Although most authors insist for an exclusive emphasis on evidence-based evaluation rather than narrative reporting, the "evidence based" evaluation may prove as being too inflexible considering the complexity of human behaviour and the multitude of variables to deal with. We would rather advocate for a mix approach which include: a) a constant media survey which seeks to identify changes in the nature and tone of coverage of targeted issues, and, where possible, the reasons for these changes; b) the opinion change among public opinion "influencers" on specific topics representative for cultural diplomacy.

Cultural Diplomacy's evaluation framework need to be a long term one with intermediate targets (short and medium term) according to different specific goals. The articulation of the links between each stage and the next is critical to the validity of the evaluation process[13]. The "links" consists in "intermediate outcomes", which for the evaluation process allow impact to be evaluated from a shorter-term perspective while still enabling general main "course" to be assessed in relation to longer-term outcomes. The viability of this model consist in the capacity to use and advocate even negative or disastrous intermediate results as intermediaries towards the long term final positive outcome.

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[13] *Ibid.*

THE RHETORIC OF "GOOD GOVERNANCE" AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY — THEIR PRESENT INTEREST

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Abstract. *This text concisely maps the main co-ordinates and directions of analysis for the investigation of the concept of "good governance", underlining the present interest for the concept. Starting from the definition and the principles of good governance the author emphasizes the important role of the (forgotten?) principle of tranparency. Without transparency (and accountability), the ideal of "good governance" remains closer to a rhetorical exercise and farther from the path of "good governance" relevant for democratization. The role of media in maintaining transparency is emphasized in the article, too.*

Keywords: *good governance, openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coherence, transparency, democratization.*

I. *What is "good governance"?*

"Good governance" represents a concept replete with present interest as well in the European Union, as worldwide. Nowadays, especially considering the economic consequences of the financial crisis, it is important to investigate the relationship between good governance and transparency. At the same time, it is relevant to notice the (theoretical) trend of parting of the ways between good governance and transparency, on the one hand, and democratization and rule of law, on the other. From this perspective, it is more significant to analyze the current Romanian governance.

Nevertheless, traditionally, Romanian governance proved to be deficient in terms of governance, as well before the communist era, as during the communist era (then, with dare consequences more than ever), and as the situation we have witnessed after the revolutionary events of December 1989. All the Romanian governments after 1989 barely accepted and answered to the democratic imperative of accountability, and all of them blamed the previous governance for all the deficient chapters and aspects of governance.

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The main coordinates for the investigation of the notion of good governance are developed starting from the extended definition of good governance — *openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence* — offered by the European documents. Briefly put, "good governance" does not represent entirely a new instrument in politics, but it relays on the same "old" set of techniques of government that lead to further democratization and have the benefit of efficiency, too. First, there is no good governance outside democracy and, second, where there is good governance there is also efficiency, reflected in the democratization of society. Etymologically, good governance refers to the craft of governing, a political craft. The phrase relates to the techniques, rules and good practices that approximate best the democratic political optimum. In our complex and global world, democratization depends on the good governance exerted by the local, regional, national and global factors, according to the same set of principles of good governance. At each of these levels, these principles of good governance should be efficient.

The argument here is also based upon the assessment of the relationship between good governance and transparency. By transparency, we understand in this investigation a combined presence of government information disclosure, decision making openness, disclosure and access to public information and the freedom of information and media. Patrick Le Galès defines good governance as "the process of co-ordination of public and private players, social groups and institutions for the purpose of achieving specific goals discussed and agreed together in fragmented and uncertain environments".[1]

The global and rapidly developing environment of the European Union represents now, considering also the European consequences economic crisis triggered by the end of 2008, a fragmented and uncertain environment that could only benefit from the reinforcement of these principles of good governance. Thus, to the extent that this co-ordination of public and private players, or of the social groups and institutions takes place for the purpose of achieving specific democratic goals of public interest with respect for the rule of law and the human rights of the citizens, one may perceive the positive side of the concept manifested through the *good* democratic practices, skills and techniques associated with procedural democracy and also through the reinforcement of the democratic values characteristic for substantial democracy. On the other hand, when in the process of co-ordination of public and private players, and of the social groups and institutions some players become an impenetrable combination of political, administrative and economic elites which govern alone then the legitimacy of that governance is severely affected and governance becomes a negative enterprise and an approximation for an authoritarian, non-democratic, rule. Considering the global directions for democratic development and the interests with global relevance, the specialists discuss the global good governance as well.[2]

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[1] Hermet Guy, Badie Bertrand, Bimbaum Pierre, *Dictionnaire de la Science politique et des institutions politiques*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2005.

[2] The "political optimum" represented by the "good governance" is a recurring idea within the articles on "Governance, Powers and Democracy" selected by the Council of Europe and available at http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/sps/synthesis_Summer_University_%20Democracy2008.pdf

II. *Why the rhetorical perspective?*

With Bourdieu, the relations between language and symbolic power have become a classical notion. At the same time, good communication is vital for good governance. Approaching the discourse of good governance in this theoretical context, the rhetorical perspective is useful within this attempt in order to underline the gap between the discourse of the European documents and the actual act of governance. The former represent a referential for the latter. In my view the wider is this gap the more accentuated is the rhetorical dimension of the discourse of good governance and the less clear is the contribution of good governance to the democratic life of society. As following, I shall describe as concisely as possible the role of transparency in relation to all the principles of good governance as outlined in the White Paper for European Governance.

III. *European governance and Romanian governance*

The White Paper[3] states clearly that the principles of good governance are openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. None of these key words can be understood dissociated from the democratic meanings of transparency and all could become manifest and fulfilled only when a substantial level of relevant public information is ensured. The rhetoric of good governance becomes a part of reality when accountability is at the heart of the practice of governance. Accountability has indeed a pivotal role in relationship with governmental openness and citizen participation, on the one hand, and the effectiveness and coherence of the government's political practice, on the other. At the same time to talk about accountability without the transparency of the acts of government in terms of both spending and investment is unconceivable from a democratic perspective.

Whatever results we cherish in what concerns European governance; they have been achieved by democratic means. "The Union is built on the rule of law; it can draw on the Charter of fundamental rights, and it has a double democratic mandate through a Parliament representing EU citizens and a Council representing the elected governments of the Member States. The Union should seek to apply the principles of good governance to its global responsibilities. It should aim to boost the effectiveness and enforcement powers of international institutions".[4] Meanwhile, the harsh recent realities brought about by the consequences of the economic crisis threaten the principles of good governance by the temptation of placing a heavier accent on the principle of effectiveness of governance on the detriment of all the others. The incentive to efficiently cope with the crisis could bring the democratic tone of European governance a couple of tones lower, toward authoritarianism. It may bring to the fore the attention for economic recovery to the detriment of democratization and good governance in the harmony of all the principles.

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[3] Commission of the European Communities, European Governance. Awhite Paper, Brussels, 25.7.2001, COM(2001) 428 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 5.

Especially, since the importance of the element of transparency is already left implicit in the European document, the reality of the crisis might push it to a farther background along with the principles of openness, participation, and accountability. This will render good governance a mere rhetorical adornment of a rather authoritarian exercise of redressing economy, with efficiency and coherence, hidden behind the expert technocratic governance. Once this expert and technocratic governance becomes "the new good governance", the principles of openness, participation, and accountability, along with any requirement of transparency, will become improper to the act of good governance. The expert governance does not leave much room for the openness and participation and, thus, accountability becomes solely a "waste of time". The same is true for IMF oriented governance.

Declaratively, the Commission will both improve the dialogue with governmental and non-governmental actors of third countries when developing policy proposals with an international dimension, and it will propose a review of the Union's international representation in order to allow it to speak more often with a single voice. But will the discourse resist in front of the realities of the crisis?

The White Paper on European Governance looks also beyond Europe and contributes to the debate on global governance. "Reforming governance addresses the question of how the EU uses the powers given by its citizens. It is about how things could and should be done. The goal is to open up policy-making to make it more inclusive and accountable. A better use of powers should connect the EU more closely to its citizens and lead to more effective policies".[5]

When one considers the main composing elements for good governance in relationship with the political Romanian reality understands that it is more appropriate to talk of the degrees of *closeness, insulation, deficient accountability, ineffectiveness and incoherence*, related to Romanian governance, instead of *openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence*. The former principles stand in a relationship of contradiction with the five principles that underpin good governance in the White Paper concerning European governance as good governance.

III.1. *Closeness*: While good governance states that institutions in UE should work in a more open manner, Romanian government represents an illustration of the opposite characteristic — closeness. The European document explains: "Together with the Member States, they (the institutions — my note) should actively communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it takes. They should use language that is accessible and understandable for the general public. This is of particular importance in order to improve the confidence in complex institutions".[6] Thus, in terms of national governance, Romanian government should actively communicate its decisions in an "accessible and understandable language" for the general public. Instead, Romanian reality of everyday governance proves the contrary. The communication shifts from inappropriate silence to either

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 6.

[6] Commission of the European Communities, *European Governance. A White Paper*, Brussels, 25.7.2001 COM(2001) 428 final, p.10, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

aggression or confusion.[7] At the same time, there is a strain of very concise optimistic clear and professional communication issued by the Central National Bank of Romania, a main source of economic and social (fragile) stability.

III.2. *Insulation*: Good governance is impossible without participation. Meanwhile, governance in Romania is characterized by the insulation of the act of government and by the fragmentation of the policy chain. Instead, the European recommendation states: "The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain — from conception to implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies. Participation crucially depends on central governments following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing EU policies".[8] On the one hand, the ministers support rapid and confusing changes, sustaining projects and proposals written in a bad Romanian language that even contradict their expert status, as it was the case with the most recent minister of education (Daniel P. Funeriu). On the other hand, they minimize the scope and the role of the practice of consultation with the trade unions, often attempting to "forget" the aspect negotiated in the later version of documents drafted, as was the case in what concerned both the sector of education and health. Also, an interesting proposal emphasized both the tendency to insulate the governmental act and to rend it more unaccountable and it was prompted by Minister Elena Udrea — a key government personality and, rumor has it[9], close to the President, maybe even the following prime-minister in Romania, — who suggested that certain tenders should become protected as national secrets. The result of insulation in governance is therefore not only confusion, but also the diminished trust and the diminished transparency in the communication of institutions delivering public policies. On the short run, this is damaging the social fabric, and, on the long run, the very legitimacy of the institutions.

III.3. *Deficient accountability*: In what concerns *accountability*, the European standard of good governance does not translate very well into the Romanian reality: "Roles in the legislative and executive processes need to be clearer. Each of the EU

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[7] Ioana Maria Muntean, journalist at PRO TV, and competitor at Miss Italy became spokeswoman for Romanian government on the 23rd of February 2009. There is the significant correction in the oral and media culture: the government's spokewoman sustains the surname "the silences bearer". See www.ciutacu.ro/.../purtatoare-de-tacere-muta-sau-emotiva/; www.sfin.ro/.../taceri_vinovate_in_comunicarea_ dintre_putere_si_media.html; www.gandul.info/.../boc-decreteaza-codul-tacerii-la-guvern-cum-reactioneaza-ministrii-guralivi-amenintati-cu-remanierea-55... -; www.claudiulucaci.ro/2010/.../ce-simplu-pare/ -, etc.

[8] Commission of the European Communities, *op.cit.*, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

[9] Certainly, rumor is not science, but this mention has relevance in the case in point, considering that modern sociology showed that rumors fill in the gap between what it is known and what it is not known, all the more relevant considering the closeness and the insulation characterizing governance in Romania. At the same time popular interest (as the Presidential direction of the rumor, see, for instance, www.thediplomat.ro/articol.php?id=7) in this case is perked up by the fact that while a former minister, Ms. Monica Rizi, is investigated for oversized and inappropriate governmental spending, the current minister Elena Udrea was publicly congratulated by the Court of Accounts for the huge spending executed and currently continuing... www.6am.ro/.../curtea-de-conturi-gasit-nereguli-la-zeci-de-institutii-de-stat — As popular intuition should not be mistaken for scientific truth, it also cannot be discredited as a relevant parameter of democratic popular culture, calling for increased openness and accountability in Romanian governance.

Institutions must explain and take responsibility for what it does in Europe. But there is also a need for greater clarity and responsibility from Member States and all those involved in developing and implementing EU policy at whatever level".[10] Current Romanian reality provides numerous illustrations for the diminishing of the role of legislative and the accentuated role of presidency. For instance, it is a public fact that government did not answer well to the attempts of the legislative to render government accountable, while the President frequently calls the parties to "consultation" at Cotroceni Palace.[11] That is, at a closer analysis, the frequent and apparent consultations emphasize the deficient accountability of Presidency and government. More generally, at all the levels of government and management, lower accountability represents the hallmark of Romanian society. No one can offer an instance where even a director or a mayor, and not a medium or high level government representative, resigned after a conflict of interests, a misdemeanor or a scandal of corruption. The televised proceedings from the National Agency of Integrity are simulacra of rendering politicians and statesmen and stateswomen accountable. There were conflicts of interests, misdemeanors and scandals brought to public attention by media. None was followed by a resignation. Instead, in Romania, currently all accountability for government and governance is transferred to the IMF, as previously all the responsibility for any either ridiculous and unpopular measure was transferred to the requirements of the European Union, taking advantage of the unprecedented popularity that the European Union and Romania's accession to the EU had with Romanian population.

III.4. *Ineffectiveness*: The European document above mentioned explains: "Policies must be effective and timely, delivering what is needed on the basis of clear objectives, an evaluation of future impact and, where available, of past experience. Effectiveness also depends on implementing EU policies in a proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the most appropriate level".[12]

On the 26th of March, 2010, Prime-Minister Emil Boc gave a press briefing at Victoria Palace concerning the anti-crisis measures undertaken and implemented by Boc government(s). He said that out of a total of 32 anti-crisis measures considered, 28 were accomplished and 4 are still in various stages of completion.[13] The unitary tax quota was maintained at 16%, and the VAT at

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[10] Commission of the European Communities, *op.cit.*, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

[11] The "consultations" directed by the President in virtue of his constitutional role as a mediator underline the weakling role of the Social-Democrat Party and the modest role of the Liberal Party as opposition, and the role of "presidential party" for the Democrat Liberal Party. (Un)surprisingly, there is never at least a wink of disagreement between the President and the Democrat Liberal Party, and for this reason the negotiations and "consultations" look more similar to a briefing. About the consultations at Cotroceni www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-7170436-consultari-cotroceni-traian-basescu-cere-proiectul-lege-privind-functionarea-ani-fie-adoptat-par...; www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-7027442-luni-loc-consultari-cotroceni-tema-modificarii-constitutiei-vor-propune-pdl-psd-pnl-lui-traian-...; www.gandul.info/.../runda-a-doua-de-consultari-la-cotroceni-basescu-lui-ponta-trebuia-sa-l-aduceti-pe-adrian-nastase-sa-va-spuna-ce...; www.adevarul.ro/.../A_doua_zi_de_consultari_la_Cotroceni_0_225578019.html; www.cotidianul.ro/consultari_la_cotroceni_pe_tema_revizurii_constitutiei-109688.html, etc.

[12] *Ibidem*.

[13] Source: AGERPRESS, 26 March, 2010, hour 16:30.

19%, while unemployment is considered within acceptable limits. 20% of the budgetary spending was allocated for investments after the 1st of July. The small and medium enterprises as well as the business environment were supported by state stipendiums increased times five. Companies (56 thousands) will be allowed to postpone the payment of their debts for 6 months. The progress in absorption of the European funds was mentioned, underlining the simplification of procedures and the increased quota for the pre-financing (from 15% to 20%, and from 20% to 30%), too. The government supports also the companies that employ the persons with disabilities and the unemployed using the finance from the Social European Fund to pay 50% of the salary costs per employee, for a year and in special occasions for 2 years. The programs "Prima casă" ["First Home"], for which 20 banks offered 1,457 billions euro as well as "Rabla" ["The Wreck"], for the acquisition of a new car that was modernized and extended to utilitarian vehicles, *an unlimited number* of vehicles for the physical persons. As for the social protection, the government decided to institute the minimal social pension at 300 Ron since the 1st of April and 350 Ron since October 1st. People with income under 700 Ron benefit from a compensation of 90%. The price of the natural gas for the population will also be decreased by 5%. The minimal guaranteed income with be increased with 15% for people with minimal income and special needs.[14] Related to the four measures yet not implemented, the government intends to further sustain the business environment by not taxing the reinvested profit and negotiates with EC and IMF the maintenance within the limits of the negotiated deficit of 2.7%. CEC Bank capitalization is another intention of the government. "I mention here that I have allocated a bulk of money resulted from the fact that I did not undertaken the profit of CEC Bank at the state budget and it remained at the CEC Bank, accomplishing thus a partial capitalization and we hope that by the decision of the European Commission, to be able to finalize the remains of the capitalization of CEC Bank, with that afferent amount of money" underlined Prime-Minister Boc. Another objective considered by Romanian government is public-private partnership, and the Guide of the public-private partnership is elaborated at present by the Ministry of Finances to be approved by the ministries of resort. The final measure in course of realization is the supplementation of the budget for research at the future budgetary rectification, to be able to sustain an important domain of national economy" added the Prime-Minister. Even more, the head of Executive reminded that there is the intention of the government to extend to other sectors of the economy the mechanism of governmental guarantees used by the Program "First Home": "This mechanism, that proved useful, efficient, creative, benefic for economy, will be extended in agriculture, also, and to supporting local administration, and, maybe, for the construction of social housings" explained Emil Boc at the press conference above mentioned.

The ineffectiveness of the Romanian governance can be followed on two dimensions: first, the agglomeration of confuse measures and, second, the

[14] *Ibidem*.

vagueness of the means and protocols for implementing these measures. Most of these measures are unsustainable for the system and lead to a total obstruction of all the mechanisms of the state. Assessing only a few of these measures, Rabla"/"The Wreck," for the acquisition of a new car that was modernized and extended to utilitarian vehicles, *an unlimited number* of new vehicles purchasable for the physical persons there are several aspects that point clearly toward the ineffectiveness of governance. One aspect is that the government does not have enough vouchers required to follow the steps for the acquisition of a new car, although it promises *an unlimited number* of new vehicles for the physical persons. People have to stand in huge lines. Second, besides the insufficiency of vouchers there is also the insufficiency of parking places for the racks that are then parked illegally. As a consequence people have their "wreck" toed and they are fined for the most part of the value of the voucher (and some claim that they have to pay more than the voucher is worth). It is almost as if the government did not expect this success of the program and hoped that only a couple of dozen will be interested. When more people attempted to access this opportunity offered by the government the system blocked.

As for the objective of People with income under 700 Ron to benefit from a compensation of 90%, on the one hand it was never clear how will this be implemented, and, on the other hand, soon the news that the assistance institutions could not sustain this compensations started to flow and again, the entire system was brought to the margin of failure.

III.5. *Incoherence*: The European document affirms: "Policies and action must be coherent and easily understood. The need for coherence in the Union is increasing: the range of tasks has grown; enlargement will increase diversity; challenges such as climate and demographic change cross the boundaries of the sector policies on which the Union has been built; regional and local authorities are increasingly involved in EU policies. Coherence requires political leadership and a strong responsibility on the part of the Institutions to ensure a consistent approach within a complex system. Each principle is important by itself. But they cannot be achieved through separate actions. Policies can no longer be effective unless they are prepared, implemented and enforced in a more inclusive way." Nevertheless, there is an economic stability in Romania, nowadays, that should be noticed and appreciated. It should be also evaluated as an element contributing to good governance, too. Central National Bank of Romania has an important contribution to good governance in Romania, from this perspective. The exchange rate, for instance, is the clearer among the 32 anti-crisis measures considered, and it is entirely the accomplishment of the Central National Bank of Romania.

Until recently, not only the high level politicians, but also numerous analysts affirmed that we will not experience the financial and economic crisis in Romania and hence not many attempted to anticipate the counter-reaction for a real crisis situation. Now, the perspective is that the crisis is to come only from now on, in Romania. According to AGERPRES, the discussion of crisis should discern among the sectors of economy, in general and the sectors of Romanian

market. Some of these evolved atypically, as the housing sector were crisis imposed merely a correction of prices, closer to the real ones. Although the current global financial crisis began in the USA caused especially by the housing sector, in Romania this specific market is not really influenced by the crisis since even a further decrease will only mean a normalization of the market. Furthermore, with the governmental program "First Home" the intention to impulse to the construction of new apartments and houses was not accomplished. This program only brought the prices of the most demanded two room apartments closer to the governmentally guaranteed limit of 60,000 euro and thus it only stopped the desired normalization of this market. Even more, the costs of the credit "First Home" is considered higher than that of a regular mortgage credit.

Public opinion received well both "First Home" program and "The Wreck". The problem was only that the governmental promoters were not prepared for a true positive reception. It appears as if the government cannot sustain, for example, its own successful "The Wreck" program and it did not foresee any of the side-effects. Mainly, there is the fact that the vouchers seem scarce, the adventurous chase for the vouchers and the long lines to both get and file these vouchers, not to mention the traffic with vouchers.[15]

The transparency brought about by the freedom of expression only aggravated the confusion of crisis, by exploiting it as any sensational piece of news.

Most of the objectives of the government are expressions of good will, without the capacity to coherently sustain the state budget, which relies entirely on future funding that, will only increase the external and the internal debt of Romania. The observation that the objectives of the government are commendable but not by far considered with sufficient attentive in what concerns their implementation still stands in assessing the incoherence of the measures of governance.

Each principle is important for establishing more democratic consolidation through democratic governance. They all underpin democracy and represent the important concepts, words that succeed. They prompt the rule of law in the Member States, and have the benefit that they apply to all levels of government — global, European, national, regional and local. The application of these five principles reinforces "proportionality and subsidiarity". The European document states: "From the conception of policy to its implementation, the choice of the level at which action is taken (from EU to local) and the selection of the instruments used must be in proportion to the objectives pursued. This means that before launching an initiative, it is essential to check systematically (a) if public action is really necessary, (b) if the European level is the most appropriate one, and (c) if the measures chosen are proportionate to those objectives."[16] When these principles are not accompanied by (a), (b) and (c) the words succeed, but the policies fail.[17] Currently, the major policy frameworks (economic, financial

[15] See, for instance, www.ziare.com/.../bisnita-cu-vouchere-la-programul-rabla-2010-1000107

[16] Commission of the European Communities, *op.cit.*, p.11, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

[17] This is also the title of an important work of Murray Edelman who explains the mechanisms of symbolic and practic politics concisely inscribed in the phrase "words that succeed, policies that fail".

and structural) are relatively independent of one another and therefore Europe should strengthen its economic policy coordination, and place it in the broader context of the range of policies that matter for growth and economic stability. Europe itself lacks coherence and efficiency at the moment. "The crisis has shown you can't have a common currency without having a more coordinated economic policy", Strauss-Kahn told European Parliament.[18] He also stressed the need to reignite growth and tackle unemployment. From this perspective Romanian governance does precisely the opposite, following the very indications from the negotiations with the IMF. Economic policies should support growth and facilitate adjustment. A sizable unemployment might undermine this objective. And the same IMF official, Strauss-Kahn, saw the unemployment in Romania situated on a growing trend, in spite of the governmental anti-crisis measures.[19]

This analysis represents an indication toward a rich area for contemporary research in good governance, transparency and democratization and not an exhaustive investigation and diagnosis of the subject. This work hypothesis related to the correlations between good governance, decision-making, government information and freedom of expression transparency deserves further investigation and a wider debate from political, social and economic perspectives and it is especially relevant in nowadays Romania. Deficient transparency might be correlated with the quality of the political class, legitimacy, corruption and a poverty of democratization, all valuable work hypotheses in the political science contemporary research.

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[18] See www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/.../NEW033110A.htm

[19] *Șomajul va crește în ciuda măsurilor anticriză*, "Capitalul", 30th of March.

EU, UN AND SWEDISH ENVIRONMENTALLEADERSHIP

IRINA STOICA*

Abstract. *The Swedish contribution to the environmental issue-building in the UN framework and then the EU represents a unique case of issue formulation in international agenda-setting and coalition-building by a nation state around a precise matter of contention the overuse of ecological resources emerging onto the international agenda at the beginning of the 1970s. The factors which allow Sweden to act as a successful actor on the EU environmental stage, employing normative persuasion, also predispose Sweden to favorably act on the world stage. Sweden's interests, of course, serve to link the role of power and the role of ideas together in a catalytic symbiosis of normative influence. For it is the content of these ideas, which represent Swedish interests — those interests deemed salient by the national public and expedient by political actors — which are then sold to other political actors — this time international — in a process that empowers Sweden.*

Keywords: *EU and UN framework, EU environmental stage, environment coalition building, national private interest aggregation, specific policies, Sweden.*

The environment as a foreign policy issue (UN, EU and Sweden)

From a foreign policy point of view, the question of the environment has never been an issue of foreign diplomacy. The old 'real politik' school of thought does not pay attention to else than concepts such as balance of power, interest and actors without any heed or hint to ideas of transnational cooperation and agreements. I intend to move beyond the 'realist' theoretical approach of international organizations, which merely conceives of them as arenas for national interest accommodation and conflict resolution to a broader understanding of international institutions as negotiated sectoral legal systems (Gehring and Oberthur, 2006).

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This is exclusively due to the methodological fact that I am concerned with the importance of environmental policy in the domestic politics of one country. According to Oberthur and Gehring (2006), only negotiated institutions may be used instrumentally to bring about 'collectively desired' change in the international system inasmuch as they constitute distinct systems of norms negotiated to balance the interests of the member states and other actors involved. They also include in this category — of negotiated institutions — all EU legal instruments such as regulations and directives, which they identify as "the suitable functional equivalent of specific international institutions at the EU level inasmuch as [...] they focus on limited functionally defined issue areas and possess separate communication processes". Although I am not concerned here with the study of international institutional change or effectiveness, it is worth mentioning Keohane' s definition of international institutions (1983: 3) as "persistent and connected set of rules and practices that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations". This definition opens up a starting point in my theory of environmental policy building as a coherent set of legal instruments brought on with considerable input from a leader country. Additionally, the leadership position of Sweden in setting up the environmental agenda is in concert with the emergence of the first environmental threats in Europe. (FTN. Acidification of forests and eutrophication of lakes and land in the 1970s in Western Europe were the first manifest signs of environmental degradation.)

Since it is extremely helpful in accounting for the leadership position of a single actor in the international arena, I would rely here on environmental policy analysis or EPA as developed by Harris et al. (2007) (FTN. See Fig. W). His analytical approach underlines the crossover and interaction between domestic and international politics with the aim of examining environmental issues on multiple levels. That is, Swedish environmental leadership cannot be fully understood by looking solely at domestic policy and policy making, on the one hand, or by examining international politics and diplomacy, on the other. This research' s independent variable — one state environmental leadership — focuses on the crossover between the domestic and international arenas of politics and policy making just as EPA does. As EPA pays attention to the crossover between these levels of analysis, and indeed includes each of them, it is a potentially productive way to of viewing the problem, its causes and potential solutions. One way of assessing the impact of the 'environmental leadership' variable is to frame the environment issue in terms of environmental foreign policy, and to look in some detail at the actors and processes of foreign policy that, by definition, operate in the analytical space that crosses over between the domestic and the international.

Barkdull and Harris (2002) propose a framework typology that highlights a variety of potentially important variables in the shaping of foreign policies in particular circumstances related to addressing international environmental issues. (FTN) The authors note that most theoretical approaches to foreign policy are of three major types based on the explanatory forces they emphasize: systemic, societal or state-centric (FTN). Systemic approaches argue that foreign

policy stems from the role, identity or interests given to the state by systemic factors (e.g. regional or global configurations of power, hegemonic ideas). They direct our attention to the structural characteristics of international relations, showing that states may 'arrive at their roles, identities, and national interests as a consequence of the regional or global configurations of power or as a consequence of ideas. Systemic theory is distinct in that it does not attribute outcomes to factors such as domestic politics and institutions' (Barkdull and Harris, 2002: 68). Consequently, this type of approach to EFP would divert the focus away from bureaucracy, public opinion and interest groups, pointing instead to, for example, 'environmental hegemons' like the US in largely determining environmental policy, even in Europe.

Societal theories point to the preferences of domestic actors, which are translated into policies adopted and implemented by the government. From this perspective, explanations for foreign policy "are found in the ongoing struggle for influence among domestic societal forces or political groups." (Ikenberry et al, 1988: 7) This approach might suggest that governments do not independently decide EFP; they are instead neutral or passive arbiters of policy struggles, or perhaps merely fragmented arenas for bargaining over policy. The international arena might be viewed as merely a venue for the expression of policies determined by society. Societal theories suggest that the forces shaping Europe' s environmental policies are found within European societies — among elites, interest groups, social movements and public sentiments — not within the government of a member state or in international distributions of power (Barkdull and Harris, 2002: 74-76).

Alternatively, state-centric approaches suggest that foreign policy is shaped by the structure of government and the individuals and agencies that promulgate and implement foreign policies on its behalf, often with an emphasis 'on the goal-oriented behavior of politicians and civil servants as they respond to internal and external constraints in an effort to manipulate policy outcomes in accordance with their preferences' (Ikenberry et al, 1988: 10). State-centric approaches often discount the importance of societal actors and forces in shaping foreign policy, instead placing a premium on the influence of institutions or the focus of top policy-makers on promoting the national interest. 'The general message of this perspective', according to Barkdull and Harris (2002: 79), 'is that the state can act independently of societal interests', and 'foreign policy outcomes cannot be read off from the structure of the international system, however defined'. Alternatively, the structure of the state, such as the distribution of power between executive and legislative branches of government, or the workings and influence of bureaucratic agencies, largely determine foreign policy. Thus, one might say that European policies — and especially European environmental policy — derive not from public pressure or international forces but instead from perceptions of threats to national interests by leaders, pressure from legislatures on policy-makers, or the degree to which environmental issues are important to bureaucratic actors. In the latter case, the influence of environmental and foreign ministries, and the European Commission, deserves attention.

These three broad approaches to understanding foreign policy — focusing on the international system, domestic society or the state — can be refined by simultaneously considering, in each case, the role of power, interests and ideas (Barkdull and Harris, 2002: 67-68; Hassenclever et al, 1997). In brief, there are: the 'realist' approach, the 'liberal institutionalism' approach and the 'constructivist' method. The first approach — a power-based approach and often characterized as 'realism', countries join international regimes due to hegemonic or oligopoly distribution of power in the international system. Hegemons or small groups of leading powers create regimes that serve their interests, and then force them upon their countries. Alternatively, interest-based theories — often associated with liberal institutionalism — posit that international cooperation stems from the desires of states to promote their interests in a given issue area. According to this perspective, hegemonic power is not essential because rational state actors will cooperate to achieve joint gains.

Yet another set of theories focus on ideas and on what Smith calls the 'social construction of foreign policy' (Smith 2004: 123). Ideas can direct international actors toward new ways to pursue their interests, whether unilaterally or multilaterally (FTN. See the distinction between structure and agency at Richardson). From this 'constructivist' perspective, material interests and power may have limited influence compared to even more influential identities that the international system generates for global actors.

No single theory, or even type of theory, is necessarily best for explaining and understanding the EFP Environmental Foreign Policy of all states in all circumstances. Indeed, approaches might suitably be combined to arrive at the richest explanations for policy. For example, power in the international system is seldom going to adequately explain environmental policy. Certainly, the distribution of 'environmental power' of the US and China matters greatly and Europe' s 'power' in this respect is on the rise and of increasing utility. However, Sweden' s power in this context does not rely on the state only, but it is largely wielded due to society-based factors.

Alternatively, principled ideas, such as the obligations of the EU to take on initiative in may environmental issue areas, have influenced policy framing in this respect, but power configurations among European and pother states, as well as assessments of national interests in this context, mean that influence of those ideas in shaping environmental policy are substantially reduced. In any case ascertaining how those ideas are influential requires looking at potential interactions and feedback loops at all level of analysis.

Marshall (2007) uses FPA in an analysis of Swedish environmental diplomacy performance over GCC Global Climate Change negotiations and policy framing.

Recalling Lijphardt' s measures of consensus democracy, he comes up with a two indexes solution for assessing environmental performance in 36 thirty-six democracies. The first is Monte Palmer' s (1997) composite index of concern for the environment based mainly on CO2 emissions, fertilizer consumption and deforestation. This index ranges from a theoretical high of one hundred points, indicating the best environmental performance to a low of zero points for the

worst performance; the correlation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level and is not affected when the level of development is controlled for. The second index for assessing environmental responsibility is energy efficiency. The most environmentally responsible countries produce goods and services with the lowest relative consumption of energy; the least responsible countries waste a great deal of energy. The correlation between consensus democracy and energy efficiency is extremely strong (significant at the 1 percent level) and unaffected by the introduction of the level of development as a control variable.

Sweden and the environment coalition building in the UN and EU

The Swedish contribution to the environmental issue-building in the UN framework and then the EU represents a unique case of issue formulation in international agenda-setting and coalition-building by a nation state around a precise matter of contention the overuse of ecological resources emerging onto the international agenda at the beginning of the 1970s. Environmental consensus was difficult to reach and the early efforts were burdened with the usual hurdles concerning lack certainty, verifiable of scientific data, assessment and expertise. The formulation stage and agenda-setting early formation need to be interpreted from the point of view of the policy network approach whereby policies are the outputs of actors' socialization.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s many scholars and thinkers observed that continual economic growth was causing environmental decline, and argued that it could not be sustained forever. Among them, the Swedish scientist Bert Bolin, former chairman of the IPCC and of the first GARP meeting — was actively involved in the coordination process behind the first UN Conference on the Human Environment organized in Stockholm in 1972. His role, as a scientific expert in the preparatory committee work prior to the organization of the first serious studies of public and political impact, is to point out to the importance of the epistemic communities of transnational groups of scientific experts in shaping the global political agenda. That is why the policy network approach best accounts for the development of the environmental debate and its subsequent spillovers into the political decision process.

First of all, the early formation of the environmental policy and its agenda-setting represent the fundamental stages to analyze the environmental policy process and its implications onto the policy framework in the national states. The Swedish case represents epitomizes a peculiar circumstance where a national state input an issue onto the global political agenda out of an internal environmental concern. For instance, the UN 1972 Stockholm Conference was largely organized out of a Swedish early concern with the acidification problem. The early series of the reports and scientific assessments were carried out in collaboration by groups of scientific experts the US, Sweden and Norway. This is the proof supporting the theoretical approach access to which environmental policy formulation is dependent on densely populated networks of scientific

experts from key national state with a heavy national interest in the issue at stake. For instance, the UNEP was an initiative the Nordic Group in the UN. Actually the whole coordination process (before and after the coming gaining into visibility of the EC and of the EU later) in the UN has developed out of the early consultation process within the Nordic Group.

More stress is necessary to be laid on the cooperation and coordination process in the UN across two different time spans: from the 1970s till the 1990s and from the 1990s on, respectively. The importance of laying down and comparing two different time spaces with the international framework is illustrative of the dependent variable under concern: the internal politics dynamics within a MS member state which was at first very active in one international framework, the UN, and then become equally active in two international arenas, the EU and the UN. What did it change for the internal policy spectrum and the internal policy party structure? What about the party system and the chances of the SAP in engendering societal consensus and reaping electoral benefits?

The link between the international and national arena is difficult to establish even for one single case, — such as Sweden — let alone for a wider number of countries and to support a metatheory governance on interest groups, governmental actors and party structure. However, no previous work on institutional coordination at the hands of one single state the leadership of a single state and the early coordination in the UN on environmental issue has yet been undertaken. Conversely, issues of policy convergence over environmental issues have already been addressed by Oberthur & Gehring (2004).

This research aims to fill the gap by addressing the role of one particular state, Sweden, in forging environmental consensus in the UN and organizing the early assessments, while providing assistance and mustering efforts to globally address this pressing issue. Briefly, it is sustained here that Sweden has strongly contributed — by its prominent role in the UN discussions — to the building of the so called environmental diplomacy. For the sake of parsimony, the early EU environmental process concomitant with the Swedish — and with the US-Norway activities — in the UN over the same goal — environmental awareness and regulation — is not covered here. The early European environmental regulations (the 100 Article, the Seveso Directive, etc.) and the subsequent developments with the 1986 SEA — when environmental regulation began to tighten in Europe — will be briefly mentioned, but would not be given extensive heed.

The bulk of this article is dedicated to the analysis of two different periods of environmental regulation in two different international fora — the UN and the EU, with its complex decision-making process — by emphasizing the role of one particular state, Sweden in reaching environmental consensus.

In the first time space, in the UN period, concepts such as communicative action and strategic bargaining are used to analyze an essentially intergovernmental process of consensus building over a particular issue, the environmental threat. The research addresses the problem of the choice of these concepts in relation to the policy network theory, which is the dominant theoretical tool. It also explains why the first UN period is characterized as intergovernmental while the 2nd

environmental EU period is considered as supranational. Broadly, this has to do with the prevailing methods of negotiations: the dominance of the intergovernmental method in the UN and the dominance of the institutional procedure of co-decision in the environmental policy in the EU.

The presence of policy networks — together with communicative action and strategic bargaining — in the 1st phase (of building environmental consensus) is often highlighted in the specialized literature when focusing on the importance of actors building bridges in reaching a policy decision (Zito in Jordan, 2005: 146). As opposed to other sets of sectoral policies, environmental decisions are not only based on extended epistemic communities (Hage, 2007), but are also based calculations of interest in the context of politics. In the case of the Swedish contribution to environmental policy-making in the UN and EU, this analytical concept — the policy network approach — has the advantage of clearly emphasizing actors (e.g. Swedish government, Swedish diplomats, Swedish ministers, supranational bureaucrats, etc.) from their interests, but it is not intended to explain the broader policy process after the agenda-setting phase when the final intergovernmental decision making (in the Council of Ministers) takes place. By the same token policy network approach faces the difficulty of cleanly differentiating actor interests from ideas and institutions (Zito, 2005: 146). However, I would try to fill this gap by using the explanatory power of Barkdull & Harris EFP typology. Precisely, I will try not differentiate between norms and ideas, on one hand, and particular actors and interests, on the other hand, but to combine them together in order to explain Swedish environmental leadership along across three issues: air regulation, chemical policy and GCC global climate change.

The specific domestic factors pertain to the interest part of the Barkdull & Harris's typology (Harris, 2007: 140). This includes the PO public opinion, IG (interest groups), corporate and trade unions' voice and stakes, which are channeled into the Swedish polity and which help define Swedish national interest. I will further try to aggregate these plethora of interests into the final NS national state interest, which asserts itself in international negotiations through diplomatic channels. That is so party because the interests Sweden is able to represent and the norms (Marshall in Harris, 2007: 144) the Sweden is able to "sell" at the international level , they all have an intimate relationship with domestic policy processes. For example, Kronsell's factors of normative influence (see Harris, 2007: 142 fig. 6.1) all draw heavily on national policy experiences or repertoires. Both state and society share these experiences and repertoires. In the case of Sweden, with its tradition of corporatist politics, it is particularly difficult to disentangle the state from society. Therefore, insights from both levels of analysis are needed to make sense of politics at the systemic or international level. Therefore, I will try using mostly societal and systemic theoretical approaches when analyzing the Swedish Social Democratic case of political supremacy combined with environmental leadership at both domestic and international levels.

I will further argue that this was due equally to social democratic ideology and policy and to corporatist factors specific to the Swedish polity. The explanation

lies into the preferences of the domestic actors, which are translated into policies adopted and implemented by the government (Harris, 2007: 19). This is the view of societal theories, which suggest that the forces shaping Europe's environmental policies are found with European societies — among elites, IG interest groups, social movements and public sentiments — not with the governments of MS or in international distribution of power. I will argue this is precisely true for the Swedish case, but however I will not discard the influence of the bureaucracies and diplomacies belonging with the governments.

National private interest aggregation

The actors (comprising the media, the public, the ENGO environmental non-governmental organizations, etc) shaped the internal policy forum and were paramount in funneling "enabling conditions" (see Kjellen, 2007), that is the consensus behind Swedish environmental actions. Thereupon, given the increased public environmental in the Swedish society, it is not surprising that the government adopted a pro-active attitude at both domestic and international levels, which finally built into environmental leadership. But, how can national interest decompose itself into a plurality of autonomous interests activated by different groups, apparently aloof from each other? How could there one explain an aggregation of opposing interests in a corporatist state? Can these interests be aggregated into one coherent national interest? Which would be the role of the party system — particularly the social democratic one — in the aggregation of these interests?

In articulating the thesis of the national interest as a function of the corporatist or grassroots' interest, I partially base myself on the study undertaken by Crepaz Markus M.L. (2006: 254-275). He successfully launches an explanation of environmental performance as a function of corporatist institutions. Crepaz (2006) argues that, independently of the policy field, it is the specific institutional arrangement of corporatism which explains the success of corporatist policy making. The goal oriented character of corporatism, combined with its accommodative policy style and the encompassing manner in which interests are activated — through peak associations — are the ingredients which explain the successes of corporatism in the macroeconomic field in the 1970s and 1980s. Crepaz asks why should that same institutional structure not be able to score similar successes in the field of environmental politics? Given the fact that environmental issues are ultimately economic problems, why should the tremendous expertise which corporatist countries have accumulated in guiding the economy, not be applied into backing environmental problems?

Barkdull & Harris provide the link between the national interests in society and foreign environmental policy. The societal approach emphasizes elements which stress the role of social movements and public opinion, factors whose importance is evidenced below in the 1979 national referendum on nuclear power (Carter and Neil, 2007). However, it would be wrong to assume the view of the state as a neutral arbiter or arena, as many societal views of the state do

(Barkdull & Harris, 2002 : 74-5). Rather, for an understanding of the Swedish state's action in response to societal pressures, we must turn to the state level of analysis, which explores the way in which states and state agencies act to protect a multitude of perceived interests. The state — even the Swedish state — has interests beyond environmental protection. Namely, the state wishes to protect itself. Environmental protection may be one way in which state survival is assured, but this is not the only way. Therefore, I have introduced the argument according to which the society approach in EFP environmental foreign policy is not entirely appropriate to the whole gannet of environmental policy concerns, but only to certain aspects of it, such as air development and chemical regulation. In what regards the GCC aspect of environmental policy, the Swedish diplomacy formulated answers which were not in accordance to this approach, but rather pertained to the state level theoretical framework. (FTN. As a matter in point, Bo Kjellen, the Swedish chief negotiator on climate change admits that even international negotiations on sustainable development on behalf of the Swedish government were always stalled to the national instructions guidelines sent from the national Foreign Ministry. However making the case pleading for the existence of a new diplomacy, Kjellen recognize the difficulty of coping with the new environmental challenges at both governmental and public or individual levels.)

Principled issues and specific policies: agenda-setting and formulation

A. Kronsell (2001; 2002) identifies 4 specific ways in which Sweden participated to the UN/EU environmental agenda. These ways are a result of norms-based influence and they help to explain the Swedish success on the world stage: 1. expectation of other states regarding the type of policy it will advocate (mainly, the developing states foster broad hopes for a line and direction in relation to their development agenda and its poss. repercussions); 2. knowledge of environmental process; 3. expertise with environmental at the national level (Agenda 21); 4. an ability to present a unified national position based on a shared understanding of the national interest among all Swedish government representatives (Kronsell, 2001: 5-9).

The construction of the Swedish normative power and influence in international affairs can be analyzed through social constructivist methodological insights. An analysis of the Swedish view on the development issue in the UN can be evocative of this wielded normative power. Also, what Krousell's four domestic normative factors amount to is Sweden's ability to event a perhaps disproportional amount of influence and persuade other states to trust its analysis and assume its valuation and causal interpretation of the issue; this is, essentially, a type of "soft power", or the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want; it is the ability to get desired outcomes because other want what you want; it is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion (FTN This is the broad definition of "soft power" onto international scene as given by Keohane & Nye, 2001: 220).

The promulgation of norms is a key of soft power; Sweden's power and efficacy result from its ability to influence the norms of the larger community. While attempting to directly influence the norms of the larger world community, the potential for Sweden's global influence is enhanced once the larger EU community adopts a Swedish policy or a compromise policy. In this scenario, adoption of the common EU policy position, essentially magnifies the Swedish position, projecting it forcefully beyond Europe (Harris, 2007: 142, Kronsell's domestic avenues of normative influence).

Normative power or influence is heavily reliant on ideas, turning our attention to the role of ideas in foreign policy. It is helpful to view norms as principled meanings that guide, rationalize, justify or express expectations about actions or events (Ruggie, 1998: 97). Understanding norms as "meanings that guide" fits the dynamic process of normative influence because of the stress placed on self-reflection and, thereby, the potential for internationalization. Ruggie also argues that norms are causal beliefs without the actual power of causality (Ruggie, 1998: 97). This is precisely applicable in the area of environmental issues, where scientific approaches and uncertainty frequently create conflicts. Under conditions of uncertainty, norms on be conceptualized as descriptive and cause-laden stories that states use to persuade one another. Thus, norms condition the larger context of interstate influence through their descriptive and causal power.

Finlayson and Zacher argue that the importance of norms comes from "the importance [that] most influential members [in a regime or system] attach to them" (Finlayson & Zacher, 1983: 305). That is why in international environmental policy debates, Sweden is frequently able to exercise enough influence, that is, by drawing upon its recognized leadership in the environmental domain which is fed by its domestic normative strength. There are the same avenues of normative influence (Krousell) which used to sway more traditionally powerful actors such as the US and the EU democracies as well as China and India (see Bretherton & Vogler 2006). For instance, to this account, Mitchell suggests that within a given system, norm dominance may come as a result of a response to specific pressures: economic, issue political or ecological. All these 3 three types of pressures have the potential to push the EU toward harmonized environmental action and, to a larger extent, to push the international environmental agreements onto the world stage.

The factors which allow Sweden to act as a successful actor on the EU environmental stage, employing normative persuasion, also predispose Sweden to favorably act on the world stage. Sweden's interests, of course, serve to link the role of power and the role of ideas together in a catalytic symbiosis of normative influence. For it is the content of these ideas, which represent Swedish interests — those interests deemed salient by the national public and expedient by political actors — which are then sold to other political actors — this time international — in a process that empowers Sweden.

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PORTUGAL BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND LITERARY DISCOURSE

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Abstract. *Romanian diplomacy has been represented in Portugal by great cultural personalities: Lucian Blaga end Mircea Eliade. Obviously enough, the political discourses of these cultural personalities have a pragmatic grammar obeying to diplomatic reasons which pertain to the moment when they were uttered. We shall consider the speeches belonging to each personality mentioned above, analysing their rhetoric, pointing out and contextualising the cultural, esthetic and mentality codes.*
At the same time, we shall be interested in each particular literary speech, in an attempt to indicate to what extent is achieved the rhetorical transfer from their own work, which is not subjected to politics, towards the diplomatic speech. We believe this is the exact direction of transfer — from the creative vocation towards the diplomatic one, all the more because each of them, when being appointed ambassador, already belonged to Romanian intellectual elite.

Keywords: *diplomat writers, diplomatic discourse, diplomatic / private correspondence, rhetorical figures.*

In the Romanian area, Portugal was perceived in a relatively discreet manner. As the two countries are situated at the geographical extremities of the former great Roman Empire, the diplomatic links between them were the ones that consciously ranked/ put an order among their relations/reports.

It seems that in the Romanian area, the first news about the Portuguese dates from about 1541-1547. Only the beginning of the XXth century brought more generous/ varied information on the Portuguese phenomenon in its philological, historical, political and literary complexity by means of the translations from Portuguese into Romanian.

It was only by chance that the first class writers of our culture were among the members of the Romanian diplomatic delegation. We shall stop briefly, for illustration only, on those writers who after the end of their diplomatic mandate

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brought into Romania their own impressions on the Portuguese phenomenon in its whole complexity: Lucian Blaga, Mircea Eliade, Mihai Zamfir and Teodor Baconsky.

As an interesting detail we should mention the fact that their diplomatic activity in Lisbon took place in various intervals that escaped the communist influence. Three of them held the highest position within the diplomatic mission from Lisbon, that of ambassador: Lucian Blaga (1938-1939), Mihai Zamfir (1997-2001) and Theodor Baconsky (2002-2005). As an irony, all three would be called back to the country before the end of their official mandate[1]. As regards Mircea Eliade, he would hold the modest office of cultural attaché within the same embassy (1941-1945).

From the perspective of the frontier literature, three writers will record/take down the Lusitanian itinerary through the biographical or diaristic (or the journal pages) genres: Mircea Eliade, 2006, *Jurnal portughez*, (Portuguese Journal) I, II, Humanitas, București; Mihai Zamfir, 2006, *Jurnal indirect. Scrisori portugheze*, (Indirect Journal. Portuguese Letters), București, ICR; Teodor Baconsky, 2005, *Insula cetății. Jurnal parizian — 1991-1994, cu o postfață din Lisabona* — 2003 (The Island of the Borough. The Parisian Journal, with a postface from Lisbon — 2003, București, Curtea-Veche.

Furthermore, a cultural and political experience gathered within the Portuguese framework was about to be shared through extremely diversified studies and essays.

In the lyrical manner, Lucian Blaga mentioned in *La curțile dorului* (1938) about "a saudade lusitana". Eliade, through his historical and critical studies composed in Portugal was deeply involved in the daily problems — see, for instance *Salazar și revoluția din Portugalia (Salazar and the Portuguese Revolution), Românii, latinii Orientului (The Romanians, The Latins of the East)* (traducerea în portugheză fusese realizată de Eugénio Navarro) (the translation into Portuguese had been made by Eugénio Navarro), *Camões ți Eminescu, Camões and Eminescu, Dor — saudade românească (Yearning-Romanian melancoly), Ginta latină e regină (The Latin race is the Queen)* etc.

As regards the ties/links of Professor Mihai Zamfir with Portugal, it must be mentioned that they had been established before the diplomatic moment, for he was a lecturer of Romanian language at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon during the period 1972-1975. From his editorial activity mention should be made of *Dicionario romeno-portugues* (1977), (*Romanian-Portuguese Dictionary)*, *Formele liricii portugheze* (1985) (*The Forms of the Portuguese Lyrics*). After 2001 he will publish in a volume, besides the *Indirect Journal* mentioned above, an epistolary novel — 2006 *It Is Getting Dark. The mist is coming down, Iasi, Polirom* — on the ardent passion that transcends a destiny passing beyond its central characters (he — a Romanian, she — a

[1] Cf. Constantin I. Turcu, *Lucian Blaga sau fascinația diplomației*, 1995, p. 136 and http://www.hotnews.ro/articol_16189-Dinozaurii-diplomatiei-sint-trasi-pe-linie-moarta.htm

Portuguese), imposing in the Romanian literature a character typology stemming from the endless longing for the flawless immensity of the Lusitanian sky and the sea that brings territories.

The discourse of Mr. Theodor Baconsky bears the signs of an overwhelming pluralism in which the theologian formation, the philosophical skills and the neo-rhetoric balance seem to exclude, at least for the contemporary political class, the caliber of highly diplomatic value. He assumes the diplomatic experience in the Portuguese area with a certain amount of loyalty towards the realities to which he had to report himself but both "the limits of personal freedom" and "the content of cultural diversities" are made clear.

Among the essays and articles in written or digitalized press that we know, we shall quote/cite the volumes The Inclined Tower, (A Fair Referendum, Eliade — A Portuguese), A Sincere/ Right Confession.

It was our intention to do an analysis of the diplomatic discourse of the four above mentioned writers, following its re-dimensioning in the unofficial literature. On the grounds of a restricted access to a proper biography[2] we have to partially abandon this project, at least for the moment. We shall focus on the Portuguese bibliography of Lucian Blaga as well as that of Mircea Eliade, watching the points of view on the Lusitanian cultural phenomenon in the inter-war period, paying special attention to what the perceptiveness of this phenomenon will mean/ suppose in the post-revolutionary period in Romania.

Lucian Blaga presented his letters of accreditation to the president of the Portuguese Republic, General António Óscar de Fragoso Carmona on the 1st of April 1938. One year later, on the 1st of April 1939 he was announced that his diplomatic mandate in Lisbon came to an end.

Mircea Eliade's position in the centre of the Romanian embassy in Lisbon was among the most modest — as a second-class press secretary[3]. He would be in office between the 10th of February 1941 and the 13th of September 1945. The end of his mandate took place in the period in which Romania, ruled by the government led by Dr. Petru Groza, was at the beginning of the sovietizing process.

Following his official reports sent from Lisbon, Blaga is to be perceived as a fine and careful observer of the international politics, always cautious to the diplomatic strategies undertaken on the basis of more or less traditional alliances, having a good intuition that changes in the situation, especially in this geo-political area may be surprising.

The balance between his political opinions and the realism in presenting the context in which Salazar conducted the negotiations with the great powers interested in the possibility of the opening into the ocean prove Blaga's coherent integration in an extremely versatile system, in which things are never said in a clear manner and the interpretations may be distorted or create false tracks.

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[2] www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5470&idlnk=0&cat=2-According to the internal order regulations, consulting the documents of the Diplomatic Archives of M.A. E. and the access to the documents of foreign affairs in Romania is allowed only after 50 years after their creation etc.

[3] Florin Țurcanu, Lisbon in the volume *Mircea Eliade. The prisoner of history*, Humanitas, Bucharest, pp. 396-432, republished in Mircea Eliade, *Jurnal portughez*, I, II, Humanitas, București, 2005, I, pp. 28-68.

Due to history, the documents attached to the first official report drawn up by Blaga on the occasion of his accreditation ceremony as an ambassador in Portugal were preserved and later made public. The short speeches he delivered then reflect Blaga's future attitude in relation with the Portuguese realities as well as the reaction of the Portuguese officials.

The official speech[4] starts *ex-abrupto* with the precise identification of his duty (Mr. President,/ I have the honour to hand the letters to Your Highness ...") Blaga successfully chooses a speech in which he alternates the personal/ official registers, putting them in order after the rule of clarity and specificity. This interchange can be interpreted as a reconstruction of *captatio benevolentiae* in order to obtain the audience's adhesion.

Besides the two mentioned rules, the rule of adaptation and that of inclusion also appear, found in the text at the level of the detail, with clear significations in a certain community or culture. The speech is meant from the beginning to establish a personal connection with the audience to whom it is addressed. Blaga introduces twice strategic arguments revealing this intention, making use of the autobiographical detail.

We say strategic because they will subsequently trigger the conversation, in particular. By specifying the native province ("Born in the Transylvanian Carpathians"), on which he offers ethnic and military information[5], Blaga emphasizes the fact that that territory defines his identity and that his fundamental logic is not different from the Portuguese logic in what it concerns the values of the inner patriotism.

Another alteration of the official tone appears with the insertion of a statement that defines his spiritual transformation influenced at this moment by the Portuguese values. Because the personal detail has a maximum rhetorical efficiency in the context of the Lusitanian receptiveness, Blaga reports that "

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[4] We quote here from Constantin Turcu, the cited work, p. 214, the document to which we report ourselves: "Mr. President, I have the honour to hand to Your Excelency the letters through which His Majesty, the King, my august sovereign, announces you that the diplomatic mission of Mr. Alexandru Duiliu Zamfirescu came to an end, His Majesty giving another destination to my predecessor. The mission that my august sovereign decided to give me as regards Your Excelency and the noble Portuguese people, overwhelms me with happiness and pride.

Born in the Transylvanian Carpathians, in the eastern citadel of the Latin world, I consider myself extremely happy about the signs of honour assigned to me when I was asked to represent Romania in Portugal which is the other western citadel, in Europe, of this Latinity, whose miracle of civilization and glory will shine forever in the life of humankind. Since my teenage I was given the opportunity to know the wonderful epic which is the history of Portugal. That of Portugal that never ceased — through its spirit, its courage and the empire across the seas — to continue the Roman Imperial splendour and that offers us again, starting from the 28th of May 1926, a new reason of admiration through its wonderful rising and its will tos ave the nation".

[5] We quote here from Constantin Turcu, the cited work, p. 213: The president of the republic, surrounded by Mr. Salazar and the civil and military class, welcomed us in the Louis XV Hall, where they delivered their speeches, whose text we shall add in the appendix.

After that we were asked to go in a neighbouring hall, where I met and discussed with the President, general Carmona, Mr. Salazar and Mr. ambassador Sampayo, the general secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. On this occasion, being asked among others, from what region I came, I had to clear things up that I am a Romanian from Transylvania and that although Transylvania belonged to Austro-Hungaria till the war, the Romanians, the overwhelming majority of the population, fought against the Hungarians for the great union with the mother country: Romania.

since my teenage I was given the opportunity to find out the wonderful epic which is the history of Portugal", showing that he read enough books to understand the course of history and the contemporary realities, in fact that he was prepared to be the leader of the diplomatic mission in this country.

Blaga had already held other important diplomatic offices, in other European capitals, he used the strategy of the positive politeness, stating in successive sentences the satisfaction he felt as a result of his investiture.

The speech is constantly ordered taking into account a territorial logic always redefined, sometimes even in the terms expected by the audience. We see how, apparently under the impulse of a positive politeness strategy and the rule of the specificity, a lexical antithesis subordinated to a spatial proximity "the eastern citadel vs. the western citadel" is employed.

As central rhetorical figures we can mention the repetitions with a more complex structure: epanadiplosis and polyptote. Epanadiplosis, with a syntactical and emotional outline strongly emphasized, draws the attention on a valuable statement[6] about Portugal which is "through its spirit, boldness and territorial conquest", the one that continues the tradition of the Roman Empire.

Polyptote is the figure that assures the continuity of the speech both at the semantic and argumentative levels: speaking about *the empire from beyond the seas* that continues the *Roman Imperial splendour*, Blaga cannot be suspected of accusing the Romanian or The Portuguese state of expansionism as long as he comes to specify in a moving manner the origin of the Romanians, *descendants of the same Universal Empire.*

The great lineage underlined and stated strategically asks for a similar attitude and thus the spiritual identity of the two countries expressed in related languages appears. The facility to communicate through close idioms gives the suggestion of an unaltered structural mentality, confirmed by the same humanitarian ideals and a common trajectory.

The similar tendencies must have proved strategic statements for the audience, but today, after the experience of the dictatorships installed in Portugal and Romania, they appear to us as factual.

The final formula of the speech introduced by a conclusive connector functions as an engagement that stems from the discursive reasoning formulated on the grounds of the statements (factual, defining, of value and strategy), of the just analogies and the similar case.

The credibility of the speech was built on the use of the rule of sincerity and that of the personal example embedded through argumentative strategies into the amount of official information detained by the speaker regarding the Portuguese mentality and culture.

If the text met the expectations of the audience can be verified by checking the speech of the president in response to that of Blaga and by observing his attitude taken down by Blaga in the report submitted afterwards to the Romanian officials.

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[6] Cf. Karyn C. Rybacki, Donald J. Rybacki, *O introducere în arta argumentării*: the valuable statements prove the evaluation or the important thinking / consideration of the one who pleads, 2004, p. 140.

The response speech[7] is structured in the same way and by the same rules as the first: clarity, specificity, inclusion and adaptation. The coming back to and debate on the strategic statements in the first speech as well as of those with personal notes are obvious.

The autonomous repetitive figures are found in the second speech, too, also in the form of epanadiplosis and..., but this time they are combined. Both emotionally intensify the rhetorical outline of the figures updated in the text under the form *The feelings* (...)/ ... *feelings* (...)/(...) *through feelings*.

Furthermore, the polyptote contextualized now insists upon the epanadiplosis from the former speech (...Portugal.../ ...to Portugal.../... Portugal...), indicating that his acceptance as a Romanian ambassador in this area is due to "the just appreciations" and the "affinities convincingly reaffirmed" "on the bases of our common Latin background."

Blaga's intuition of using the terminology filter to define the term *citadel* proved beneficial because of its positive effects on the audience. The use of the noun in the second speech, in the final paragraph is made in the context of a defining appositive statement: "*Portugal and Romania, glorious citadels of the Latin world, as you called them...".*

The indicators of him being accepted as a partner belong to the semantic field as well as the manner of using and disposing of the statements taken from the previous speech. We saw how using the same defining statements again, the development of the strategic statements found in the first speech respectively, confirmed in the second, the adhesion of the audience.

We consider that our interpretation seems completely validated in the final part of the second speech where the identification of the source text ("*as you called them*") is just a strategy not to draw attention on the quotation in-integrum of the end of the first speech.

The final fragment states in clear terms that the bases of the future relations are both of personal order and strictly politic for the new ambassador will have "all my support", also counting on "the loyal support of my government."

Paying attention to Blaga's diplomatic correspondence we shall see that he had impressed the public and he was very popular. As a matter of fact, not only this first report shows that but also the following ones in which the friendly attitude of the Portuguese officials is clearly expressed; we can guess the strong

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[7] We quote here from Constantin Turcu, cited work, pp. 215-216: "Mr. Minister, I gladly accept the letters through which His Majesty, the King, your august sovereign, accredits you as his extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister in the Portuguese Republic, replacing Mr. Alexandru Zamfirescu, called to achieve another task and about whom you inform me in the recalling letter.

The feelings of happiness and honour that you express for the high mission you were given in Portugal, cannot be but extremely pleasant to me. These feelings, the knowledge of the Portuguese history that you show to me, the just appreciation you made regarding its glorious traditions, its civilizing work in the vast empire over the seas, are guarantees of the affinity you will find here for the accomplishment of your mission. This fact will be facilitated by the mutual feelings of our countries, by these affinities that you convincingly mentioned and that are built on this unperishable Latinity fund eveywhere it found itself over the centuries and that is reborn and flourish to its great glory and to the welfare of the humankind".

impression the patriotism of the Romanian ambassador must have made on them, since he had "the opportunity and the honour of making some conversations"[8] with Salazar three times in only one year.

From Blaga's private correspondence, as well as from the few poems influenced by Lusitania, we observe a concern for the sense of space, the sea and the pine forest. The tonality is a melancholic one, one of going back to the fundamental myths that helped to the creation of the spiritual dimension of the world. Nostalgia, yearning, the sea, all melt in "The peace/ in which the empire grows/ heavenly among us." (*Estoril*).

Between the two diplomatic offices held successively by Lucian and Mircea Eliade, respectively, Romania's political situation suffered a fundamental mutation without repercussions on the Portuguese cultural and political phenomenon in our country.

Up to that inter-war moment, Portugal was known in Romania as a result of the efforts of some Romanian elite intellectuals. Mircea Eliade, in his article *A Few Romanian Lusophils,* creates one of the first synthetical attempts of this kind in our country.

By mentioning the names and the contributions of those who had brought and supported the Portuguese culture in the Romanian area: Alexandru Ciorănescu[9], Nicolae Iorga[10], Lucian Blaga[11], Ovid Densusianu[12], Popescu-Telega[13], Mihail Manoilescu[14], he expected the recognition of the quoted studies and the annulment of the verdict regarding our spiritual poverty. So we can see thew fragmentary framework of the Portuguese literature made up of translations and critical studies on the works of Camões, Gil Vicente, Almeida Garrett, Eça de Queiróz, Leite de Vasconcelos, Teófilo Braga, Luís Chaves etc. At the end of the article he also mentions the name of Nicolae Bogdan, the author of a volume comprising more studies on *Oliveira Salazar*, 1930 (as an autobiographic detail, Eliade did not quote this study for his monography dedicated to Salazar, twelve years later (1942).

The perspectives the two of them have on the daily life in Lisbon are relatively different. Blaga seemed absorbed mostly in the political and diplomatic relations while Eliade was involved in the cultural life, evaluating and comparing the two areas of the neo-Latin extremity.

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[8] Constantin Turcu, cited work. In a diplomatic report drawn on the 29th of June 1938, in Lisbon, Lucian Blaga wrote down: "During the conversations I had since my arrival here with different ministers and other members of the diplomatic mission I noticed an open expression of dissatisfaction of the diplomats because Mr. Salazar, the chairman of the committee and Foreign Affairs minister, rarely opens the doors of his office to the diplomats. One of the foreign representatives complained that he was never received by Mr. Salazar in an audience. Even the Portuguese high class in the capital commented upon this curiosity/situation. I myself was given the opportunity and the honour to discuss with this important personality of the state three times and I had the impression that neither indifference nor the lack of courtesy is the cause of this attitude towards the diplomatic missions, but his multiple occupations, interests and passions for the essential things and a certain demureness of this exceptional spirit in his relations with the people".

[9] *Ibidem*, p. 384.

[10] *Ibidem*, pp. 386-387.

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 384.

[13] *Ibidem.*

[14] *Ibidem.*

The *Portuguese Journal* kept by Eliade during his entire stay in Lisbon, recently published entirely in a scientific edition occupies an important position in the Romanian culture. On the one hand because it shows a completely new facet of Eliade, and on the other hand because this area where he lived devastating experiences can be identified with many of the Portuguese obsessions: the solitude, yearning, melancholy, distress, and then the waiting, fight and rebirth.

We have here the only journal of Eliade's crisis. The critics have confirmed that once he left Portugal, Mircea Eliade abandoned the writing of the journal of crisis, choosing another typology: "After the departure from Lisbon and the settlement in France, the same memorialist chooses for good the "journal of existence", edited, reedited at Gallimard and praised. (...)"[15].

Beyond the dramatic transformations that took place in Eliade's life in Portugal, his interest for the culture and mentality of this space is real. It was confirmed that he "discovers in Portugal a Latin culture whose peripheral condition in the modern era is similar to that of the Romanian culture, so that he will try to create a connection between the two sister cultures."

From the entire private correspondence, from the journal and then from the study he made, we can observe that Eliade was preoccupied with the philological and anthropological issues (the Latin character of the two languages is recurrent in his work) but also with the historical dimension both in synchrony and diachrony.

This is how we can explain his interest for Salazar. But we have seen that Salazar had appreciated Blaga, too, a fact that cannot be neglected. Mircea Eliade, in the audience Salazar offered him on the 7th of July 1942, went beyond the strict limits of such a meeting: "The audience had been fixed for fifteen minutes, but when the secretary came to announce that it was over, Salazar made a sign with his hand. He came again after thirty minutes; the same sign. Finally, after fifty-five minutes, I was impatient and I wanted to get up many times. Then Salazar got up (...)"[16].

It seems that Eliade's volume on Salazar will play an important role in the international contour of his myth[17]. Maybe we can understand why Salazar is still alive today in the hearts of the Portuguese people[18]. His coming back into actuality was felt in the Romanian contemporary printed materials and to exemplify, we have chosen a lucid, analytical fragment[19] by Mr. Teodor Baconsky.

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[15] Cf. Mihai Zamfir, *Mircea Eliade și Portugalia*, în vol. Mircea Eliade, cited work, I, 2006, p. 78 ș.u.

[16] Mircea Eliade, *op. cit.*, I, p. 129.

[17] Florin Țurcanu, *Lisbon*, in *The Portuguese Journal,* I, 41: "By publishing this book, from which a few fragments will appear in the Portuguese press, Eliade joined those intellectuals who, from Paul Valéry to the beginning of the 1930's, to Kojève at the beginning of the 1950's contributed to the realisation of the "Salazar myth".

[18] It is interesting to mention that in 2007 in a contest organized by the public TV station RTP for the designation of the greatest Portuguese of all times, Salazar won with 41 percent of the votes.

[19] Teodor Baconsky, *A Fair Referendum*, the volume An *Turn înclinat* (Inclined Tower): "I know from my Portuguese experience that, in the societies suffocated by totalitarian systems, most of the people go, almost naturally, from one side/extreme to the other. This is what happened to our cousins from the western area of the Iberian Peninsula. After the rule of Salazar ended in 1974, the voters chose the attraction of extreme left-wing politics. Salazar had not been a dictator proper but an authoritarian leader, a former saviour of the economy, who resembled De Gaulle rather than Hitler."

Another major theme discussed by Eliade in his articles published in the Portuguese press is represented by the Latin character and the Latin solidarity. It seems that in his study on Eliade, Florin Țurcanu observed that "the Latin character is for Eliade a complex topic, in which the immediate political stake meets his old attraction towards the Iberian and Italian areas, towards Unamuno's and Ortega y Gasset's essays, towards Menéndes y Pelayo's encyclopedic character or Papini's and Alfredo Panzini's literature.

The obsession of the miracle of Latinity made Eliade project a history of Latin solidarity from the last century, beautiful as a "theme for a study of the philosophy of culture." Moreover, he noticed that during the delivery of the political speeches, one of the terms for which people show interest is that of Latinity: (the 30th of April1940) "The scene from the Palace: the old general Carmona, the providential president — who, instead of shooting Salazar, following the Romanian tradition, made him the dictator of Portugal — listened, leant against his sword, to the letter from Iurascu, shaking his head whenever he heard the word Latinity."

Eliade's vocation as universal writer is proved by the awareness regarding the lack of translations from the literatures that do not benefit from the advantages of a language of international circulation. He is equally sad for the fate of so many writers — Portuguese and Romanian who remained unknown. He blames for this the lack of financial support, because the big (French) publishing houses hesitate or avoid giving it for these projects. He illustrates by presenting the lack of numerous translations both from the Portuguese and the Romanian literature. For example, the fact that Eça de Queiróz is not known in the Romanian culture seems extremely unfair to him[20].

The intuition of promoting a culture taking into account the similarity with another, led to the promotion of the latter. Following some everlasting themes, Latinity, the Roman character, the translations of the diplomat writers were compelled by the situations and the the promotion of the political issues. We see how the themes and the preoccupations were historically validated and reconfirmed today by means of the cultural initiatives.

We shall stop at the project of the Romanian Cultural Institute of translating into Portuguese from the works of the Romanian writers. On the occasion of the inauguration of RCI in Lisbon, the director of the institution gave an interview to the daily *Diario de Noticias(the 14th of March 2007)* called "Portugal Is for Romania a Brother from the Other Pole of Latinity."

As regards the number of the Portuguese titles translated into Romanian, the number 75 is clearly not updated. Among the most promoted Portuguese writers are Jose Saramago and Antonio Lobos Antunes (the latter visited Romania when

[20] Eça de Queiróz in romanian language: *Amor de perdição — Iubire de pierzanie* (1927) and *Réliquia — Relicva* translated by Al. Popescu-Telega. *O crime do padre Amaro — Crima părintelui Amaro*, translated by Micaela Ghițescu, Univers, 1967; *A Réliquia — Relicva*, translated by Micaela Ghițescu, Univers, 1972; *Os Maias — Familia Maia*, translated by Micaela Ghițescu, Univers, 1978; *O primo Basílio — Vărul Basilio* (I, II), translated by Micaela Ghițescu, Minerva, 1983; *Orașul și muntele — A cidade e as serras*, translated by Mioara Caragea, Univers, 1987; *Defunctul*, Universal Dalsi, 1999.

the translation of his novel "Word to a Crocodile" into Romanian was released at the international festival "Days and Nights of Literature" in Neptun, on the 15th of September 2004).

A retrospective view of the facts presented in this article may emphasize a few characteristics of the Lusitanian promotion and the way in which this culture is perceived in the Romanian area, underlined by the presented personalities.

Their attempt to make a connection between the two cultures had as a result a considerable thematic unity both in their interventions in the public speeches and in the articles, essays, frontier or the fiction literatures. Following the identification of the common elements of the collective mentality, one can reach the systematic and coherent approach on the promotion phenomenon of the two cultures "in a series".

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IMPACT OF GLOBAL CRISIS ON THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA[1]

ZELJKO MIRKOV*

Abstract. *This practical article approaches the impact of global crisis on the Republic of Serbia, having as a conclusion the fact the it is expected that in the upcoming period of the global financial and economic crisis will have more spill over effects on the Serbia economy. The announced privatization of the large state owned companies probably will not be realized this year because of low costs that they can achieve in market. Serbia biggest problem and macroeconomic risk is the already mentioned balance of payment which is in huge deficit. Global crisis was not the best time for liberalizing imports from EU, but Serbia showed a clear signal that is fully committed to become an EU member.*

Keywords: *global financial and economic crisis, macroeconomic risk, framework of measures.*

The Republic of Serbia (in the following text Serbia) had very strong Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth prior to the global economic crisis, averaging above 6% last five years. However, first draft of GDP growth rate for 2009 was set up at 2% and due to changed global economic conditions is being revised down. Now, it is projected at the level of -2% for 2009 and zero for 2010. Serbia Minister of Economy and Regional Development stated that the effect of the crisis depends on the level of trade integration with the rest of the world[2], so we can say that Serbia is more or less well integrated.

During the first three months of 2009 Serbia exports dropped 25% and imports dropped 30% lower than the same period in 2008. Serbia had disparity of import and export before in favour of import, now scale is being changed in favour of export but not enough to compensate deficit that is still huge. Deficit, outflow of capital, increase of interest rates, depreciation of exchange rate and

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1 The article was presented at the ANSES XII school, Belgrade, September 2009.

2 Dinkic Mladan interview "Global crisis in the Balkans: Serbia's fiscal plans and future EU membership" Harvard International review, Summer 2009, available at http://www. entrepreneur.com/ trade journals /article/ 205506325.html acceded September 7th 2009.

Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., **VII**, *2*, p. 156–161, Bucharest, 2010.

downfall of the market prices of stocks was followed by the decline of industrial production, slow-down of the entire economy and consequently by decline of budget revenue. Account gap is high and foreign debt too.

In Serbia, spending was already much greater than production and the excess spending was financed by foreign sources such as investment (such as green-field or securing additional capital), private loans and especially high remittances from large emigration diaspora caused by wars in 1990's. Excessive spending is closely linked to overheated demand, i.e. ultimately to excessive liquidity on the market, and high GDP growth is closely related to high demand generated by foreign funds (of different kinds) but also by funds from local sources.[3] Now Serbia has to accommodate its budget to reality. That task is not an easy one having in mind different pressure groups represented in multiparty government coalition in Serbia today (for instance Party of United Pensioners or some local parties such as League of Social-democrats of Vojvodina).

Government of Serbia made in December 2008 "Framework of measures" for the crisis management and pointed out that direct beneficiaries of the Budget such as the pensions are planned restrictively and in 2009 they will remain at the 2008 level. Improving the system of human resources management at the level of the whole state administration will be accomplished through better efficiency and create no increase in the number of employees. Around 14 000 people will be fired from state administration and local selfgovernment. The plan is to reduce the public administration expenses by nearly 850 million euros in 2009 by decrease and freezing of wages, decrease of subsidies, expenses for representation, business trips and ban on the new employment included. For companies and organizations where the Republic of Serbia has the majority ownership no new employees also letting go of some number of employees.

Increasing domestic demand will be solved through the implementation of infrastructure projects such as Corridor X, Corridor VII, reconstruction and streamlining of infrastructure within public enterprises, construction of co-op apartments and development of rural infrastructure. Concerning Social welfare, social spending will be at the same level as in 2008 which was really low to meet all the needs. All of this

[3] "The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Serbian Economy — Framework of Measures", Government of the Republic of Serbia — Office of the Prime Minister, December 2008, available at http://www.media.srbija.sr.gov.yu/medeng/documents/economic_crisis280109.pdf acceded September 7th 2009.

has been done to assure International Monetary Fund (IMF) about Serbia discipline and commitment to reforms.

Prime minister of Serbia stated that: The IMF will take part in drafting Serbia's 2009 budget and that is important not only to lower public spending, but also to reassure foreign creditors who are constantly watching our financial system and our ties with the IMF.[4] In last three years IMF — Serbia relations were really low because there was no stable government due to constant elections and turbulences in Serbia due to Kosovo illegitimate declaration of independence. Kosovo became member of IMF in May 2009.

On May 16th 2009 the IMF granted Serbia 2.9 billion euros emergency stand-by loan arrangement for macroeconomic stability and dealing with the effects of the global economic crisis during the next two years. According to this decision Serbia could draw 788 million euro immediately. The construction of Corridor X will be also financed by the 810 million euro loans from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development which were approved in the middle of 2009. According to the financial agreement with the World Bank, Serbia will be able to draw 900 million US dollars, of which 450 million dollars will be used for budget support in the next two years. A total of 388 million dollars will be set aside for the construction of Corridor X, and the remaining part will be intended for health and local self-government projects.[5] Serbia was also seeking another billion euros credit loans from Russia and China to improve state budget condition and finance infrastructure projects that are highly depended on endangered financial sector. We can say that Serbia is highly vulnerable to a credit pullback.

Serbia recently concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the EU, Turkey, Russia and Belarus, currently negotiating an FTA with Iran. EU accession is a top priority for Serbia, despite FTA applied by Serbia only and not by EU. New laws are being adopted. Ruling coalition has a slim but majority enough for adopting decisions in parliament. By the end of 2012 regulatory framework in Serbia should be brought in line with EU legislation, and probably in 2010 Serbia will submit a formal application for EU membership.

The goal Serbia has is not an easy one to accomplish. Capital city of Serbia is a city of two million inhabitants — Belgrade. Serbia census of the population in 2002 had counted close to eight million people. As you can see the capital city is one giant head on a not so strong body. Economy in Belgrade and somewhat in the north (The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina) is strong. If you go to the south or east, many cities such as Prokuplje[6] are in big problems.

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[4] "Balkans Warm to IMF Advice, Funds in Global Crisis" Reuters Analysis, October 17th 2008, available at http://www.javno.com/en-economy/balkans-warm-to-imf-advice-funds-in-global-crisis_193555 acceded September 10h 2009.

[5] Arsic Vesna presentation "Measure to Address the Impact of Global Crisis on CEFTA Trade", State Secretary Meeting 2009, available at http://www.cefta2006.com/Sastanci-pomocnika-ministara/link/za%20download/Serbia.pdf acceded September 8h 2009.

[6] More about problems in The Municipality of Prokuplje and similar ones see Lowen Mark: "Devastating effect of recession in Serbia", BBC news, August 24th 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8217353.stm acceded September 11h 2009.

The rest of the uncounted population of constitutional territory of Serbia lives in far worse conditions — in The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. Overwhelming, ethnic majority, Albanian community declared independence of Kosovo unilaterally. Non-albanian population — Serbs especially, southern of Kosovska Mitrovica city — actually the bridge on Ibar river, lives in ghetto villages with no economy or fragile one. Even electricity is denied for them, which makes problems with food and water supply. They are dependent on finance injections of government in Belgrade and good will of KFOR (NATO) for freedom of movement. As President of Serbia said: Serbs in Kosovo are most endangered population in Europe.[7]



Belgrade and Vojvodina will lead Serbia to recovery, but problems in southern parts remain. Underdeveloped municipalities in south and east will decline even more during this crisis. This will produce new flow of the population to the capital city and some other big cities such as Novi Sad. These will not be migrations to Belgrade forced by enemy in boots and uniform such were in 1990's. This will be continuation of depopulation of the pure regions, which has to be prevented, or no one will actually live there. Ministry of Economy and Regional Development suggests so called Statistical regions approach, which will somehow help and bring new perspective.



Prospects for Serbia citizens in future are not so good. Domestic credit growth has been fueled from external funding sources. High security bank reserves and restrictive monetary policy will make banks depend more heavily on National Bank interventions. Global economic crisis will increase Serbia borrowing costs with higher price of money. Individual and

[7] More about problems in The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija see statement "President Boris Tadic at UN SC session in New York" March 24th 2009 available at http://www.un.int/serbia/Statements/38.pdf acceded September 12th 2009.

commercial loan interest rates will go up. GDP will be reduced, inflation is expected to go up, while the risk of devaluation of national currency will be present.[8] Serbia currency — Dinar slide already from 75 to 95 for one euro. The exchange rate was stabilized for psychological reasons as confidence took off again. Foreign banks operating in Serbia started to repay loans from private companies, putting pressure on the exchange rate and creating an outflow of foreign currency. As a result, more than a billion euros exited Serbia, but foreign currency reserves are still three times higher than the money supply.

Serbia multiparty coalition government has been borrowing money merely to keep voters afloat but that is not enough for implementation of long-needed reforms. Money comes through privatizations, rare donations, taking new loans and reprogramming old credits. Serbia slid into recession in the first quarter when its economy shrank 3,5% compared with last year, now it is worse. Dozens of thousands of workers have been laid off since official data put unemployment at around 25%. The government was able to implement this unpopular policy measures and has made the necessary reforms to qualify for the second instalment of the IMF loan. Parliament has adopted budget rebalance really restrictive for citizens that depend on it. Some analysts say that the second IMF trance after cashing in a first installment of 788 million euros looked dim due to no structural concept, no strategy, not even a political idea.[9]

It is expected that in the upcoming period of the global financial and economic crisis will have more spill over effects on the Serbia economy. The current trends show that the food manufacturing and processing industry will not be so affected by the crisis. The announced privatization of the large state owned companies probably would not be realized this year because of low costs that they can achieve in market. Serbia biggest problem and macroeconomic risk is the already mentioned balance of payment, which is in huge deficit. Global crisis was not the best time for liberalizing imports from EU, but Serbia showed a clear signal that is fully committed to become a EU member. The European Commission granted Serbia 100 million euro in budget support to help "ease the economic and social consequences of the crisis".

Good thing for citizens of Serbia is easing up conditions for new investments that might create new jobs. Economy of Serbia cannot compete on the global market, but it is still strong compared to the neighbourhood. Serbia balance of payment is the best with Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro and FYR Macedonia. Operating costs in Serbia are highly competitive. Value added tax is 18%, corporate income tax 10% and labor expenses are half of those in Eastern Europe. Besides that, labor force in Serbia is skilled and educated. Government offered state subsidies for investment projects in manufacturing, services, research and development

[8] "Global slowdown — impacts on Serbia", Inter Capital 2009, available at http://www.intercapital.rs/img_content/pdf/Global_slowdown_-_impacts_on_Serbia.pdf acceded September 12th 2009.

[9] "Crisis hit Serbia sinks deep into red say analysts — Agence France-Presse report from Belgrade", Hurriyet, August 9th 2009 available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=crisis-hit-serbia-sinks-deep-into-red-say-analysts-2009-08-09 acceded September 10th 2009.

for each new job created, while for large projects may cover up to 25% of the total investment value. Big investments in transportation and telecommunication infrastructure are in progress. At the moment small business reforms are being done such as company registration in five days and elimination of all non-essential business regulations. Because of Serbia's future in the EU and because of its friends to the East, the country is in "a great location for economic activity."[10]

Prime minister of Serbia stated that there should be more even distribution of the financial crisis burden between developed and developing countries, which is based on joint responsibility.[11] However, a real life situation, which we encounter in Serbia, as a developing country, is significant problem for our economy so we need financial help.

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• The *Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations* (ISPRI) approaches its major research interests (from its departments and laboratories) in *monthly conferences*, which stimulate the scientifically works and prolific debates.

From the beginning of the year 2010, a large historical, philosophical, economic, social, cultural theories and research area were accorded to the science political and international relations imperatives.

The conferences have had the following schedule:

January — Oana Simion (approaching the old and new context of the laws and realities from the international relations area);

February — Florin Müller (ideological and historical Right Wing in Romania);

March — Rodica Iamandi (economic and political theories upon the Economic Crisis in Romania);

April — Antoine Heemeryck, Légitimation Philanthropique du Capitalisme Postcommuniste en Roumanie;

May — Viorella Manolache (a recessive and marginal pattern: *Luceafărul* Review, 1930-1940);

July — International workshop: Language Strategies and Official Discourse as Disseminated in the State Media, organized by Henrieta Anișoara Șerban, lecturer guest – Lutgard Lams.

• The Faculty of Political Science, "Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University" and the *Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations*, have organized the conference: *Major Changes in the contemporary world and the necessity of ontological reforming of politics* (April, 2010).

The analysis and discussion sections were approaching the *ontology, political theory and political engagement*; *feminism and the new political ontology entities*; the *new senses of global and globalism; ethics and politics — the relations between law, politics and morality* and *migration as a new challenge of the contemporary world*.

• 14th of June 2010, Hotel Intercontinental, Bucharest, The 4th Session of the Seminar The Strategic Dimension of the Relationships between the Republic of Moldova and Romania entitled "Romania and the republic of Moldova in the New Geopolitical Context: Opportunities, Challenges, Solutions" chaired by the Director of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Ion Bulei.

• The Annual Session of Scientific Communications, ISPRI (September – October 2010) gathers the studies of the researchers from the institute and capitalizes the directions of research / the plan of research of the institute.

Ion Goian
Pólis și filosofie politică. Idei și forme politice clasice, Institutul de Științe Politice și Relații Internationale Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, 154 p.

Approaching an *archeology* of the philosophical and political ideas, consecrated by the Antic Greek (to which the occidental culture remains tributary and sterile!), the book *Pólis and political philosophy* (re)configures the substance of the works of thinkers as Plato and Aristotle, establishing the social and political context and (re)arranging (on the theoretical recuperations) the Greek *pólis* and what does it mean to participate in the political life of the epoch.

Ion Goian's demarche is to (re)configure the dynamic structure of a term — *pólis* — which become an indicative of the influence of the political and philosophical Hellenic world view, with its ramifications and derivations in the modern thinking areal: *policy*, *polity*, *police, politesse, Politik* and / or *politics.*

If the majority of the studies consecrated to such a recuperative intercession, were placing in the same theoretical equation the dual nature of the *pólis,* as urban centre and political community, Ion Goian's *Pólis and political philosophy* operates a certain dissociation, (re)investing fully the term with its political and philosophical connotation, harmonizing it with two types of sources: the Greek political institutions and ideas before the *pólis* (because this times have a great echo in the later philosophical litterature as the golden age of Greek history) and the recent researches about the *pólis*.

An important number of pages are dedicated to the problem of ancient *tyranny* as a counterpart of the *pólis*, exploring the idea that the conceptual couple of *tyranny* and *pólis* is the point of depart for the Greek political thought.

Confering to the *tyranny* a special aura, appraching a concept with a major place in the history of the political thought, the special theoretical bet of a such a concept — also for the ancients and for the contemporaries — is not analyzed in a real conjunction with the real idea of *politic*.

Being a creation of a certain antic Mediterranean and historical context, the term *tyranny* is (re)invested with intension in different (re)active contexts: medieval, renaissance, modern and revolutionary, or even in a postmodern one.

The recurrence of the *tyranny* obliges the researcher to a summary of the historical facts, exploring a real "gallery of the tyrants", an imperative that is discuss and analyzed by Ion Goian from two points of views: *an apparent nostalgic era*, invested with a positive imagine of the tyrant and an *opposite perspective*, which establishes the tyrant representing the oriental habits, introducing strange political acts, different to the Greek spirit, *as an exotic influence*.

Such a discussion upon the place of the tyranny in the Greek political world claims its utility, beyond the black and white judgments, emitting the conclusion that, *without tyranny, the Greek polis would have emerged much later and more difficult the traditional universe of the political culture* (pp. 54-70).

Preoccupied with the hermeneutics of Plato's dialogues, Ion Goian considers that the particular structure of his dialogues is responsible for the very different and quite irreconcilable interpretations of his thoughts, because Plato thinks about the *pólis* and *politics* that they cannot be solved by a linear and a "zero degree" lecture of the dialogues.

The final chapter of the book brings into discussion some anticipation in the ancient and medieval times of the principal aspects of the modern concept of the *state*. Because, according to Ion Goian, the modern state becomes a continuation of the Greek polis, as two funding myths of the modernity political philosophy.

Following the foucaltian approach, that of the *genealogy of the state*, connecting it with the *political power,* Ion Goian translates the neology of the term "state" into a episteme, into a geometry of the concepts correlated with the politic, paying attention — metaphorically — to the mutations from the political thinking space, following the one way route: *from the expression to the concept*!

Viorella Manolache

Ana Rubio, *Los Nazis y el Mal. La destrucción del ser humano*, Barcelona, Niberta, 2008, 178 pp.

The book of Ana Rubio, Master in Philosophy and Doctor of Theology at the University of Barcelona, draws attention to several fundamental and communicational problems related to the issue of evil. Firstly, it can be more percussive and more sensitising, as the author underlines, if the concrete manifestation of evil is analysed, from different sides: the conclusions provide us with a more enlightened perspective than, probably, the analysis of the concept in its various historical hypostases. Of course, this latter analysis helps us to better understand how people have imagined *evil* — a synthetic moral concept, because it is metaphysical, and metaphysical, because it is moral — and what were the grounds of their thoughts and actions. But we cannot analyse the issue only from this theoretical level, precisely because evil has evolved and transcended the peace given by the immersion within theory.

After more than 60 years from the practical manifestation of Fascism, as also after many debates in this respect, what purpose does a book about Nazism serve? The idea which Ana Rubio makes us reflect on is that of the continuity and discontinuity of evil phenomena in society, therefore the understanding of evil in its exacerbated manifestation only warns us with more acuteness over what evil truly represents. Precisely this is the reason why Fascism is dissected from the point of view of the consequences of its main aspects over its participants, both executioners and victims. And from the direct documents, written by these participants — not only the bibliography is impressive, but also the documentation behind it, volumes from the Nuremberg trials, the German historical institutes, the *Journal of the American Medical Association* — we can understand more than from the hermeneutics of savant texts, at least this was the author's opinion.

That is why the book — of applied philosophy — does not begin with the historical definition of evil, as it was presented in theological and philosophical works throughout time[1], but immediately with the description and inference of the characteristics of evil in the manifestation of Nazism. The evil outlined could not confirm the conformist optimistic principle according to which "all that is real is rational", namely the Good which grows naturally —, as actually, the optimism could no more be confirmed by the phenomena generically referred to as the "current global problems of mankind."

The evil emphasised by Ana Rubio is that which is born within the *conscience of the human being* and which generates a new type of dehumanised people. But this evil is not an inherent tendency of human nature, because, as already known, this concept, itself of a human nature, form as it is known, even this concept of human nature is a historical construct which reflected the inter-human relationships within the historical societies based on *power relations*. In this respect, Fascist power relations were structurally connected to a "new anthropology, which surprises us through its ordinary character" (p. 17). The Fascist structural evil consisted in the power relations achieved precisely through their paroxysm, the exacerbated domination over the other. Hannah Arendt has evidenced, from the standpoint of historical research and also from a political philosophy perspective, the *continuity*, therefore the differences of degree which gradually resulted in essential differences, between the liberal domination in the western capitalism and Fascism. Ana Rubio wished to write a work of philosophy of (individual and collective) psychology, insisting on the *discontinuity* of Nazism as opposed to "respectable", therefore democratic, capitalism.

This discontinuity was the result of the radical, structural evil manifested during Nazism through the constitution of a new image about man as being dependent on the *domination over the other*, image which was deeply absorbed in the everyday existence. As a result, this image excluded the former modern idea and modern conviction regarding the dignity of man, and exacerbated the old observation that *homo homini lupus*: the human being as such ceased to be, as it nevertheless was, an axiomatic value of the human behaviour, being replaced by *power* and by *the powerful man*.

Consequently, both executioners and victims lost their *trust in the world*, the only one establishing the constitutive relation of our species, that between the individual and community.

[1] See also Miklos Vetö, Le Mal. Essais et études, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000.

Reason and justice as specific to human kind and to society obviously ceased as well. *The arbitrary, the irrational and the justice of the powerful became the guiding marks for the new attitudes*.

Trust in the order of the world is destroyed when injustice — namely the action of hurting the other, up to physical annihilation, the psychical annihilation being methodically pursued by Nazism before the "final solution" regarding the other — becomes the world's regulating principle. For the ancient Greeks, *dike* represented justice as acceptable order; when injustice replaces it, the result is the more and more pronounced alienation of the individual from all the ideas, myths and structuring institutions of society: even the shattering of the religious belief, as religion does no more seem to protect the individual from injustice, is a manifestation of the structural injustice. (Just as, the refuge in religious belief is the sign of the same structural injustice, generating uncertainty: only belief seems to provide man with an idea of order of the world and protection.)

The action of physically and psychically hurting the other represented the *global evil* (p. 25) which assaulted the entire human being, almost regardless of the place where it was located, amongst victims or "winners". The global evil was *consciously committed, gratuitously and remorselessly* (p. 24) and of course, against the will of the victims.

The world build by Nazism was an immense Auschwitz: this one not referring only to the concentration camp, but to "the entire savageness promoted by the regime of the Third Reich" (p. 23). Four main institutions — medicine, anti-Semitic ideology, religion and justice — were analysed by Ana Rubio from the perspective of the constitution of evil through them. As we see, she refers to constitutive social institutions, which, although always contained in their functioning the contradictory tendencies generated by the power relations within society, they have never transformed *in the western modernity* the assassination into a therapeutic and eugenic means, as it happened during Nazism (p. 29-31), nor have they considered hygiene as a means for defending a race, as it happened during Nazism (p. 32-44), nor have they considered that the obstacle to the existence and development of some people, of a people, would be *other* people[2], (p. 44-56), nor have they considered a political strategy as a "political religion", as it happened during Nazism (p. 56-66), nor have they subordinated, at lease theoretically, the sovereignty of law to the decisions of political leaders, as it happened during Nazism (p. 67-76).

The modern state of law/ rule of law were based, as we know, on the isonomy principle. The Fascist state was based on the principle of *discrimination* and *persecution*. These concepts became theorised and accomplished as new forms of the new principle of "justice", that of the most powerful. By way of these transformations, modernity entered into collapse, its subsequent evolution being distinguished not so much by the liberal enlightenment of democracy, but by *the tendency to impose the law of the most powerful*.

Within this framework, the morals have also changed: using the other as a means, and never as a purpose (or, the illuminist Kant had requested and demonstrated as the supreme modern moral principle precisely the considering of the other as a purpose, and never as a means), and therefore using the other against its will, even eliminating him as a mere object, have become the new criteria of behaviour. Cruelty and rudeness — opposed to kindness, generosity, and gratuitous altruism — have become the respectable signs of power, and envy, the craving for power (if not for mere personal safety) led to assuming these signs, to the inner perception regarding the noxiousness of the old common sense in the relationships with the others, and to the dissolution of the ancient sense of being liable for one's acts towards one's own conscience and toward the other and all the others, be this liability in secular or religious forms. God himself did no more personify this liability before one's own conscience and before the conscience of the others, but only the confirmer of power.

Doing evil — the former modern evil perceived from an illuminist perspective — was therefore able of being *intentionally* and *perseveringly* committed. The great exam, the rationalist one, over facts and thoughts — subjecting all these to the logic judgement, among others to *reductio ad absurdum* — was consciously excluded from morals: by this, two thousand years during when the *golden rule of reciprocity* was the fundamental criterion in which people believed and which differentiated the just and unjust acts, were cancelled.

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[2] It was so, although the colonialist practice and ideology strongly contained this idea, even if most of the time implicitly, and not explicitly, as in Nazism.

The evil committed by executioners ultimately overflows unto them. They too become objects, means for the more powerful ones, their interior uncertainty not being limited by any evidence of their own power. But Nazism legitimated itself, as we all know, through the idea of the superiority of race and of a people, a modern form the ancient concept of the "chosen people". From this standpoint, evil was indeed an exacerbated form of the social existence also because it promoted the *anonymous mass* of the superior people, au fond becoming those who give the evil (p. 88-94), though those who had a concrete place within the power structures, representing the *noble mass* (p. 94-98), had the same alienated uncertain position (and therefore, generating an expansion of violence).

At the same time, those who receive the evil — being forced to this —, as considered, on the one hand, as the *surplus mass* (p. 98-109), therefore internalising the victim behaviour, participant to the evil, prove, on the other hand, at lease sometimes, to have reminiscences of human morals: that is why, the ethicist who wrote the prologue to this book, Norbert Bilbeny, underlined that the most representative moment of the 20th century is that concerning the father who entered the gas chamber holding the hand of his son and telling him that they would simply take a shower etc., minimising his suffering, hiding from him the imminence of suffering and annihilation (p. 12).

The Nazi evil, radical and paroxysmal, was at the same time ordinary. It was achieved through initiative, collaboration and passivity, led through profound ideological reins for the anonymous and for the noble mass: civil servants who obeyed orders, "decent" citizens, young wolves eager for assert themselves, they all participated, regardless of the degree they did, to the *cancellation of the human rights for fellow creatures*, to the events which always determined the fate of things. In this way, radical evil tended to become "normal" (p. 114), a constitutive framework and principle of society.

The intentionality of evil, visible in the Fascist "theory" is, nevertheless, a characteristic of actions and facts: not the simple thinking of the evil — which, if it remains as such, is simply a mean of psychical overflowing, pursuant to which any evil intention disappears, because during the psychical overflowing the conscience succeeds to control the evil intention —, but the *evil actions*, the exceeding of the thresholds beyond which human being becomes his opposite, represent the evil. And evil means *conscious intention*: the intention to do evil convinced that this is the only desirable/wanted personal path. At the same time, evil also means that *some people must endure evil*. Even if, in order to endure evil more easily, and also as a result of the psychical formation as a victim, those who endure evil may consider it to be inherent, constitutive to society and destiny, and even if they come to mix within their reactions impulses of executioners and victims at the same time, *evil emerges from the intention of people who commit evil acts and not from the acceptance of evil by those who receive it.* Thus, responsibility never belongs to the victims, but always to those which are in one way or another masters of the intention to do evil things. Even if — and all these people have the anti-modern quality of mass-man, where the individual becomes superfluous in relation to the mass which confers him reality, and therefore his judgement is reduced.

The Nazi evil, as a violent attitude towards the individual, toward masses and toward society, has reduced the human being to the animal one, whose sole motivation is existence as such and not the manifestation of the self: and, of course, for the human being consists in *me plus the other/others*, the purpose of the Nazi man was not to contribute to the manifestation of the self of the others. The possible, and sometimes real, human fraternity — through the nature of things, asymmetrical, because it occurs between human beings — had become during Nazism a simple symmetric camaraderie of the members within each type of mass (p. 115). This camaraderie was an integral part of the process of strengthening the Nazi identity: *through the violence of the mass* (through the direct Nazi actions) *the agent identity was achieved* (which would presuppose the freedom of choice, therefore of reflection) *of the mass individual* (p. 126-130). The refusal of reflection — and reflection is inherently critical — became the most convenient reply to the Nazi order and the sign of complete abdication from the quality of human being (p. 119-125). In this way, the "rationality of murder" was established, intending to determine the acceptance of the regime by each participant to the regime, the final subjection of the subject and of subjectivity to the order of power, the maximum loyalty towards the leaders representing the essence of the new morals (p. 164).

Where was God in Auschwitz? This was the question of the victims and of those who came and judged history latter. The last chapter of the book deals precisely with the idea that, if many

said that God is dead after Auschwitz, man is actually the one who died[3]. If among those who dealt with this latter point of view were also the ones who considered that the mawkish vision about man should be surpassed, because man should be endowed with historical responsibility, hence, to judge rationally the consequences of his actions and "not to write poems"[4], the author rightfully asserted the change of the conception about God but, actually aiming at the man, she considered that omnipotence would consist in the acceptance of all the men, including those who gave the evil, in forgiveness; this acceptance, this forgiveness would lead to the restitution of the human being (p. 162). (God cannot in any way, the author evidenced, be conceived as omnipotent, as he was before Auschwitz: as victorious over all the enemies, therefore a saviour and bringer of justice, of human order; because such potency is rather a totalitarian one, it does not demand not does it involve the freedom of people. But the conception about God after Auschwitz is, as it was already showed, one which basically excludes the rational judgement and choice of the future human trajectories so that they do no more choose evil: because *forgiveness, forgetfulness lead to the perpetuation of moral arbitrariness, namely to the incapacity of choice between evil — and still in its radical form — and good*.)

The book of philosophical analysis regarding Nazism reviewed here seems, thus, to be more important than imagine at the first glance those who fail to understand what the purpose of philosophy is. The forgiveness of those who committed evil as well as the forgetting of the fight between good and evil occurs today. The Romanian authorities did not have an *official or public* attitude towards the pride wearing of the Nazi uniform and pose — by mayor Radu Mazare together with his son in July 2009 at a fashion show —, and media decreased the malignancy of Nazism to its mere adversity towards the Jews. But the moral significance of Fascism is precisely that of the *unity between the exceptionality* — through the "final solution" — *and ordinariness of evil*. Fascism is that warning us over the ordinariness and vulgarisation of the evil, namely over the intertwining of radical evil with obedience, with the moral compromise, the authoritarian behaviour, the moral arbitrariness, generated by the power relations. For the exceptional circumstances always emphasise the tendencies up to and pursuant to these particular circumstances. In other words, *the radical character of evil highlights its ordinary character*. The visibility of evil in its paroxysmal form represents also a pattern for the understanding of the prosaic evil, made up by daily adjustments, renunciations and cowardice.

As a conclusion, maybe the most adequate reference from the history of philosophy to Ana Rubio's theme is the one about evil in Socrates' opinion (i.e. specific to the period before the Peloponnesian war):

"Soc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by to be most disgraceful?

...

Soc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

...

Soc. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice.

...

Soc. That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?

...

Soc. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion"[5].

Ana Bazac

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[3] Among these, Heidegger showed that the historical "humanist" modes are those which need not be fetish anymore, man being able to freely construct himself only in this way. See *Lettre sur l'humanisme. Réponse à Jean Beauffret* (1946), Paris, Aubier Montaigne 1957.

[4] Theodore Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society" (1949), in Theodore Adorno, *Prisms* (1955), London, Neville Spearman, 1967; Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981, p. 34: "writing poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric".

[5] Plato, *Gorgias*, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/gorgias.1b.txt (478e, 479a, 479c.)

Axel Honneth, *Disrespect. The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, Polity Press, 2007, 268 pp.

This work reminds the reader that Axel Honneth[1] has been developing and investigating the concept of recognition as a foundation for his work on a critical theory of society. One of the leading social and political philosophers in the world today, a symbol for the contemporary evolutions in critical theory, Axel Honneth, presents the world a theoretical example for the developments of social and political critique. Thus all the fundamental aspects, concepts and themes in present day critical theory are situated and put in a historical perspective, too. As this is a continuation of his previous work *Struggle for Recognition*, moral philosophy takes a central place among all these discussions.

The volume consists in three parts: part I, "The Tasks of Social Philosophy", part II, "Morality and Recognition," and part III, "Problems of Political Philosophy." Starting with the first part, under the title "Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy" he shows that all the varieties of social and philosophical reflection has an origin in Jean Jacques Rousseau's critique of civilization. His aim is to recapture both the interdisciplinary feature and the specificity of the field, since in the German speaking world it is becoming a specious discipline, while in the Anglo-Saxon countries it became a subdivision of political philosophy. From this perspective, social philosophy should be "concerned with determining and discussing processes of social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments (*Fehlentwicklungen*), disorders or "social pathologies."(p. 4)

From social philosophy to sociology, "the twentieth century found itself under the spell of Marx and Nietzsche," (p.18) and also with the contribution of the founding fathers of sociology attempted to approach the traumatic historical experiences of fascism and Stalinism. Historical perspective highlights as well the specific claims and questions of the social philosophy. On the one hand it investigates what is impeding the members of society to live a "good life" and it gives the opportunity for reflection (*Reflexionsinstanz*) on the criteria for successful forms of social life. He finds similarities in the work of early Foucault with Nietzsche, Weber and Adorno, in describing the disciplined human life and body, foe a purposive and rational course of life. In what it concerns his perspectivism, that is, the statement that the truth of knowledge claims can be assessed solely in terms of how widely socially accepted they are (*soziale Durchsetzung*) he gets inscribed in the theoretical line Richard Rorty — Judith Butler defined by the statement that "every context transcending norm — and especially every reference to human nature — merely conceals a power-related construction." (p. 40)

As for the ethical criteria determining the social pathologies the author embraces the anthropological and historical-philosophical perspective described by the theories of Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Plessner, Arendt, with a special (critical) interest for Habermas, next to Foucault and Charles Taylor, these last ones, seen as the most important three contributions to present-day social philosophy (p. 42). Since the classical claim of social philosophy to be able to estimate the aspects related to social life as pathologies in a context transcending way does not stand anymore, Axel Honneth's vision is to propose a future for social philosophy in relation to a weak and formal social anthropology.

When he discusses the possibility of a disclosing critique of society investigates the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* to prove it answers to the methodological impositions of an alternative form of social criticism, opening new horizons of meaning highlighting the pathological character of the given social relations. The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* "provokes us to perceive parts of our apparently familiar life-world in a different way, so that we might become attentive to their pathological character" (p. 59). This way works the frequent use of the Odysseus myth for instance, understanding better how the familiar events place an excessive burden on each of us. What was natural and unquestionable might become in this light monstrous and an urgent matter of investigation. To a similar end functions the rhetorical device called "chiasmus" enforced to

[1] Axel Honneth is Professor of Philosophy at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, in Frankfurt.

help the collapse of the familiarity of the conventional combination of meanings. In the light of Honneth's interpretation Horkheimer and Adorno standpoint is brought closer to Derrida's works on "trace" and deconstructivism.

Clearly anchored methodologically in the Hegelian legacy and in the particular tradition of social theory of the Frankfurt School, the author delineates the specificity of the "social dynamics of disrespect" starting from a "careful demarcation from Habermas's theory of communication" (p. 64). He ponders over the thought of a communication paradigm (dealing with the communication of the feelings accompanying the experience of disrespect such as shame, anger or indignation) should be "conceived not in terms of a theory of language, but in terms of a theory of recognition (...) The feelings of injustice that accompany structural forms of disrespect represent a pre-theoretical fact, on the basis of which a critique of the relations of recognition can identify its own theoretical perspective in social reality." He claims that the expectation of social recognition belongs to the structure of communicative action and that Habermas's universal pragmatics should be replaced with an anthropological conception to explain the normative fundamental statements guiding social interaction. In Axel Honneth's view, social reality is presented critically as inadequately capable of providing the experience of recognition. As long as the theoretician cannot be sure that the same criticism is embraced by the victims of disrespect, he cannot conceive his own theory in the Horkheimer's terms, where the critical theory is an intellectual expression of the process of emancipation that is already on his way. In exchange, his critical theory advances a question of "how moral culture could be so constituted as to give those who are victimized, disrespected and ostracized the individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere, rather than living them out in a counterculture of violence." (p. 78)

In this sense is that he turn to Dewey in the third part of the volume, discussing democracy a form of reflexive cooperation, elaborating on the confidence that Dewey showed that all members of the democratic society as marked as they are by the "individualism" of democracy are nevertheless able to constitute a community. He quotes the idea "There is an individualism in democracy which there is not in aristocracy; but it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the ethical ideal, not an individualism of lawlessness." (p. 224) he parted this way with the original notion of organic democracy, highlighting the path of the rational value of the democratic procedures, with an epistemological focus, but also with interest for the theoretical discussion concerning the democratic community of values. Interestingly, in Axel Honneth's critical interpretations, the idea of social cooperation from Dewey is a sort of a division of labor under conditions of justice. This way, "Dewey's theory of democracy contains an answer that opens a third avenue between the false opinions of an overethicized republicanism and an empty proceduralism, namely to grasp democratic ethical life as the outcome of the experience that all of the members of society could have if they related to one another cooperatively through a just organization of the division of labor." (p. 235)

The volume ends with an interesting confrontation between the liberals and communitarians and their common idea that a social community of value or a form of cultural life is compulsory for the functioning of society falls under incertitude. The proposal of the concept of "post-traditional community" is to clarify the dispute between the liberals and communitarians. The author sees in "community" the patterns of social integration useful of the individuals to acknowledge one another in their achievements and capacities on the basis of the common notions of value due to a "pattern of recognition represented by mutual esteem and validation." (p. 258) Therefore, symmetrical esteem among separate and autonomous individuals becomes a core presupposition of the social relationships and the prerequisite for solidarity. Mutual esteem is relevant here in the light of the values of capacities and characteristics of others that are relevant for a common activity. Thus in such a post-traditional community this perception on social relationships is to open up "that horizon within which individual competition for social esteem assumes a painless cast, unperturbed by experiences of contempt." (p. 261)

Henrieta Șerban

INTERLUDE *CAHIERS LUCIAN BLAGA* — A DECADE OF UNINTERRUPTED STUDENT RESEARCH. After a decade of uninterrupted student research, *Cahiers Lucian Blaga* (*The Review of the National Student Colloquium*), edited by the common and singular effort of the Department of Romanian Language and Literature and the Intercultural and Philological Research Center of the Faculty of Letters and Arts of the University "Lucian Blaga", pleads with obstinacy, for the constant presence of the student research.

The deeply involvement of the "young hermeneutics" of 14 prestigious universities in the country — in the philological and intercultural research fields is confirmed by the anniversary of the 10th "Lucian Blaga" National Student Colloquium from Sibiu — opportunity to recognize the intention, otherwise justified, of the young researchers to bring theory, criticism and history from libraries in an active cultural space, in order to interact with confine areas (philosophy, politics, sociology, figurative and nonfigurative arts, history, etc.).

Thus, "Lucian Blaga" National Student Colloquium from Sibiu confirms that such a segment of research is not a barren and unattractive area, ignored or rejected by the students. The agonistic discussions in seminars and the lofty spirit of the essay give the impression of a successful Symposium.

Analyzing the "elements and the mechanism of success", Mihai Ralea considered that, from the moment we are disposed to "break up with tradition", the young will be those who will confiscate the "reward" of this option.

What would be the secret of this socio-aesthetic, which I'm happy to attribute — equally — to the young intelligentsia from Sibiu? Perhaps, in what the author of the "theory of success" called the "reaction to the triumph", as an accumulation of spiritual forces. And one of them can, pragmatically, be recognized in the publishing of the tenth op of the Colloquium. And this is o way to explain the "essence of things" by "their effect"!

The nucleus of the review remains still in the thematic files, in which are recognized by the first edition until the tenth one-the latest and most exciting prospects on the text and the literary imagination. One of the advantages of summary is given by the fact that the thematic file is typographical orchestrated in order to allow to a possible unpressured reading.

Who is interested in the "hieroglyphic history" of the Colloquium and its review, will be surprised to find that, as far as we know, there are already works of license and / or master degrees dissertations on the subject of the dynamic post-December student phenomenon, about the free action of which it was born and raised in Sibiu. This social — objective dimension of a "success phenomenon", combined by Michael Ralea the "proceed phenomenon in full freedom and spontaneity" makes the author of this interlude to persist in showing its "relative novelty".

In his tentative of analyzing the map of a "young generation", G. Călinescu could not avoid the impact provoked by the pluriformed configuration of the phenomena, launched and sustained by reviews, published in an epoch, in which, paradoxically, the number of the readers would vertiginously go down. What then G. Călinescu considered the effect of a crisis, of a "*skandalon*", is now in the third millennium, a break up with the consecrated formulas — a phenomena which determined the academic life to grow, even on "narrow portions".

The publication — even in this context of global crisis! — of the 10th issue of *Cahiers Lucian Blaga* is a clear sign that students across the country found in its pages a creativity remedy, translated into a free initiative, creative and, as they themselves admit, a relatively-new one.

Gheorghe Manolache

Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., **VII**, *2*, p. 170, Bucharest, 2010.

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